THE STATE-SOLICITOR’S REPORT ON THE 1803 REBELLION IN COUNTY KILDARE

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Introduction

Around eight o’clock on the evening of 23 July 1803 between one hundred and four hundred United Irish insurgents occupied the town of Maynooth. The rebellion organised by Robert Emmet in Dublin on the same day went disastrously wrong. Despite careful planning and the fact that Dublin Castle had little prior warning of the intended coup d’état, the rebellion was over in a matter of hours. Outside the capital the only serious rebel activity occurred in County Kildare. In Naas there was no rising as such. Instead, around one hundred and fifty rebels left the town, intending to join their comrades in Dublin. By contrast in Maynooth rebels actually occupied the town on 23 July and attempted to prevent the Longford mail coach passing through. They eventually surrendered or dispersed two days later.

This level of rebel activity in Kildare, and especially Maynooth, both worried and puzzled the Dublin authorities. In response William Wickham requested that James McClelland, the Irish State-Solicitor, compile a report on the rebellion in Kildare. In it, McClelland commented: ‘It is difficult to account for this insurrection breaking out in Maynooth and in its progress being almost exclusively confined to the inhabitants of that town, while the remainder of the county of Kildare continued tranquil, altho’ it is certain that a strong spirit of disaffection prevails throughout the whole county.’ McClelland’s based his report on information supplied by informers and prisoners who had been involved in the events of July 1803. The report, which was forwarded to Wickham in late August, was intended as a distillation of government information and reflected the Castle’s thinking on the subject.
The report dealt almost exclusively with the outbreak of insurrection in Maynooth. McClelland concluded that: 'the insurrection in the county of Kildare was confined to the town of Maynooth and its vicinity.' The centrepiece of the government's information on rebel activity in the town was the material supplied by a local informer, Daniel Collison. Both Collison and his father, the local postmaster, had supplied information on rebel activity in the town in 1798. They continued the role until 1803 when Daniel Collison had managed to infiltrate the leadership of the local United Irishmen. In March 1801 Collison reported the movements of a suspected French agent in Maynooth. His evidence was obviously taken seriously, since Thomas Conolly of Castletown detained a man matching the description a few days later. More ominously, in February 1803 Collison was reporting rebel meetings in the Maynooth area and their connections with Dublin. Collison later claimed that he participated in the rebellion in Maynooth under duress. On 26 July he supplied the government with a detailed account of the events in and around Maynooth. His evidence is similar to the much lengthier version of McClelland. Collison continued to stress his importance to government after the rebellion. In August he wrote: 'be assured the minds of the people here are by no means tranquil, and if government are not prompt in their measures much mischief will ensue.'

In contrast to the situation in 1798, the McClelland report and related evidence provides information on the United Irish leadership in Maynooth and its hinterland in 1803. Four key figures emerge: Carter Conolly, Thomas Keraghan, Thomas Frayne and Owen Lyons. Conolly was a schoolmaster in Maynooth and was arrested a few days later the surrender of the rebels. He supplied detailed information about the rising, claiming that he had been forced to join the insurgents by Daniel Collison. By October his aunt, Ann Russell, claimed he had a 'temporary derangement'. The prison authorities accepted that he was certifiably insane. Thomas Keraghan, described as a Grand Canal boatman, was arrested in November by Richard Griffith. Another source claimed that he was a farmer from Crew Hill outside Maynooth. Thomas Frayne was leader of the hesitant Celbridge rebels with whom the Maynooth contingent tried to link after their failure to stop the Longford mail coach on the evening of 23 July. Daniel Collison later provided two addresses, one at Boreen, near Maynooth, the other at Harwood, near Dunboyne. He was picked up (apparently voluntarily) in October and supplied details on the rebel leadership in Kildare (especially on Nicholas Gray and Michael Quigly).

Frayne had met Michael Quigly (the leading Kildare conspirator) during the latter's mission to the north Kildare United Irishmen in March 1803. In July he accompanied Keraghan and Owen Lyons to the Thomas Street depot in Dublin, where Emmet introduced the Wexford United Irishman, Nicholas Gray, as the leader of the projected Kildare forces. It was Owen Lyons, the most elusive of the leadership cadre, who appears to have exerted most control and ultimate command in Maynooth. Conolly described him as a shoemaker and native of Cloncurry, though he appears to have resided at Newcastle on the Kildare-Dublin border. He was closely involved in
the plans for rebellion in Dublin, and one report described him as active in the Marshalsea Lane depot in the capital. In 1804 the zealous Admiral Pakenham reported: ‘I have had an overture from Capt[ain] Lyons of the Kildare croppies proposing to surrender giving bail for his good behaviour and a hint that he had rather be hung’d [sic] than transported.’ He was subsequently arrested with his brother Nicholas (who had been detained for rebel activity in 1798) and imprisoned in Dublin.9

These leaders were involved in the 1803 conspiracy from at least March that year, when Quigly’s mission reactivated United Irish cells in north Kildare. The meeting with Emmett and Gray in Dublin less than two weeks before the outbreak of rebellion suggests that they considered Maynooth important in the overall plans. The fact that the local leaders came from a wide area around Maynooth indicates that the town became a focal point for rebels in its hinterland. This was probably a result of Maynooth’s strategic position on the Dublin road to the west. The rising in Maynooth was clearly pre-planned, as was the march of Naas rebels towards Dublin. McClelland’s report attempted to find local and contingent factors to explain the confusing events in Maynooth. However the rising in the town could only be properly understood when contextualised against the larger conspiracy of 1803. Of course, McClelland’s report also had a political impulse.

The report was produced only a month after the rising in Maynooth had dissipated. However McClelland would have had valuable information at his disposal (he noted that eight leading rebels had already been arrested), especially from Collison, Conolly and the guards on the Longford mail coach who were tracked down by Edward Lees on 24 July.10 Nevertheless the report makes some fundamental errors. For example he mistakenly calls Michael Quigly of Rathcoffey, ‘James Quigly’, and calls Robert Emmet, ‘Counsellor Emmett’ (obviously confusing him with his brother, Thomas Addis).11 McClelland’s basic question was: ‘why Maynooth?’ Rather than seeking an answer in United Irish strategy, he pointed to two sources of ‘disaffection’ in the town: the College and the duke of Leinster. Both had taken a hammering from loyalists in the aftermath of the 1798 rebellion, when accusations of complicity and outright involvement were levelled at them.12 The evidence against the duke centred on his precipitous offer to surrender arms to the rebels and his later proposal for an informal rebel surrender in Maynooth. But he could hardly have been held accountable for the position of esteem in which, according to McClelland, the rebels held him. Indeed he had written to Hardwicke informing him of the outbreak, and urging action, in the early hours of 24 July.13 The duke had no idea that Collison (who supplied the story about the duke’s offer of arms) was an informer and warned Marsden that he ‘was much deeper concerned in this business than he thinks we are aware of.’14 The evidence against the college was even more dubious. The report suggested that the college authorities had advance warning of the intended rebellion, but failed to communicate this to the government.15 Moreover, the French-born professor of natural philosophy at the college, André Darre, had also been involved in securing the
rebels surrendered on 25 July. In explaining rebellion in Maynooth alone, McClelland felt that the sheer presence of the college and duke were major contributory factors. He was well aware that his conclusions were 'of that delicate nature that precludes their being made public without doing much mischief'. For the Dublin administration they provided further ammunition, as Thomas Bartlett has pointed out, to portray the 1803 rebellion as another example of Catholic insincerity and unreliaibility.

The McClelland report is a valuable collation of detailed government information on the events in Maynooth between 23 and 25 July 1803. However, it also reflects their immediate search for an explanation and the resulting suspicion cast on two particularly vulnerable scapegoats. An alternative reading of the same evidence suggests a rising planned by the middling and lower orders (the five leading figures were a shoemaker, a grand canal boatman, a farmer, a schoolmaster and the son of a postmaster) in close collaboration with the focal point of the insurrection in Dublin.

The Document

The report produced below is a copy of a letter sent from James McClelland to William Wickham, dated 26 August 1803. The spelling of the original document has been retained, but capitalisation has been standardised. Text in italics was underlined in the original letter. The numbers in square brackets indicate the individual folio numbers in the original document.


[369] Sir,

In compliance with your request I have read all the papers and informations laid before me relative to the late insurrection in the county of Kildare, and I have also examined all the witnesses and prisoners that appeared to me likely to give any important information on the subject. I think I have satisfactorily ascertained that the insurrection in the county of Kildare was confined to the town of Maynooth and its vicinity. I find that one James Quigley of Rathcoffey in the county of Kildare who is one of the persons named in the act of the 38th Geo: III usually called the Banishment Act returned to Ireland from transportation in the month of May last, since that time he has principally remained in the county of Kildare, privately going through every part of the county, holding meetings of the [369v] leaders of the Kildare rebels in the former rebellion and using every means in his power to excite and revive the ancient spirit of disaffection in that county. I find that Quigley some time prior to the 23rd of July last was occupied in Dublin in preparing for the insurrection, that he had by different messengers apprized the disaffected in the neighbourhood of Maynooth of the attack intended to be made on Dublin on the 23rd of July, and had required them to appear in arms on the same night at Maynooth to disarm the gentlemen in the county and to proceed to Dublin to co-operate with the rebels there. A person of the name of Owen Lyons appears to have
been the principal leader at Maynooth, and to whom Quigly confided the conduct and management of the insurrection in that part of the county. About eight o'clock in the evening of the 23rd of July last a number of persons assembled in the town of Maynooth principally consisting of the inhabitants of the town [370] amounting to upwards of one hundred. A few of them were armed with musquets and carbines, a few with pistols and swords, and the remainder with pikes. The first step they took was to make prisoners two dragoons who were stationed at Maynooth for the purpose of escorting the mail coach on its arrival there from Dublin. They then proceeded to seize the arms of the few loyal inhabitants in the town, having accomplished this object, about ten o'clock one of the leaders Carter Conolly dressed in a green uniform faced with white proceeded with a small party of the rebels to attack the houses of different persons in the vicinity of Maynooth who were supposed to have arms. This detachment broke into several houses and carried away all the arms and ammunition they could find in them. About twelve o'clock this detachment returned to Maynooth where the principal body of the rebels had continued from their first assembling. The leaders then held a conference together, to wit, Carter Conolly, [370v] Owen Lyons, both already mentioned, and Thomas Keraghan, a farmer near Maynooth, these three wore green uniforms faced with white and had gold epaulettes, they said this dress was a general's uniform, while they were consulting together the body of the rebels were employed in marching and exercising in the street. Soon after this a person of the name of Thomas Cooney a servant of the duke of Leinster came into Maynooth from Carton and informed Owen Lyons that the duke desired him to say that he would be glad that Lyons should take his arms least government should say that the party (to wit, the rebels) would not lay a hand on him (to wit, the duke). Lyons said that he would wait that night to see how the Dublin people would behave, but that at all events he would go for the arms to Carton the next night. In addition to this extraordinary transaction I think it necessary to state some [371] circumstances connected with it and tending to explain it. When the rebels first assembled at Maynooth on the same Saturday evening which was between eight and nine o'clock, the gauger of that district of the name of David Harvey escaped from the town and fled to Carton, he immediately on his arrival inquired for the duke and informed him of the insurrection, the duke not giving credit to his statement, he begged the duke to walk out to the front of the house and that he would be convinced by hearing the noise, the duke went out with Harvey when he heard a great noise in the town and a shot fired. Harvey then said he hoped his grace was convinced of the truth of his statement. The duke made no reply but immediately returned into the house and ordered the gates to be locked. Harvey intreated permission to remain there during the night, as he conceived his life would be in danger if he returned to Maynooth, this request the duke granted. In a few minutes after Harvey had a conversation with the duke's steward [371v] in a room where the steward and some of the upper servants of the duke were assembled. The steward said that if the rebels came there the arms were to be given up to them by the duke's directions. Harvey
then asked what quantity of arms was there in the house, the steward replied fourteen stand of arms. Harvey then said that with such a quantity of arms the rebels could be beaten off, and that it would be an astonishing thing to give up the arms to the rebels when there were so many persons in the house to defend it. The steward replied that it was the duke's orders to give them up. Two or three hours after this conversation it was that Cooney went into Maynooth and delivered the message above-mentioned to Lyons the rebel leader. On the next morning (to wit Sunday) Harvey left Carton and went to Dublin, having heard at Carton that the rebels were to be there that night for the duke's arms.

Soon after Cooney had delivered the above message to Lyons notice was given to [372] the rebels of the approach of the mail coach from Dublin. The rebels were immediately divided into three bodies which were placed at about an interval of about 100 yards from each other. The first division headed by Lyons were armed with musquets, carbines and blunderbusses, the second by Keraghan armed with pistols, and the third under the command of Conolly was placed on the bridge and armed with pikes. On the bridge a barricade was formed with cars, and in case the coach should force through the first and second divisions Conolly and his party were to kill the horses with their pikes, when the coach got entangled with the cars on the bridge. The coachman forced his way through the first and second divisions notwithstanding their fire, and the third division on the bridge on the approach of the coach threw down their pikes and fled. The coach forced its way thro' the barricade and escaped. Some of the party then began to express their apprehensions that the attack on Dublin had failed as the [372v] mail coach had been permitted to leave it. The leaders however asserted the reverse. Lyons ordered them to march to Celbridge where he expected to be joined by a large party under the command of Thomas Frane, on their arrival at Celbridge Frane met the party, but not accompanied by any body of men. Frane stated that his men would be ready for the next night. Lyons then said he would proceed to Rathcoole to receive orders from a person he called General Fox, and that he expected to find 18,000 men assembled at Rathcoole under the command of General Fox. Lyons however soon returned with intelligence that the attack on Dublin had failed, that General Fox had not been able to assemble his men, but that the attack would be renewed on Dublin that evening, to wit, Sunday. The rebels then moved from Celbridge towards Rathcoffey, sending out detachments from time to time on all sides to plunder the different houses of arms and ammunition.

[373] At Rathcoffey the rebels halted about three o'clock on Sunday and the leaders spent some time in Quigley's house, while there the rebels received information that a farmer of the name of Malone had received a message from the duke of Leinster stating that the rebels might return home and that there would be no more inquiry about the business of the night before. The rebels the[n] proceeded to the house of Malone who lived near Rathcoffey and were there informed by Malone that he had received such a message from the duke. Many of the rebels appeared anxious to return home, but the four leaders opposed their doing so.
The four leaders, viz. Lyons, Keraghan, Franc and Connolly consulted some time together and then rode off leaving the rebels. Where they went is not known, but they returned in about an hour and marched the body which had remained at Malone's back [373v] to Rathcoffey. The leaders dined at Quigley's house and along with them Collison, the principal witness for the crown, there a good deal of conversation took place which disclosed their plans and by whom the insurrection had been planned.

A person arrived there during dinner from Dublin and told them of the defeat of the rebels the night before in Dublin, that Quigly had been in the engagement, had escaped unhurt and was then in Thomas Street. They stated in the course of the conversation that to Quigly had been entrusted the organizing of the county of Kildare and that Counsellor Emmett was the person who directed all the proceedings and commanded all the rest. Lyons said he had seen Emmett and conversed with him in Dublin.

The rebels left Rathcoffey in the evening and proceeded to attack and rob other houses of arms until it was dark when they returned to Maynooth where the greatest part of them lived.

[374] On Monday morning the 25th July several of the rebels assembled again, but alarmed for their safety they sent a message to Abbe Dare, a professor of the Cathlick College at Maynooth, requesting him to apply to the duke to know if he would advise them to lay down their arms and that if he did they would. The abbe waited on the duke as he alleges, and brought back an answer from the duke, that all was granted that the duke desired, and that the duke would come to Maynooth to receive their arms, but that the rebels should by no means go to Carton.

The duke soon after went to Maynooth, where about 20 of the rebels appeared and delivered up a few arms. Thomas Keraghan the leader appeared and gave up a gun but no other arms. The other leaders did not appear, they and the great body of rebels dispersed and carried their arms with them on hearing by the Abbe Dare that all was granted by the duke.

[374v] Having mentioned the Catholic College, I think it right to state two extraordinary facts relating to members of it which have been sworn to.

Early on the evening of Saturday the 23rd of July, one Hannagan (now a prisoner, and who was an active rebel during that night) was heard telling two of the students, that they might rest assured that the rebels would be up that night without fail.

It also appears that on the same evening about eight o'clock Dr Russell the principal of the lay college delivered up voluntarily to Carter Connolly the rebel leader, two musquets and twelve foils. These arms were delivered to Connolly alone and unaccompanied by any one, and before any mob assembled. Yet all these facts were kept secret, and no information given to any magistrate, they were only discovered by the examination of the prisoners.

Since Monday the 25th of July I do not find that the rebels have assembled [375] at Maynooth or any other part of the county of Kildare. I find that twenty eight of the persons engaged in the above-mentioned insurrection at Maynooth are identified and I think there
is sufficient evidence in the power of the crown to convict them of high treason. There are but eight as yet in custody, but I think there is every probability that the greater part of the remaining twenty will be speedily taken.

It is difficult to account for this insurrection breaking out in Maynooth and in its progress being almost exclusively confined to the inhabitants of that town, while the remainder of the county of Kildare continued tranquil, altho’ it is certain that a strong spirit of disaffection prevails throughout the whole county. On the most accurate investigation I am inclined to think two circumstances have contributed to this. First, it appears to me that the establishing of the Catholic College at Maynooth has tended to increase in the town [375v] of Maynooth in a considerable degree among the Catholic inhabitants that intemperate religious spirit which contributed so powerfully to produce in several counties the former rebellion. And I am sorry to be obliged to state that it appears to me that the spirit of disaffection in Maynooth has been increased by the conduct of the professors and students of the college. It appears beyond all doubt that some of the students and some of the professors of the college had notice of the insurrection intended, early in the evening of the 23rd of July; yet no effort was made by any of them to prevent or suppress it, altho’ the students were more numerous than the rebels, and generally of an age equal to the use of arms, and altho’ the professors were as Catholic clergymen likely to possess that influence over the minds of the rebels who were all known to them, as would have enabled them on appearing amongst the rebels to have dispersed them by a single remonstrance. I am the more confirmed in this latter opinion from the rebels applying to the Professor Dare on [376] Monday the 25th of July to negotiate their pardon with the duke of Leinster.

Another circumstance appears to me to have still more powerfully operated on the minds of the inhabitants of Maynooth and its vicinity in exciting them to insurrection. It appears that the leaders of the rebels in Kildare had constantly represented to the people that the duke of Leinster was privately their friend and would shrieve them from punishment if defeated. From these representations and probably others of a stronger nature it appears that a general opinion prevailed among the Kildare rebels that a great personage was to appear their leader as soon as they had assembled in great force, this opinion the leaders took every pain to inculcate, and I am inclined to think pointed out the duke as the person. Such an opinion would naturally operate most powerfully in the vicinity of the duke’s residence amongst his own tenants in Maynooth.

These observations as to the [376v] probable cause of the insurrection in Kildare being confined to Maynooth notwithstanding the general spirit of disaffection in that county, I thought it right to communicate for your private information altho’ they are of that delicate nature that precludes their being made public without doing much mischief.

It appears that a considerable number of persons, between fifty and one hundred, left the town of Naas on Saturday the 23rd of July last and proceeded to Dublin and did not return again until Sunday
morning the 24th. Most of these persons have been examined by magistrates in the neighbourhood of Naas and have been all discharged except three. I am strongly inclined to think that the magistrates were imposed on by many of those persons in the reasons they assigned for going to Dublin on Saturday the 23rd of July. I have therefore directed a further investigation to be privately [377] made with respect to those persons and I expect in a short time to procure such evidence as will warrant the arrest and probably insure the conviction of several of those inhabitants of Naas as having been actually engaged in the insurrection in Dublin on the 23rd of July last.

I have the honour to be your obedient and humble servant.

(signed) James McClelland

26 August 1803


3. See ‘Depositions and information relating to various persons connected with Robert Emmet’s rising dated Naas 1803’ (Royal Irish Academy MS 12 M 8). Maslens was informed that 1,500 men from Kildare were expected to participate in the rebellion in Dublin (R. R. Madden, The life and times of Robert Emmet, ed. (Glasgow, 1902), p. 73.

4. James McClelland to William Wickham 26 August 1803 (Public Record Office, HO 100/112/369-377), f. 375v. This echoes the Lord Lieutenant Harwick's comment that “there is a more general and rooted spirit of dissatisfaction in that county than in any other part of Ireland” (Earl of Hardwicke, The victory’s post-bag; correspondence hitherto unpublished of the earl of Hardwicke, first Lord Lieutenant after the union, ed. Michael MacDonagh (London, 1904), pp. 385-6). Hardwicke and Alexander Marsden kept London informed of events in Maynooth as they unfolded: Marsden to Lord Pelham, 23 July 1803, Hardwicke to ---- 24, 25 July 1803, (Public Record Office, HO 100/112/127-8, 131-2, 133).

5. McClelland to Wickham, 26 August 1803 (Public Record Office, HO 100/112/369-377), f. 369.


7. Daniel Collison, Maynooth, to Alderman James, 9 March 1801 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/65/92); Thomas Conolly, Castletown to James Ryder, 12 March 1801 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/64/69).

8. Daniel Collison to Alexander Marsden [February?] 1803 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/64/144); Daniel Collison to Alderman James, 6 February 1803 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/64/145).


in Maynooth was probably a mistake based on his own statement that he had visited the college immediately previous to joining the rebels. If he had been so closely connected with the college the Dublin administration would surely have made more mileage from his case (Landreth, Pursuit, p. 227). Newman assumed that Conolly like Collison, was a government informer (Maynooth, p. 98).


14. In the report his surname is spelled ‘Frane’, see below.


17. Landreth, Pursuit, p. 165. Chambers, Rebellion, p. 114. According to information supplied by Collison, Keraghan was active even before the Quigly mission (Daniel Collison to Alexander Marsden, [February] 1803 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers. 620/66/144)).


19. Thomas Pakenham to Alexander Marsden 1804 (N.A.I., State of the Country Papers, 1030/41); Statement of John Wolfe, Newry, 28 May 1804 (N.A.I., Prisoners Petitions and Cases 997); Petitions of Revd Christopher McAllister and Nicholas Lyons, 29 December 1798, 1799, 7 June 1799 (N.A.I., State Prisoners Petitions 322, 355, 420). A Richard Lyons was also arrested for involvement in the 1803 rebellion in Maynooth (N.A.I., Prisoners Petitions and Cases 1005, dated 25 July 1804).


21. McClelland to Wickham, 26 August 1803 (Public Record Office, HO 100/112/369-377), f. 369, 373.


24. Duke of Leinster to Alexander Marsden, 30 July 1803 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/65/170); Duke of Leinster to Col Littlehales, 3 August 1803 (N.A.I., Reb. Papers, 620/65/171). He also passed on a tailor called Bracken to the Castle authorities. He was suspected of making the ‘regimentals’ mentioned in McClelland’s report. The duke’s gauger, David Harvey, mentioned in the report (f. 371), received a payment from the secret service fund in November, presumably without the duke’s knowledge (John T. Gilbert, Documents relating to Ireland 1795-1804 (first published 1893; Dublin, 1970), p. 82).

25. An account presented to the parliamentary commission in 1826 by a student in the college in 1803 suggested there was some truth to this claim. Moreover, the college tailors were also suspected of helping to produce the uniforms of the rebel officers (Newman, Maynooth, pp. 97-8, 104).


27. McClelland to Wickham, 26 August 1803 (Public Record Office, HO 100/112/369-377), f. 367v.


29. Madden described Frayne as ‘a small farmer, of Boven [sic] county of Kildare’, though he included him in a list of persons of respectability and those of influence. (Robert Emmet, p. 79)).


31. A spelling correction was inserted in the text: Darré.