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Survival and Assimilation: Loyalism in the Interwar Irish Free State

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In 1997, historian R. B. McDowell suggested that when "compared to the thorough methods for dealing with unpopular minorities … in eastern and central Europe and elsewhere, the harassment of loyalists was not notably severe" in Southern Ireland.[1] When measured in lethal violence (a crude and sometimes unreliable metric), there is much truth in this. Between 1919 and 1921, during an Irish War of Independence which was followed by a short, sharp civil war and part of a longer "Irish Revolution," just over 2,300 people were killed in ways that can be directly linked to the conflict. The separatist Irish Republican Army (IRA) killed 184 alleged civilian "spies" and informers, out of a total of just under 1,000 civilian casualties.[2] Elsewhere, the "Posen Uprising" claimed twice as many lives in seven weeks as the Irish War of Independence did in three years.[3] There were over 36,000 fatalities in less than five months during the Finnish Civil War, 3,000 or so in a few days in Bulgaria in September 1918, and another 1,500–3,000 over five days in September 1923. The shorter Estonian and Latvian Wars of Independence saw 11,750 and 13,246 fatalities, respectively.[4] And as Charles Townshend has written, the significant reduction of the non-Catholic minority in Southern Ireland between 1911 and 1926 "may appear trivial in comparison with the massive dislocation of peoples in Europe, starting with the Greek-Turkish conflict in the early 1920s."[5]

Anne Dolan has recently pointed to the limits of such comparisons, noting that violence in Ireland gained its reputation from "its nature not because of its extent," and warns against any simple assumptions that they might bring.[6] Perhaps because of the perceived scale of the Irish Revolution, and Ireland's position on the western periphery of Europe, Southern Irish loyalists have yet to be integrated into major studies of minorities in interwar Europe (though some fruitful comparisons have been made between Ireland and Poland).[7] If "trivial" by some standards, Irish loyalists arriving into Britain in early 1922 were widely described as refugees but have yet to be considered by scholars of interwar refugee crises.[8] Irish historians have often been guilty of insularity in return (if increasingly less so). The Irish loyalist experience, however, was not unique. Forced to accept the dismantling of the century-old Act of Union between Ireland and Britain and abandoned by their Northern (or "Ulster")

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brethren, by 1922 the Southern Irish loyalists—like other European minorities—found themselves on the "wrong" side of a new border drawn as a response to nationalist insurgency.[9]

Southern Irish loyalists do, however, stand apart in some respects. They were, for instance, part of a union with Britain but separated from their heartland by the sea. And, as Alvin Jackson points out in his chapter in this volume, there was no permanent royal residence in Ireland (unlike in Scotland). This allowed nationalists to take a permanent, unalterable island border for granted and meant that loyalists were "conscious that they both dwelt in the empire's heartland" and "were stationed on the imperial *limes*."[10] The Southern Irish case is one of the few in this volume where a religious divide took precedence over linguistic differences. While loyalists' perceived betrayal of the nation was, rhetorically at least, based on their allegiances and behavior rather than denomination or ethnicity, religion was the most durable means of differentiating between the majority and the minority (notwithstanding the existence of Catholic loyalists).[11] Southern Ireland was also a territory seceded from a victorious power after the Great War and has maintained a stable democracy since. Where the drawing of a new border in Ireland was an exception in Western Europe, the map of Eastern Europe looked radically different after 1919. Pieter Judson has suggested that the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin—in "a peripheral crownland capital of one of Europe's empires"—should be "of special concern to historians who study the character of Central Europe's empires."[12] The "everyday" experiences of the "imagined noncommunity" in Southern Ireland can similarly contribute to an understanding of the quest for homogeneity in interwar Europe and its limits.[13]

The behavior of civilians in Ireland during the revolution was often similar to that observed by Stathis Kalyvas in his seminal *Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Kalyvas found that civilians tend to offer incomplete collaboration or neutrality toward any side in areas where no armed actor exerts full control. This "hedging" or "fence-sitting" is variable and aligned with the nature of the conflict, the party in control, and how much power they exercise. Essentially, it involves a pragmatic approach that prioritizes personal safety and economic well-being over political preferences.[14] Civilians with nationalist or republican sympathies could, for instance, resist IRA taxes and levies and disobey republican edicts when they felt they were unfair (and that they could get away with doing so), or refuse to comply with boycotts where the financial benefits of serving the police or military outweighed the potential cost of non-compliance. Loyalists, meanwhile, contributed to republican collections under duress or to avoid trouble (though others claimed resistance as evidence of their allegiances).[15] Southern Irish loyalists first had to withstand efforts to enforce nationalist/republican hegemony in their communities and then negotiate a passage in a nationalist and Catholic-dominated state. In defining the concept of "national indifference," Tara Zahra has written that it can "apply to many different kinds of behaviour and people."[16] But as Olga Linkiewicz points out elsewhere in this volume, national indifference essentially refers to behaviors and peoples that did not embrace nationalism. In assessing the experiences of the loyalist minority in post-independence

Ireland, this is how "national indifference" will be understood in this chapter. It will also acknowledge, however, as Linkiewicz does, "hesitation, pragmatism, and reluctance to confront anybody in authority."

The Southern Loyalist Minority

Who were the Southern Irish loyalists? Unionism can be defined as support for an unreformed union with Britain and the maintenance of the constitutional settlement of 1801, with loyalism a potentially broader category (though with some overlap and use of both terms interchangeably). Loyalism is understood here as an allegiance to, or service to, Britain, the Crown, or the Empire. This essentially encompasses two groups. The first are those who were ideologically committed to the continued connection with Britain. The second is trickier to define and encompasses soldiers, civil servants, policemen, and others who served or acted in the interests of Britain, both in Ireland and abroad. Though an identity closely associated with Protestants and Protestantism,[17] both groups—and particularly the second—included a minority of Catholics. These are found among the landed gentry who advocated for the status quo before 1922, but even more commonly among the police (the Royal Irish Constabulary or RIC) and the British army where Catholics made up the majority of rank and file Irish recruits.[18] These policemen and soldiers did not always consider themselves "loyalists" but were regularly labeled that way by others. While there was no conscription in Ireland, service in the Crown forces or in imperial administration created a similar "common experience" of popular engagement with Britain and the Empire—with similar material benefits—for men and their families as Pieter Judson has identified in the Habsburg case (but with English as a common language).[19]

Though an official border only existed on the island from 1920, this chapter will focus on loyalists in "Southern" Ireland—the twenty-six Irish counties granted dominion status in 1922 as the Irish Free State. Distinct from their majority Ulster brethren in many respects, Southern loyalists were a relatively small and scattered minority. In 1911 there were just over 311,000 Protestants in the twenty-six county area that became the Irish Free State (10 percent of the total population), compared to 2.8 million Catholics. In the remaining six counties, there were 768,000 Protestants and 430,000 Catholics. If the small but influential sets of Protestant nationalists and republicans might be very roughly offset by cohorts of Catholic loyalists, this gives some sense of the size of the loyalist minority. By 1926, Catholics made up 2.7 million of a total Free State population of 2.9 million, while the Protestant population had dropped to 207,000 (7 percent of the total).[20] Southern unionist and loyalist culture had been diverse and impressively organized in Dublin, comprising a small but strong working-class Protestant community; clerks, shopkeepers, and professionals concentrated in suburban townships; and a "haute bourgeoisie." Elsewhere outside of Ulster, unionism was usually—but not exclusively—concentrated around the big landed estates and "networks of aristocrats and squireens who dominated rural Protestant society in the

south and west," or in small urban clusters.[21] Unlike in East Central Europe, where high illiteracy has been identified as a contributor to postwar instability, the Southern Irish minority was widely literate and often well-educated.[22]

Survival

In July 1921 a truce was agreed between republicans and the British government to end the Irish War of Independence, followed by an Anglo-Irish Treaty signed in December 1921. As a split in the republican movement over the terms of the treaty descended into a short but bitter civil war (June 1922–May 1923), a provisional government oversaw the formal creation of a partitioned state with dominion status in December 1922. With the union between Great Britain and Ireland thus "gone beyond recall," considering oneself a unionist or loyalist in Southern Ireland after 1922 was, as R. B. McDowell described it, "an attitude of mind rather than membership of a political party."[23] In reality, the process of accepting and adapting to the prospect of a new dispensation had begun much earlier.

There were very genuine fears among loyalists for their safety in the new order. This was prompted by a decade of unionist political rhetoric about the consequences of a Dublin parliament, by low-level incidents of sectarian violence—including the burning of churches and raids on Protestant homes—and by the shooting of Protestants as alleged spies between 1919 and 1923. Such fears were confirmed for those who wished to see it that way by a series of killings in west Cork in April 1922 (during a period of supposed "peace" between the July 1921 truce and the outbreak of civil war in June 1922). Seemingly sparked by the shooting of an IRA member who had entered a known Protestant/loyalist home late at night, thirteen Protestant men were killed over three nights in the Bandon Valley area. In the 1990s, Peter Hart concluded that "in the end, the fact of the victims' religion is inescapable. These men were shot because they were Protestant."[24] Hart further suggested that this was not an "isolated event," but an eruption of latent distrust and paranoia.[25] This, and Hart's broader conclusions about the nature of republican violence, has since been robustly challenged (and defended) and remain a source of debate.[26]

Some of Hart's critics have gone too far in removing sectarianism as a motivation for violence against the minority, while Marie Coleman has recently pointed to the need for a broader understanding of sectarianism than has often been the case. This, Coleman argues, should include attitudes, beliefs, and practices containing a religious element that may not necessarily extend to bigotry or prejudice, and account for the consequences as well as the motivations for violent actions.[27] While religion was not necessarily the primary explanation for violence, it did not have to be and remained an important label and identifier within communities.[28] As R. B. McDowell suggested, "there was no declared hostility to protestants on religious grounds. But the protestant was often a unionist where a unionist was a *rara avis*."[29] Moreover, even if there is little evidence of a systematic national campaign of violence, arson, or intimidation aimed at removing Protestants from their communities, it was possible for some Protestants to believe—even incorrectly—that there was.[30] The Bandon Valley killings were widely

denounced, and the provisional government offered a Church of Ireland deputation assurances that it "would protect its citizens," but one Protestant bishop described the violence as "a grim reminder of our helplessness" and another noted a "week of v.great [sic] anxiety as to the church's future."[31] The *Cork Examiner* reported an "exodus" from the Bandon area, though framed it as a "temporary" withdrawal until peaceful conditions had resumed.[32] While most "either resisted the pressure to leave home or subsequently returned," including the wife of one of the victims, the communal impact of violence should not be underestimated.[33] For some, survival meant temporary or permanent exile.

As noted above, between the 1911 census of Ireland and the first Irish Free State census in 1926 the Protestant population fell by about one-third.[34] Explaining this decline has proven challenging, particularly the part played by "forced" migration. Scholars have accounted for the impact of Protestant fatalities of the Great War and the withdrawal of British forces in 1922, and debated the extent to which the remainder was the result of longer-term natural decline or abnormal emigration prompted by violence and threats.[35] Most provocative was Hart's tentative use of the term "ethnic cleansing." While downplaying comparisons with other ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the same chapter, Hart also argued that it was ultimately the shock of the violence of 1920–3 that precipitated the "Protestant exodus."[36]

In a more recent study of West Cork Methodists, David Fitzpatrick (Hart's doctoral supervisor) concluded that the impact of violence was "fairly minor" and "the inexorable decline of southern Protestantism was mainly self-inflicted."[37] Andy Bielenberg's wider study of Protestant demographics suggested that only between 2,000 and 16,000 Protestants could have left Ireland owing to revolutionary terror from a total decline of over 100,000.[38] Donald Wood's 2020 analysis, however, leaves a much larger estimate of 40,000 potential Protestant emigrants.[39] Some perspective might be provided by the contemporaneous exodus of German speakers from Western Poland. Though the precise figures are similarly contested, the number of Germans who left Pomorze and Poznania after 1918 was much more significant—perhaps around 800,000 with some estimates as high as 1 million; by 1926 the German population there had declined by 85 percent. The language barrier was a notable reason to leave that did not apply in Ireland, but Irish Protestants and loyalists also shared many of the same concerns for employment, prosperity, and treatment under the new majority government (including those that ultimately proved unfounded or exaggerated) identified by Richard Blanke in his study of the German exodus (exacerbated in both cases by a new conflict: the Russo-Polish War and a civil war in Ireland). There are also many of the same—unresolved—debates about the extent to which this migration was voluntary or involuntary.[40]

The exact scale and timing of the Irish loyalist "exodus" remains difficult to discern. The 1926 census of Northern Ireland suggested that about 10,000 people had moved from the Irish Free State area to Northern Ireland between 1911 and 1926.[41] Others crossed to Britain, with a notable peak beginning in spring 1922. In May 1922, the British government was sufficiently concerned by an influx of Southern Irish loyalist "refugees" to establish an Irish Distress Committee for "persons ordinarily resident in Ireland who, for reasons of personal safety, have come to Great Britain and are

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represented to be in urgent need of assistance." As of March 1923—by which time it had become known as the Irish Grants Committee and had its remit expanded—7,500 applications for loans or grants had been received, including 5,600 for immediate assistance of which 4,330 were approved. A "large proportion" of applicants were married men with wives and children and, while not all of those who arrived in Britain sought or needed relief, when dependents of those who did are included there are potentially several thousand southern loyalist "refugees." Nor were they all Protestant: it was recorded that 598 grants were awarded to Protestants and 1,063 to Catholics between May and October 1922—most, but not all, from the Free State.[42] These included "ex-service men, members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, ex-civil servants in our service in Ireland … who cannot return to Ireland."[43]

The private, voluntary Southern Irish Loyalists Relief Association (SILRA) was founded in summer 1922 "for the relief of distress amongst the Southern Irish Loyalists."[44] Around the same time, the Ulster Unionist Council formed a "Refugee Committee" for those crossing the border into Northern Ireland.[45] SILRA's membership was drawn almost exclusively from the diehard wing of the Conservative party, with a scattering from elsewhere on the British right.[46] The creation of the Irish Free State was, as Paul Stocker has suggested, a "moment of profound trauma" for SILRA members and their political circles, representative of "the growing trend of subversion which was spreading like a virus around the world."[47] SILRA's chairman from 1924 until his death in 1930 was the Duke of Northumberland, a reactionary diehard and fiery orator and propagandist. Though it survived until the early 1960s, the association was at its most active and provocative under Northumberland and held public meetings, produced propaganda pamphlets, ran fund-raising balls, bazaars, and open houses, and organized clothing drives across Britain.[48] Like some commentators in Germany in reference to the exodus from western Poland, SILRA and its circle defined Irish loyalist migration as involuntary, enforced by "impoverishment and misery" (though tended to place the blame on the British surrender and withdrawal).[49]

By the mid-1920s, the diehards' persistent lobbying convinced the British government that Southern Irish loyalists had not been adequately compensated for losses suffered after the July 1921 truce. A second Treasury-funded Irish Grants Committee (IGC) duly met for the first time in October 1926. Eventually, it would deal with over 4,000 applications and recommend 900 awards. Given the nature of the scheme and its purpose, surviving application files must be treated with some caution but are an invaluable source of near first-hand testimony of Southern loyalist experiences of the revolution in Ireland and its aftermath.[50]

Some applicants had left Ireland between 1920 and 1923 and had either returned from a period of exile or remained in Britain in the late 1920s. Their depictions of flight from Ireland frequently involved periods of separation from loved ones, shattered mental health, property stolen, damaged, or sold at a loss, and struggles to find suitable work and accommodation. Leaving Ireland was also equated with the disappearance of good prospects, comfortable standards of living, or an inability to make a living in one's own country. Jonathan Darby, for instance, noted that he and

his wife had "lost all the comfort and amenities of the home they had built up during a period of over 40 years."[51] Abraham Good was doing a "good practice" as a vet in Bantry before he fled for South Wales where his new practice was "heavily in debt" and made only "the bare expense of living."[52] These Irish loyalists were in the unusual position of appearing in front of sympathetic British audiences as both "refugees" and "British citizens."[53] Indeed, while the narratives that appear in sources like the IGC make clear that integration was less than seamless, this was often not categorized as migration at all.[54]

SILRA, in turn, drew on these narratives in its propaganda. A typical pamphlet entitled "Victims of the suspension of the law in southern Ireland" highlighted the case of "a young man" with a "good and rapidly expanding business" in Cork. "When the massacre of Protestants took place there he managed to escape, but had to abandon his house, shop, general store and goods, valued at a large amount. He was for a long time in a state of absolute penury, and has to start all over again, having lost all his capital."[55] In another case, an ex-soldier in a small country town had been "boycotted and threatened, and finally had to give up his shop and come to England, leaving his wife and children behind." With SILRA's assistance, this "destitute" ex-soldier was able to "send for his wife and start a small shop in one of the suburbs in London."[56] This is what SILRA suggested revolution in Ireland had meant for loyalists; respectable, successful members of their communities whose lives and livelihoods had been destroyed through no fault of their own. As Mo Moulton has pointed out, the rhetorical value of this tale is also clear: with a small financial grant, a ruined loyalist refugee in England was put in a position to make an honest living and provide for his family while contributing to the metropolitan core.[57]

The Irish Free State administration was naturally concerned about its reputation and external perceptions about the safety and security of its minority. In May 1922, one Irish official complained to a British counterpart about an "organized movement … in both countries which has for its purpose and political objective the discrediting of the Provisional Government in Ireland and of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain."[58] It was "common knowledge," he suggested, that "a considerable number [of refugees] have left on a plea of compulsion without any justification whatever for that plea."[59] By 1931, a British Home Office memorandum on RIC pensioners agreed that "many men who alleged that their lives would be endangered if they ever returned to Ireland have now taken the risk and no grievous harm has come to them."[60] Other exiles remained unconvinced. Fifteen months after Travers Blackley fled Ireland after shooting raiders at his home, the Free State government stopped paying his under-sheriff's salary arguing that it was by then safe for him to return to his work. "Mr. Blackley naturally took a different view of the situation"; he remained in London earning a "precarious living by selling on Comm[ission]."[61] Not all migration, however, was "forced," and personal and economic emigration continued even in the most violent period of 1920–3.[62] While of little consolation to the many individuals who endured traumatic experiences of flight and exile, the worst fears of Southern Irish loyalists or their advocates did not ultimately come to pass.

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Assimilation

However difficult the experiences of the exiles, more southern Protestants and loyalists ultimately remained in the Irish Free State than left. An editorial in the unionist *Irish Times* proclaimed that in accepting the Anglo-Irish Treaty the Southern loyalists

> have watched the passage, in mournful procession, of the host of laws, institutions, traditions, and ideals that bound them to Great Britain. They have embarked—not gladly, yet not afraid—on uncharted seas. They are entrusting themselves to the good-will of a majority from which, politically, they have suffered much, and with which in the past they have had little in common save love of Ireland. The Southern loyalists accept the Treaty because the country accepts it and invites their aid in making it a success.[63]

The main Protestant denomination's *Church of Ireland Gazette* expressed concern for the safety of its communities but also a similar commitment "to recognise the legitimacy of the new administration."[64] This was made easier by a comparatively swift restoration of order from late 1923, and, indeed, the continued publication of newspapers representing minority interests throughout the interwar period and beyond.

Assimilation could, however, be challenging in a state that wished to set itself apart from its former rulers, and to define itself as Gaelic and Catholic. A way of thinking and acting in conformity with a Catholic worldview permeated society, and over the first half century of independence the Catholic hierarchy and state leaders shared, as Daithí Ó Corráin has put it, "a desire to develop the country according to a philosophy of Catholic nationalism."[65] Catholic moral code on issues like sexuality and family relations was enshrined in law and, while conservatism was cross-denominational and the Protestant churches broadly welcomed strict censorship legislation and the constitutional ban on divorce (1937), the most vocal opponents tended to be Protestant.[66]

Even as violence subsided in Ireland after 1923, complaints remained about discrimination against the loyalist minority in the Irish Free State. As they became a less pressing or visible concern, SILRA turned its attention from Southern Irish loyalists in Britain to those who remained in the Free State. From the mid-1920s, the association repeatedly highlighted cases of poverty and destitution among loyalists in the Free State and continued to blame the coalition government who had made the settlement and abandoned the Southern loyalists in the first place.[67] In February 1928, for instance, SILRA's London relief secretary publicly insisted that he was not "criticising the Free State Government in any form … It is the British Government that have let these poor people down."[68] Calls for the reconquest of Ireland were rare on the British right, "suggesting that while Irish independence from Britain was a tragedy, it was accepted and its reversal was not seen as realistic."[69] The "plight" of the Southern Irish loyalists instead served as a reminder of past treachery and a warning of continued threats to the Empire. SILRA's public rhetoric, propagandistic by its nature, drew some justifiable complaints. This included one correspondent

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to the local Irish press who noted that a SILRA notice published in an American travel magazine would give potential tourists the unfortunate impression of a country blighted with poverty, want, and consumption.[70] At the same time, the IGC often vividly demonstrates the long-term personal and financial consequences of revolution not only for Southern Irish loyalist exiles, but also for a portion of those who remained at home.[71]

A more recent study by Robin Bury is much more willing to blame successive administrations in the Irish Free State for a rather bleak picture of minority life. At its worst Bury found "cultural and constitutional discrimination"—a state that was "institutionally and emotionally anti-Protestant" and practicing a form of "social and cultural apartheid."[72] For some Protestants in some places, and perhaps especially at specific times of crisis, it may have felt that way. But other work has convincingly highlighted a "self-assurance" among the minority "in the practice of its religion and place in Irish society."[73] Protestant isolation was also often self-imposed rather than enforced, and could be liberating in a society where a domineering Catholic Church held significant control over individuals' daily lives.[74] Catholics and Protestants were quite content to be schooled and to socialize separately. The Catholic Church dominated education and welfare provision, but rather than actively enticing Protestant children into Catholic schools, the state facilitated small Protestant schools and focused on concessions rather than changes of policy. From the 1930s, a subsidized transport scheme allowed Protestant children to attend a school of their denomination.[75]

If they so wished, Protestants who had formerly been aligned with unionist politics could seek and even secure election in the Irish Free State on a range of different political platforms.[76] A prominent figure in Dublin unionism before 1922, Major Bryan Ricco Cooper sat as an independent Teachta Dála (TD, member of parliament) for Dublin South from 1923 until his death in 1930. Former Unionist MP for Rathmines J. P. Good was returned as a Businessmen's Party TD in the same constituency from 1923 to 1937.[77] By the early 1930s, the integration of former unionists into Cumann na nGaedhael, the majority governing party in the Free State for the first decade of its existence, was obvious enough to be regularly pilloried by the cartoonist in the (then opposition) Fianna Fáil's *Irish Press* newspaper.[78] It is hard to judge the impact of more sinister accusations about ex-unionists and freemasons that appeared in local Fianna Fáil campaigning, but their presence at all suggests that—in spite of much successful integration—an underlying suspicion could remain. In that sense, Southern Irish Protestants and "ex-unionists" offer a useful cohort in which to emphasize the fluidity of national indifference and majority-minority relations in a Western European context. Even if they felt themselves at times an isolated or persecuted minority, they continued to demonstrate their "Britishness" where it suited. A term like "ex-loyalist," thus, seems less useful than Ian d'Alton's "cultural royalism."[79]

These "royalist" remnants can be easily found in places with traditionally strong unionist and loyalist communities. The Church of Ireland congregation in Dublin, for instance, continued to maintain what Martin Maguire has described as "an emotional link to the crown and empire," seen in the cancellation in 1928 of all

parish entertainments in Clontarf "on account of the dreadful gloom everywhere felt on the death of His Majesty King George V."[80] Journalist Brian Inglis recalled that in Malahide, "in everyday matters, the fact than an Irish Free State did exist was hardly noticeable."[81] It was still possible to spend time with "like-minded people," and to "ignore repugnant elements of the new regime."[82] Leaving the theater before the national anthem was played, listening to British radio stations, eschewing Gaelic football and hurling in favor of "English" games like soccer, rugby, or cricket, or insisting that Dún Laoghaire was still Kingstown, Portlaoise was still Maryborough, and Cobh was still Queenstown were more subtle forms of resistance.[83] Associations, clubs, and professional bodies continued to carry the "Royal" prefix, Dublin had more streets named after Queen Victoria than London, and, though literally painted over in green, the post-boxes still contained the royal cipher.[84] Nationalists had in fact been winning and losing battles for the streetscapes and place names of Dublin since the early twentieth century. The shamrock was a common motif on the street furniture in the city, for instance, but not in the unionist Rathmines township.[85] Nationalist councillors had succeeded in renaming Great Britain Street as Parnell Street and Carlisle Bridge as O'Connell Bridge, but not Sackville Street, which was colloquially rather than officially known as O'Connell Street until 1924. Statues to nineteenth-century constitutional nationalists Daniel O'Connell and Charles Stewart Parnell stood at either end of that street, which was dissected by a forty-foot column for Admiral Horatio Nelson.[86]

Displays of loyalism were not the preserve of Protestants. Service and sacrifice in the Great War provided a particularly powerful, if complex, motivation for remembering the British connection. In 1924, 20,000 veterans were joined by an estimated crowd of 50,000 in observing the two-minute silence at College Green in Dublin. These included large numbers of Catholic ex-servicemen and their families. Reasons for attending were as personal as political but "God Save the King" was sung and the Union flag was flown while a Celtic cross was unveiled in honor of the 10th (Irish) Division.[87] That same year, the bitter divides of civil war meant the first official state commemoration of the 1916 Easter Rising was a small, sombre affair.[88] Over 250,000 poppies were sold in Dublin in 1925 alone and high sales continued into the 1930s.[89] While the size of the crowds diminished over the years, and they were moved further away from the city centre, the Union flag was seen and "God Save the King" heard at armistice ceremonies in Dublin into the 1950s. None of this happened, of course, without occasionally violent protests against what some saw as undesirable displays of "imperialism." While not overtly hostile, and sometimes accommodating, the government tended to stay at arm's length.[90]

Lionel Fleming suggested that the majority of his Protestant co-religionists "remained unconverted to the new way of life" and "did not regard the Irish nation as having anything to do with them":

> It had to be accepted, of course, as a system to which one must now pay one's income tax, but never, until the end of their lives, would they speak of the government as 'our government.' In spite of the supposed treachery of Britain, their flag remained the Union Jack and their anthem 'God Save the King.'[91]

There was no newfound devotion to nationalist Ireland, but nor was there a challenge to its authority. Loyalty to Britain, moreover, did not necessarily have to mean a rejection of the Irish Free State. Trinity College, traditionally associated with Protestant ascendency, flew the tricolor *and* the Union flag in the 1930s. As Nora Robertson put it in 1960, "in respecting new loyalties it had not seemed incumbent upon us to throw our old ones overboard."[92] Irish men and women from the twenty-six counties continued to seek service in the Empire throughout the interwar years: in the British Colonial Service and as soldiers and NCOs in the British army.[93]

Tara Zahra's understanding of "national indifference" includes intermarriage and bilingualism, and this is where the behavior of the Southern Irish minority presents some complications. Whereas Czech and German speakers regularly married in the Bohemian Lands, mixed marriage in Ireland remained relatively uncommon until the 1950s. Even then, it was contentious within both communities and often split families.[94] Indeed, Marie Coleman has found that in County Longford it was not a dilution of religious identity through mixed marriage that accounts for a disproportionate decline among Presbyterian and Methodist women between 1911 and 1926, but a willingness to move to find a marriage partner of the same denomination (less challenging for the larger Church of Ireland congregation).[95] The Catholic *Ne Temere* decree—effectively insisting that children of a mixed marriage be raised as Catholic—was particularly contentious among Protestant congregations concerned about the survival of their flock.[96]

There were Protestants who spoke Irish and they initially dominated the Gaelic League, a cultural nationalist movement founded in 1893 to promote Irish as a living language. The movement also inspired some Protestants (mostly in Dublin) to engage in nationalist activism or republican militancy. In the early twentieth century, however, the League expanded, became more obviously Catholic and increasingly politicized, and Protestant membership declined.[97] Unionists had long despised the idea of compulsory Irish teaching in primary schools or as a requirement in public appointments. When the Free State Minister for Education prioritized Irish in the primary school curriculum from 1922, compulsory Irish was opposed by Protestant stakeholders in education. It was, though, compulsion rather than the language itself that was most divisive, and some individual Protestants even embraced it.[98] As there were very few monolingual Irish speakers, and English remained the dominant language of communication, this was a rather different situation than in the Second Polish Republic as described by Olga Linkiewicz elsewhere in this volume (nor were there any plebiscites carried out in Ireland in this period). For its part, the department of education allowed Irish language policy to be diluted in practice in Protestant schools and "was prepared to make significant practical concessions toward the convictions of the religious minority."[99] The department was similarly willing to concede to requests (if only on an ad hoc basis) regarding school textbooks, many of which were deemed by Protestants to "unquestioningly equate Irish nationality, language revival and Catholicism" or rely exclusively on "the Catholic-nationalist perspective of Irish history."[100] For those who could afford it, sending children to school in Britain or Northern Ireland was another means of avoiding the perceived impositions of a Catholic/nationalist educational environment.[101]

Catholic Loyalists

As a distinct minority (or a minority within a minority) the Catholic (English-speaking) loyalist occupied a unique space. Like Protestants, Catholic unionists and loyalists had mixed experiences during the struggle for independence. The "occasional Catholic," for instance, had been included among the burnings of big houses and mansions between 1920 and 1923.[102] At first glance it might appear that Catholic unionists and loyalists endured a less turbulent transition to the new order. When he died in 1941, the *Irish Times* described how the Earl of Kenmare, a Catholic former member of the Irish Unionist Alliance, had lived "a quiet, retired life in Killarney for many years, where he was well known in the countryside."[103] Kenmare had continued a long family tradition of promoting "not only their tenants, but the whole community" in development, sporting, and cultural pursuits.[104] This, however, was likely as important as Kenmare's religion. The Protestant owners of nearby Muckross House believed that their own family home was spared burning on account of their standing in the community and treatment of employees.[105]

In some cases, politics and allegiances shifted over generations. William Monsell, 1st Baron Emly (d. 1894), had been a liberal unionist and firm opponent of home rule. His son and heir Gaston was a "strong Conservative" in his youth before showing "much sympathy with the more popular Nationalist movement" in later years.[106] Nor was a former career in Crown service necessarily a barrier to integration into the institutions of the state. In 1934, a compensation hearing was held in County Cavan relating to the burning of a RIC barracks on a night in September 1920. Two of those who gave evidence (including the claimant) were men who had defended the barracks that night. The other was a member of the IRA who had attacked it. All three were serving in the Irish Free State's police force, An Garda Síochána. The two former RIC had resigned from the force in 1920.[107] Remaining out of trouble during the War of Independence offered no guarantees, but could make integration easier afterward.[108] Others suffered as a result of their past careers. One RIC pensioner felt safe enough to return to Castletownbere in West Cork in 1924, but by 1930 complained that "Ex R.I.C. men wont [sic] get any employment on account of remaining in the force until disbandment."[109] In 1936 a local Fianna Fáil councillor "strongly objected to, and protested against" a town clerkship being given to "a man who served in the RIC during the troubles."[110] A month later, in another part of the country, "ill-feeling" surrounding the appointment of a teacher ended with the burning of the school and was attributed to her father's service as a sergeant in the RIC.[111] SILRA believed it was "still necessary to help the widows and children of men who had served in the Royal Irish Constabulary" in 1935.[112] Catholic loyalists were also excluded from what Ian d'Alton has described as a convivial "Protestant Free State."[113]

Former servants of the Crown had developed bonds and communal experiences during war and revolution but did not share a homogeneous political identity. Their experiences of life in the Free State were thus mixed. Many Catholic ex-servicemen endured hardship and poverty (for a myriad of reasons), but the Irish government did

not interfere with British efforts to meet legal obligations to its veterans. There were persistent complaints from Irish ex-servicemen, but they were ultimately often better off than their British counterparts (who, in turn, received less state assistance than veterans in France and Germany).[114]

Conclusion

The nature of the division between the majority and the minority impacted the levels of violence in Ireland. In Ulster this was mostly inter-communal and based on religious grounds rather than between the IRA and the Crown forces. The conflict between the Ulster Special Constabulary (recruited locally but only organized in six counties of Ulster) and the IRA, for instance, was essentially a conflict between two rival communities.[115] This was explicitly sectarian in a way rarely seen outside of the northeast. The IRA in Ulster also viewed the conflict (and their enemies) in these terms and shot proportionally fewer Catholics than IRA units elsewhere.[116] As T. K. Wilson has put it, "victims were chosen as representatives of their communities, not as individuals."[117] In southern counties, meanwhile, victims of republican violence and intimidation were primarily, if not exclusively, selected based on individual behavior.

The dynamics of violence were also markedly different in the six counties. At least 90 percent of the fatalities between 1920 and 1922 occurred in Belfast and the overwhelming majority of those were civilian victims of inter-communal rioting and sniping.[118] The conflict in Belfast was "a communal war and sectarian war, fought on the basis of ethnic mobilisation."[119] Moreover, more people were killed in Belfast in the five months after the July 1921 truce than during the previous seven months, while the opposite was the case in the twenty-six counties.[120]

The basis of the cleavage in Ireland—religious rather than linguistic—also impacted on the severity of the violence. Wilson found that Ulster was more deeply divided than Upper Silesia, for instance, but clearer lines of demarcation between communities served to lessen the severity of the violence there.[121] In Southern Ireland, the size of the minority also mattered. It was large enough to survive but not to mount any serious challenge to separatist hegemony either during the revolution or afterward (though this was not inevitable and assumptions that a small German minority in western Poland would lead to better relations with the Polish Republic do not seem to have been borne out in practice).[122] Whereas the large minority Catholic community claimed to be victims of a "pogrom" in Belfast between 1920 and 1922, Protestant minorities in Cavan, Monaghan, and Donegal (three northern counties that became part of the Irish Free State) found that "any contest was practically over before it had begun in earnest."[123] This was also the case elsewhere, as the loyalists who suffered most severely from threat and violence (real or perceived) were those in smaller and more isolated communities.[124] There was no single experience of revolution and secession for Southern Irish loyalists. Some suffered loss, exile, or isolation where others did not, and in that sense one of the challenges encountered in analyses of national indifference is mirrored in the Irish case.[125]

J. J. Lee's suggestion that the Irish Free State was "subjectively virtually 100 percent homogenous, and that was all that politically mattered" has much truth in it.[126] But it also underestimates the resilience of the minority and the ways in which they subtly challenged nationalist and Catholic orthodoxies. Wilson has written that the comparably "mild" experiences of the Irish minority were "largely due to the totality of their defeat and the resulting inevitability of their surrender."[127] While the assimilation that followed that surrender was incomplete and sometimes stubbornly begrudging, the unionist and loyalist community in Southern Ireland had suffered a long decline rather than a sudden implosion. Unlike in Poland, where the "final defeat for the German communities" came in 1945, Southern Irish loyalists had been abandoned early—"something of blessing in disguise," as Wilson has put it.[128] Once the inevitable occurred, flexibility and adaptability were key to efforts to unobtrusively carry on with their own allegiances under the new dispensation, helped by a state that may not always have been friendly but was not, by wider European standards, especially hostile either.

Notes

1 R. B. McDowell, *Crisis and Decline: The Fate of the Southern Unionists* (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1997), 135.
2 Eunan O'Halpin and Daithí Ó Corráin, *The Dead of the Irish Revolution* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2020), 1–22, 544. Some scholars question or reject the suitability of the term "revolution" for the series of interlinked and overlapping conflicts that took place from *c.*1912 to 1923.
3 Tim Wilson, "Ghost Provinces, Mislaid Minorities: The Experience of Southern Ireland and Prussian Poland Compared," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 13 (2002): 69.
4 Anne Dolan, "Killing in 'the Good Old Irish Fashion?' Irish Revolutionary Violence in Context," *Irish Historical Studies* 44, no. 165 (2020): 13.
5 Charles Townshend, *The Republic: The Fight for Irish Independence* (London: Allen Lane, 2013), 452.
6 Dolan, "Irish Revolutionary Violence," 13–14.
7 Maarten von Ginderachter and Jon Fox, eds., *National Indifference and the History of Nationalism in Modern Europe* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019) broadens the traditional focus on East Central Europe to include Belgium and France, and territories in Central and Southern Europe, but not Britain or Ireland. For comparisons of Ireland and Poland, see T. K. Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence: Conflict and identity in Ulster and Upper Silesia, 1918–1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and Julia Eichenberg, "The Dark Side of Independence: Paramilitary Violence in Ireland and Poland after the First World War," *Contemporary Irish History* 19, no. 3 (2010): 231–48.
8 Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002); Panikos Panayi and Pippa Verdi, eds., *Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011); Peter Gatrell, *The Making of the Modern Refugee* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch, eds., *Refugees in Twentieth-Century Europe: A Forty Years' Crisis?*

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(London: Bloomsbury, 2017) for instance, make no mention of the movement of Southern Irish loyalists from 1920.

9 The territory that became the Irish Free State in 1922 comprises twenty-six Irish counties. The six remaining counties, in the north-east of the island where there was a Protestant/unionist majority, became a separate jurisdiction that remained part of the United Kingdom but with its own parliament. Though the historic province of Ulster is made up of nine counties, three of which were excluded from Northern Ireland, unionists and loyalists in the six counties regularly referred to it as Ulster and are usually described as Ulster unionists.

10 Wilson, "Mislaid Minorities," 71–3.

11 Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*, 136; Wilson, "Mislaid Minorities," 64; Eichenberg, "Dark Side of Independence," 233, no. 6, 243.

12 Pieter M. Judson, "'Where Our Commonality Is Necessary … ': Rethinking the End of the Habsburg Monarchy," *Austrian History Yearbook* 48 (2017): 1–17. See also Judson's chapter in this volume.

13 Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (2010): 93–119.

14 Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 104, 226–9.

15 For more on this see Brian Hughes, *Defying the IRA? Intimidation, Coercion, and Communities during the Irish Revolution* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2016).

16 Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," 98.

17 See Alvin Jackson's chapter in this volume. In an Irish context this primarily means three main denominations, the Church of Ireland (by far the largest in Southern Ireland), Presbyterian, and Methodist. While treating these denominations as a homogeneous whole has its problems, it has been done here for convenience unless a specific denomination is mentioned.

18 Elizabeth Malcolm, *The Irish Policeman, 1822–1922: A Life* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 58–67; Peter Karsten, "Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792–1922: Suborned or Subordinate," *Journal of Social History* 17, no. 1 (1983): 31–64.

19 Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 363–70. For Irish involvement in colonial service, see David Fitzpatrick, "Ireland and the Empire," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III: The Nineteenth Century*, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 509–15; Seán William Gannon, "Southern Irish Loyalists and Imperial Service," in *Southern Irish Loyalism, 1912–1949*, ed. Brian Hughes and Conor Morrissey (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2020), 155–72.

20 *Saorstát Éireann. Census of Population, 1926,* vol. 3 (1929), Table 1A; *Census of Population of Northern Ireland, 1926. General Report*, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 83 [N.I.] (1929), Table XXVIII, 1i. There were also tiny numbers of Jews, Baptists, and others, accounting for about 13,400 people.

21 Alvin Jackson, "Irish Unionism, 1870–1992," in *Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801*, ed. D. George Boyce and Alan O'Day (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 121–3.

22 Sabrina P. Ramet, "Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-building, the Fate of Minorities—an Introduction," in *Interwar East Central Europe, 1918–1941: The Failure of Democracy-Building, The Fate of Minorities*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 7–8.

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23 McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 163.
24 Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. and Its Enemies: Violence and Community in County Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 288–92, quote at 288.
25 Ibid., 292.
26 See Brian P. Murphy and Niall Meehan, *Troubled History: A 10th Anniversary Critique of Peter Hart's "The I.R.A. and Its Enemies"* (Aubane: Aubane Historical Society, 2008); John M. Regan, "The 'Bandon Valley Massacre' as an Historiographical Problem," *History* 97 (2012): 70–98. For a defense of Hart, see David Fitzpatrick, "Ethnic Cleansing, Ethical Smearing and Irish Historians," *History* 98 (2013): 135–44 and for a more recent evaluation of the "Peter Hart affair" see Ian McBride, "The Peter Hart Affair in Perspective: History, Ideology, and the Irish Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 61, no. 1 (2018): 249–71.
27 Marie Coleman, "Protestant Depopulation in County Longford during the Irish Revolution, 1911–1926," *English Historical Review* 135, no. 575 (2020): 934.
28 Hughes, *Defying the IRA?*, 129–36, 181–2.
29 R. B. McDowell, *The Church of Ireland, 1869–1969* (London: Routledge, 1975), 109.
30 Jack White, *Minority Report: The Anatomy of the Southern Irish Protestant* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1975), 84.
31 Brian M. Walker, "Southern Protestant Voices During the Irish War of Independence and Civil War: Reports from the Church of Ireland Synods," in *Southern Irish Loyalism*, ed. Hughes and Morrissey, 79–80.
32 *Cork Examiner*, May 1, 1922.
33 David Fitzpatrick, *Descendancy: Irish Protestant Histories since 1795* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 240.
34 *Saorstát Éireann, Census of Population, 1926*, vol. 3 (1929), Table 1A.
35 See Robert E. Kennedy, *The Irish: Emigration, Marriage, and Fertility* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 119, 138; Kurt Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State: Ireland's Privileged Minority* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983), 21–5; Enda Delaney, *Demography, State and Society: Irish Migration to Britain, 1921–1971* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), 69–83.
36 Peter Hart, *The I.R.A. at War, 1916–1923* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 225–8, 239.
37 Fitzpatrick, *Descendancy*, 159–80.
38 Andy Bielenberg, "Exodus: The Emigration of Southern Irish Protestants during the Irish War of Independence and the Civil War," *Past & Present* 218, no. 1 (2013): 199–233. See also Barry Keane, "Ethnic Cleansing? Protestant Decline in West Cork between 1911 and 1926," *History Ireland* 20, no. 2 (2012): 35–8.
39 Donald Wood, "Protestant Population Decline in Southern Ireland, 1911–1926," in *Southern Irish Loyalism*, ed. Hughes and Morrissey, 27–47. Another recent study of one county reinforces the prevalence of long-term natural decline and emigration: Coleman, "Longford," 931–7.
40 Richard Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles: The Germans in Western Poland, 1918–1939* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), 32–53.
41 *Census of Population of Northern Ireland, 1926. General Report*, 15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 83 [N.I.] (1929), xxv.
42 *First Interim Report of the Irish Distress Committee* (London, 1922); Irish Grants Committee second interim report [Cmd. 2032], HC, 1924.
43 Hansard 5 (Commons), vol. 154, col. 2160 (May 31, 1922).

44 Minutes of meeting of SILRA provisional committee, June 13, 1922 (Public Record Office of Northern Ireland [PRONI], D989/B/1/3).
45 Minutes of Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) "Refugee Committee," June 6, 1922 (PRONI, D1327/15/6); Minutes of UUC "Refugee Committee," June 12, 1922 (PRONI, D1327/15/6). See also *Belfast News-letter*, March 3, 1923. The meeting was told of refugees who had come "from out-lying parts of the Six Counties, and even from the South and West of Ireland."
46 McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 132.
47 Paul Stocker, *Lost Imperium: Far Right Visions of the British Empire, c. 1920–1980* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021), 61.
48 See, for example, *Manchester Guardian*, July 23, 1923 [open house]; Pamphlet announcing a ball to be held in Hyde Park Hotel in aid of SILRA, June 12, 1930 (PRONI, D989/5/2); *Aberdeen Press and Journal*, January 3, 1923 [clothing drive].
49 Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles*, 40. For similar SILRA rhetoric, see speech by Northumberland reported in *Daily Mail*, May 16, 1923.
50 IGC application files, The National Archives, Kew (TNA), CO 763/3–202.
51 Jonathan C. Darby claim, TNA, CO 762/11/1.
52 Abraham Good claim, TNA, CO 762/66/9. He owed £250 to his brother.
53 "The Plight of Irish Loyalists. Our Obligations. Terrible Cases of Victims. Terrible Suffering," 1923, London School of Economics Archives (LSE), COLL MS 0028; *Belfast News-letter*, May 12, 1922; *Yorkshire Post*, September 27, 1922.
54 Mo Moulton, *Ireland and the Irish in Interwar England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 216–17.
55 "Victims of the Suspension of the Law in Southern Ireland," SILRA, n.d., LSE, COLL MS 0028.
56 "Victims of the Suspension of the Law," *c.*1923, National Library of Ireland (NLI): ILB 300 p3 [Item 112].
57 Moulton, *Ireland the Irish in Interwar England*, 209–10.
58 O'Hegarty to Curtis, May 18, 1922, in *First Interim Report of the Irish Distress Committee*, H.C. 1922.
59 Ibid.
60 Memorandum on "Question of Furnishing Addresses and Supplying Information concerning Former Members of the Royal Irish Constabulary," April 17, 1931, TNA, HO 144/22600. I am grateful to Dr. Seán William Gannon for alerting me to this file.
61 Travers Robert Blackley claim, TNA, CO 762/37/6.
62 Coleman, "Longford," 963–6.
63 *Irish Times*, December 10, 1921.
64 *CoIG*, January 13, 1922. See also *Irish Times*, January 16, 1922; McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 177–96; White, *Minority Report*, 86–8.
65 Daithí Ó Corráin, "Catholicism in Ireland, 1880–2015: Rise, Ascendancy and Retreat," in *The Cambridge History of Ireland, Vol. IV, 1880 to the Present*, ed. Thomas Bartlett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 733–4.
66 Ibid.; Senia Pašeta, "Censorship and Its Critics in the Irish Free State, 1922–1932," *Past & Present* 181 (2002): 193–218.
67 See, for example, SILRA pamphlets available in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (D989), the LSE, COLL MS 0028, and in the NLI, ILB 300 p3.
68 *Irish Independent*, February 10, 1928.
69 Stocker, *Lost Imperium*, 61.
70 *The Liberator (Tralee)*, May 1, 1928.

71 Applicants were required to give details of their present financial situation when applying. See Irish Grants Committee claim files, 1926–30, TNA, CO 726/3–202.
72 Robin Bury, *Buried Lives: the Protestants of Southern Ireland* (Dublin: The History Press, 2017). For alternative interpretations see reviews of the book by Ian d'Alton, *Irish Times*, March 4, 2017, and Kim Bielenberg, *Irish Independent*, March 19, 2017.
73 See, for example, Heather Crawford, *Outside the Glow: Protestants and Irishness in Independent Ireland* (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2010). Also, Marianne Elliot, *When God Took Sides: Religion and Identity in Irish History, Unfinished History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 216–35; Daithí Ó Corráin, *Rendering to God and Caesar: The Churches and the Two States in Ireland, 1949–73* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 70–105; Ian d'Alton and Ida Milne, eds., *Protestant and Irish: The Minority's Search for Place in Independent Ireland* (Cork: Cork University Press, 2019). See also Caleb Richardson, *Smyllie's Ireland: Protestants, Independence, and the Man Who Ran the Irish Times* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2019).
74 There is an extensive literature on Catholic influence on life in the Irish Free State. For a succinct summary, see Ó Corráin, "Catholicism in Ireland, 1880–2015," 729–39.
75 Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," 100–1; Martina Relihan, "The Church of Ireland, the State and Education in Irish Language and Irish History, 1920s–1950s," in *Educating Ireland: Schooling and Social Change, 1700–2000*, ed. Karin Fisher and Deirdre Raftery (Kildare: Irish Academic Press, 2014), 154–6.
76 Bowen, *Protestants in a Catholic State*, 48–65; McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 55; David Fitzpatrick, *The Two Irelands, 1912–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 203.
77 Martin Maguire, "'Our People': The Church of Ireland and the Culture of Community in Dublin since Disestablishment," in *The Laity and the Church of Ireland, 1000–2000: All Sorts*, ed. Raymond Gillespie and W. G. Neely (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2002).
78 *Irish Press*, December 5, 1931; December 12, 1931; December 25, 1931; January 2, 1932; January 7, 1932; January 14, 1932; January 27, 1932; February 6, 1932; February 15, 1932. Fianna Fáil was founded in 1926 after a split within the anti-Anglo-Irish Treaty Sinn Féin party. It entered the parliament, Dáil Éireann, for the first time in 1927. Fianna Fáil first came to power in 1932 and was electorally dominant for much of the remainder of the century.
79 Ian d'Alton, "Protestant 'Belongings' in Independent Ireland, 1922–49," in *Protestant and Irish*, ed. d'Alton and Milne, 28.
80 Maguire, "Our People."
81 Brian Inglis, *West Briton* (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), 15.
82 McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 167.
83 Ibid.; d'Alton, "Protestant 'Belongings,'" 29; Elliot, *When God Took Sides*, 225–6.
84 Ian d'Alton, "'A Vestigial Population?' Perspectives on Southern Irish Protestants," *Éire-Ireland* 44, no. 3&4 (2009): 39.
85 Ciarán Wallace, "Fighting for Unionist Home Rule: Competing Identities in Dublin 1800–1929," *Journal of Urban History* 38, no. 5 (2012): 941.
86 Yvonne Whelan, "The Construction and Destruction of a Colonial Landscape: Monuments to British Monarchs in Dublin before and after Independence," *Journal of Historical Geography* 28, no. 4 (2002): 508–33. The Nelson pillar survived until 1966.
87 Jane Leonard, "The Twinge of Memory: Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday in Dublin Since 1919," in *Unionism in Modern Ireland: New Perspectives on Politics*

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and Culture, ed. Richard English and Graham Walker (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996), 102; Mandy Link, *Remembrance of the Great War in the Irish Free State, 1914–1937* (Cham: Palgrave, 2019), 135–46.

88 *Irish Times*, May 5, 1924.

89 Paul Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors? Experiences of Southern Irish Soldiers Returning from the Great War* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2015), 213.

90 Leonard, "Twinge of Memory," 102–5; Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?*, 241; Link, *Remembrance*, 148–57.

91 Lionel Fleming, *Head or Harp* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1965), 93.

92 d'Alton, "Protestant 'Belongings,'" 31.

93 Gannon, "Imperial Service," 155–72; Keith Jeffery, "Ireland and the British Army since 1922," in *A Military History of Ireland*, ed. Thomas Bartlett and Keith Jeffery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 431–58; Steven O'Connor, *Irish Officers in the British Forces, 1922–45* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014), 16–22.

94 Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," 103; Michael Viney, "The Five Per Cent—4: The Mixed Marriage," *Irish Times*, March 25, 1965.

95 Coleman, "Longford," 947–52, 974.

96 Eoin de Bhaldraithe, "Mixed Marriages and Irish Politics: The Effect of 'Ne Temere,'" *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review* 77, no. 307 (1988): 284–99.

97 Conor Morrissey, *Protestant Nationalists in Ireland, 1900–1923* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 32–44.

98 Relihan, "Church of Ireland," 147. See *Church of Ireland Gazette*, March 10, 1922, for criticism of the policy and a letter to the editor, March 17, 1922, for individual Protestants embracing the language.

99 Relihan, "Church of Ireland," 157.

100 Ibid., 159–61.

101 McDowell, *Crisis and Decline*, 167, 180.

102 James S. Donnelly, Jr., "Big House Burnings in County Cork during the Irish Revolution, 1920–21," *Éire-Ireland* 47, no. 3 & 4 (2012): 141, 179, no. 166.

103 *Irish Times*, November 22, 1941.

104 Ibid.

105 Notes on an interview between Eunan O'Halpin and Billy Vincent, Monaco, March 16/17, 2012. I am grateful to Professor O'Halpin for sharing these notes.

106 "Monsell, William" by Matthew Potter, *Dictionary of Irish Biography*; *Irish Times*, November 26, 1932.

107 *Irish Times*, November 17, 1934.

108 Hughes, *Defying the IRA?*, 197.

109 Michael Flynn to RIC Pensions Committee, August 1, 1930, TNA, HO 144/22575.

110 *Irish Times*, January 4, 1936.

111 *Irish Times*, July 11, 1936.

112 *The Times (London)*, July 17, 1935.

113 See d'Alton, "Protestant 'Belongings.'"

114 Taylor, *Heroes or Traitors?*, 91–136.

115 Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*, 17.

116 Ibid., 155. Peter Hart found that even in Cork, where he argued that IRA sectarianism was widespread, 36 percent of civilian victims of the IRA were Protestant. While this was far out of proportion with their percentage among the civilian population, it still amounts to a substantial number of Catholic victims: Hart, The I.R.A. at War, 234.

117 Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*, 196.
118 Ibid., 175–6; Hart, *The I.R.A. at War*, 247–8.
119 Hart, *The I.R.A. at War*, 249.
120 Robert Lynch, *The Northern IRA and the Early Years of Partition, 1920–1922* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 2.
121 Ibid., 5–6.
122 Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles*, 52–3.
123 Wilson, *Frontiers of Violence*, 198.
124 Hughes, *Defying the IRA?*, 186–7; Wilson, "Mislaid Minorities," 66–7; Coleman, "Longford," 936.
125 Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities," 106.
126 J. J. Lee, *Ireland 1912–85: Politics and Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 77.
127 Wilson, "Mislaid Minorities," 86.
128 Ibid.