Policing, politics and state intelligence: maintaining order in times of political agitation in England, France and Ireland (1870-1910)

Amélie Gaillat

Supervisors: Dr Brian Hughes, Dr Richard Mc Mahon

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, to the Department of History, Mary Immaculate College

December 2024

Candidate's Declaration

This thesis is entirely my own work, based on research in primary and secondary sources.

Candidate: Amélie Gaillat

Supervisors: Dr Brian Hughes, Dr Richard Mc Mahon

Date: 16 December 2024

Abstract

This thesis compares how England, France and Ireland policed political agitation from the closing decades of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century and how this led to the institutionalization of intelligence-led policing in the three police cultures. It will focus on the period from 1870 to 1910 as this encompasses a crucial time in the political history of all three case studies when police forces had to contend with a range of political groupings that advocated and utilized political violence. The thesis will examine how the police sought to maintain order in times of political agitation by developing innovations in policing methods and practices in each country.

Acknowledgements

My first thanks go to my supervisors at Mary Immaculate College, Dr Brian Hughes and Dr Richard Mc Mahon who took the time to read and edit many drafts of this thesis, guiding me through this research and helping me define its purpose. I would also like to thank Dr Liam Chambers and the Department of History at Mary Immaculate College for awarding me a Departmental Assistantship back in 2021, giving me the opportunity to carry out this project in Ireland. Many thanks to Dr Julianne Stack and the Research Graduate School of MIC for their advice these past three years, particularly in supporting my application to the Irish Research Council (IRC) postgraduate scholarship, resulting in the granting of a two-year scholarship. This financial help allowed me to pursue this work in the best environment and I am very grateful to the IRC for this award. I would also like to thank the faculty of the History Department at SciencesPo Paris, who gave me the taste for research and particularly, Dr Nicolas Roussellier, my MA thesis supervisor, who was the first to encourage me to pursue the PhD path.

I would like to express my gratitude to the personnel of the archives I visited these past three years - the National Archives of Ireland, the National Archives in Kew, the Archives Nationales and the Archives de la Préfecture de Police in Paris - and MIC librarians; without them I would not have been able to achieve this work. I also need to acknowledge the support provided by other historians during this thesis, that took the time to respond to my email and helping me navigate throughout the policing history of England, France and Ireland. Many thanks to Dr Stephen Ball and Owen McGee, helping me find a way through Irish archives, alongside Dr Brian Griffin who was always available to answer my questions on the Irish police and making his own work available to me. I would also like to thank Dr Vlad Solomon who shared with me his knowledge on the history of the special police in England and making his archive materials available, saving me some precious time. The same goes for Thomas Beugniet, a fellow French doctoral student who helped me find my way through the French diplomatic archives. I would also like to thank Dr Marie Vogel who sent me a hard copy of her thesis. For an early-career researcher, the support of established academics is essential at this stage.

Finally, I need to thank my friends and family who have supported me throughout these past three years, through the ups and downs that punctuate the PhD journey. My friends in Paris: Chloé, Colin, Erwann, Lucie, Mario, Ninon, Romain and Tsolinée, providing me with a home during my many archives trips and most importantly, their love, laughs, help and support every time I needed it. I would also like to thank my friend Laura who welcomed me in London for

my first trip to the National Archives in Kew, greatly improving this research experience. Thanks to Lucile and Alain, my parents-in-law, for providing me a comfortable and pleasant workspace during my visits to France. Many thanks go to my parents, Corinne and Thierry and my brother, Mathis, who have always believed in me and supported this project, financially but most importantly emotionally, always being available whenever I needed them. I would have never achieved this work, without my grandparents, Olga and Bernard, their love and support have been endless all my life and especially these past three years. The last person I would like to thank is my partner in life, Bastien, whom I met in Ireland at the very start of this PhD and who has been by my side ever since. His presence completely changed the way I approached this research experience, and I am grateful that it will always be associated with him.

To Bastien, my partner in this adventure and in many more

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

A.D.R. Archives Départementales du Rhône

A.N. Archives Nationales

A.P.P. Archives de la Préfecture de Police

C.I.D. Criminal Investigation Department

C.S.O. Chief Secretary Office

D.I.C.S. District Inspector Crime Special

D.M.P. Dublin Metropolitan Police

G.A.A. Gaelic Athletic Association

I.N.F. Irish National Federation

I.N.L. Irish National League

I.P.P. Irish Parliamentary Party

I.R.B. Irish Republican Brotherhood

M.P. Member of Parliament

N.A.I. National Archives of Ireland

P.P. Préfecture de Police

R.I.C. Royal Irish Constabulary

R.M.s Resident Magistrates

S.G. Sûreté Général

S.R.M.s Special Resident Magistrates

T.N.A. The National Archives

List of Figures

List of Tables

Introduction

The aim of this project is to explore the development of political policing from the closing decades of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century in England, France and Ireland, using comparison as a tool to gain insights and context that could not be achieved through researching each case study individually. It will focus on the period from 1870 to 1910 as this encompasses a crucial time in the political history of the British and French state, when the police, as the civil force of each state responsible for enforcing the law but also for preventing and detecting crime, had to contend with a range of political groupings that advocated and utilized political violence. The thesis will examine how this period of intense political agitation led to innovations in terms of policing methods and practices in the three policing systems.

From the end of the eighteenth century, England, France and Ireland were on varied paths towards greater central control of policing. The state, defined as the ensemble of governing institutions with a monopoly over the enforcement of the law and the related use of public force, was increasingly reliant on policing bodies. At the same time, the state provided greater powers for the police to engage in surveillance of political groupings and, by extension, the wider population, in what can be referred to as 'political policing'. As Clive Emsley contends, political policing can be defined as the 'political partisanship on the part of the police' and/or 'the surveillance of politically suspect groups or individuals'.[1] It is the second aspect of this definition that we are referring to in this study, however it is important to note that the groups subject to political policing were not quite the same in England, France and Ireland. In the French case, surveillance was not limited to groups and individuals making use of extreme political violence. Indeed, under the Second Empire, all kind of political activities, from mainstream to extremist, were monitored by the police and a 'secret file' was held in the archives on every potential enemy of the regime, a practice that was extended during the Third Republic.[2] In Ireland, the political police focused almost exclusively on various groups pushing

[1] Clive Emsley, *The English police: a political and social history* (New York, 2014), p. 103.

[2] Malcolm Anderson, *In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France* (Oxford, 2011), pp 267-74; Nathalie Bayon, 'Personnels et services de surveillance de la préfecture de police: de la constitution des dossiers de surveillance à la mise en forme du politique (1870-1900)' in *Cultures & conflits*, no. 53 (2004), pp 83–98.

for Irish independence from the UK,[3] while the English authorities was first monitoring subversive activities linked to Irish nationalism before focusing on far-left radicals operating from London the moment they started to constitute a challenge to security in Britain.[4]

The decision to compare England, France and Ireland also came from a more general sense that England and France possessed the two dominant and opposing models of policing in Europe at the time.[5] While Paris appeared as an authoritarian place of power using the police to spy on and repress – with the use of force – its population, London presented itself as the example of liberal government with its uniformed and unarmed police force at the service of English citizens.[6] While this image of both policing systems has already been questioned by researchers,[7] the case of Ireland offers another perspective. Dublin was not policed like the rest of the United Kingdom despite being part of it since 1801. This specific political situation led the British authorities to police Ireland differently by relying on a system very similar to the one existing in France.[8] The value of comparing those three case studies lies confronting three different models of policing and to extend further studies focusing on each national context. It reveals the realities rooted behind political policing in each case study and show how similar the central administration in Dublin, London and Paris functioned regarding the production and control of intelligence work to prevent political agitation.

As policing was increasingly run from the center of the state apparatus in Dublin, London and Paris, referred to broadly as the 'central administrations' in this work, a case can also be made that the police was part of a wider 'centralization' process taking place in England, France and Ireland at the time.

---

[3] Charles Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983).

[4] Bernard Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state: the London Metropolitan Police before the first world war* (London, 1987).

[5] Jacques de Maillard, *Comparative Policing* (London, 2022), pp 22-3.

[6] cf. Chapter 1.

[7] Jean-Marc Berlière, 'Du maintien de l'ordre républicain au maintien républicain de l'ordre ? Réflexions sur la violence' in *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire*, xii, no. 1 (1993), pp 6–29 ; Florent Calvez, Fabien Jobard, *Global police: la question policière dans le monde et l'histoire* (Paris, 2023); Clive Emsley, *The English police*.

[8] Jérôme Aan de Wiel, 'Irish Police Intelligence, 1820's-1922' in Simon Ball (ed.), *Cultures of Intelligence in the Era of the World Wars* (Oxford, 2020); Stanley Palmer, *Police and protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988).

What did the 'centralization' of policing mean and how did it come about in our three case studies? In France, according to Jacques de Maillard and Wesley Skogan, centralization was inherited from the Napoleonic model of policing, favouring 'a strong hierarchical structure, distance from local communities, and a high priority on political policing'.[9] In England, by contrast, policing was left to the management of local authorities and the Westminster government exercised limited control over the police throughout the country.[10] As Emsley notes, however, the system entered a process of 'centralization' from the middle of the nineteenth century. For Emsley, the centralization of the English police limited the authority of local powers while reinforcing links with the central administration.[11] The aim of this re-organization was to rationalize 'the police in terms of economy and efficiency'.[12] The policing institutions established by the British authorities in Ireland also emerged from a need to gather information on the state of the country and to maintain order and political authority. According to Jérome Aan de Wiel in his article on Irish police intelligence, the Irish police seems to have been inspired by the Napoleonic system of political policing and centralization of information gathering.[13] Later, it was more like the French gendarmerie and the Renseignments Généraux, the intelligence service set up in France in the early twentieth century.[14] R.B. McDowell also insists on the centralized dimensions of the police force in Ireland, directly responding to the Irish executive.[15] This is something Virginia Crossman has, more recently, analyzed in an article on the growing importance of the state in nineteenth century Ireland, by reflecting on the impact of centralization on the Irish police and how it was related to the central government's legitimacy.[16] In England, France and Ireland, greater central oversight of policing thus expanded a process illustrated by the existence of a chain of command, descending from the central administration to local police officers. Those operating on the ground were increasingly

[9] Jacques de Maillard, Wesley Skogan (eds), *Policing in France* (New-York, 2021), p. i.

[10] Clive Emsley, 'La légitimité de la police anglaise: une perspective historique comparée' in *Déviance et société*, xiii, no. 1 (1989), pp 25-6.

[11] Emsley, *The English police,* p. 6.

[12] Ibid, pp 6-7.

[13] Aan de Wiel, 'Irish Police Intelligence', p.129; p. 131.

[14] Ibid, p.132; p. 140.

[15] R. B. McDowell, *The Irish administration, 1801-1914* (London, 1964), p. 139.

[16] Virginia Crossman, 'The Growth of the State in the Nineteenth Century' in James Kelly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 3: 1730–1880* (Cambridge, 2018), pp 542-66.

bound to varying degrees to the authority of the central administration via the communication of daily reports.

In each jurisdiction, the control and greater centralization of political policing and intelligence work was run by a specific institution: the Home Office in England, the Chief Secretary's Office (C.S.O.) in Ireland and the Ministry of the Interior in France. The Home Office was established in 1782, and the Ministry of the Interior was created in response to the French Revolution in 1790. Both were executive departments, respectively of the British and French governments, in charge of the police. The Ministry of the Interior only lost this prerogative between 1796 and 1818 in favor of the Ministry of the Police Générale.[17] In Ireland, the C.S.O. was the seat of executive power, under the control of the chief secretary – a political appointment and generally a member of the British Cabinet - and his under-secretary – a civil servant responsible for the day to day running of the Irish administration. The C.S.O. became increasingly central to the work of the police in nineteenth-century Ireland.[18]

Between 1870 to 1910, each institution favored a process of greater central oversight, to reinforce their control over policing and to monitor political groups using increasingly intelligence-led methods. To quote Jacques de Maillard and Wesley Skogan, centralization 'does not mean that police action is totally controlled by the state and that vertical logics apply mechanically'.[19] Indeed, this was a constant process of adaptation and negotiation with other institutions – especially police officials, the parliament but also public opinion – achieved progressively and differently in each country. Parliaments, for instance, attempted to control the power of police institutions in certain cases: they voted for the police budget in England and established the legislative framework for policing in England and Ireland, while attempting to control how secret funds were spent by the government in France.[20]

It is vital, therefore, to reflect on the powers held by the C.S.O., the Home Office, and the Ministry of the Interior over policing in 1870, how this changed by 1910, and how we understand these changes. How much central control of policing was there and how England, France and Ireland compared to each other in 1870? What changes occurred between 1870 and

[17] cf. Chapter 1.

[18] Kieran Flanagan, 'The Chief Secretary's Office, 1853-1914: A Bureaucratic Enigma' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxiv, no. 94 (1984), pp 197–225.

[19] de Maillard, Skogan (eds), *Policing in France*, p. 5.

[20] cf. Chapter 6.

1910? How much central control of policing was there by 1910? What, overall, do we learn about the policing of political agitation in western Europe from these three case studies?

In this thesis, we will argue that processes of centralization accelerated in the last two decades of the nineteenth century but encountered different challenges in England, France and Ireland. This was rooted in and linked to the different policing histories and cultures of each country, resulting in the different characteristics associated with each system: the source of its financing, the verticality of its chain of command, its control of intelligence work, and its role in the defence of the interests of the state. By exploring the evolution in the policing of political agitation, this thesis analyzes processes of the institutionalization of intelligence-led policing orchestrated by, the C.S.O., the Home Office, and the Ministry of the Interior and considers these processes as indicators of greater central oversight and control over policing. This will allow us to reflect on the growth of intelligence-led policing under the direct control of central administrations but also on its limits, especially when it comes to establishing international forms of policing co-operation.

While it is not the place here for an in-depth study of the key economic, social, legal and political characteristics of each case study, it would be remiss not to briefly acknowledge that there were often compelling differences between England, France and Ireland, economically, socially and politically, at the time. England and Ireland were both constituent parts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and shared a common law system but relations between the two jurisdictions were also often fraught. There were deep divisions, particularly on issues of land and the nature of political control over the island of Ireland. Indeed, the smaller island was often viewed with a mix of condescension and concern over its apparent unwillingness to fully embrace its place within the empire. It also remained predominantly rural and agricultural while England was at the forefront of nineteenth-century industrialization. The differences and divisions between England and France in the late nineteenth century were also obvious and compelling. England was a constitutional monarchy throughout the nineteenth century, and the Third Republic was proclaimed in 1870 in France and put an end to the imperial regime of Napoleon III. Both had very different legal systems and traditions, and both were historical and imperial rivals. Industrialization and urbanization also occurred at a greater and more impressive pace in England than France across the nineteenth century. Both were, however, also arguably liberal powers facing the increasing influence of an imperial and more conservative Germany. This would ultimately draw them closer together via the entente cordiale of the early twentieth century, but deep mutual suspicions remained. These specific

national contexts, crudely drawn here, also contributed to the development of distinctive kinds of policing, in each country, as will be seen in this thesis.

Profound philosophical differences around policing, of course, existed between Dublin, London and Paris and their resulting systems, whose modern origins generally date back to the early 1800s.[21] In France, despite the establishment of a republican regime in 1870 and protest coming from the parliament regarding the use of the police to track down political opposition in a democratic regime, the police was still at the service of the state apparatus, ready to defend it against all kinds of political threats, potential or proven.[22] This eventually resulted in the implementation of a political police at the service of the Republic, centralizing and institutionalizing practices previously developed by authoritarian regimes.[23] Like its predecessors, the republican government used the police as an instrument in defense of the regime, ostensibly at odds with the liberal values associated with republicanism.[24] This thesis thus reflects on the tension existing between liberal ideals and the development and institutionalization of intelligence-led forms of political policing in France.

In England, the concentration of powers in the hands of the central administration was resisted by powerful elements within British political elites and arguably by influential sections of popular opinion.[25] The English system relied on the principles of 'policing by consent' theorized by Robert Peel when he set up the Metropolitan Police in 1829. The police was at the service of the public, with the mission to prevent crimes and disorders and to make use of physical force as a last resort.[26] For this reason, during the first part of the nineteenth century, the police remained largely a matter for local authorities, and detective functions were not well

[21] The origins and evolution of political policing during the nineteenth century is developed in Chapter 1.

[22] Amélie Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République: les institutions de l'État face à l'anarchisme dans les années 1880' (M.A. thesis, SciencesPo Paris, 2019).

[23] Jean-Marc Berlière, 'L'institution policière en France sous la 3ème république (1875-1914)' (PhD thesis, Université de Bourgogne, 1991); Jean-Marc Berlière and Marie Vogel, 'Aux origines de la police politique républicaine' (2008), p. 15.

[24] Anja Johansen, 'A Process of Civilisation? Legitimisation of Violent Policing in Prussian and French Police Manuals and Instructions, 1880–1914' in *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, xiv, no. 1 (2007), pp 49–71; Anja Johansen, 'Beyond the Reach of Law? Criminal Prosecution of Parisian Police Personnel, 1872–1914' in *The Journal of Modern History*, xcii, no. 3 (2020), pp 485–520.

[25] Palmer, *Police and protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850*, pp 303-8; Vlad Solomon, *State Surveillance, Political Policing and Counter-Terrorism in Britain* (Woodbridge, 2023), p. 12.

[26] Calvez, Jobard, *Global police*, p. 33.

developed.[27] While the Metropolitan Police, which operated in the heart of the English capital, relied on political police practices at specific times, it had more difficulty than its French and Irish counterparts in institutionalizing these practices when it faced a clear political threat in the 1880s. In comparison to its European neighbors, England did not produce homegrown groups dedicated to political violence, when Fenians[28] emerged in Ireland or the anarchists in France in mid-nineteenth century. While other powers were subjected to political revolution in 1848, the British empire arguably served as a kind of safety valve.[29] This specific dimension and the lack of native agitation perhaps explains the later emergence of an intelligence-led policing system in England.[30]

In Ireland, the authorities did not hesitate, in the first place, to use an armed and repressive police force to put down the various agitations challenging the power of the state.[31] Unlike in England, the Irish administration came to rely heavily on a centrally-controlled police force deployed throughout the country to ensure order and political authority. The specific situation of Ireland within the UK made its policing model an exception in the British system. It proved to be more professionalized and arguably more effective in countering insurrections, and more centralized,[32] a process which accelerated from the early 1880s, as Dublin Castle sought increasingly to manage the policing of political agitation.

Berlière and Lévy, while recognizing the centralized dimension of the French system, have nuanced its strictly hierarchical aspect, insisting on the existence of not one but different police forces similar to Great Britain in the nineteenth century.[33] While this thesis agrees with this analysis, it will insist on the existence of various institutions responsible for gathering

---

[27] Emsley, 'La légitimité de la police anglaise', p.25; Clive Emsley, 'Police, maintien de l'ordre et espaces urbains: une lecture anglaise' in *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine (1954-)*, vol. 50, no. 1 (2003), pp 8-9.

[28] The term 'Fenians' is used in this thesis as an umbrella term encompassing different groups and organizations contesting British Rule in Ireland, often through the use political violence, in a similar way to which the term was used in police reports at the time.

[29] Miles Taylor, 'The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire' in *Past & Present*, no. 166 (2000), pp 146-80.

[30] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*.

[31] Georgina Sinclair, 'The "Irish" policeman and the Empire: influencing the policing of the British Empire-Commonwealth' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxvi, no. 142 (2008), pp 173–187.

[32] Palmer, *Police and Protest*, p. 31.

[33] Jean-Marc Berlière, René Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing. From the Ancien Régime to De Gaulle and the *Police Nationale'* in de Maillard, Skogan (eds), *Policing in France*, p. 21.

intelligence on political agitators, eventually leading to the birth of networks in charge of political policing that were under increasing central oversight and control.[34]

The police in the three jurisdictions were also influenced by each other. Experts in political policing were travelling between Dublin and London during times of political agitation, while competition between Britain and France stimulated policing innovations at the end of the nineteenth century. Despite moments of collaboration brought about by the international threat posed by movements making use of political violence, intelligence-led policing, under the direct control of central administrations, fell short of developing into more sustained international structures of policing. There were, therefore, clear national limits placed on the development of the policing of political agitation in the decades before the Great War that reflected mutual suspicions and conflicting national interests. This was, moreover, at a time when radical political movements took on an increasingly transnational character encompassing both Europe and the Americas.[35]

Throughout the nineteenth century, there were significant ideological and rhetorical dissimilarities between UK and French authorities in terms of their justification of political policing and willingness to use it. Yet, despite these ideological and rhetorical dissimilarities two paradoxes appear. First, policing in Ireland developed much along the lines of French policing. Second, the English authorities from 1870 to 1910, adopted an approach very similar to the French and Irish, despite facing a lower level of political violence. This research thus demonstrates trends towards convergence in the institutionalization of political policing in England, as well as in France and Ireland, with high levels of centralization of intelligence-led policing by Dublin, London and Paris. Conversely, both London and Paris showed considerable reluctance to further improve the effectiveness of political policing through international cooperation and to share intelligence practices with other European countries.

The first chapter of the thesis offers a detailed overview of the evolution of policing in England, France and Ireland throughout the nineteenth century with a particular focus on the policing of political agitation,[36] but it is necessary here to offer a short outline of the different institutional

---

[34] Vlad Solomon, 'Straining the Law: The creation of a British Model of political policing,1881-191' (PhD thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 2016), p. 14; Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 177-8.

[35] E.g. Richard Bach Jensen, *The battle against anarchist terrorism: an international history, 1878-1934* (Cambridge, 2014); Mathieu Deflem, *Policing world society: historical foundations of international police cooperation* (Oxford, 2002).

[36] cf. Chapter 1.

frameworks that the police worked within in each jurisdiction and the contexts in which they operated.

In France, the two main institutions in charge of political policing throughout the national territory, but also abroad, where the Préfecture de Police or Parisian Police (P.P.) and the Sûreté Générale (S.G.). The former, in charge of policing Paris since 1800, was under the management of the Préfet de police de Paris or Paris police prefect appointed by and reporting to the government.[37] Officially, its jurisdiction was limited to Paris and its suburbs, but the P.P. also employed agents to gather information abroad.[38] It was considered as a municipal police force, funded by the city with a contribution by the state. It thus employed a uniformed force in charge of policing the streets of Paris. The P.P. also managed different sections of plainclothes officers, among them the four research squads in charge of political policing.[39] The S.G. was the other policing institution in charge of gathering information for the Ministry of the Interior. It employed the special railway commissioners, who were first in charge of policing the railways as their name indicates, before monitoring both the movement of criminal individuals and political opponents of the regime and reporting on the state of public opinion in 1855 under Napoleon III.[40] They were progressively put in charge of port and border control, before their strategic position conferred upon them the specific mission of political policing from the early 1880s.[41] The S.G. also recruited and managed the police commissioners in charge of the municipal forces for cities exceeding 5,000 inhabitants and the entire staff of the nationalized municipal forces.[42]

[37] Berlière, Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing', p. 22.

[38] cf. Chapters 1 and 3.

[39] Berlière, Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing', p. 22.

[40] Jean-Marc Berlière, René Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France: de l'Ancien régime à nos jours* (Paris, 2013), p. 304.

[41] Ibid., p. 305.

[42] Berlière, Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing', p. 22.

Figure 1: French policing institutions in charge of intelligence work in 1880



The Lyon police is also part of this research because of its role in the repression of anarchism in the city in 1882.[43] All agents of the force were recruited and paid by the state from the budget of the Ministry of the Interior voted by the parliament, while police powers were confined to the departmental prefect here and not the mayor, as was the case normally for the municipal police forces.[44] Although not central to this study, as they were not involved in political policing, the municipal forces are still mentioned in this work when exploring the reinforcement of the centralization of intelligence-led policing by the state apparatus following the municipal law of 1884.[45] Finally, the gendarmerie, a uniformed police force employed by the War Ministry, was purposely excluded from this research due to the military nature of their work and records. If the gendarmes sometimes undertook political policing under the Third Republic, especially regarding the control of nomads, their principal function remained maintaining order and public tranquility and leading counter espionage operations against foreign powers.[46]

[43] cf. Chapter 4.

[44] Berlière, Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing', p. 22.

[45] cf. Chapter 4.

[46] Laurent Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu: gendarmes et policiers, co-acteurs de la sécurité publique sous la Troisième République, 1870-1914* (Paris, 2014), pp 177-88.

In nineteenth-century England, an effort was made to establish a form of regional policing. The system of uniformed police force established in London by Robert Peel in 1829,[47] known as the Metropolitan Police, was adopted more broadly in the rest of the country and Wales in 1856. We decided here to only study the Metropolitan Police because of its role in gathering and centralizing information from the early 1870s and as a police force under direct ministerial supervision. The commissioner of the Metropolitan Police was directly responsible to the home secretary, while the other forces were controlled by local authorities.[48] The Home Office was then monitoring political policing work in England and made continued efforts to increase its control over intelligence-led policing in moments of political agitation from the end of the nineteenth century.

In Ireland, both police forces, the Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P.), were involved in political policing. The R.I.C. was a hierarchical armed and uniformed police force, managed, from 1836, by a central inspector general of police, who oversaw 14,000 armed officers deployed throughout the country by the 1880s.[49] The D.M.P. was responsible for Dublin city, with uniformed and unarmed officers deployed in six districts across the city, and with a detective branch also known as the G Division. It was under the authority of a chief commissioner. Both forces were directly controlled by the chief secretary of Ireland's office stationed at Dublin Castle, which relied on them to gather information on political matters.

[47] cf. Chapter 1.

[48] Emsley, 'La légitimité de la police anglaise', p. 26.

[49] McDowell, *The Irish administration,* p. 143.

Figure 2: The Irish police administration in 1880



It is the surveillance and information gathering practices produced by these three policing systems that are at the heart of this thesis.[50] Although agitators and their motives will necessarily be examined here, they are primarily studied as objects of surveillance by the selected police forces in England, France and Ireland and their views on police practices will not be central to the thesis. The way they were perceived by the police and the reflections the policemen may have on their own work will, however, be explored in detail here.

If we are to adopt the point of view of the police and the governments that control them, this does not mean that we approve or consider as accurate their analysis of political agitators. As in any historical work, it is necessary to take a critical view of the sources studied and raise their potential flaws. It is important to note that the production of information about certain groups may have tended to overstate their importance to enhance the need for greater powers and resources. Similarly, this systematic monitoring may also have been a way to discourage agitators from acting. We have also tried to mention, where possible, the criticism that emerged in public opinion and parliament regarding the use of political policing and its centralization in the hands of the state apparatus. The comparative scale and dimension of the thesis also presented challenges when it came to the primary and secondary sources available to conduct this research and it is important to reflect on these challenges from the outset.

Historiographical review

This thesis, comparing three policing systems over thirty years, builds on an extensive historiography. Except for a few studies, detailed at the end of this section, most of the research discussed here only focuses on one of the three case studies: England, France or Ireland. The comparative aspects of this work, its specific focus on the political dimension of policing and its institutionalization at the end of the nineteenth century along with its reflection on international police co-operation, are central to the contribution of this research to the understanding of the subject. The aim of this dissertation is not to question the national historiography of each country when it comes to political policing, but to contextualize the existing historiographical interpretations into a larger European framework thanks to the use of comparison. It starts with the different models of English and French policing and ends with the existence of similar patterns of centralization of intelligence work limiting collaboration

[50] An English chart was not put here on purpose, as other charts are included in following chapters showing evolution and changes within the English police, such as the anti-Fenian network in 1883 and the establishment of the Special Branch in 1887.

when it came to police transnational menace. Regarding Ireland, the thesis does bring new insights on the events of the 1880s, as the current historiography on policing does not tackle fully the question of intelligence work and the role of the D.M.P. in this matter. It also insists on the influence exercised by the Irish policing system over its English counterpart.

In France, the history of policing has been the object of a recent and abundant historiography. The work of Jean-Marc Berlière is extensively referenced in this study as it remains the seminal work on the history of the police in France.[51] Berlière was the first to study the police under the Third Republic and deeply interrogate the notion of 'republican political policing', which is a central feature of this thesis. Quentin Deluermoz's work on the construction of public order in Paris retraces the evolution of policing, the daily practices of the policemen and the professionalisation of their function from the Second Empire to the First World War.[52] Deluermoz primarily focuses on the urban dimension of policing, and the fundamental place of the P.P. in Paris throughout these years, something this thesis will complement by reflecting on the role of the Parisian institution within the French central administration at the time of the Third Republic. Marie Vogel also analyses the administration of local police in her PhD thesis, offering some elements of comparison with the case of the S.G..[53]

Arnaud-Dominique Houte's research on the Third Republic and his work on crime and public security in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also needs to be mentioned.[54] His approach to policing through criminality and its social aspects differs from ours, but his recent book on the 'fears' of the *Belle Epoque* reflects on the perception of political agitation by the press and public opinion, complementing our own research on policing institutions and the

[51] Berlière, 'L'institution policière en France sous la 3ème république'; Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le préfet Lépine: vers la naissance de la police moderne* (Paris, 1993); Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France: XIXe-XXe siècles* (Bruxelles, 1996) ; *La police à Paris en 1900* (Paris, 2023); with Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France: de l'Ancien régime à nos jours*.

[52] Quentin Deluermoz, *Policiers dans la ville: la construction d'un ordre public à Paris* (1854-1914) (Paris, 2012).

[53] Marie Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national : l'administration des polices urbaines sous la Troisième république' (PhD thesis, Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble, 1993).

[54] Arnaud-Dominique Houte, *Histoire de la France contemporaine*, t. 4 : *Le triomphe de la République, 1871-1914*, (Paris, 2014), *Propriété défendue: La société française à l'épreuve du vol, XIXe – XXe siècles* (Paris, 2021) ; *Citoyens policiers: Une autre histoire de la sécurité publique en France, de la garde nationale aux voisins vigilants* (Paris, 2024).

response of the police to those agitations.[55] Houte also contributed to the anthology *Histoire des Polices en France* published in 2020, offering a holistic view of French policing history.[56] This work, aimed at a non-specialist audience, still offers a point of entry into the history of policing in France, insisting on the variety of its institutions and actors. The chronological approach adopted by the authors allows us to grasp the evolution of policing in the long run, a methodology also applied in this thesis. Laurent Lopez's more recent study on the police and the gendarmerie complements this field of research on police forces and the establishment of professional policing at the end of the nineteenth century.[57] His multi-scale approach sheds light on the work of the policemen of the S.G. at a local level. Other historians have studied the work of the special police officers, relying on departmental archives, like Marie-Josèphe Dhavernas in her article on the individualist anarchists and Maurice Mathieu in his research on special commissioners of the Vienne department.[58] Lopez, Dhavernas and Mathieu shed light on the practices of surveillance and information gathering employed by the policemen of the S.G. throughout the territory.

When it comes to the history of political policing and intelligence work in France, the literature is less extensive, probably due to the secret nature of these kinds of practices. Regarding the use of informants and their role in gathering information, Jean-Paul Brunet's *La Police de l'ombre: indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine* remains the key text on the subject.[59] In keeping with Brunet's work, we offer a fresh perspective on the use of informants in the three jurisdictions showing how this political practice was institutionalized as much as others at the end of the nineteenth century. It is also necessary to mention the research of Sébastien-Yves Laurent on what he called the 'secret state'.[60] While Laurent extended this

---

[55] Arnaud-Dominique Houte, *Les peurs de la Belle Époque: crimes, attentats, catastrophes et autres périls* (Paris, France, 2022).

[56] Vincent Milliot (ed.), Emmanuel Blanchard, Vincent Denis, Arnaud-Dominique-Houte, *Histoire des polices en France: des guerres de Religion à nos jours* (Paris, 2020).

[57] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*.

[58] Marie-Josèphe Dhavernas, 'La surveillance des anarchistes individualistes (1894-1914)' ; Maurice Mathieu, 'Le rôle politique des commissaires spéciaux de la police des chemins de fer dans la Vienne entre 1874 et 1814.' in Philippe Vigier, Alain Faure (eds), *Maintien de l'ordre et polices: en France et en Europe au XIXe siècle* (Paris, France, 1987).

[59] Jean-Paul Brunet, *La Police de l'ombre: indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine* (Paris, France, 1990).

[60] Sébastien-Yves Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre: État, renseignement et surveillance en France* (Paris, 2009); *Le secret de l'Etat. Surveiller, protéger, informer XVIIe-XXIe siècle* (Paris, 2023).

idea of the existence of a clandestine state in charge of political policing and intelligence work, whose role was to preserve the democratic transparency of liberal governments in France and England, his approach is more theoretical and philosophical than historical.[61]

In England, the preeminent historian of the new police remains Clive Emsley, who published numerous studies, not only on the English police but also on its European counterparts, and interrogated the centralizing processes of the Metropolitan Police from the 1880s.[62] He also reflected on the policing practices of European police forces throughout the nineteenth century.[63] Like Berlière's work on the French case, Emsley's research is important to this thesis when it comes to the evolution of English policing. While the French historian insisted on how the Third Republic institutionalized political policing, Emsley does not dwell on the similar evolution experienced by the English model in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Bernard Porter's book *The origins of the vigilant state: the London Metropolitan Police before the First World War* is also relevant to understanding the tension existing between a British liberal ideal and the necessity to rely on political policing in times of agitation.[64] While highlighting the direct impact that revolutionary movements had on the development of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch in the 1880s, he does not insist on the role the London force played in institutionalizing political policing practices at the time. It is important to acknowledge that this thesis does not aim to insert itself into the classical 'traditionalist/ revisionist' debate regarding the police in England,[65] as neither of these historical schools of thoughts consider the political police as a specific object of study.[66] This is not the case, however, with Philip Thurmond Smith, whose research retraced in detail the events leading to the creation of the Metropolitan Police detective branch, while insisting on the inefficiency of the police in monitoring and detecting political radicalism in the 1860s.[67]

---

[61] Sébastien-Yves Laurent, *Etat secret, état clandestin: essai sur la transparence démocratique* (Paris, 2024).

[62] Emsley, *The English police;* Clive Emsley, *Crime, Police, and Penal Policy: European Experiences 1750-1940* (Oxford, 2007); Clive Emsley, *Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-century Europe* (Oxford, 1999).

[63] Clive Emsley, Haia Shpayer-Markov (eds), *Police detectives in history, 1750-1950* (Burlington, 2006); Clive Emsley, Barbara Weinberger (eds), *Policing Western Europe: politics, professionalism, and public order, 1850-1940* (New York, 1991).

[64] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state.*

[65] On this see Emsley, *The English police*, pp 4-5 and Palmer, *Police and protest*, pp 6-8.

[66] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 5.

[67] Phillip Thurmond Smith, *Policing Victorian London: political policing, public order, and the London Metropolitan Police* (Westport, 1985).

Similarly, this thesis shows that England eventually developed a working system of intelligence-led policing after repeatedly facing political agitators in the 1880s-90s but places these developments within a wider comparative framework.

Our study is also carried out in the light of the work of Lindsay Clutterbuck and the recent research of Vlad Solomon on the existence of a British model of political policing in the nineteenth century.[68] Vlad Solomon argues that 'a distinctly British model of policing political threats to the stability of the state emerged from the discrete, and often conflicting, visions of several individual statesman, bureaucrats and police officials – and that the principal feature of this model was extra-legality'.[69] Similarly, this thesis insists on the institutionalization of political policing practices into a specific system in England, due to a distinctive move towards greater centralization following conflicts between political and policing actors. Our research, however, does not explore the legal and administrative dimension of said practices but interrogates how England insisted on preserving the secrecy of its system to maintain its liberal superiority over its European counterparts.

Regarding the literature on the history of the police in Ireland, the work of W.J. Lowe and Elizabeth Malcolm on the social history of the Royal Irish Constabulary constitutes the most important reference points on the subject.[70] While this thesis focuses on the political dimension of policing, Malcolm's research also reflects on the detective functions of the R.I.C. and of the centralized organization of the police force.[71] Jim Herlihy's reference guides on the personnel of the constabulary and the D.M.P. and Anastasia Dukova's study of the Dublin Metropolitan Police offer a good account of both police forces in Ireland, but neither of the authors mention how Dublin Castle relied on them to police political agitation throughout the

---

[68] Lindsay Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history? The evolution of counter terrorism methodology in the Metropolitan Police from 1829 to 1901, with particular reference to the influence of extreme Irish Nationalist activity' (PhD thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2002); Solomon, 'Straining the Law'; *State Surveillance*.

[69] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 14.

[70] W.J. Lowe, Elisabeth Malcolm, 'The domestication of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 1836–1922' in *Irish Economic and Social History*, 19 (1992), pp 27-48; Elisabeth Malcolm, *The Irish policeman: 1822-1922* (Dublin, 2006).

[71] Elizabeth Malcolm, 'Investigating the "Machinery of Murder": Irish Detectives and Agrarian Outrages, 1847-70' in *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, vi, no. 3 (2002), pp 73–91; Elizabeth Malcolm, 'The Irish Inspectors General, 1838–1916: Leading Dublin Castle's constabulary "machine"' in Kim Stevenson, David Cox, Iain Channing (eds), *Leading the Police: A History of Chief Constables 1835–2017* (London, 2017).

nineteenth century.[72] The research of Brian Griffin on the social history of the Irish police was particularly helpful, because it also shed light on the missions and practices of the police and their evolution in response to political agitations in Ireland, in both rural and urban areas.[73] Stephen Ball's thesis on the policing of the Land War, while focusing on the legal repression of the conflict, takes a good look at the functioning of the Irish central administration.[74] He argues that the reform of the Irish police to counter the Land War agitation, if efficient at the time, 'ultimately undermined the legitimacy of British rule in Ireland'.[75] Complemented by his edition of Samuel Water's memoirs, Ball's research helps us grasp the installation and functioning of an Irish intelligence system and its impact on political agitation in the short term.[76]

With the exception of Jerome Aan de Wiel's article on Irish Police intelligence and its comparison to the French model, there has not been any extensive survey on the political dimension of policing in Ireland.[77] The work of Charles Townshend on the use of political violence in Ireland in relation to fenianism from the mid-nineteenth century allow us to get a better understanding of the functioning of the Irish political police, while Niall Whelehan's recent study on Irish nationalism exposed the policing challenges dynamiters caused to British institutions at the time.[78] If both approaches focus on political agitators, Whelehan's work insists on the transnational dimension of fenianism, allowing us to extend our reflection on policing collaboration when it comes to this kind of agitation. Whelehan, nevertheless, contested the establishment of a political policing system in Great Britain at the time, arguing

---

[72] Jim Herlihy, *The Royal Irish Constabulary: a short history and genealogical guide : with a select list of medal awards and casualties* (Dublin, 1997); *The Dublin Metropolitan Police: a short history and genealogical guide ; with notes on medal awards and casualties and lists of members connected with the London Metropolitan Police, the Irish Revenue Police, the (Royal) Irish Constabulary and the British Army* (Dublin, 2001); Anastasia Dukova, *History of the dublin Metropolitan Police and its colonial legacy* (London, 2017).

[73] Brian Griffin, 'The Irish police, 1836-1914: a social history' (PhD thesis, Loyola University Chicago, 1991); 'Prevention and detection of crime in nineteenth-century Ireland' in Norma M. Dawson, *Reflections on law and history: Irish Legal History Society discourses and other papers, 2000-2005* (Dublin, 2006).

[74] Stephen Ball, 'Policing the land war: official responses to political protest and agrarian crime in Ireland, 1879-91' (PhD thesis, University of London, 2000).

[75] Ibid., p. 2.

[76] Samuel Waters, Stephen Ball (ed.), *A policeman's Ireland: recollections of Samuel Waters, RIC* (Cork, 2005).

[77] Aan de Wiel, 'Irish Police Intelligence', pp 129-44.

[78] Charles Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*; Niall Whelehan, *The Dynamiters: Irish nationalism and political violence in the wider world, 1867-1900* (Cambridge, 2015).

that 'the authorities (...) stumble through, improvising and testing different methods.'[79] On the contrary, this thesis shows that after encountering Fenian dynamiters, the British central administration came to rely directly on methods previously used by the Irish police to counter this kind of agitation. Those methods were also used against anarchists in the mid 1890s by the Metropolitan Police Special Branch set up in 1887, testifying to their institutionalization and of the existence of a system of political policing in England. Shane Kenna's work also need to be mentioned here, as he argues that the establishment of intelligence-led policing in England was partly the result of the Fenian bombing campaign of the 1880s.[80] Kenna's study, however, focusses on Fenian terrorism at the time, while this thesis considers the functioning of intelligence-led policing systems and not directly the agitators and their strategies.

A key aspect of this thesis resides not only in the comparison of three models of policing but also their interconnections. When it comes to the establishment of policing systems in Great Britain, Stanley Palmer tackled the contradictions existing between the Peelian preventative approach to policing in London and the experimentation of a centralized police force in Ireland.[81] Clive Emsley offered a reflection on the legitimacy of the English police in a comparative perspective and attempted to draw up a typology of nineteenth-century police, comparing the French, English, Italian and Prussian cases.[82] We can also mention the work of Roisin Healy, analyzing and comparing the use of political violence in Ireland and Ukraine at the time.[83] When it comes to comparative policing histories, this thesis places itself in the tradition of Anja Johansen's studies of the English, French and Prussian police at the end of the nineteenth century.[84] While Johansen's work does not focus on intelligence-led policing but

---

[79] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters,* p. 133.

[80] Shane Kenna, 'The philosophy of the bomb: the Fenian dynamite campaign and the British counter response 1876-1885' (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2011).

[81] Palmer, *Police and protest*.

[82] Emsley, 'La légitimité de la police anglaise'.

[83] Róisín Healy, 'Nationalist Violence in Ireland and Western Ukraine: Political Assassinations Compared, 1882-1934' in Ireland and Ukraine' in Stephen Velychenko, Joseph Ruane and Ludmilla Hrynevych, *Essays in Comparative History and Politics* (Stuttgart, 2022), pp 330–46.

[84] Anja Johansen, 'A Process of Civilisation?'; 'Violent Repression or Modern Strategies of Crowd Management? Soldiers as Riot Police in France and Germany, 1890–1914' in *French History*, xv, no. 4 (2001), pp 400-20; Anja Johansen, 'Keeping up appearances: Police Rhetoric, Public Trust and "Police Scandal" in London and Berlin, 1880-1914' in *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies*, xv, no. 1 (2011), pp 59-83; Anja Johansen, 'Lost in Translation: The English Policeman through a German Monocle, 1848–1914' in *History*, xcviii, no. 333 (2013), pp 750-68.

rather on public order and police accountability,[85] the methodology she developed to compare the different police forces is similar to the one used here. We relied on different case studies to explore the functioning of the three-policing system, highlighting their similarities and differences in matters of administration, but mostly in their process of reaction to political violence. Ultimately, in drawing these different strands together, this thesis also follows the research of political scientists Jacques de Maillard and Fabien Jobard, who both offer a comparative approach to policing in France.[86] In the graphic novel Jobard published with Florent Calvez entitled *Global Police. La question policière dans le monde et l'histoire*, different policing models are compared, including the French and the British ones, while the authors draw a bridge between past and present to explore the evolution of diverse forms of policing existing in the world.[87]

By comparing the English, French and Irish policing systems at the end of the nineteenth century, this thesis necessarily falls within the field of comparative history. As defined by Philippa Levine, comparative history is 'nothing more than historical investigation at multiple sites (two or more) in order to tease out similarities and differences … and to test what the local might help reveal at the level of the general'.[88] This study is grounded in a definite historical period – 1870 to 1910 – and explores the different networks and actors involved in policing at the time, but also moments of exchange and collaboration within said period as Levine's methodology of comparative history suggests.[89]

Besides offering original research comparing the three policing systems established and functioning in France, England and Ireland from 1870 to 1910, this thesis also tackles the issue in an original manner. In the studies previously mentioned, some historians acknowledge the intelligence dimension of policing as one aspect of the work. However, this thesis puts intelligence-led policing at its core, and to study its practices, actors and evolution over forty

---

[85] Anja Johansen, '"Citizens" Complaints and Police (un)accountability: the Career of a Parisian Commissaire de Police of the Belle Epoque' in David Nash and Anne-Marie Nash (eds), *Law, Crime and Deviance since 1700* (London, 2016), pp 173-90; Anja Johansen, 'Policemen in the Dock' in *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies*, no. vol. 23, n°2 (2019), pp 51-75.

[86] de Maillard, *Comparative Policing*; Fabien Jobard, Axel Groenemeyer, *Déviances et modalités de contrôle: la France et l'Allemagne en perspective* (Genève, 2005); David P. Waddington, Fabien Jobard and Mike King, *Rioting in the UK and France, 2001-2006: A comparative analysis* (Cullompton, 2009).

[87] Calvez, Jobard, *Global police*.

[88] Philippa Levine, 'Is Comparative History Possible?' in *History and Theory*, liii, no. 3 (2014), pp 332.

[89] Ibid., pp 334-5.

years. In comparison, historians and researchers in security studies tend to date the emergence of intelligence-led policing to the establishment of certain well-defined institutions, such as MI5 in England or the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (D.G.S.E), the French external security services.[90] Other work in this field linked the study of intelligence-led policing with specific events, such as the First and Second World Wars,[91] and the Cold War.[92] This also tends to reinforce the idea that police intelligence gathering did not exist before the twentieth century, something this thesis argues against. If other research has attempted to offer a long-term approach to intelligence studies, it often limits this to its military aspects.[93]

Thus, this thesis focuses on the history of intelligence-led policing in England, France and Ireland from 1870 to 1910 and concludes that three institutions – the Home Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the C.S.O. – favoured an increasing centralization of intelligence-led policing to put it at the service of the government to counter political agitation. This process was, however, subject to constant negotiation and adaptation involving police officials and political actors which varied across the three jurisdictions and resulted ultimately in greater national central control and (very) limited international forms of policing collaboration. The main challenge of such work, of course, resides in the comparison of three geographical and historical spaces, which therefore necessitates access to a large number of primary sources.

Primary sources

Due to previous Master's research on the police and its repression of anarchism in France at the end of the nineteenth century, we were already accustomed with the French side of this research and especially the archival records used in this thesis.[94] The easy access provided by the Archives Nationales (A.N.) and the Archives de la Préfecture de Police (A.P.P.) in Paris permits the study of a large number of documents produced by the policing administration between 1870 and 1910. We were also able to easily access material relating to the Metropolitan Police and the central administration from the National Archives (T.N.A.) in Kew, except for the

[90] Christopher Andrew, *The defence of the realm: the authorized history of MI5* (London, 2012); Jean Guisnel, *Histoire secrète de la DGSE* (Paris, 2022).

[91] Peter Jackson, *Beyond the balance of power* (Cambridge, 2013); Anthony Simkins, Francis Hinsley, *British intelligence in the Second World War* (London, 1979).

[92] Jérôme Aan De Wiel, *East German intelligence and Ireland, 1949-90: espionage, terrorism and diplomacy* (Manchester, 2017); Richard Aldrich, *British intelligence, strategy and Cold War, 1945-51* (London, 1992).

[93] Olivier Brun, Jérôme Poirot, *Le renseignement français en 100 dates* (Paris, 2022).

[94] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République.'

registers and accounts ledgers of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, containing traces of political policing work, which have been deliberately destroyed.[95] The following series have been extensively analyzed as part of this research: "F7: Police Générale" at the A.N., "BA: Affaires Générales" from the A.P.P. as well as regional archives series like the "4M-Police" entry from the Archives Départementales du Rhône (A.D.R.) in Lyon. Regarding British archives, the Home Office, Foreign Office, and the Metropolitan Police records available at T.N.A. contain voluminous documentation on British political institutions and on policing practices implemented in Great Britain.

In contrast, the sources relating to Irish policing were more limited regarding the period studied, with much material destroyed at the time of the Irish war of independence and civil war. As the main challenge in carrying out research for this thesis was accessing records relating to the Irish policing administration, some more detailed discussion of the Irish material is necessary. The National Archives of Ireland (N.A.I.) in Dublin does not hold a catalogue of all its material for the years studied here. The work of previous historians offers some indications on the sources available there – D.M.P. files, District Inspectors Crime Special (D.I.C.S.) and other police reports – but we have not been able to work on the Special 'S' Branch files due to a reorganization of the archives at the time of study. If available, the 'S' files might have provided us with more details on the practices of political policing used by the Irish administration from the 1890s. While the agents of the Special Branch were selected from the R.I.C., for instance, we do not know if they received specific training to monitor and gather information on agitators and if their work differed partially or completely to the missions exercised by the rest of the Irish network of intelligence.

The CO 904 series available at T.N.A. and on microfilm was, however, very useful to fill some gaps, while the material accessed at the N.A.I. provided a good overview of the political policing work exercised by policemen and aids our understanding of the functioning of the intelligence-led policing system existing in Ireland. The Police and Crime Records contain documents tracing Fenians activities from 1857 to 1883. For years before the 1867 Rising, constabulary officers reported on 'secret societies' from various counties in Ireland

[95] We contacted the Metropolitan Police to access those documents and have been told they have been destroyed as 'they served no policing purpose' and that the National Archives 'found them to not be of historical interest to retain'.

from 1858 to 1859, but also on Fenian activities in America from 1859 to 1861.[96] Letters and reports relating to fenianism and produced by R.I.C. and D.M.P. officers can also be found in the Chief Secretary's Office Registered Papers (CSO/RP) for the years 1863-1879.[97] There is also a series of 'Reports on fenianism' for the year 1864-65, but most of the documents on the movement are from the A Files, organised in two series: one for the years 1864-68 and one for the years 1877-83. The A files and the documents relating to the Irish National League (I.N.L.) shed light on the political policing practices used by the R.I.C. to counter political agitation. We also had access to the monthly reports of the District Inspectors Crime Special (CBS DICS) sent to the C.S.O. and produced by the special men employed by the Police and Crime Division, and the precis of information produced by the R.I.C., the D.M.P. and the Home Office sent to the Crime Department, reporting on 'secret societies' and related matters.[98]

Organization

Throughout the thesis, the comparison is not systematically three-way but sometimes concerns only two of the three case studies depending on the topic. The aim was to make the comparison relevant to the issues raised in the research concerning political policing, intelligence work and centralization. Our starting point was always the agitation, and that is why, in the case of the Fenians dynamite campaign of the 1880s, we only study the English and Irish police (Chapter 5). Similarly, the question of the monitoring of socialist organizations in France and republicans in Ireland also lent itself to a two-way comparison (chapter 8). Finally, in regard to the transnational threat of anarchism, the question of police collaboration was dealt with directly by the British government and thus only involved London and not Dublin in the early twentieth century (Chapter 10). Despite the absence of a systematic three-way comparison in some chapters, all three jurisdictions are covered in each of the three parts of the thesis.

The first part provides context on the policing of political agitation and political violence in England, France and Ireland. After presenting an overview of political policing in the three jurisdictions throughout the nineteenth century (Chapter 1), this study begins by examining the policing of political agitation. It does so first by analysing the political threats of land agitators

[96] National Archives of Ireland, *Guide to documents relating to Fenianism, 1857-1883*, prepare by Breandan Mac Goille Choille in June 1969, p. 2

[97] Ibid., p. 6.

[98] See the bibliography section at the end for more details.

and fenianism in England and Ireland (Chapter 2) before comparing the English and French approaches to the presence of anarchists and socialists in their territories (Chapter 3).

The second part reflects on the growing oversight of central authorities over intelligence-led policing in connection with political violence in England, France and Ireland between 1882 and 1910. It first compares how France and Ireland reacted to political agitators, following dramatic moments of political violence in 1882 (Chapter 4) before exploring the reinforcement of central administrative oversight of intelligence work in England and Ireland in the 1880s (Chapter 5). In the three case studies, the institutionalization of intelligence work was subject to government and parliamentary oversight which, as will be demonstrated, was often needed to fund specific political policing practices like the employment of informants (Chapter 6). It will further be shown that policing administrations also evolved to adapt themselves to this increasing control over intelligence-led policing in France and Ireland but also faced new domestic challenges in the 1890s (Chapter 7). In both countries, it will be seen that methods to counter agitators making use of political violence were increasingly applied to monitor legal political movements (Chapter 8).

Finally, the third part of this thesis explores the question of international relations by examining the limits of European political policing through the comparison of England and France between 1890 and 1910. Dublin and London were both integrated into a UK intelligence network in the early 1890s, whereas the Metropolitan Police and the P.P., occasionally collaborated, despite their rivalries and mutual suspicions (Chapter 9). When intelligence-led policing was increasingly internationalised in the fight against anarchist terrorism at the end of the nineteenth century, neither the English nor the French police was willing to develop international structures to coordinate political policing preferring to protect the secrecy of their systems in a moment of policing competition (Chapter 10).

By comparing England, France and Ireland this thesis explores the transition from an ensemble of varied political policing practices used in moments of political agitation at the end of the nineteenth century to the implementation of more formal intelligence-led policing systems by the early twentieth century. If this process is common to and operated similarly in all three case studies, we need to understand the individual policing systems and cultures to appreciate these developments. Relying on comparative history to do so, allows us to operate as a ‘bridge-

builder'[99] and expand beyond familiar national considerations on the subject of political policing practices in Europe between 1870 and 1910.

[99] Levine, 'Is Comparative History Possible?', p. 331.

Part I

Contexts: Policing political agitation and political violence in England, France and Ireland

Chapter 1

Policing in context: The structure and evolution of political policing in nineteenth-century England, France and Ireland

It was during the nineteenth century that national police cultures were established and institutionalised in England, France and Ireland. The changes during this period determined the implementation of political policing practices in the surveillance of politically suspect groups or individuals.[1] In the early 1800s, France and England established two policing systems that appeared to be very different in operation, style and culture. Under the First Empire, a priority was to set up a police force that would monitor the political activities of the French population throughout the country. In contrast, the English and Irish police were meant to patrol the cities and countryside in uniform and were, in principle, not to engage in the investigation of the political activities of their fellow citizens. However, as we shall see, the system in Ireland and the employment of political practices at different moments throughout the nineteenth century in England often highlighted the contradictions of English discourses on policing.

1.1 Two cultures of 'preventative policing': Fouché v. Peel

There was, in a sense, two cultures of policing existing across these western European countries in the early to mid-nineteenth century. 'Spying' on political agitation appears as constituent of the French system but was, claimed at least, to be inimical to the British model at the time. As Clive Emsley explains: 'The word "police" was not popular in England as it smacked of absolutism, and in particular of Bourbon spies and of the military *maréchaussée* which patrolled the main roads of eighteenth-century France'.[2] Indeed, Englishmen despised the French police they associated with the absolutism of Louis XIV's regime and the Lieutenance de Police Générale established in Paris in 1667, an institution at the service of royal authority with extensive repressive and monitoring powers.[3]

The police also had a central function in the establishment of Napoleon I's imperial regime at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It had to restore domestic peace following ten years of revolution and to protect the regime against its opponents by extending its

[1] Emsley, *The English police,* p. 3.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Calvez, Jobard, *Global Police*, p. 42.

surveillance.[4] The aim of the emperor was to strengthen the future imperial state – officially established in 1804 – relying on the police.[5] This started with a reorganization of the force with the creation of the prefects in charge of the police in their department and of the very powerful Préfecture de Police de Paris (P.P.) in the capital city in 1800.[6] The P.P., placed under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, increased the political nature of the Parisian police.[7] The Paris police prefect was appointed by the central administration, like the police commissioners working for him.[8] He was representing the city of Paris, acting as its mayor and controlling its municipal police, while the state granted him large police powers.[9] The central administration and the Paris municipal council financed the P.P. equally and the institution possessed a larger budget and more personnel than any other local force.[10]

In the rest of the territory, the centralization of policing was operated through the prefects, who were appointed by Napoleon I himself. They maintained public order, recruited the policemen, made sure local authorities were respecting the orders of the government and provided information to Paris on the state of their department and on what the public said about the imperial regime.[11] Alongside the prefects and the P.P., another organisation oversaw the control and surveillance of the population: the Ministry of the Police Générale. The head of the institution, Joseph Fouché, developed a theory of 'preventative policing' based on the necessity to gather information on all parts of society to prevent crime.[12] He developed a network of 'secret agents', or 'informants', to observe the population. They monitored political opponents and were in charge of preventing conspiracy against the regime.[13] A list drawn up in 1802 detailed the names of more than 250 individuals providing information to the Napoleonic policing administration.[14] This document appears to have been established by a royalist opponent of the regime, Louis-Charles Dupérou, and was divided into three sections: the

[4] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France,* p. 288.

[5] Ibid., p. 289.

[6] Ibid., pp 294-5.

[7] Deluermoz, *Policiers dans la ville*, pp 27-66.

[8] Belière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 58.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, pp 295-6.

[12] Ibid., p. 299.

[13] Ibid., p. 301.

[14] Les mouchards de Paris, 1802 (A.P.P., DB 353); Brunet, *La Police de l'ombre*, p. 35.

individuals acting as police inspectors, those working in the streets of Paris and paid only when they reported a violation of police regulations or gave the address of an immigrant, and the individuals paid through secret spending. The latter were considered the most useful to the police.[15]

Thus, policing under Napoleon I was highly centralized and its mission was to gather information to protect the regime against political opponents.

Figure 3: Policing institutions in charge of gathering information at the beginning of the 19th century in France



In England, 'preventative policing', as established by Robert Peel, was different, in theory and practice, to the political police system established by Fouché in France. The Metropolitan Police, set up in London in 1829, was an unarmed and uniformed police force; Peel insisted on the necessity of preventing crime by patrolling the streets in uniforms.[16] Englishmen were reputedly very suspicious of officers in plainclothes that they perceived as spies.[17] Therefore, no detective branch was established within the Metropolitan Police, in contrast to the previous force existing in London up to 1829: the Bow Street Runners.[18]

---

[15] Ibid.; Jeanne-Laure Le Quang, 'Une « police officieuse » ? Le rôle des mouchards dans le contrôle du Paris napoléonien' in *Revue d'histoire moderne & contemporaine*, lxix–ii, no. 2 (2022), pp 66-7.

[16] T. A. Critchley, *A history of police in England and Wales* (New Jersey, 1972), p. 160.

[17] Emsley, Shpayer-Markov (eds), *Police detectives in history',* p. 7.

[18] R.M. Morris, '"Crime does not pay": Thinking again about detectives in the 1st Century of the Metropolitan Police', Emsley, Shpayer-Markov (eds) *Police detectives in history'*, p. 79.

The Runners comprised a small band of detectives established by magistrates Henry and John Fielding in 1749, after John noticed an increase in crime in the years 1749-50 and organized a group of men to apprehend and bring serious offenders before the Bow Street courts.[19] This organization was a response to the perceived weakness of the civil authority, with citizens left to themselves to apprehend offenders and bear the expensive cost of prosecution.[20] At Bow Street, people came to declare a crime, or an offence, and the role of the officers was to spread the word on the crime as fast as possible to collect rapid information and apprehend the suspect.[21] Alongside this policing mission, Bow Street Runners were sent to patrol the streets of Westminster after the press reported attacks around the city from the mid-1750s.[22] In the 1760s, the Runners were still investigating offences of all kinds, with their work based on detection, apprehension and prosecution.[23] While an important part of the mission of Fielding's men was to patrol the streets, they received their best information from informants, something that was kept secret as much as possible.[24]

From the Bow Street Runners, Peel only kept the patrolling aspect of their policing, dismissing their investigative prerogatives, when he established the new police. This emphasis on patrolling also occurred in Ireland, albeit with a greater centralized and an armed dimension to the Irish force.[25] The Irish policing system implemented at the beginning of the century was at the crossroad of the Peelian theory of 'preventative policing' and the authoritarian Napoleonic police force. According to Stanley Palmer: 'Ireland proved to be the experiment station where the English Government could readily implement a project of centralization, including one in police.'[26]

If Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, since the Union Act of 1801,[27] some historians have argued that the country was still considered as a colony by the British

[19] J.M. Beattie, *The First English Detectives. The Bow Street Runners and the Policing of London, 1750-1840* (Oxford, 2012), p. 17.

[20] Ibid., p. 18.

[21] Ibid., pp 30-1.

[22] Ibid., p. 34.

[23] Ibid., pp 52-4.

[24] Ibid., p. 67; p. 69.

[25] Palmer, *Police and protest,* p. 25; p. 31; Aan de Wiel, 'Irish police Intelligence', p. 132.

[26] Palmer, *Police and protest,* p. 24.

[27] 'An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland' (39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 67).

administration.[28] As Georgina Sinclair contends, this colonial dimension was reinforced by the Irish policing system, with 'the Irish Constabulary's original role as an imposer of force on the people, a constant reminder that Ireland could only be governed through force.'[29] When Robert Peel was appointed chief secretary of Ireland in 1812, he noticed that peacekeeping was ensured by the army as the country did not possess a proper police force.[30] Following the end of the Napoleonic wars and the exile of the French emperor in Elba in 1814, the Irish army was meant to be partly discharged, despite the protests of the lord lieutenant at the time.[31] The lack of police forces in rural Ireland led Robert Peel to propose a reform bill entitled 'A Bill to provide for the better Execution of the Laws in Ireland' in 1814, creating a paid police, controlled by Dublin Castle and to be deployed in the most disturbed areas of the country.[32] This was known as the Peace Preservation Force, which was to be sent to areas of particular unrest. Such a force was regarded as exceptional and would not have been tolerated or thought necessary in England.[33]

Peel was aware of the importance of ideas of public consent for policing, and forms of authoritarian or political police would have been always associated with French despotism.[34] But, while this 'preservation of the peace' force was meant to be used under extraordinary circumstances, the Irish County Constabulary Act of 1822 created a day to day police force.[35] Stanley Palmer argues that 'for the first time this placed an efficient police in every county for Ireland'.[36] While the force established by Peel in 1814 was only sent to the most agitated counties, this new armed and uniformed police was destined to be permanent throughout the entire territory. Chief constables were appointed and controlled by the central administration and the rest of the officers were under the authority of the local magistracy, thus creating a form

[28] On this see Georgina Sinclair, 'The "Irish" policeman and the Empire', pp 173-87; Kevin Kenny (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2004), pp 1-25; Charles Jeffries, *The colonial police* (London, 1952), p. 30.

[29] Sinclair, 'The "Irish" policeman and the Empire', pp 173-4.

[30] Palmer, *Police and protest*, pp 195-7.

[31] Ibid., p. 199.

[32] Ibid., p. 200.

[33] Calvez, Jobard, *Global police,* p. 29; Palmer, *Police and protest*, p. 521.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Palmer, *Police and protest*, p. 240.

[36] Ibid., p. 243.

of hybrid policing system between local and central control.[37] It was amalgamated with Peel's 'preservation of the peace' force in 1836 to become the centralized Irish Constabulary.[38] This appears as something of a contradiction with the practice of policing in England, with the instalment in Ireland of a system that would not be accepted as aligned with the supposed British values in London. The centralization of the Irish system of law and order, however, was gradually established and remained a 'hybrid' form of centrally controlled policing working alongside local unpaid magistrates throughout the nineteenth century. Thus, if Ireland did not possess a political police force in the first half of the nineteenth century, its uniformed armed police increasingly resembled the French centralized imperial police.

1.2 The development of detective functions in England and Ireland

The detection of crime and the use of police detectives was also seen as reflecting 'continental' brutality and was regarded as 'un-British'.[39] In England, while Robert Peel did not establish a detective department within the Metropolitan Police, Assistant Commissioner Richard Mayne strongly defended the need to use plainclothes officers to detect crime.[40] In Ireland, an early occurrence of the use of detectives by the state can be traced back to an Irish Statute in 1793, which sanctioned funding to detect 'conspiracies against the state'.[41]

According to Elizabeth Malcolm, a detective branch was under consideration for the Irish Constabulary in 1836.[42] However, the Irish lord lieutenant revealed in a letter in 1864 that 'any approach to the system of espionage would revolt the public' and could 'endanger the existence of the [constabulary] itself', which explains why the reform was not carried through.[43] From 1837, the instruction books of the constabulary and of the Dublin Metropolitan Police – set up the year before to police the district of Dublin city –[44] indicated that the prevention and

---

[37] 'An act for the appointment of constables, and to secure the effectual performance of the duties of their office, and for the appointment of magistrates, in Ireland, in certain cases' (3 Geo. 4, c. 103); Stanley Palmer, *Police and protest*, pp 243-4.

[38] 'An act to consolidate the laws relating to the constabulary force in Ireland' (6 Will. 4, c. 13).

[39] Critchley, *A history of police in England and Wales*, p. 160.

[40] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 120.

[41] John F. McEldowney, 'Legal aspect of the Irish Secret Service Fund, 1793-1833' in *Irish Historical Studies*, n°98, vol.25, (1986), p. 129.

[42] Malcolm, 'Investigating the 'Machinery of Murder', p. 75.

[43] Ibid.

[44] *A bill for improving the police in the district of the Dublin metropolis*, H.C. 1836, III.195.

detection of crime was a constitutive mission of the policemen of both forces, but that investigations were to be left to the magistracy.[45]

Irish recruits received better training than their English counterparts, before being sent to the field 'to provide 24-hour protection against crime'.[46] Similar to Peel's beat system used by the Metropolitan Police in London, Irish policemen got acquainted with their neighbourhood, knowing each street, each house and each person living there and they did not hesitate to remind suspicious persons that they were monitored.[47] This shows that while the Irish police was not employing officers in plain-clothes at the time, uniformed constables were performing functions that could be categorised as intelligence-gathering work.

In England, despite the official discourse regarding the use of detectives, the Popay case demonstrated that the Metropolitan Police used officers in plain-clothes to gather information on political meetings. Following a violent dispersion by the police of a workers' meeting at Cold Bath Fields in 1833, it was revealed that Sergeant William Popay had infiltrated the National Political Union and was spying on radical meetings for two years. However, Popay was not sanctioned because he gathered information in plain-clothes, which was his duty, but because he did so by using a false identify and therefore acting as a spy.[48] Mayne recognised, in front of the committee enquiring on the Cold Bath Fields case, that officers in plain-clothes were regularly sent to political meetings to gather information because it was safer than wearing their uniforms.[49] Charles Rowan, the other assistant commissioner, specified that five or six men were selected to fulfil this kind of mission.[50] Mayne explained that they were employed to maintain peace and gather information on future meetings.[51] Despite Peel's principle of 'preventing crime by patrolling the streets in uniform', the evidence to the Committee regarding the Cold Bath Fields case revealed a systematic use of officers in plainclothes to gather information.[52] Therefore, the Popay case exposed that the Metropolitan Police had recourse to political policing practices from at least 1833. This raised suspicion against the institution as it

[45] Griffin, 'Prevention and detection of crime in nineteenth-century Ireland', p. 99; Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, p. 120.

[46] Griffin, 'Prevention and detection of crime in nineteenth-century Ireland', p. 100.

[47] Ibid., p. 100; p. 102.

[48] Palmer, *Police and protest*, p. 312.

[49] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history', p. 151.

[50] Ibid., p. 153.

[51] Ibid., p. 154.

[52] Ibid.

appeared to be using spies in the interests of the government and the affair, according to Stanley Palmer, 'delay[ed] for a decade the establishment of the Metropolitan Police detective department'.[53]

In 1842, the Metropolitan Police eventually hired its first official detectives.[54] That year, Jane Good was murdered by her husband Daniel Good, but no officers within the Metropolitan Police held the administrative powers to find and arrest the suspect who was on the run.[55] Following the arrest of Good thanks to a former Metropolitan Police officer who recognised him, the home secretary sanctioned the creation of a Detective Department at Scotland Yard.[56] The force acted directly under the command of Rowan and Mayne. However, the quick nomination by the police commissioners of two inspectors and six sergeants to carry out this duty implied that a detective force already existed in an un-official capacity,[57] confirming the conclusion of the Committee on the Cold Bath Fields case.[58]

It was a year later, on 17 March 1843, that the Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P.) gained its detective branch, knew as the G Division.[59] It took, however, longer in the Irish countryside to introduce a detective force: the justices of the peace, the local magistracy and the sub-inspectors did not trust the constables to hold investigative powers.[60] It was the increase of famine-related crimes that led the Irish Constabulary to appoint 'a limited number of experienced policemen' in each county to conduct investigations from 1847.[61] They were not called detectives but 'disposable men' as they were filling detective missions on a temporary basis.[62] It was then necessary for rural policeman to be familiar and take part in the life of their area to gather information, something encouraged by their hierarchy:

> the constabulary authorities sought to create the impression of their force as an omniscient, ever-alert presence in Irish society, representing both a deterrent to crime and forming the basis for an impressive source of local information which should be invaluable in prosecuting offenders. Even such innocuous

[53] Palmer, *Police and protest*, p. 313.

[54] Critchley, *A history of police in England and Wales*, p. 160.

[55] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', pp 129-30.

[56] Morris, '"Crime does not pay"', p. 81.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Smith, *Policing Victorian London,* p. 61.

[59] Herlihy, *The Dublin Metropolitan Police*, p. 122.

[60] Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, p. 120.

[61] Griffin, 'The Irish police', p. 389; Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, p. 120.

[62] Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, p. 120.

> activity as the annual collection of agricultural statistics after 1847 was turned into an intelligence-gathering exercise: this duty was frequently given to newcomers at a station so that they could discreetly and quickly acquire a close knowledge of the area and the local inhabitants.[63]

While the constables did not receive official detective training, they had to rely on their own 'common sense' and developed policing techniques to detect crimes and apprehend offenders, as Inspector General Thomas Marcus Brownrigg testified in 1859:

> [those men were] always ready to mount the frieze, to assume the short pipe, to converse – many of them – in the Irish language – and to employ other devices, as an Irishman knows how, to come at the knowledge they are in quest of.[64]

The term 'detective' was eventually officially used in Ireland from 1872.[65]

The Irish police appeared well versed in investigative techniques from the end of the 1830s, but the institutionalization of those practices took longer than in London, where a Detective Department was established within the Metropolitan Police in 1842 in charge of criminal cases. Then, the arrival of political refugees from Europe following the revolutions of 1848 led some of Scotland Yard's plain-clothes officers to veer further into political policing.

1.3 The English policing model and political refugees from Europe in the 1850s

Because of Great Britain's 'liberal tradition of asylum and its strong identity and exceptionalist dimension', immigrants were not controlled when entering the British territory and no law allowed their extradition.[66] The arrival of thousands of refugees in the United Kingdom, however, expanded the powers of some members of the detective department established in 1842. Bernard Porter notes that 'the old detective department also dabbled into political matters from time to time. Between 1851 to 1859 a few of its officers were organized into a Special 'foreign' Branch, reporting directly to the police commissioner, to keep a watch on alien refugees.'[67] Two men particularly distinguished themselves in this period: Adolphus Frederick Williamson and John Hitchens Sanders. Williamson, drawn from the ranks of the detective

[63] Griffin, 'Prevention and detection of crime in nineteenth-century Ireland', p. 106.

[64] Quoted in Griffin, 'The Irish police', p. 390.

[65] Malcolm, 'Investigating the 'Machinery of Murder', p. 90.

[66] Constance Bantman, 'Anarchismes et Anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne, 1880-1914: échanges, représentations, transferts' (PhD thesis, Université Paris 13, France, 2007), p. 370; p. 375.

[67] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 8.

department, was particularly useful as he spoke French and German, which made him the specialist in extradition and naturalization cases.[68] On the other hand, Sanders started acting as an informant, attending meetings and sending on detailed information on the situation of the refugees, from 1849, before joining the Metropolitan Police in 1850.[69] He quickly became 'Mayne's right-hand detective in matters connected with the refugees'.[70] If there are no traces of an official establishment of a 'foreign department' in the archives of the Metropolitan Police according to Bernard Porter, a variety of elements hint at its existence.[71] Porter noticed potential proof: the recruitment of informants at the time of the Great Exhibition in 1851, the regularity of Sanders' reports and their level of detail by November 1851, and a surveillance of the refugees that appears systematic.[72] He attended meetings, both public and private, used his own network of informants and intercepted postal communications which provided him with 'first hand' knowledge on the refugees.[73] As Bernard Porter notes, 'Police surveillance of the refugees was now regular and professional: probably for the first time ever'.[74] He contends that this monitoring of refugees was partly to find out the potential threat they could represent for England, but mostly to investigate what they might have planned for abroad, to communicate it to foreign governments and thus to expand their diplomatic relations.[75] In a sense, this renders this use of political policing acceptable as it did not directly concern British suspects. But it was also meant to be kept secret suggesting a fear of political backlash.

Some traces of the 'foreign' branch practices can certainly be found in the archives of the Metropolitan Police. For example, a report from Sanders on 4 March 1852 detailed the number of political refugees present in London and their country of origin. He wrote that 'from enquiries made' he counted 1,970 refugees in total, coming from France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Prussia and Austria and specified that two thirds of those people lived in 'straitened circumstances.'[76] It appears that Sanders was very well integrated among the refugee

[68] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', pp 163-4.

[69] Porter, *The refugee question in mid-Victorian politics* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 151.

[70] Hammond in 1858, quoted in Porter, *The refugee question*, p. 151.

[71] The fact that the 'Foreign' branch activities were secret in nature could explain the absence of an official status; another possibility is that documents relating to its existence were destroyed for the same reason.

[72] Porter, *The refugee question*, pp 151-2.

[73] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', pp 169-71.

[74] Porter, *The refugee question*, p. 152.

[75] Ibid., pp 153-4.

[76] Report from Sanders, 4 March 1852 (T.N.A., MEPO 2/43).

communities to gather that kind of information. From August 1852, Sanders also enquired into French refugees in Jersey.[77] A memo from 17 July 1854 referred to this activity, as the detective required money to 'defray the expenses of the French Refugee Seigneuret and Family from Jersey to London'.[78] The police were monitoring the activities of political refugees, and they also facilitated their arrival and departure from the United Kingdom, relying on secret funds. For example, there are, in the archives, tables drawing money advanced 'in aid of Destitute Foreign Emigrants'.[79] The most interesting element from these documents is that they specified that the money was advanced by Sir Richard Mayne to Captain Labalmondière, the first assistant commissioner under the direction of the state secretary. Thus, the commissioner of the police was directly involved in the process at the time, and it did not go through typical channels of financing, testifying once again to the possibility of a special department separated from the rest of the Metropolitan Police to deal with the refugees, and hinting at a form of central control of political policing in England at Scotland Yard. In terms of the policing mission realized by this department, it seems that it mostly dealt with the re-settlement of refugees, usually on request from foreign countries. For example, there was a list of names of French and Italian citizens that the 'French government would be pleased to see pulling away from London and move to the United-States'.[80] There is also a table detailing the 'names of the French Political Refugees to whom free passages to New York have been granted'.[81]

This proves that the Metropolitan Police, via the work of John Hitchen Sanders, was versed in political policing, something usually associated with the French authoritarian regime and despised by Robert Peel. However, it appeared that the mission led by the foreign branch was specific to the situation of the refugees and the London police at the time did not possess a fully equipped organisation able to deal with political violence. In contrast, Irish policemen seemed to be accustomed to information gathering and surveillance techniques, something they

[77] Porter, *The refugee question*, p. 152.

[78] Memo from Sander, 17 July 1854 (T.N.A., MEPO 2/43).

[79] Account of Money advanced by Sir R. Mayne to Captain Labalmondière and disbursed by him in aid of Destitute Foreign Immigrants under the Directions of the Secretary of State, 1852 (T.N.A., MEPO 2/43).

[80] Français que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur verrait avec plaisir s'éloigner de Londres et gagner les Etats-Unis; Italiens que le Gouvernement Français verrait bien avec plaisir s'éloigner de Londres et gagner les Etats-Unis (T.N.A., MEPO 2/43).

[81] Name of French Political Refugees to whom free Passage to New-York have been granted (T.N.A., MEPO 2/43).

put to use to counter the emergence of a Fenian movement threatening both Ireland and England from the mid-nineteenth century.

1.4 The Fenians and policing practices in England and Ireland

The 1860s marked a period of political agitation for both England and Ireland with a Fenian movement organising itself and perpetuating attacks on British soil. It had a direct impact on both systems, putting them on the path toward political policing. It also revealed the weakness of the Metropolitan Police's detective force, and the variety of practices implemented by the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. to monitor the Fenians. Hoppen states that the appearance of 'formal "secret" societies such as the Irish Republican Brotherhood' accelerated the implementation of political policing practices in Ireland.[82] The 'Fenians A Files', held in the N.A.I., testify that from at least 1857 to 1883 the Irish administration was gathering information on Fenians.[83] Analysis of the records shows that from the end of the 1850s, police forces in Ireland were using informants and detectives to keep track of the militants' activities in both urban and rural areas.[84]

Those practices were later used by the D.M.P. to prevent a Fenian revolt plot during the summer of 1865. Jim Herlihy contends that D.M.P. detectives closely monitored Fenian activities in Dublin city and, as the movement was appearing more threatening, began arresting members who were plotting against the government.[85] The 'G Men' successfully uncovered the 1865 conspiracy thanks to various political policing methods: monitoring of the *Irish People* office and following its members to their homes and hiring an informer named Pierce Nagle who had been sworn in as a member of the I.R.B.[86]

Another Fenian rising was staged in 1867 but was successfully suppressed by the Irish Constabulary, which became the 'Royal Irish Constabulary' after Queen Victoria honoured the force for its duty.[87] In terms of its function, the R.I.C.'s first mission was to keep the peace by supressing armed rebellion, sectarian riots and agrarian disturbances. It also inherited the

---

[82] K.T. Hoppen*, Elections, Politics and Society in Ireland, 1832-85* (Oxford, 1984), p. 354.

[83] The National Archives of Ireland, *Guide to Documents relating to Feniansism, 1857-1883*, prepared by Breandan Mac Goille Choille in June 1969.

[84] E.g. N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 3, A 252-435. Both the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. were aware of Fenians activities, producing numerous reports on the subject.

[85] Herlihy, *The Dublin Metropolitan Police,* p. 131.

[86] Ibid., p. 132.

[87] Herlihy, *The Royal Irish Constabulary*, p. 60.

functions of the Revenue Police, abolished in 1857, which consisted of collecting agricultural statistics, enforcing fishery laws, acting as enumerators at the census of population, among other things.[88] The various documents produced by the police found in the N.A.I. clearly testify to the resources allocated by the R.I.C. to the surveillance of the Fenian movement.[89]

If, in England, some practices of political policing were implemented within the Detective Department at the time of the refugee crises in the 1850s, the Metropolitan Police was not able to prevent a bomb attack organized by Fenians at Clerkenwell Prison in London on 13 December 1867 despite the Irish police providing the necessary intelligence.[90] According to Philip Thurmond Smith, this event revealed the deficiencies of the English police, which were mostly issues with its leadership and the lack of experience and knowledge from its detectives in preventing conspiracies.[91] He argues that the over centralized control exercised by Commissioner Mayne on its agents at the time prevented them from taking the initiative, which would have been effective against the Fenians.[92] The attack increased the surveillance operated by the Detective Department on the agitation and led to the creation of a 'special' branch or 'Irish office' outside of the organization to enquire on matters relating to Irish republicanism which mostly relied on Robert Anderson.[93] Also known as the 'Secret Service Department', this institution stopped its activities a few months later, in April 1868.[94] According to some historians, the activities ended because there was no more threat and the English government did not want to establish a permanent body in charge of political policing. Padraic Kennedy, however, argues that there was no direct correlation between the existence of the Secret Service Department, established before the explosion, and the Fenian rising of 1867.[95] The aim of the Department was to improve British intelligence gathering capacity and its closure was not the result of the absence of political danger but of administrative issues preventing it from functioning properly.[96] While London did not implemented another body specifically in charge

[88] Ibid., p. 62.

[89] cf. Chapter 2.

[90] Morris, '"Crime does not pay"', p. 81.

[91] Smith, *Policing Victorian London*, p. 183.

[92] Ibid., p. 184.

[93] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 8.

[94] Padraic Kennedy, 'The Secret Service Department: A British Intelligence Bureau in Mid-Victorian London, September 1867 to April 1868' in *Intelligence and National Security,* XVIII (2003), p. 101.

[95] Ibid., p. 102.

[96] Ibid.

of political policing following the closure of the Secret Service Department, the fact that the English police were still monitoring Fenians in the following years despite this lack of a specialized institution tends to confirm Kennedy's view.

While Anderson remained attached to the Home Office as a special adviser in political crime from 1868,[97] the Metropolitan Police also started to rely on informants, something its founder Robert Peel associated with the Fouché police in France and in total opposition to British liberal values. Several occurrences of the use of informants were notified in the police commissioner's letter book from 1869 to 1871 with some specially gathering information on Fenians.[98] On 13 January 1870, a 'copy of a letter from an Informant in London (…) relative to fenianism' was sent and on 16 February 1870 a letter from a 'Fenian informant' was transmitted.[99] Superintendent Williamson was also directly implicated in the surveillance:

> Jan 20, 1870
>
> Report by Supt. Williamson, of this date, relative to a Meeting of the "Released Fenians Reception Committee" on 19th January.[100]

Williamson's special skills and knowledge of the French language had also been used as he spent some time in Paris during this period.[101] Evidence of this can also be found in the commissioner's letter book on 5 March 1870, as the superintendent provided a report on the 'Société Internationale des Travailleurs.'[102]

The second direct consequence of Fenian activity was the setting up of an inquiry by the home secretary in 1868 regarding the inefficiency of the detective force. The report of the Home Office Departmental Committee on the subject stated that:

> The detective police, having regard to their number, appear to the Committee to be very efficient for the detection of ordinary crime, but their numbers are wholly inadequate to the present requirements of the metropolis, and their constitution scarcely adapts them to cope with conspiracies and secret combinatious.[103]

---

[97] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 8.

[98] See T.N.A., MEPO 1/48.

[99] Henderson to Liddell, 13 Jan. 1870; Henderson to Liddell, 16 Feb. 1870 (T.N.A., MEPO 1/48).

[100] Henderson to Liddell, 20 Jan. 1870 (T.N.A., MEPO 1/48).

[101] Smith, *Policing Victorian London*, p. 185.

[102] Henderson to Liddell, 5 March 1870 (T.N.A., MEPO 1/48).

[103] *Report of Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Police Force, 1868*, p. 21.

The main recommendations formulated to solve the issue were that the detectives should form a separate body of men from the 'preventative police', that the status of detective should be achieved via duties as a divisionally based plain-clothes officer and that detectives should be paid at a higher rate than their uniformed equivalent.[104] Another issue at that time was that the police lacked the educated candidates that were needed to fulfil the detective positions. As the superintendent of the C Division stated in 1868: 'In my whole experience, I never knew a man of superior education join unless there was a screw loose somewhere'.[105] According to Williamson, the Detective Department needed better educated detectives and also better salaries.[106] This resulted in the promotion of Williamson as superintendent of the Detective Department and an augmentation of its staff with the appointment of two chief inspectors, nine sergeants and, eventually, 158 divisional detectives in 1869. The structure remained the same for the next ten years.[107] This did not mean that the Metropolitan Police detectives were accustomed to these kinds of practices at the beginning of the 1870s. The lack of political policing habits among the English police was evident when the Home Office, after receiving demands from the French government regarding the Commune refugees in England, directly wrote to Karl Marx to gather information in 1871.[108] The Detective Department could count on some particularly skilled officers such as Superintendent Williamson and on the expertise of Anderson to exercise surveillance on political movements, but no real sustained system of political policing was established by the end of the 1870s.

[104] Ibid., pp 21-2.

[105] Morris '"Crime does not pay"', p. 84.

[106] Ibid., pp 84-5.

[107] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 176.

[108] Christopher Andrew, *Secret service: the making of the British intelligence community* (Sevenoaks, 1987), pp 42-3.

Figure 4: British institutions in charge of political policing (before 1870)



1.5 Political policing: from the Second Empire to the Third Republic in France

While from the 1850s the English police was dabbling in political policing, like Napoleon I's centralised and authoritarian force in the early nineteenth century, the French police was also inspired by its British neighbour. In the report reforming the Parisian police in 1854 and establishing a municipal force, Minister of the Interior Adolphe Billaut wrote to Napoleon III, the Emperor: 'Struck by the excellent organization of the London police, you wished that the Paris police would not remain inferior to it'.[109] The English 'bobby' appeared as a model of efficient and respected police in Europe at the time of the 1848 revolutions. In his report, Billaut insisted on the preventative function of this new police force regarding demonstrations and insurrections. In increasing the number of officers patrolling the streets of Paris, the city would be better monitored and crime better prevented in the capital. The aim was for the population to appreciate the police and therefore appreciate the government: *'Faire aimer la police, c'est faire aimer le gouvernement'* as Billaut apparently said.[110] According to Quentin Deluermoz,

[109] Billaut report, 9 Sept. 1854, quoted in Deluermoz, *Policiers dans la ville,* pp 27-66.

[110] Deluermoz, *Policiers dans la ville,* pp 27-66.

'the presence in the capital of a civil police whose action is subject to public scrutiny now seemed necessary for the legitimacy of governments'.[111] In practice, this reform meant the creation of officers in charge of patrolling in a defined territory – îlot – of Paris. The officers were bound to provide reports of what they witnessed during their patrols. The Préfecture also straightened its control over its agents with various circulars detailing the frequency and the quality of those reports.[112] The following decades also show the Second Empire reinforcing the means of police surveillance.[113] Alongside the reform of 1854, which saw the number of agents in the streets of Paris going from 900 to 2800, the Direction de la Sûreté Générale was created in 1853.[114] Two years later, 30 special railway commissioners were established by decree to exercise political surveillance throughout the national territory.[115]

While Napoleon III increased the means to monitor the population, the use of the police by the imperial regime also symbolised a softer approach to maintaining order in the second part of the nineteenth century. In case of demonstrations, the army was not sent directly, and the force was used gradually: first the Sergents de Ville – the uniformed officers –, the Garde de Paris and then the army. The uniformed police established by the reform of 1854 served as a buffer between the demonstrators and the rest of the security forces.[116] In the context of the wider liberalisation of the regime, with an increasing presence of newspapers and the organisation of elections, Napoleon III tried to legitimate his action and downplay the authoritarianism of his government.[117]

The question of policing arose again after the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870, dominated by monarchist-leaning conservatives, it was only with the rise to power of committed republicans in 1879 that the question of policing reemerged on the political agenda. Despite the harsh discourses pronounced at the Chamber the Deputies against Napoleon III's administration

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Quentin Deluermoz, *Commune(s), 1870-1871: une traversée des mondes au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2020), p. 51.

[114] Quentin Deluermoz, 'Police forces and political crises: revolutions, policing alternatives and institutional resilience in Paris, 1848–1871' in *Urban History*, xliii, no. 2 (2016), p. 240; J.M. Berlière and Marie Vogel, 'Aux origines de la police politique républicaine' in *Criminocorpus* [Online], (2008), p. 3.

[115] J.M. Berlière and Marie Vogel, 'Aux origines de la police politique républicaine', p. 4.

[116] Deluermoz, *Policiers dans la ville,* pp 137-68.

[117] Ibid.

and the necessity to reform the imperial policing system,[118] the new regime could not totally separate itself from its predecessor. Indeed, it seemed difficult to purge former imperial personnel, as the Republic needed qualified officers to police the territory. Laurent Lopez, who has studied the records of the Sûreté Générale (S.G.), explains that in terms of personnel the institution had not been able to get rid of people who used to be at the service of the Second Empire.[119]

Table 1: Return regarding Parisian police officers, 1879-1882

Years	Resignations	Dismissals	Death in the line of duty	Retirements	Reformations
1879	156	65	47	288	5
1880	248	75	61	457	8
1881	299	74	44	550	9
1882	387	63	71	531	6

Source: Police municipale, statistique des opérations (1872-1900) (A.P.P., DA 193)

In the case of the P.P., table 1 shows that in 1880, with reformist republicans in power, the number of dismissals was the highest. This only represents 1 per cent of the total personnel, as the total number of agents at that time was 7,000.[120] Therefore, even after the rise of power of reformist republicans in 1879, there was no massive purge from either the S.G. or the Parisian police. Arnaud-Dominique Houte insists on the fact that the most eminent individuals employed during the Second Empire were purged.[121] Nevertheless, despite a certain willingness to remove certain personnel from the policing administration, political intelligence system was developed within republican institutions to protect the new regime but at the same time promoted practices that might be described as anti-liberal.[122]

The Parisian police, perceived as a 'consular institution' – as it was established by Napoleon I when he was consul of France – also survived the change of regime and even took a central

[118] E.g. George Clemenceau's intervention at the Chamber of Deputies on 3 March 1879, *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, 4 mars 1879, p. 1644.

[119] Laurent Lopez, 'Servir la République après avoir juré fidélité à Napoléon III' in *Histoire & mesure* [Online], XXIX-2 (2014), pp 107-33.

[120] Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France,* pp 63-4.

[121] Houte, *La France contemporaine*, p. 80.

[122] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 69.

place in the Third Republic policing administration.[123]

Officially, the P.P. did not exercise political policing anymore: the Paris police prefect Louis Andrieux even suppressed the 4th research squad in charge of political policing under the Second Empire. In his memoirs, Andrieux, however, admitted that he only did that to replace it with a new political brigade working directly for him.[124] As declared by Minister of the Interior Emile de Marcère, in 1879: 'Are there no more adversaries of the Republic? Certainly, these parties are powerless, and they know it: but you will agree with me that it is useful to monitor them, to know what they are doing.'[125] His recommendation seemed to be heard, as in the following years, the French police implemented a large network of surveillance, targeting specifically the anarchist movement.[126] This directly contributed to the implementation of a political police at the service of the Republic as well as the centralization of the system.

On 30 June 1880, Emile-Honoré Cazelles, the head of the S.G., sent a report to Minister of the Interior Ernest Constant, in which he argued in favour of an information gathering service in the Republic. Sébastien-Yves Laurent contends, in his study on the history of intelligence in France, that this text was an example of a civil servant worrying about the stability of the new republican regime and arguing for the need to monitor political enemies.[127] Known as the 'Cazelles report', this document defended the necessity to finance an intelligence department at the service of a republican regime.[128] At the time, the S.G. employed the special railway commissioners stationed at ports and train stations, monitoring borders and collecting information. According to Cazelles, the S.G. made sure that the laws were implemented and that they reported useful knowledge to the government's home policy but he complained that this intelligence mission was limited to a daily report sent to the minister and that the S.G. lacked the financial means to pursues its missions.[129] He then compared the resources of his institution to the ones of the Parisian police:

---

[123] Belière, Lévy, 'The evolving organization of policing', p. 25.

[124] Louis Andrieux, *Souvenirs d'un préfet de police* (Paris, 1885), p. 36.

[125] Emile de Marcère at the Chamber of Deputies on 3 March 1879, *Journal Officiel de la République*, 4 March 1879, p. 1650.

[126] cf. Chapter 3.

[127] Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre*, p. 262.

[128] This report is reproduced in Berlière, Vogel, 'Aux origines de la police politique républicaine', pp 6-11.

[129] Ibid., p. 6.

> While the *Préfecture de Police* controls a large and experienced personnel and handles a significant budget, the *Direction de la Sûreté*, as this service was only an accessory, use but a few agents, who are badly disseminated, of mediocre capacity and have a budget which prevents the necessary extension of official personnel of secret agents.[130]

For him, the economic question was at the heart of the good functioning of a political policing system. He also warned the republican administration of the anarchist threat and the lack of information the government possessed on the matter:

> The administration may suspect a danger but cannot precisely determine its proximity and its intensity, it cannot provide the government with the intelligence that will allow it to stop a campaign and to put in place the necessary measures.[131]

To compensate for the weakness of its services, Cazelles then suggested that the Ministry increase the number of special commissioners 'who would be more useful as agents in charge of gathering information.'[132] Cazelles estimated that the S.G. employed twenty-eight special commissioners for the entire national territory charged with informing and protecting the government. Their mission was essential as they provided a report to the Ministry and to the departmental prefects, using the information provided to fulfil their policing duties. The head of the S.G. argued that, with the policing funds allocated to the prefects and financial means put directly at their disposal by the central administration, the special commissioners could organise a system of surveillance with the help of secret agents.[133] Finally, Cazelles called for an economic reform of the policing administration:

> Even if the administration cannot be armed by the Government of the Republic with all the means of defence, it may better exploit the means and personnel at its disposal that it can reward with the resources of the budget for the years 1880 and 1881.[134]

Therefore, this report insisted on the necessity to better 'arm', financially and in terms of personnel, the S.G. to make it a real political police force capable of protecting the Republic.

---

[130] Ibid, pp 6-7.

[131] Ibid., p. 7.

[132] Ibid., p. 8

[133] Ibid.

[134] Ibid., p .9.

In the early 1800s, if the French and British states seemed quite opposed on the use of political policing, events taking place during the nineteenth century contributed to bring the three policing cultures closer. The political situation in Europe and in the United Kingdom eventually led British authorities to adopt similar practices previously developed by their French counterparts. In Ireland, the police was organized with the aim to contend with the Fenian wave thanks to its detectives' habits of gathering information, while in England various experiences throughout the nineteenth century hinted at a move towards politicizing the Metropolitan Police despite the difficulty of institutionalization before 1878. In France, the Second Empire implemented a uniformed force in Paris, getting inspiration from its London counterpart. The Third Republic inherited this structure, together with the legacies of authoritarian approaches to policing of many previous regimes, which had direct consequences on the organization of its policing administration. Thus, throughout the nineteenth century, Ireland and England were gradually heading in the direction, albeit at different speeds, of adopting forms of police surveillance that were increasingly close to the French model. And, from the end of the 1870s, the emergence of former and new political threats tested the three policing systems and contributed to the development and systematization of a variety of political policing practices.

Chapter 2

Policing Political Threats: Fenians and Land Agitators

At the end of the 1870s, London and Dublin were facing agitators challenging the established order and perceived as great threats to security. A Fenian movement trying to put an end to British rule in Ireland was organizing itself both in North America and Ireland,[1] where voices in favor of self-government were growing in strength. Agrarian outrages intensified on the island while bombs were placed by Irish republicans directly on English soil.[2] As noted in the previous chapter, the two policing models developed and evolved at different rates during the nineteenth century. The English police engaged in the surveillance of Fenians in the 1860s and early 1870s but lacked an organisational structure to do so particularly effectively. In contrast, its Irish counterparts were able to count on their more centralised system to monitor, first, Fenians and, then, land agitators in the early 1880s. In both places, this agitation forced a political reaction focused on the need to protect public order and led to the development of more overtly political policing methods.

Historians have long discussed the level of threat the Fenian movement represented to the British government in Ireland. R.V. Comerford argues that fenianism was more of a social organisation than a political or military one. The appeal the I.R.B. represented for young Irishmen could be considered as a path towards 'self-realisation through appropriate social-outlets.'[3] Oliver P. Rafferty contends, however, that the Fenians threatened the established religious and political order by supporting a 'Republican revolution' in Ireland while the Catholic Church was pushing for reformation and concession from the British government.[4] According to Rafferty, the amount of intelligence gathered by the Irish police on the movement proves the reality of the political threat.[5] John Newsinger also argues against Comerford's revisionism stating that fenianism was 'the most important force in Irish politics in the 1860s'.[6] It challenged British rule by enrolling thousands of Irishmen, infiltrating the British army and

---

[1] Owen McGee, *The IRB: the Irish Republican Brotherhood, from the Land League to Sinn Fein* (Dublin, 2005).

[2] Philip Bull, *Land, politics and nationalism: a study of the Irish land question* (New York, 1996); Whelehan, *The Dynamiters.*

[3] R. V. Comerford, *The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society, 1848-82* (Dublin, 1985), p. 112.

[4] Oliver P. Rafferty, *The church, the state and the Fenian threat, 1861-75* (Basingstoke, 1999).

[5] Ibid.

[6] John Newsinger, *Fenianism in Mid-Victorian Britain* (London, 1994), p. 1.

launching a minor rising in 1867.[7] Owen McGee also insisted on the political dimension of the I.R.B. and its influence on Irish politics, especially regarding Home Rule in the 1880s-90s, its repression being the will of social elites opposed to republicanism.[8] Similarly, Niall Whelehan recognized fenianism's long-term impact on Irish society, while placing the history of Irish nationalism within a wider transnational context.[9]

This chapter contends that the Irish administration took the Fenian threat seriously enough to implement a massive surveillance of its members, with both the D.M.P and the R.I.C. attending and reporting on political meetings, shadowing suspects and infiltrating the movement. They then put those practices at the service of the policing of another kind of political agitation during the Land War (1879-1882), which saw agrarian outrages and attacks on landlords happening in disturbed parts of the country. These, if anything, intensified in late 1881/early 1882 with the imprisonment of key leaders within the Irish land movement.[10] The involvement of Fenians in land agitation at the time of the Land War has been the subject of discussion. For some, the Irish police, and more specifically the R.I.C., lacked adequate intelligence on agrarian agitation and on those willing to carry out assassinations and other violent political actions.[11] Stephen Ball argues that 'crimes connected with fenianism were not recorded as agrarian, despite the close involvement of many Fenians with the agrarian agitation', [12] implying an important influence of Fenians in the movement but a lack of reporting by the police. This view is, however, contested by Brian Griffin in a recent book, *Crime and the Criminal Classes in Ireland, 1870-1920,* where he argues that claims of Fenians, and more broadly, 'secret societies' involvement in agrarian crime is, at best, 'speculative'.[13] Based on police records, we shall see that Irish policemen were themselves attempting to determine if fenianism played a role in this agitation and adapted their policing in consequence.[14]

---

[7] Ibid.

[8] McGee, *The IRB*.

[9] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 4; p.11.

[10] W.E. Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in Ireland, 1848-1904* (Dublin, 1994); Carolyn Conley, *Melancholy accidents: the meaning of violence in post-famine Ireland* (Lanham, 1999).

[11] Lindsay Clutterbuck, 'Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function' in *Terrorism and Political Violence,* n° 1, vol.18, (2006), p. 113.

[12] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', pp 389-90.

[13] Brian Griffin, *Crime and the Criminal Classes in Ireland, 1870–1920* (Cork, 2024), p. 26.

[14] cf. N.A.I., Fenian A Files.

In this chapter, we will consider the political policing systems established in England and Ireland, from the 1870s, while facing Fenians – in both jurisdictions – and land agitators in Ireland. There was already a sophisticated and relatively centralised system of policing in place in Ireland which provoked particular types of responses to radical political threats and actions, while, in England, the policing culture led to a more distinctive and arguably less effective response to fenianism at the time.

2.1 Political policing systems and political threats in England and Ireland

At the end of the 1860s, England and Ireland were facing a Fenian movement planning attacks on British soil, culminating with the bombing of the Clerkenwell Prison in London in 1867, killing twelve people.[15] If the Irish police seemed to be equipped to contain the threat, it revealed the weakness of an English force in need of reform.[16] Both policing systems continued to monitor the Fenian movement throughout the 1870s, leading to the creation of an international political policing network, but they did so in different ways and with different levels of organization.

After the dismantling of the 'Secret Service department',[17] the Irish civil servant Robert Anderson was still working as 'the Home Office's resident expert on Fenian matters'.[18] In 1870, Anderson learned from Henri Le Caron, an informant and 'agent provocateur' who infiltrated the Fenian network in America,[19] that 'Fenian affairs were dead at present.'[20] Even if it appeared to be the case for the rest of the decade,[21] Fenian activities were still monitored by the Irish and English police. In 1871, the British government set up secret funds for 'secret service' purposes to the value of £65,000 per annum.[22] This money was probably employed to finance informants. In a report from 26 December 1876, headed 'Re. Contemplated Fenian Outrages', a chief

[15] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 58.

[16] cf. Chapter 1.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 38.

[19] James J. Trainor, 'Le Caron, Henri (Thomas Billis Beach)', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://www.dib.ie/biography/le-caron-henri-thomas-billis-beach-a0505) (29 Aug. 24); Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 123.

[20] Quoted in Solomon, 'Straining the Law', pp 38-9.

[21] Ibid., p. 39.

[22] Note to the chancellor of the exchequer, 13 Jan. 1914 (T.N.A., T1 11689/25138).

inspector of the Metropolitan Police Detective Department makes direct reference to paying informants to get information on fenianism:

> I beg further to report that I have been in constant communications with persons who are likely to be informed of what takes place in London … I attach reports from the two officers especially employed, which support the statement given by my informants. I also attach particulars of expenses incurred up to the present time: - self-incidentals necessarily spent for refreshments and small sums to informants from time to time to obtain information as to what was taking place.[23]

The head of the Detective Department, Adolphus Williamson, also claimed back expenses 'respecting the Fenians', showing his involvement in this matter.[24] The surveillance of the movement involved officers from the Detective Department, as testified by a report on a Fenian meeting taking place in Cambridge Hall, on New Street in London in December 1878,[25] but also the rest of the Metropolitan Police in the 1870s. Correspondence from Southend police station reveals, for instance, the surveillance of an individual 'known as Captain Burke an agent of the Fenian conspiracy'.[26] Thus, despite not establishing a structure specialised in political policing, the Metropolitan Police, in particular the Detective Department, made use of political policing practices to monitor Fenian activities in the 1870s.

The Irish Police was also accustomed with those kinds of practices and informants were used to monitor Fenian activity. John Mallon, superintendent of the D.M.P. and head of the G Division in Dublin, relied heavily on this political policing practice. On 1 July 1878, he wrote:

> I have to report that on Wednesday evening a man who is accustomed to give information called on me to say that on Friday night there would be an extraordinary Meeting in the house 55 Bolton Street of Persons interested in keeping up the Fenian agitation. This house has been under observation for some time past as a place of Fenian resort [27]

The report confirms the status of the caller: 'On Saturday evening *the informant* called again and he assured me that there were 200 persons at the Meeting and that a Doctor Corbett…was

[23] Detective officer's special report, 26 Dec. 1876, Re. Contemplated Fenian Outrages (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[24] Williamson to under-secretary of state, 15 Jan. 1877 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[25] E Division Special Report, 12 Dec. 1878. (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[26] Inspector Hawtree to Admiral Mc Hardy, 19 Sept. 1876 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[27] John Mallon, 1 Jul. 1878 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 576).

there as a Chairman.'[28] Thus, this report shows that Mallon used informants that were integrated in the movement to gather information on Fenians, but that he also implemented surveillance over places visited by its members.

Informants were also used by the R.I.C. and the information they provided was reviewed and analysed by policemen, working on a district level, who considered all reports submitted by their colleagues. A confidential report on possible Russian spies in the west of Ireland submitted by the R.I.C. on 17 December 1878 illustrates this:

> From the monthly reports received from Counties, which detail all the movements of the leaders of Fenianism and other Secret Societies, as well as the working of the societies for the previous month, it does not appear that there has been anything observed in the movements of the Fenian leaders that bear out the information alluded to in Govt. minute. Annexed is a letter received last July from a Police Pensioner, which refers to the visit of some Russians to parts of Mayo…[29]

The annexed letter mentioned here dated from 24 July 1878 and referred to information provided by an informant:

> An acquaintance of mine informed me that there were strangers supposed to be Russians but speaking the German language fluently, also English going through the country trying to rise the minds of the people especially in the part of the country between Ballina and Killala in the County Mayo (that is the part where my informant came from).[30]

While the author of the letter affirms that this information 'is reliable' and that he 'would not communicate if he had any doubt of its accuracy',[31] the report submitted by the R.I.C. stated that 'after careful inquiries it was stated by the District Officer that there was no foundation for the report, the paper was not submitted'.[32] Therefore, the district police officers verified the information received by the informants and only communicated it to a higher authority if it appeared conclusive. Still, the report concluded as follows: 'However the matter will not be lost sight of, and very discreet further inquiries will be made and the result reported.'[33] This

[28] Ibid.

[29] Royal Irish Constabulary Office, 17 Dec. 1878 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 573).

[30] Anonymous letter, 24 Jul. 1878 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 573).

[31] Ibid.

[32] Royal Irish Constabulary Office, 17 Dec. 1878 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 573).

[33] Ibid.

demonstrates that the R.I.C. officers kept gathering information on the subject, when the initial report was not conclusive. In this way, political policing in Ireland relied on a process of gathering as much information as possible from various sources, and the role of the policemen was to cross check them. They used informants to pursue the monitoring of potential political threats, making sure to be informed when a real one emerged.

The surveillance of the Fenian movement was also central to the development of a network of policing involving police officers and public officials across Ireland, England and North America by the end of the 1870s. Both the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. G Division were involved in this surveillance but also the Home Office and the British Consulate of the United States. Only the Metropolitan Police in London appeared to have been left out of these communications. The archives held in the Fenian A Files series shed light on the different personalities involved in this network. Among them was Robert Anderson, the Fenian specialist attached to the Home Office, who relied on his contact with le Caron to provide information to the British government regarding possible and actual agitation.[34] Alongside Anderson's reports, we find a great number of documents produced by John Mallon, superintendent of the D.M.P. and head of G Division, and by Thomas Burke, the under-secretary for Ireland, until his assassination in 1882.[35]

An important network of correspondence was established between these three men at the end of the 1870s. For instance, in a report from 21 December 1878, John Mallon indicated that he did not know Fenian leader James Stephens' 'permanent address in Paris'.[36] Thomas Burke annotated the document on 26 December 1878:

> 'Mr Anderson, Home Office,
> The annexed file is transmitted for Mr Cross's information.
> Have you any information respecting James Stephens movement in Paris?[37]

Anderson's answer came a couple of weeks later, on 8 January 1879.[38] In his letter he explained that 'nothing definite is known here of James Stephens Movements in Paris' or his address. He

---

[34] Richard Hawkins, 'Anderson, Sir Samuel Lee', *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://www.dib.ie/biography/anderson-sir-samuel-lee-a0152) (7 Nov. 22).

[35] cf. Chapter 4.

[36] John Mallon to the chief commissioner of D.M.P., 21 Dec. 1878 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 573).

[37] Ibid.

[38] Robert Anderson to Thomas Burke, 8 Jan. 1879 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 573).

added that the influence of the organisation 'United Brotherhood' in the United States was 'far greater than that of the Fenians who are friends of Stephens'.[39] The United Brotherhood was first mentioned back in February 1877 by the British Consul of New York, stating that it was also known as 'Clan-na-gael' and that it was more efficient than the 'old Brotherhood'.[40] The same Consul indicated on 9 March 1877 that the association was more efficient than its predecessors in promoting revolution in Ireland.[41] Those indications laid the bedrock for the information provided by Anderson two years later. This also illustrates the level of communication existing between the under-secretary and the 'Fenian specialist', and the necessity for Dublin to know where individuals like James Stephens were at all times – though in this case they did not find out exactly where he was living.

Something of a secret service network started to emerge to deal with the threat, which went beyond Irish borders. Indeed, the Fenian A Files also include documents produced by the British administration outside of Ireland, especially in the US where the movement was particularly active. The British consulate of Philadelphia multiplied its communications to the ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, in the months prior to the Fenian Conventions that took place in the city in June 1880. In a letter dated 19 April 1880, George Crump, the vice-consul, wrote:

> I have the honour to enclose your copies of the second call for a convention of the Irish race to be held in this city in June next together with a report of an interview by a newspaper correspondent with one of the leaders of the movement said to be O'Donovan Rosa.[42] One or two delegates, it is said will be present from Ireland who after the adjournment of the Convention will lecture before all Irish Societies throughout the U.S. on the condition and demands of the Irish people.[43]

He also provided two newspaper articles referring to the convention.[44] This shows the variety of actors implicated in this network devoted to the surveillance of fenianism but also that newspapers were used as source of information by the central administration.

---

[39] Ibid.

[40] Report of Consul General Archibald of New York, 27 Feb. 1877 (N.A.I., Fenian Papers, Carton 4, Fenians police reports).

[41] Report of Consul General Archibald of New York, 9 March 1877 (N.A.I., Fenian Papers, Carton 4, Fenians police reports).

[42] Fenian leader and member of the I.R.B., organizing the movement from America.

[43] George Crump to Sir Edward Thornton, 19 Apr. 1880 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 5, A 622-623).

[44] Ibid.

The English police, however, appear to have been left out of this 'anti-Fenian' network, even if England had been threatened by the movement before. If Robert Anderson was officially attached to the Home Office, the Fenian A Files hold no reports from the Metropolitan Police Detective Department, while the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. G Division produced documents on the subject. This might be explained by the struggles encountered by the Metropolitan Police at the end of the 1870s.

Following a bribery scandal involving detectives in 1877, the home secretary appointed a Departmental Commission on the 'State, discipline and organization of the Detective Force of the Metropolitan Police' in 1878. The main issues arising from the report was the jealousy and the lack of co-operation between the central and divisional detectives and the 'unsatisfactory results produced, as shown by statistics'.[45] The main recommendation was then to amalgamate all the detectives of the force and that 'they should be separated from the uniform branch and placed under an officer of their own.'[46] This led to the creation of the Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) on 8 April 1878 and the appointment of Howard Vincent as 'Director of Criminal Investigation', now overseeing the work of Chief Superintendent Williamson and its detectives staff at Scotland Yard.[47] According to a memorandum from Police Commissioner Samuel Henderson, addressed to the secretary of state, the role of the new detective staff was to undertake 'all cases coming under the extradition treaties, naturalisation enquiries, investigations for Governments and private individuals and upon all cases of a serious nature specially placed in their hands'.[48]

The nomination of Vincent also highlighted the desire of the British authorities to establish a more specialised form of policing. Indeed, the new director of criminal investigation was a lawyer who studied at the Law faculty of the University of Paris and, during that time, researched the Parisian police.[49] The main effect of this reorganization was the placing of the

---

[45] 'Confidential report of the Departmental Commission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department to enquire into the state, discipline, and organization of the detective force of the Metropolitan Police, 1878' p.45 in Reports on the Metropolitan Police Force 1868-1878-1879-1886, available at the Open University International Centre for the History of Crime, Policing and Justice (https://www5.open.ac.uk/arts/research/policing/resources) (12 December 2024).

[46] Ibid., p. 49.

[47] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 178.

[48] Memorandum from Henderson to the secretary of state, 25 March 1878 quoted in Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', pp 178-9.

[49] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 42.

detective force under one command to put an end to the lack of cooperation arising from the existence of the divisional detectives' system.[50] Vincent, who was especially critical of the inefficiency of the former divisional force, focused on improving training and increased the detectives' salaries so they were paid more than their uniformed counterparts.[51] Nevertheless, the new organisation still failed to attract the most competent men to fulfil the duty of the detectives as Williamson admitted in 1880.[52]

Despite the creation of the C.I.D. and the reorganization of the Detective Department, Bernard Porter argues that, in 1880, England still did not have a secret political police force, making it an exception in Europe at the time.[53] The Detective Department was accustomed to political policing practices and was involved in the monitoring of Fenians in the 1870s, however, there was no structure in place to centrally collate intelligence and implement systematic surveillance of suspects. In contrast to the Metropolitan Police detectives, both the R.I.C. officers and the D.M.P. G Division were more accustomed with political policing practices and were involved in an 'anti-Fenian' network composed of institutions, across different countries, gathering and communicating information on suspected individuals.

2.2 A Growing Threat? Policing Fenians and Land Agitators in England and Ireland

As we previously established, both the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. were engaged in the surveillance of the Fenian movement from the end of the 1860s in Ireland and abroad. No attack had been perpetrated on either Irish or English soil since the late 1860s. The movement was, however, still active in the United States, where different leaders and organisations were planning their future actions. Their strategies were to target directly the authorities – the British government – responsible for the situation in Ireland by planting bombs at strategic locations in England.[54] At the same time, the Land War increasingly challenged the Irish policing system in a new manner. It led policemen to adapt their previous practices and develop new policing methods to deal with the situation.

In the early 1880s, the R.I.C. was tasked with a new mission of 'preventative' policing in the face of increased and increasing land agitation. The presence of the force all over the country

[50] Smith, *Policing Victorian London*, p. 69.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 1.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters,* p. 2.

ultimately provided Dublin Castle with a large, uniformed policing network which, according to Stanley Palmer, could be relied on to maintain order but which was not designed to undertake undercover investigations.[55] Indeed, the main mission of the R.I.C. was, as Brian Griffin has put it, 'the prevention and detection of crime …and the preservation of the peace' rather than the uncovering of clandestine plots.[56] Griffin contends, however, that surveillance and intelligence were extremely important in preventing crime and the duties carried out by the R.I.C., such as reporting on agrarian crime, exercising surveillance, policing public meetings and producing general statistics, were central to Irish policing.[57]

Some of these practices were undoubtedly to prove useful when it came to policing the land agitation of the early 1880s. The leading organization, the Irish National Land League, presided over by the Irish Nationalist M.P., Charles Stewart Parnell, aimed at organizing Irish tenants' farmers to get ownership of the land they worked from their landlords.[58] An important part of the land movement was to hold public meetings to promote land reform. Thus, one mission of the R.I.C. was to attend and report on what was said during those meetings. The Irish Land League and National League records held in the N.A.I. testify to this practice by police constables from different counties.[59] This was evident in the early years of the agitation. As two circulars from 1880 attest, policemen were required to communicate information on these meetings. The earliest available report was issued on 14 September 1880 and required county inspectors to provide 'their report for the information of the Inspector General (giving as early notice as practicable), when any Land League meeting is to be held in their respective counties, at which members of parliament and influential members of the League are expected to be present and address the meeting.'[60] One month later, county and sub inspectors were reminded that 'all reports relative to the Peace of the Country and Land League meetings should be made direct to Head Quarters.'[61]

---

[55] Palmer, *Police and protest,* p. 519.

[56] Griffin, 'The Irish police', p. 349.

[57] Ibid., pp 349-501.

[58] See Bull, *Land, politics and nationalism* for more details on this.

[59] Irish Land League and Irish National League papers etc. 1879-88, 10 boxes (N.A.I., CSO/ RP).

[60] Circular from the R.I.C. inspector general to the county inspector at Ballinasloe, 14 Sept. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

[61] Circular from the R.I.C. inspector general to the county inspector at Ballinasloe, 14 Oct. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

The information reported by the policemen usually concerned the principles of the association, the strategies promoted by its members regarding land biding and discourses in favour of self-government. On 30 November 1880, J.G. Biggar, M.P. for Cavan, gave the following speech in Ballycastle, County Antrim:

> If you all have your eyes on the man who breaks through the rules of your Association, bring pressure to bear on that man. I do not mean to say you should kill him, or maim his cattle, or strike him; but you can use other pressure equally powerful and equally calculated to make him submit.[62]

This speech indirectly promoted political violence by encouraging the people to use other forms of action – supported by the Land League – to respond to the tactics used by their landlords. It thus informed the police on the strategy promoted by certain leaders of the Land League and might have re-enforced their negative opinion towards the movement. At another meeting, which took place in Ennis, County Clare on 19 September 1880, Charles Stewart Parnell, nationalist leader of the Irish Land League, mentioned the possibility of a 'strike against all rent' if the subject of land grabbing was not settled, and argued that 'if the 500,000 tenant farmers struck against the 10,000 landlords, I should like to see where they would get police and soldiers enough to preserve the peace.'[63] On that same day, James Lysaght Finigan, Home Rule M.P. for Ennis, also suggested that if they want to achieve 'the great land question of self-government … they must do something more than cheer.'[64] Both discourses implied direct action, which would require the intervention of the police and explained why the R.I.C. officers reported these kinds of speeches.

This activity also shows how policing techniques evolved as part of the fight against the Land League movement. Indeed, in the reports provided by the Irish police, the names of the other members of the League present at the meetings were mentioned but also the witnesses reporting on the meeting. On 30 November 1880, the witnesses were indicated as follows: 'Constable J.M. Caffrey, Reporter, and Belfast Morning News.'[65] In the article published the

---

[62] Ballycastle, Co. Antrim, 30 Nov. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, County Antim, Carton 1).

[63] Ennis, 19 Sept. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO/RP Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, County Clare, Folder 1, Carton 1).

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ballycastle, Co. Antrim, 30 Nov. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, County Antim, Carton 1).

day after by the journalist in *The Belfast Morning News*, the content of the speeches was transcribed word for word.[66] But the author also reported on the people attending the meeting: 'There were a thousand persons present - Protestant, Catholic, and Presbyterian. Several policemen took notes in the vicinity of the platform, and a shorthand writer was present on behalf of the Government.'[67] The 'shorthand writer' mentioned here could be Constable Caffrey, as the administration trained police reporters to attend meetings and gather proof on potential attempts at illegal actions, before being hired to fulfil this job and being paid from secret service funds.[68]

According to Stephen Ball, 'agrarian disturbances became more frequent, severe, and widespread during 1880',[69] and Dublin Castle was forced to implement specific measures to contend with political violence. The surveillance of Land League meetings was supplemented by the monthly reports of outrages also registered by the policemen.[70] The term 'outrages' did not have a fixed definition. The R.I.C. agents could register as outrages minor criminal offences they considered held a suspect motive, which could disturb the public peace.[71] Indeed, since the 1830s, police had regularly reported on individual outrages in their areas and county inspectors had to submit each month a report of 'all agrarian outrages' in their counties, [72] but a specific circular issued on 20 November 1880 detailed how the R.I.C. were supposed to report the outrages at the time of the Land War:

> The County Inspectors will direct his district officer when furnishing reports of Outrages to Head Quarters on N°38 (Red) to write in future in the left hand upper corner of the form the nature of the Outrage as reported. For instance, if the outrage should be a murder the word "murder" simply should be as written; if a "Firing at the person" it should be co stated on "Intimidation by firing shots" or "Threatening Notice" and so on.[73]

---

[66] *Belfast Morning News,* 1 December 1880.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 55.

[69] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 120.

[70] E.g. *Return for each month of 1879 and 1880, of Land League meetings held and agrarian crimes reported to Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary,* H.C. 1881, lxxvii, 793 - Appendix 2.

[71] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 389.

[72] Ibid.

[73] R.I.C. inspector general to county inspectors, 20 Nov. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

In the returns submitted, the offences took the following shape: offences against property, offences against the public peace, offences against the person.[74] The R.I.C. were also trained to become familiar with the various Acts of parliament to allow them to successfully prosecute the perpetrators of agrarian outrages.[75] Ball argues that the R.I.C. in this period focused their attentions on what could be referred to as 'intense agrarianism' such as 'serious crimes against persons and property as well as lesser acts of intimidation.'[76] According to Margaret O'Callaghan, this resulted in transmuting 'the complex reality of local disorder …into statistical information on every aspect of outrage, eviction, legal process and action.'[77] This had an impact on the view British officials had on the situation in Ireland as the statistics could, at times, show a very troubled country and influenced the policies implemented to maintain order.[78] Indeed, it led London into taking radical measures such as implementing the Protection of Property Act in October 1881, after arresting Parnell and supressing the Land League, which was deemed a criminal conspiracy.[79]

William Forster, the chief secretary for Ireland at the time, was convinced that the Fenians were taking advantage of the agrarian agitation to raise a general opposition to British authority in Ireland.[80] While this may have been based more on preconceived (and likely exaggerated) ideas of Fenian influence, it is likely that the suppression of the formal Land League and its political leadership did serve to empower local and more informal, and sometimes violent, forms of agrarian agitation.[81] The report on meetings and on outrages provided by the R.I.C. gave substance to the idea that the land agitation posed a significant threat in the eyes of British authorities. This, in turn, may have reinforced the C.S.O.'s belief that the land agitation was used by Fenians to achieve a nationalist revolution.[82]

The monitoring of Fenians, in some respects, still relied on pre-existing practices

---

[74] *Return for each month of 1879 and 1880, of Land League meetings held and agrarian crimes reported to Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary,* H.C. 1881, lxxvii, 793 - Appendix 2.

[75] Griffin, 'The Irish police', pp 399-400.

[76] Ibid., p. 390.

[77] Margaret O'Callaghan, *British high politics and a nationalist Ireland: criminality, land and the law under Forster and Balfour* (Cork, 1994), p. 2.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid., pp 19-20.

[80] Ibid., p. 23.

[81] Ibid., p. 35.

[82] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 23.

developed to gather information on the nature of the movement and implement surveillance of persons potentially involved with fenianism. For instance, Robert Anderson, the Fenian specialist attached to the Home Office, activated a network of informants to determine the level of the threat. In a report from 19 November 1880, he wrote:

> I have succeeded in getting information from a Fenian who holds a prominent position in that branch of the Fenian organization which refuses to acknowledge the 'Supreme Council'.
> The Fenians of all parties, he says, confidently expect a large accession of members from the Land League, as great members who joined the League believing it to be a proper and legal society have thus become accustomed to seditious agitation and are growing rife for Fenianism. In fact the lower strata of the League are now practically identified with Ribbonism. On these grounds the Fenians are agreed to encourage the Land League for a little longer, and allow things to develop themselves; but "some active disturbance" will be attempted ere long.
> The present facilities for obtaining arms make the Fenians in Ireland increasingly bold, and they are again discussing the chances of a ''rising''.[83]

According to Anderson, Fenians were not key in the local origins of the agitation but encouraged it as they might benefit from ordinary Land League members becoming more radical. The main interest of this letter resides in its conclusion. Anderson wrote:

> Several of the foregoing statements are confirmed by information received from various quarters. There is no doubt whatever that there exists an amount of activity and excitement greater than there has been at any time since the winter of 1867-1868.[84]

Despite being aware of the political difference existing between the Land League and the Fenians, Anderson perceived the early 1880s situation as the worst since the late 1860s. His sentiment might also have been reinforced by the information he might have received from Henri Le Caron, his informant involved with the Fenian milieu in North America.[85] This perception of the agitation might have influenced the course of police action, but not all the Irish political policing network shared this interpretation.

Indeed, the D.M.P. heavily monitored the activity of the Irish National Land League in the capital, as a detailed report from John Mallon, submitted to Chief Commissioner of the

[83] Report by Robert Anderson, 19 Nov. 1880 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 5, File A 634).

[84] Ibid.

[85] Exchange between Le Caron and Anderson can be found in T.N.A., HO 144/1538/5-7.

Dublin Police George Talbot on 10 August 1880, demonstrates.[86] In this document Mallon described the potential implications of Fenians in the Land League, to rally the rural class to their revolutionary purpose. Mallon explains that he 'talked pretty fully with shop-keepers in this City and they really appear to have very little sympathy with the Land League, in fact they hardly know of its existence except through the Newspaper reports and they do not hesitate to describe Egan, Kettle, Brennan and their confederates of the League as swindlers.'[87] Nevertheless, he concluded his report noting the necessity to keep an eye on Michael Davitt 'as he is really the soul and essence of whatever Fenianism there is in the Land League.'[88] Mallon thus appeared to demonstrate a more acute analysis on the agitation. On 8 January 1881, he reported that the agitators could be separated into four categories:

> 1st Land Leaguers who conscientiously believe that the Land Agitation is constitutional and bona fide aiming at improvement in the Land Laws. They were not previously members of any Political Association.
> 2nd Ribbonmen who always made Agrarian Agitation their hobby.
> 3rd Fenians and remnants of the 48 movement and
> 4th The Clan. Na. Gael a modern Irish American Association.[89]

This complicated the mission of the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. agents in Ireland, who had to contend with agrarian outrages and the re-emergence of potential Fenian agitation.

It thus seemed difficult for the Irish police to assert with certitude the presence of Fenians within the Land League movement, and if it was the case, their level of involvement in the land agitation. For the authorities, to acknowledge their presence might have been a strategy to ensure and extend police resources and powers and justify their coercive actions. There might also have been a real fear, as expressed by Anderson in the Home Office, of the land agitation leading to a rising attempt like in the 1860s. Whatever the reasons, rational, strategical or emotional, the C.S.O. was considering seriously this potential political threat.

---

[86] Report of D.M.P. as regards the Irish National Land League by John Mallon, 10 Aug. 1880 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, Carton 9).

[87] Ibid., p. 7.

[88] Ibid., p. 12.

[89] Report by John Mallon, 8 January 1881 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 5, A 639).

While Ireland was heavily policed by the R.I.C. since the beginning of the Land War, making it the most policed part of United Kingdom, the Fenians, organizing themselves from North America, decided to directly target England, where the government they considered responsible for the situation in Ireland was located.[90] Compared to the earlier Fenian agitation,[91] the English police was now arguably better equipped to counter the threat, that was not potential like in Ireland, but very real for them.

The C.I.D. was aware of a potential attack, as a report submitted on 2 January 1881 by Howard Vincent testifies. The director of the C.I.D. wrote that 'ample subsidies have been received from America, arms and ammunition have been imported & leaders are only awaiting the signal'.[92] Moreover, on 4 January, the War Office published a police order to the attention of Manchester and Liverpool's volunteer regiments[93] to put their armaments in 'a place of safety' because 'an organised attempt would be made by some disaffected portion of the population to seize the arms stored […] in the district.'[94] Nevertheless, this did not prevent the explosion of a bomb at a military barracks in Salford, Manchester on 14 January 1881, which marked the beginning of a Fenian campaign on English soil. Lindsay Clutterbuck argues that the attack 'initiated the fundamental aims and operational objectives of the global phenomenon that is described today as "terrorism"'.[95]

The Fenian campaign caused great difficulty for the Metropolitan Police: the attacks were the most violent, of that type, that England had ever known. They were planned and financed from the US, which made it harder to prevent them. This was reinforced by the fact that three nationalist organisations were involved in the conspiracy – Rossa's 'skirmishers', the Clan na Gael and the I.R.B. – sometimes operating together and sometimes independently.[96] The necessity to gather intelligence on the dynamiters to prevent attacks appeared more clear than ever but required the Metropolitan Police to work with local, American and Continental European forces.[97] The British authorities in America did not seemed very willing to co-operate

[90] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters,* p. 2.

[91] cf. Chapter 1.

[92] Report by Howard Vincent re. Fenian activities, 2 January 1881 (T.N.A., HO 144/72/A19) quoted in Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 39.

[93] Regiments of the British army.

[94] *Belfast News-Letter,* 6 January 1881, quoted in Vlad Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 37.

[95] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 189.

[96] Ibid., pp 190-1.

[97] Ibid.

with London,[98] but appeared in constant communication with the Irish police regarding fenianism at time.[99]

Different actions were implemented following the attack in Manchester. Precautions were taken regarding explosives, with factories and magazines 'to be placed under Special Observation' and suspected premises to be searched in relation to the Explosives Act, 1875.[100] In terms of policing organisation, Home Secretary William Harcourt wrote on 24 January 1881 to Edmund Henderson, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, that 'Mr H. Vincent may be unavailable during the next few weeks to devote his exclusive attention to police supervision of suspected Fenian and Irish plots in this country.'[101] He also required that 'in order to facilitate the action of the English Police … an Irish Inspector may be sent on to England to act in collaboration with Mr Vincent.'[102] This led to the creation of a Fenian office in January 1881.[103]

Evidence of the existence of this office can be found in the archives, with documents directly recorded under this name. For example, on a document headed 'Office N° Fenians' on 28 January 1881, Lord Chamberlain's office requested that 'an armed constable may be placed inside each of the under mentioned entrances to Buckingham Palace, in addition to the Police already on duty there.'[104] This new entity was cooperating closely with Robert Anderson, still attached to the Home Office at the time and still relying on the information provided by Henri Le Caron based in the U.S., as Harcourt requested and obtained a rise of the Secret Service allocation, from £500 to £800 per annum.[105]

This investment was less than in Ireland, which benefited from £5,449 for secret service funds for the year 1880-1881,[106] which might explain the difference in terms of policing the Fenian agitation in the two countries. Then, Harcourt told the queen on 24 February 1881 that

---

[98] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters,* p.120.

[99] For example, see N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 4, A 620; Carton 5, A 622-623, A 629; A 639-642, A 701; Carton 6, A 707, A 719-720, A 735, A 738, A 757, A 759-762.

[100] A.F.O. Liddell to the Chief Constable of the County of Middlesex, 28 Jan.1881 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[101] Harcourt to Henderson, 24 Jan. 1881 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[102] Ibid.

[103] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 41.

[104] Lord Chamberlain's Office, 28 Jan. 1881 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[105] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 41.

[106] Eunan O'Halpin, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxiii, no. 92 (1983), p. 353.

he had set up a 'spider's web of Police Communication … throughout the United Kingdom … the center of which is in my office', to counter the Fenian threat.[107]

Most information was, however, coming from America and the information gathered by the 'anti-Fenian' network might have never reached the home secretary's office as the following events illustrate. In February 1881, Le Caron, Anderson's informant based in America, provided an account on Fenian plans to set up bombing attacks on British soil: 'The whole current of opinion is that something is to be done, that the L.L. [Land League] money will not be used for bread', and quotes O'Donovan Rossa who said 'give me five thousand dollars of the Skirmishing fund and I will have England down on her knees.'[108] The informant mentioned the manufacture of hand grenades and explosives that will be 'furnished carefully all over England, Ireland and Scotland' to be planted at various hotels and buildings, and quoted a Fenian named Meledy who said he knows 'every hotel and public building in London.'[109] On 3 March 1881, the British consul for New York, E.M. Archibald, also wrote to the British secretary of state for foreign affairs, Earl Granville, to warn him about shipment of explosives sent to England and Ireland:

> My informant tells me that explosives were sent over from here to England on the 29th of January and 12th of February. That they are sent in an ordinary travelling trunk, as he believes, by whom or what shift he cannot tell me (…) I think it not inappropriate to remark at the same time that in various despatches of mine written within the last five years, I have called attention to the constant threats of O'Donovan Rossa while collecting his skirmishing fund, to use dynamite explosives for destroying life and property in England, yet that up to the present time little or nothing has been done in fulfilment of the threats.[110]

This letter underlines a potential issue in the communication of information and the potential inefficiency of the English police in dealing with the Fenian threat. According to Vlad Solomon, the Fenian office was 'far removed from any effective system of surveillance and intelligence gathering'.[111] This was probably due to the absence of a centralised organisation in charge of political policing. For instance, a memorandum from 28 February 1881 indicated that 'all reports relative to Irish matters meetings movements are to be sent direct to the [Metropolitan

[107] Harcourt to Queen Victoria, 24 Feb. 1881, quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 41.

[108] Le Caron to Anderson, 17 February 1881 (T.N.A., HO 144 1538/6).

[109] Ibid.

[110] E.M. Archibald to the Earl Granville, 2 March 1881 (N.A.I., Fenian A Files, Carton 5, A 640).

[111] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 41.

Police] Commissioner and not the Director of C.I.D.'[112] This division of tasks might have made it difficult for information to circulate between the institutions.

This basic inefficiency was underlined by the investigation following the discovery of a flaming package outside of the mayor's house in London on 16 March 1881. Indeed, the Fenian office was apparently unaware of the city commissioner's attempt to charge and extradite one of the suspects for arson after he fled from England.[113] If Harcourt had a will to extend the activities of political policing, the absence of an institution to centrally gather the information and give the appropriate order inhibited attempts to deal efficiently with the Fenian threat. In a report dated 29 March 1881, Robert Anderson told Harcourt that, regarding fenianism, 'we shall have no serious troubles at present, but that later on – possibly not till the summer is over we shall again have an alarming state of things to deal with.'[114] But the Philadelphia consul informed Anderson that he received information regarding plans to bomb public buildings around Liverpool on 10 April.[115] This knowledge did not prevent a bomb from exploding at Chester Barracks on 5 May 1881, another one outside of Liverpool Barracks on 16 May 1881 and eventually another one outside of Liverpool City Hall on 10 June 1881.[116] Despite the home secretary's 'spider's web of communication', the Fenian office appears to have struggled to act successfully upon information.

Overall, in contrast to England, Ireland was able to rely on external contacts to gather information on the Fenian movements. In Ireland, to help the police in its mission of political policing, a circular issued on 19 January 1881 conferred the use of detectives to investigate secret organisations but noted the need to keep their employment secret.[117] Those detectives were not part of the police force but were private individuals that the R.I.C. inspectors could recruit to gather information. There are traces in the archives of one of those detectives, presenting himself as a 'reporter', based in Limerick, reporting on a meeting of the Central Land League but also furnishing general information on the movement's activities. On 18 July 1881, he wrote directly to the R.I.C. head constable in William Street barracks to report on individuals appointed for the 'Irish Republican Brotherhood and Skirmishing Funds for the city

[112] Confidential memorandum, 28 Feb.1881 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[113] Fenian Office, 31 March 1881 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[114] Anderson to Home Office, 29 March 1881 (T.N.A., HO 144 1537/1).

[115] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 53.

[116] Ibid.

[117] G.E. Hillier Inspector General, 19 Jan. 1881 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

and suburbs of Limerick.'[118] He provided the name of the persons but also their physical description: 'John Heffernan Kellerman (Ballysimon) tall, thin, gentlemanly appearance, dropped when walking, dark or brown hair and whiskers which are very light.'[119] This reminds us of the individual profile drawn up by the police informant Number 47 of anarchist militants that settled in London.[120] The most interesting information regarding political policing practices can be found at the end of the letter:

> Since my last report, I heard most positive information relative to the concealment of arms in this city. I know by whom they were concealed but the fitting of the information as their whereabouts surroundings and merchants would cost me more than I can afford to spend and I do not understand laying out money that I can't afford. In conclusion I wish to draw your attention to accompanying report of the last meeting of the Limerick Central Land League and to state that I consider myself fairly entitled to considerable remuneration for the information I have given and I will continue to give you. As a local Reporter, no one can be in a better position to obtain information on any and every matter, but the acquiring of the information, which I give you costs me money, which I hope you will get me a refund.[121]

This reporter acted like an informant for the police, furnishing information in exchange for financial reward. The question of money also figured in a report from the same reporter a few weeks later. On 3 August 1881, he concluded his letter with: 'I have again to draw your attention to the necessity of allowing me some money to follow up my enquiries otherwise you, and through you the Government, will lose some valuable information which may prove beneficial to them.'[122] The trustworthiness of this source can be discussed as much as the value of its information. We may assume that the R.I.C. not only relied on those professional reporters but that they were part of a system of information gathering alongside informants and uniformed police work.

In comparing England and Ireland, we see different strategies when it comes to policing established political threats. To respond to agrarian agitation during the Land War, the British government in Ireland implemented coercive measures to put an end to political violence and

---

[118] Confidential letter to Head Constable Chalke, 18 Jul.1881 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, Carton 9).

[119] Ibid.

[120] cf. Chapter 3.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Confidential letter to Head Constable Chalke, 3 Aug. 1881 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Irish Land League and Irish National League Papers, Carton 9).

could rely on the presence of the R.I.C. throughout the country to report on the situation at a local level and ensure the application of said measures. Moreover, while fenianism appeared as a potential and not a definitive threat for Ireland in the early 1880s, Dublin Castle was at the receiving end of information coming from North America and from Robert Anderson and could rely on John Mallon and the D.M.P. G Division surveillance of Fenians and land agitators. Regarding fenianism, England was receiving information and was willing to anticipate attacks by reforming its institutions in charge of political policing. If this was not enough to prevent the dynamite campaign, the most important issue for London remained its difficulty to set up a long-term system of information gathering and to be inserted into the anti-Fenian network.

The late 1870s and early years of the 1880s were an important time for the development of political policing practices in England and Ireland. The centralised dimension of the Irish police system appeared to favour the surveillance and gathering of information on political agitators. If Ireland was already familiar with the monitoring of fenianism from the 1860s, the Dublin administration extended its practices to police the Land League movement as the threat of political agitation appeared to increase. The central administration could count on its constables to monitor league meetings, while also receiving information from an 'anti-fenian' network involving various actors and institutions. A form of political policing that was, in some respects, closer to that of France, where, as we shall see in the next chapter, a network of institutions was involved in the monitoring of the anarchist movement throughout the territory and abroad. In the case of England, Scotland Yard had difficulties implementing a similar system to prevent the launch of a Fenian dynamite campaign in 1881. Despite having information on the threat, the English police could not rely on an effective police operation to counter it.

The Coercion Act voted by the British parliament in October 1881 to police the Land War reinforced the Fenian threat according to Le Caron who told Anderson at the end of the year 1881:

> 'I fail to see any good resulting from action of late on your side; it has not tended to stamp out the movement [but] has increased it one hundred fold. [Timothy] Healy to me… has confirmed everything I have heard and [seen] as to the ultimate object in view. He says before two years E[ngland] will be down on her knees.'[123]

[123] Le Caron to Anderson, 12 Dec. 1881 (T.N.A., HO 144 1538/6) quoted in Vlad Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 53.

In the following years, the dynamite campaign intensified in England, while Ireland faced renewed political agitation, posing, as we shall see in part two of the thesis, new challenges to their policing system.

Chapter 3

Policing Political Threats: Anarchists and Socialists

While England and Ireland were facing increasing threats from Fenians and land agitators from the end of the 1870s, the young Third Republic in France was challenged by anarchists who took advantage of the liberalization of the regime to organize meetings and sell newspapers.[1] Other revolutionary militants were also present in London at the time, as a result of the English government's policy towards political refugees from the second half of the nineteenth century.[2] Indeed, the anarchists were organizing themselves at the London Socialist Revolutionary Congress, taking place in July 1881, an event that did not escape the attention of the agents of the P.P..[3] While Paris focused on the need to protect public order, which led to the development of more overtly-political policing methods in the early 1880s, London did not implement similar practices, which were claimed to be incompatible with its liberal approach towards policing. It took some halting steps in the direction of greater surveillance but nothing on the scale implemented in France.

Historians of the anarchist movement in France agree on the difficulty of assessing the threat the militants represented for the Republic. The anarchists' lack of a political structure and hierarchy, the organisation of the movement into federations, its dissemination all over the national territory but also abroad makes it difficult to draw a portrait of this entity. This is why Jean Maitron, Marcel Masard, Gaetano Manfredonia and Vivien Bouhey rely mostly on police records to tell the history of the French anarchist movement alongside anarchist newspapers and private correspondence to assess the level of threat the movement represented.[4] The English case here offers greater clarity on the level of danger encountered: anarchists and socialists militants living in England did not directly threaten the integrity of the English territory and thus were not specially monitored by the police.[5] Due to a lack of organisation and experience,

---

[1] Vivien Bouhey, Philippe Levillain, *Les anarchistes contre la République, 1880 à 1914: contribution à l'histoire des réseaux sous la Troisième République* (France, 2008), pp 60-65.

[2] cf. Chapter 1.

[3] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 43-8.

[4] Jean Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France. Des origines à 1914* (Paris, 1975); Laurent Gallet, Marcel Massard, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste à Lyon (1880-1894)* (Lyon, 2016); Gaetano Manfredonia, 'Études sur le mouvement anarchiste en France: 1848-1914' (PhD thesis, Institut d'études politiques de Paris, 1990); Bouhey, Levillain, *Les anarchistes contre la République*.

[5] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 1-18.

but also for ideological reasons, a directly 'political' policing system was never fully implemented in England in the first half of the 1880s. As noted by Bernard Porter, the socialist refugees never appeared as a threat to the British, thus their presence did not require a particular response from the police.[6]

Given that there is some uncertainty around the nature of the anarchist threat posed in England and France, we will argue here that political agitation does not have to constitute an ever-present and compelling threat to provoke a reaction from central administrations and that the policing cultures in each country, as much as the threats they faced, shaped their responses. As the records indicate, the French policing system never hesitated to deploy a great number of resources to monitor anarchist actions and extended it to foreign territories, even if the movement appeared, in some respects, less threatening or at least less extensive than the Fenian conspiracy in Ireland and England. In comparison, London never seemed particularly concerned by the activities of socialist refugees present in its territory, at least until the publication of a provocative article by Johann Most, which celebrated the assassination of Tsar Alexander II of Russia.[7] Indeed, Constance Bantman suggests that it was the Johan Most case in 1881 that first challenged the liberal and welcoming policy of the British government.[8] The policing response, nevertheless, remained limited in England compared to the measures implemented in France and Ireland.

3.1 Policing domestic political threats: France

In the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Third Republic was challenged by an anarchist movement, operating outside its traditional institutions such as the parliament and political parties. Indeed, the anarchists refused to consider themselves as a political party. They organised themselves into federations; in other words, self-governed free associations. As no list identifying the members of the federations existed, it was difficult for the authorities to evaluate how many they were, their level of influence and thus the threat they posed.[9]

The anarchists took advantage of the liberal policies initiated by the republican government in 1879 to promote their political ideals and they benefited from the Communards

[6] Ibid., p. 10.

[7] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', pp 379.

[8] Ibid., pp 379-81.

[9] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 37.

amnesty voted by the French parliament in July 1880.[10] The laws of 1881 ensuring the freedom of assembly and of the press allowed the anarchists to organise public meetings and to publish various newspapers.[11] In his study on the history of the French anarchist movement, Jean Maitron analysed the circulation of those newspapers and noted the difficulty of establishing the size of the anarchist movement and evaluating the seriousness of the threat.[12] The most popular anarchist newspaper was *Le Révolté*, started in Switzerland in 1879 and moderated by anarchist leaders such as Peter Kropotkin, Elisée Reclus and Jean Grave.[13] Its first print run was 1,500 copies in 1879 before rising to 3,000 from 1883 onward. *Le Révolté* was then established in Paris in April 1885, favouring the organisation of the movement in the city.

It was, however, still difficult for the police to establish the number of anarchist militants despite these publications. The police informant, using the alias of 'Droz', who infiltrated the Fédération Jurassienne, counted forty-two groups in 1881 – sixteen in Paris, three in Lyon and the rest spread out all across France.[14] The next year, the newspaper *Le Révolté* counted the same number for Paris, stating that these groups did not have lots of members and were not very active.[15] Then, according to Jean Maitron, an unsigned police report from June 1883 counted thirteen groups in Paris, representing 200 people in total.[16] In 1887, an informant established that there were nineteen groups with 500 members in total in the capital city.[17]

The movement appears less threatening in comparison to fenianism; Commerford estimated that the I.R.B. resembled 50,000 men in the 1860s.[18] In Lyon, the locality after Paris where the anarchists were the most active at the time, the anarchists themselves estimated that they were 6,000 strong in 1883. Jean Maitron has, however, established that this number was

---

[10] It was one of the first laws voted by the Republicans when they came into power in 1879 to reunite the nation after the troubles of the past decade. It gave amnesty to the people who has been condemned because they participated in the Communes of Paris in 1871. This concerned many political militants that resumed their activities following the passing of the law.

[11] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 38.

[12] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*, pp 111-50.

[13] Gaetano Manfredonia, 'L'anarchisme' in Jean-Jacques Becker, Gilles Candar (eds), *Histoire des gauches en France. Volume 1,* (Paris, 2005), pp 444-62.

[14] Droz report, 13 Oct. 1881 (A.P.P., BA 438).

[15] *Le Révolté,* 19 Aug. 1882.

[16] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*, p. 125.

[17] Agent '22'report, 20 Feb. 1887 (A.P.P., BA 75).

[18] Comerford, *The Fenians in context,* pp 124-5.

an overestimate.[19] According to Marcel Massard, while the anarchist newspapers had a certain influence on the locality, only twelve public meetings took place between 1883 and 1885, and only two of these meetings gathered 400 people.[20] It was therefore difficult for the police to get a precise figure for those involved in the movement, and if they were active members or just supporters. There was enough activity, however, to suggest to the police at least a real and tangible threat to public order.

As previously noted, the Third Republic also maintained the political police in the early 1880s.[21] Two institutions were involved in monitoring anarchists at the time: the S.G. and its special commissioners and the P.P., with the latter given considerable resources to carry out this duty. Indeed, the budget of the P.P. was larger than any other institution in the French policing administration, as testified by the graph below. This budget was municipal as it was voted by the Paris Municipal Council and paid from the municipal budget, but with half of the expenditure reimbursed by the central state.[22]

Figure 5: Police spending of the Ministry of the Interior (1878-1900)



Source: *Compte rendu par le Ministre de l'intérieur pour l'exercice…* [1878-1900]

[19] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 126.

[20] Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste à Lyon*, p. 86.

[21] cf. Chapter 1.

[22] Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France*, pp 63-4.

Louis Andrieux, Paris police prefect between 1879 and 1881, confirmed in his memoirs that the Parisian institution also benefited from secret funds.[23] He used these funds to finance 'secret agents', individuals that were secretly employed by the P.P. for political policing missions while pursuing their professional activities.[24] A December 1880 report from Gustave Macé, head of the P.P. Surety Department, sheds light on how those financial resources were allocated.[25] He explained that he 'tried to improve his department in spite of the few resources at his disposal.'[26] Macé wrote that his agents worked on more than 45,000 cases that year and carried out 1,267 'special surveillances'.[27] The total expenses of the service were estimated at almost 67,000 francs.[28] As reflected in the high number of cases and the importance of financial investment, not only anarchists were monitored by the P.P. Surety Department but other potential enemies of the regime, especially the conservatives, such as the supporters of Napoleon III and those who sought the return of a monarchy in France.[29] If the influence of the conservatives was in decline in comparison to the success of the liberal and republican side in the early 1880s,[30] their surveillance became increasingly central in the later period as we shall see in later chapters.[31] Most surveillance records concerned the anarchist movement at the time, as testified by the archives of the P.P.. The institution relied on a large network of informants but also on police officers present at political meetings since June 1881 and the enactment of the law on the freedom of assembly to fulfil this mission. Louis Andrieux, the Parisian prefect, regularly mentioned the 'revolutionary party' – a term he employed in his reports but also in his memoirs to describe the anarchist movement – and its most eminent members, such as Louise Michel.[32]

After taking an active part in the Commune of Paris, Michel was deported to New Caledonia where she converted to the idea of anarchism. She came back to Paris in 1880 and

[23] Andrieux, *Souvenirs d'un Préfet de Police,* p. 9.

[24] Ibid, pp 32-3.

[25] Report from Gustave Macé, 24 Dec. 1880 (A.P.P., DB 45).

[26] Ibid., p. 3

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 8.

[29] Examples of this can be found on the daily report sent by the Paris police prefect to the minister of the interior, see A.P.P., BA 90.

[30] Houte, *Le Triomphe de la République*, pp 49-81.

[31] cf. Chapters 7 and 8.

[32] Andrieux, *Souvenirs d'un préfet de police.*

from that moment she became the subject of an extensive surveillance by the P.P., confirmed by Louis Andrieux in his memoirs:

> Expected by her political friends for a long time, Miss Louise Michel only arrived in Paris on 9 November 1880 … From that day, Miss Louise Michel took an important part in the socialist movement and henceforth her name came back regularly in my reports.[33]

Indeed, she was referenced on 17 September, 11, 14 and 16 November as well as 2 and 13 December 1880 reports.[34] Another report from 27 October 1881 shows the extent of the surveillance of the anarchist movement in France.[35] It gives information on the group from the fifth *arrondissement* (district) and details a public meeting organised by a group of young workers called the *Réveil Social*. The police reported that 'only 400 people' came to the meeting and 'among them, a large number of women', before specifying that the majority of the audience were workers.[36] Louise Michel spoke at the meeting and might be the reason why policemen were sent to report on it.[37] The same report also contains specific intelligence on the life of Louise Michel. A paragraph of the report is entitled 'Some details on Louise Michel':

> Louise Michel had left, apparently, pretty bad memories in Noumea [New Caledonia].
> She was the tenant of *Sieur* Bourdinat, master carpenter, who was never paid his rent.
> She taught some lessons to kids and said that she gave everything she earned to unfortunate deportees, but it seemed that she could barely support herself and that; to the contrary, those she pretended to help were helping her.
> She was feared because of her vindictiveness.[38]

The report portrayed Louise Michel in a very negative light, the policeman pointing out supposed abuses on her part, towards her landlord and the people of New Caledonia. The last sentence of the report can be seen as a warning regarding the character of the militant and the challenges she might pose to the police in the future. Louise Michel was disliked by the authorities, and it is thus not surprising to find this kind of report, not hesitating to spread false

[33] Ibid., pp 321-22.

[34] A.P.P., BA 89.

[35] Daily report from the Paris police prefect to the minister of the interior, 27 Oct. 1881 (A.P.P., BA 90).

[36] Ibid., p. 5.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., p.4.

information on her stay in Noumea, where she actually supported the Kanak people and started teaching settlers and Kanak children.[39]

Andrieux also shared with the minister of the interior details of political meetings where he sent his police officers. On 19 March 1881 – anniversary of the Paris Commune – seven pages of the daily reports were about a banquet organised by Emile Gautier and Louise Michel the day before.[40] The policemen in attendance reported, in a very detailed manner, the course of the meeting:

> The room held about 600 people who had been admitted after presenting a letter of invitation or even writing their names on small pieces of paper. The meeting was called to order at 9 a.m. In the absence of Louise Michel, who was meant to chair, an organizer called Emile Gauthier spoke. Before dealing with his subject, 'The 18th of March, what it was, what it could have been', the speaker believes he must salute the death of a tyrant: 'In the name of Solidarity and French Socialism,' he said, 'I would like to thank the nihilists who have been… getting rid of the greatest tyrant of the time. I propose that two of us go to the Progress Room in order to submit a thank you vote to the nihilists.[41]

The policemen mentioned the 600 people attending the meeting, the militants scheduled to participate and the direct words of the speakers. They never expressed their opinions on the words spoken and tried to transcribe the information as accurately as possible. The 'death of a tyrant' mentioned here and referring to the assassination of Alexander II of Russia, might have been considered by the police as an invitation to radicals to murder heads of state and was probably taken very seriously. The reports were then transmitted to the Paris police prefect, which made them available to the minister of the interior, letting the government decide on the actions to take against the anarchists considering that information. The P.P. closely monitored anarchist activities, resulting in a great deal of information being gathered and centralised and revealing the strategy of the French system when it came to dealing with political agitators.

Paris was clearly extending its use of political policing to monitor the anarchists and their meetings in reaction to the evolution of the movement. Furthermore, the Parisian police was not the only administration monitoring the anarchists' actions at the time. The series 'F7 - Police générale' from the A.N. reveal the participation of the S.G. in this mission. All the information sent to the diverse actors in charge of policing in France were reported in the S.G.'s

---

[39] Denis Salas, 'Louise Michel déportée politique au bagne de Nouvelle-Calédonie (1874-1880). Une expérience de l'écriture', *Histoire de la justice*, n° 15, 1, (2002), pp 239-49.

[40] Daily report from Paris police prefect to the minister of the interior, 19 March 1881 (A.P.P., BA 90).

[41] Ibid.

registers of correspondence.[42] Each page of the register matches a date and was divided into three columns: 'recipient – subject – ranking'. 'Recipient' corresponded to the administration (Paris police préfecture, departmental préfectures, etc.) receiving the information from the head of the S.G., the subject was the content of the information, and the classification related to the categories this information was assigned to, such as a political meeting or political association.[43]

On 10 March 1880, the S.G. wrote to the préfet de l'Isère regarding the organisation of a revolutionary socialist newspaper and of a political association named 'Chambre syndicale fédérale ouvrière' (a worker union) in the department of Isère and in all of the south-east region.[44] This is an example of the S.G. forwarding most of its information (or guidelines, circulars) to departmental préfectures, which were under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. This letter sent on 10 March 1880 testifies to the monitoring of certain political groups and shows how policing networks were used to inform on newspapers and organisations linked to revolutionary political movements. The correspondence from 12 October 1880 was addressed to the 'Police', meaning the P.P., requesting a list of public meetings that had taken place in Paris since 1 May 1880.[45] This underlines the monitoring of public meetings as a central method to the French intelligence system. The correspondence of 26 November 1881 testifies to the specific attention dedicated to the anarchist movement, as the Parisian police was asked to communicate descriptive information on key figures of the movement: e.g. 'Transmitting "signalements" [descriptive information on persons] of Malatesta & Caffiero travelling with the Russian nihilist Kropotkine.'[46]

Enrico Malatesta, Carlo Caffiero and Peter Kropotkin were three known anarchist leaders who had been organisers of the movement and publishers of anarchist newspapers in France. As a famous philosopher and opponent of the Russian imperial regime, it is not surprising that Kropotkin's name is the object of a ranking. His activities were keenly monitored by the French administration[47] showing once again how surveillance was a key part of the policing system. Moreover, correspondence from 12 October 1880 and 26 November 1881 illustrate the functioning of the French policing administration.[48] This exchange of information

[42] cf. A.N., F7 12412-12427.

[43] cf. Appendix 1.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Pierre Kropotkine, *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire*, (Paris 1898), pp 459-60.

[48] cf. Appendix 1.

between the S.G. and the P.P. allows for a continuity in the surveillance of anarchists travelling throughout the country.

In terms of political policing practices, as we previously noted, the Parisian police relied on informants to gather information on the anarchist movement. It was not the only French policing institution to implement this practice. Similar to its Parisian counterpart, the Lyon préfecture also benefited from the secret funds and used them specifically to gather information on the anarchist movement as files held in the Archives Départementales du Rhône (A.D.R.) testify. In the series 4M 74 relating to the accounts of the institution, we find traces of the use of this secret money directly provided by the Ministry of the Interior. For example, on 5 January 1881, 15 francs were spent for *indications* - various information received on political movements, without a specific target. On 16 January, 20 francs were used for the same purpose and 10 francs were spent for 'particular surveillance of an internationalist' on 14 January 1881.[49] The fees for *indications* represented the highest share of secret expenditure and were related to the anarchist militants. On 17 September 1881, 10 francs were paid for 'indications on the Socialist Revolutionary Party'[50] and on 2 October, 5 francs were invested in photographs of the 'Revolutionaries'.[51] The monitoring of the anarchist movement in Lyon is explained by the relatively large number of its members established in the locality. The city had also seen a workers' rising at the time of the Communes in 1871 and following the repression of the insurrection, many fled to Switzerland. They came back to Lyon after the Communards amnesty in 1880, establishing an anarchist network in the city.[52] This surveillance exercised by the police and the information gathered by its informants would prove useful in repressing the movement in consequence of the bombing of the Assommoir in October 1882.[53]

The difficulty for the police in establishing the importance of anarchism as a political

[49] État des dépenses faites pour les besoins du commissariat spécial près la Préfecture du Rhône, du 1er au 31 Janvier 1881 inclus [Statement of expenditure incurred for the purposes of the special commissioners reported to the Préfecture du Rhône, from 1st to 31 January 1881, inclusive] (A.D.R., 4M 74).

[50] État des dépenses faites pour les besoins du commissariat spécial près la Préfecture du Rhône, du 1er au 30 Septembre 1881 inclus [Statement of expenditure incurred for the purposes of the special commissioners reported to the Préfecture du Rhône, from 1st to 31 September 1881, inclusive] (A.D.R., 4M 74).

[51] État des dépenses faites pour les besoins du commissariat spécial près la Préfecture du Rhône, du 1er au 31 Octobre 1881 inclus [Statement of expenditure incurred for the purposes of the special commissioners reported to the Préfecture du Rhône, from 1st to 31 October 1881, inclusive] (A.D.R., 4M 74).

[52] Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste à Lyon,* pp 30-2.

[53] cf. Chapter 4.

movement in France, might explain why the political police implemented a systematic monitoring of the movement from the end of the 1870s. In contrast, the Metropolitan Police appeared less concerned with the presence of foreign anarchists and socialist militants in London at the same time.

3.2 Policing international threats: anarchists and socialists in England and France

The will of the English police to only police clear and established political threats – in the sense that they directly threatened the integrity of its territory – appears visible when it comes to policing anarchist and socialist individuals present on its soil. By welcoming political refugees from all over the world, England appeared as more liberal than the other Europeans regimes. At the same time, the plans of those individuals generally focused on agitation in other countries, so the British government had little interest in spending resources to monitor them. This approach was very different from the one adopted by the French government, who aggressively monitored the anarchist militants, not only within its national territory but also overseas.

The report of Gustave Macé, head of the P.P. Surety Department, from December 1880, sheds light on how the Parisian institution policed potential agitators established abroad: 'The money allocated to the free and detained informants as well as the correspondents living in England, Belgium and Switzerland represents 7,400 francs. No accounting documents can be officially established regarding this money.'[54] While informants were employed in France, correspondents provided information from abroad. There was a real financial investment in those activities, but because of their nature, they were not listed on official account records. Louis Andrieux, Paris police prefect at the time, explained why in his memoirs: 'It is very difficult for a minister of foreign affairs to exercise, through non-accredited intermediaries, an occult surveillance; he risks offending sensitivities provoking diplomatic incidents.'[55] The French government was looking to gather information on French anarchist militants who fled to England or Switzerland, after the Communes of Paris in 1871, that could not be obtained through diplomatic channels. As previously established, the Metropolitan Police Detective Department was not willing to inform on political refugees or did not really have the

[54] Report from Gustave Macé, 24 Dec. 1880, p.9 (A.P.P., DB 45). 7,400 francs in 1901 represented about €33 130 in 2023 according to this calculator https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794

[55] Louis Andrieux, *A travers le Républiques. Mémoires* (Paris, 1926), p. 275 quoted in Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre,* p. 287.

competency to do so at the time.[56] Thus, the Parisian police relied on a large network of their own informants stationed in England.

The archives reveal the habits of the French political police and demonstrate the use of specific methods employed to gather information on anarchists.[57] Indeed, an informant known as 'Le numéro 47' (Number 47) sent to the prefect's chief of staff a series of individual profiles of notable international figures and members of the socialist party living in London in April 1878.[58] Those profiles were not only about the political actions of the militants but also accompanying physical descriptions. Some concerned major figures in the movement. Indeed, Number 47 sent a description of Karl Marx to the French police: 'He's an elderly man, with a grey beard and black ebony eyes and eyebrows'.[59] The informant also specified Marx's influence amongst the movement: 'Writer of a book well known amongst the socialist party called Das Kapital, critical of political economy'.[60] His former address in London was also mentioned, as was his position as the former secretary-correspondent for Germany for the London General Council, but Marx's profile is surprisingly short.[61] His involvement amongst the International is not mentioned, as if the informant considered that Marx's was no longer politically influential. Knowing that Marx was quite sick at this stage, this might explain this short profile. In comparison, the former member of the Paris Commune, Auguste Serraillier, was subject to a more detailed profile and perhaps considered more relevant by the French police.[62] His appearance was not mentioned, but Number 47 retraced his political history:

> Former member of the Commune where he has been sent, the 16th of April 1871, by the voters of the 2nd district. He took part in the Commission for labour and exchange and signed the proclamation by the communal delegation of the 2nd district; proclamation calling all inhabitants of this district to take up arms and join the barricades. Convicted in absentia, the 19th of January 1879, by the 3rd war council to the death penalty.[63]

The informant also related an argument Serraillier had with another member of the Commune

---

[56] cf. Chapter 1.

[57] cf. A.P.P., BA 30; A.P.P., BA 435.

[58] Number 47 to chief of staff, 3 April 1878 (A.P.P., BA 435).

[59] Karl Marx profile by Number 47, 2 Apr. 1878 (A.P.P., BA 435).

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Auguste Serraillier profile by Number 47, 3 Apr. 1878 (A.P.P., BA 435).

[63] Ibid.

in 1872.[64] Number 47 sent at least forty profiles of more or less detail, of members of the International or the socialist party in 1878.[65] This shows that the P.P.'s informants' mission was to gather information on a large number of individuals for the Paris police prefect. It thus sheds lights on the strategy of the institution that aimed at identifying as many political agitators as possible, even if they were foreign and resided abroad, and to develop an exhaustive database on them.

The French police was then aware of anarchist actions ahead of the London Socialist Revolutionary Congress planned to take place in London in July 1881. An informant of the P.P., signing all their reports with a '*', mentioned the event for the first time on 12 March 1880: 'For some time, I am hearing about an International Congress, which will take place in London soon. All the heads of the different socialist party are supposed to be there.'[66] On 9 October 1880, the head of the 1st Bureau of the P.P. and the police prefect's chief of staff transmitted a note to the head of the municipal police in which he made reference to agent '*''s report regarding the organisation of the London Congress.[67] The chief of staff also asked the head of the municipal police to 'keep himself informed … of what could follow this project of an international anarchist Congress … and to report to the cabinet the results.'[68] This informant followed closely the organisation of the event as he wrote almost daily to the police on each development happening before providing longer reports when the Congress was held in July 1881. In a report from December 1880, a French policeman submitted a copy of a letter written by Johann Most, a German socialist refugee in charge of organising the event and giving instructions to the French delegates.[69]

As the socialist and anarchist refugees established in London were not threatening the integrity of the British territory, the English police seemed to tolerate them, but the publication of a provocative article by Johann Most, a German refugee, in the *Freiheit* celebrating the assassination of the Russian Tsar Alexander II on 19 March 1881, heightened concerns.[70] At the time, the police did not have much experience in policing political refugees. No surveillance of political meetings had been implemented, and as Porter notes, no one was there to record

[64] Ibid.

[65] cf. A.P.P., BA 435.

[66] Report by agent '*', 12 March 1880 (A.P.P., BA 30).

[67] Préfet de police's chief of staff to the chief of the municipal police, 9 Oct. 1880 (A.P.P., BA 30).

[68] Ibid.

[69] Copy of a letter from Most, Dec. 1880 (A.P.P., BA 30).

[70] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 2829; Solomon, 'Straining the Law', pp 44-5.

Most when he allegedly restated the central message of his article at a socialist meeting on 23 March 1881.[71]

Following this failure, Harcourt wrote to his permanent secretary to prosecute the author of the *Freiheit* article and noted that 'Communistic Meetings … where most atrocious doctrines were proclaimed … should be looked after for the future.'[72] The police was instructed to keep an eye on the socialist militants – something made easier with the organization of the London Socialist Revolutionary Congress.[73] According to Vlad Solomon, the Most case opened a door for the operations of the 'Irish bureau to be expanded to cover subversives activities of all types, not just fenianism'.[74] Constance Bantman also argues that Most article, coupled with the beginning of the Fenian dynamite campaign, changed the English police approach to political threats.[75] Porter too notes that: 'by March 1881 the Criminal Investigation Department of the Metropolitan Police had an embryo political arm.'[76] In practice, Most was condemned to sixteen months of hard labour and the *Freiheit* continued to be monitored until its founder left for America in 1883.[77] While Most was serving his sentence, the new co-chief editors of the newspaper were arrested for pro-Fenians articles.[78]

Yet, the establishment of the Fenian office and the reinforcement of the surveillance of socialist meetings did not have such a great impact on the policing practices of the detectives in the early 1880s. For instance, it appeared that the Metropolitan Police was not involved in the surveillance of the London Socialist Revolutionary Congress of July 1881. As Bantman notes, the policing of the event was left to foreign police forces with the meeting reuniting militants from continental Europe.[79] This could explain why we do not find a file in Kew (T.N.A.) on the Congress, while the P.P. have one in its records.[80] This event took place from 14 to 21 July 1881 and gathered approximately forty representatives from anarchist groups from all over the world. Agent '*''s first report on the Congress, dated 15 July, mentioned the name

[71] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 42.

[72] Harcourt to Liddell, 26 March 1881 (T.N.A., HO 144 77/A3385) quoted in Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 48.

[73] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 48.

[74] Ibid., p.48.

[75] Bantman, *Un premier exil libertaire*, p. 225.

[76] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 42.

[77] Solomon, 'Straining the Law' pp 53-52.

[78] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en Grande-Bretagne', p.380.

[79] Ibid. p. 385.

[80] Congrès socialiste International tenu à Londres, Mai 1881 (A.P.P., BA 30).

of thirty-five delegates, among them: Emile Gautier, Louise Michel and Peter Kropotkin.[81] The meeting aimed to reconstitute the 'International Workingmen Association' and marked the moment where the anarchists defined the notion of 'propaganda of the deed' and the idea of 'permanent revolution' as means of action.[82] This gave substance to the threat the movement represented for the regime.[83]

Information regarding the Congress of July 1881 did not only come from the informant, agent '*', or, indeed, from London. The Parisian administration also received information from informants writing from other countries. On the third day of the Congress, on 17 July 1881, an informant sent a copy from Brussels of the *Bulletin de Londres* produced by Chauvière, a Belgian anarchist.[84] The correspondent Droz infiltrated Swiss militants and wrote from Neuchâtel on 17 March 1881:

> In three months, the Congress that will take place in London will give…of the wide International organization; but from now on, we can only encourage… lots of surveillance. Particularly in Paris, because it is now interesting to see how much in a few days the revolutionary spirits will be excited and the '18 March' of tomorrow, will prove…the hope and the madness of a certain quantity of organizers of banquets.[85]

This event was also mentioned several times in the daily reports of the Paris police prefect from 6, 12 and 24 July 1881.[86] Compared to the London police, the P.P. was aware of the network that constituted the anarchist movement at the time and relied on its informants and agents from France but also from abroad to gather information on the militants. This illustrates the gap existing between the French and English policing system at the time.

In its approach of anticipating a potential threat, the French police extended its surveillance of the anarchist movement in England. In contrast, its English counterpart did not

[81] Report by agent '*', 15 Jul. 1881 (A.P.P., BA 30).

[82] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 114.

[83] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 43.

[84] Copy of Bulletin de Londres sent on 17 Jul. 1881 (A.P.P., BA 30).

[85] Extract from Droz's report, 17 March 1881 (A.P.P., BA 30); the '18 March' refers to the anniversary of the Paris Commune and the banquets refers to the event set-up by the Republicans in 1847-48 in place of political meetings when they were forbidden by the conservative government. This led to a revolution establishing the Second Republic in France in 1848.

[86] A.P.P., BA 90.

consider the socialist refugees present in its territory as a potential threat and was not willing to act on it.

As in Ireland, the French policing administration sought to monitor political movements representing a potential threat to the republican regime in the early 1880s. If the S.G. and the police of Lyon were involved in this surveillance, the P.P. deployed especially large resources to monitor a volatile anarchist movement, aiming at gathering and centralising as much information as possible on the militants and all potential political agitators gravitating around them. Political policing practices were also extended to not only monitor the anarchists present in the French territory but also to those that had settled in England and who threatened to take actions following the London Socialist Revolutionary Congress in 1881. In contrast, its English counterpart did not feel as much concern about the socialist presence in its capital city, as the militants did not directly threaten the country. It was not until the article published by Johann Most in the Freiheit and celebrating the assassination of Alexander of Russia and the start of a Fenian dynamite campaign, discussed in a following chapter,[87] that London questioned its strategy regarding the policing of political threats, leading to the first steps in implementing greater intelligence-led policing practices. But even then, despite some changes, political policing remained limited in England.

Strikingly, no members of the anarchist movement mounted an attack in either France or England at this time. The surveillance exercised by the French police may, therefore, have been unnecessary and reflected an over-estimation of the threat faced or perhaps proves Paris' effectiveness in policing political agitation. Whether effective or not up to this point, events in England, France and Ireland were about to expose weaknesses in their respective policing systems. How they would respond to these challenges and how effectively they were to meet them also reflected, as we shall now see, the different policing cultures and systems in place in each territory. In particular, it displayed the extent and limits of their respective abilities and desires to impose greater central oversight and control of policing to counter political agitation.

[87] cf. Chapter 5.

Part II

Central authorities? Policing, intelligence and political violence in England, France and Ireland, 1882-1910

Chapter 4

Reacting to political violence: Investigations, institutions and the efficiency of political policing in France and Ireland (1882-1884)

The anarchist and Fenian threats both reached new levels in the year 1882. On 6 May 1882, Under-Secretary for Ireland Thomas Burke and newly-appointed Chief Secretary Lord Cavendish, were killed in Dublin by a group of Irish republicans called the Invincibles, in what would become known as the Phoenix Park murders.[1] In Lyon, France, on the night of 22 October 1882, a bomb exploded at the Bellecour theatre's café the Assommoir, killing a commercial employee. Anarchists, very active in the locality, were the main suspects, sparking a wave of arrests among the militants and a trial in January 1883.[2] The first was clearly political murder at a time when voices in favor of self-government were growing in strength in Ireland. The second took place in France, during a period of relative political stability and liberalism initiated by reformist republicans in power since 1879. These two events allow for a comparative examination of the reactions of the French and the Irish police system to politically-motivated violence and their ability to respond to it.

In Ireland, despite their gravity and political nature, the impact of the Phoenix Park murders on the Irish policing system has not been the subject of extensive study. This might be explained by the relatively sparse records relating to the event available at the National Archives of Ireland. The most significant works are Tom Corfe and Senan Malony's research on the Phoenix Park murders and Shane Kenna's book on the Invincibles.[3] Documents produced by the D.M.P. at the time also provide an overview of the methods used by John Mallon and the G Division to track down the culprits.[4] We also look in this chapter at the effect the event had on the wider Irish policing system, something that has not yet been considered in the

---

[1] Tom Corfe, *The Phoenix Park murders. Conflict, compromise and tragedy in Ireland, 1879-1882* (London, 1968), pp 183-96.

[2] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 83-126.

[3] Corfe, *The Phoenix Park murders*; Senan Molony, *The Phoenix Park Murders: Conspiracy, Betrayal and Retribution* (Dublin, 2006); Shane Kenna, *The Invincibles: the Phoenix Park assassinations and the conspiracy that shook an Empire* (Dublin, 2019). We can also cite the following articles on the subject: Laurent Colantonio, 'De Phoenix Park (1882) à Croke Park (1920) : Luttes nationales et attentats politiques en Irlande' in *La Révolution française. Cahiers de l'Institut d'histoire de la Révolution française*, no. 1 (2012) ; Ludovic Legendre, 'Le double meurtre de Phœnix Park, 6 mai 1882' in *Etudes irlandaises*, xvii, no. 2 (1992), pp 135-45.

[4] See N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1.

historiography. Indeed, work on this period has mostly focused on how the authorities dealt with the Land War but not the policing innovations of the time.[5] Charles Townshend studied the political violence taking place in Ireland but focused on the Gendarmerie aspect of the R.I.C. and not the establishment of a network of intelligence gathering rooted more in detective work and 'secret' policing.[6] Margaret O'Callaghan's work revolves around the coercive measures taken by the British government to contain the Land War but does not reflect on the policing reforms taken on by Earl Spencer, the head of Dublin Castle at the time.[7] Ian Bridgeman is one of the few to consider the intelligence work undertake by the special police, while replacing the function of the constabulary withing the Irish criminal justice system.[8]

Similarly, in France, despite the Assommoir bombing being the first anarchist attack of this nature and the repression that ensued, the event is not subject to a very detailed study in Jean Maitron's history of anarchism in France.[9] Marcel Massard dedicated some pages of his book on the history of the Lyon anarchists to the trial of 1883, while Laurent Gallet studied the fate of Antoine Cyvoct, the potential perpetrator of the attack.[10] This chapter draws on material held at the A.D.R. and the A.N., which allow us to follow closely the investigation lead by the police on the attack and reveals the increasingly centralised dimension of the French policing administration. If in France and Ireland the police were not able to prevent the Phoenix Park murders and the Assommoir bombing from happening, the information gathered from their previous years of surveillance allowed the police, in Ireland, to repress Irish republicans and, in France, anarchists in the aftermath of the attacks. This chapter focusses on how, in both countries, greater central control of intelligence-led policing emerged in response to serious threats. If this process was not without it challenges and happened to different degrees in both countries, it was ultimately successfully achieved in both.

---

[5] Bull, *Land, politics and nationalism;* Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in Ireland, 1848-1904*; Ball, 'Policing the Land War'.

[6] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland.*

[7] O'Callaghan, *British high politics and a nationalist Ireland*.

[8] Ian Bridgeman, 'The constabulary and the criminal justice system in nineteenth-century Ireland' in Finbarr McAuley and Ian O'Donnell, *Criminal Justice History: themes and controversies from pre-Independence Ireland* (Dublin, 2003), pp 113-41.

[9] Maitron, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France,* pp 166-73.

[10] Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement Anarchiste à Lyon*, pp 58-77; Laurent Gallet, *Machinations et artifices: Antoine Cyvoct et l'attentat de Bellecour (Lyon, 1882)* (Lyon, 2015).

We will first compare the Irish and French investigations following the attacks of 1882. Then, we will analyse how the policing system evolved in Ireland to counter 'secret societies' following the Phoenix Park murders, before reflecting on how the Ministry of the Interior reinforced its control over political policing in France.

4.1 *L'année terrible* in France and Ireland: Comparing the 1882 Phoenix Park murders and the Assommoir attack investigations

Comparing the Phoenix Park murders and the Assommoir investigations highlights a revealing difference in terms of methods and purpose within the Irish and French policing administrations. In Dublin, the case was led by one unit and almost single-handedly by one man, John Mallon, from the D.M.P. G Division, while in Lyon, the detective work involved a more co-ordinated response and the involvement of different actors from the policing administration. For Dublin Castle, it was politically necessary to quickly arrest the Invincibles as they had assassinated the two heads of the Irish administration, but also to prove the efficiency of the Irish police. In France, the Assommoir attack was used as an excuse to repress the anarchist movement as well as to try and prevent other attacks of the same nature from taking place. It was followed by a trial of sixty-six identified anarchists in January 1883 with the aim of weakening the movement.[11] In Ireland, meanwhile, the trial of the Invincibles was limited to condemning the individuals directly implicated in the Phoenix Park murders, as the wider mission to repress 'secret societies' was left to the R.I.C.

Both policing services were taken by surprise by the attacks, despite the surveillance the French and Irish police deployed over Fenians and anarchists in the previous years.[12] There was a failure of intelligence in both cases. The Phoenix Park Murders came as a shock, both for the British government and the Irish people. The D.M.P. G Division faced criticism following the assassination of both senior figures in the Castle administration by a group associated with fenianism. Administrative officials and informants denounced an apparent amateurism within the police force at the time. When it came to its capacity to solve the Phoenix Park Murders for example, in a letter sent on 25 May 1882, a member of the British administration addressed his worries to Earl Spencer. Deacon − possibly a detective − wrote:

[11] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 83-126.

[12] cf. Chapters 2 and 3.

> I cannot help saying that to search the regular steamers for the murderers or even to search amongst the Irish population for them, as has been done, shows how utterly incapable are the Dublin Police and others to deal with the Crafty workings of Secret Societies.[13]

The Invincibles who plotted the murders were a small, secret society of thirty-five to forty men, who had split from the I.R.B.[14] Political murders were not a common tactic of the Fenians – as we saw in the previous chapter, some favoured planting bombs in England at the time – but the Invincibles appear disconnected from the rest of the dynamiters in terms of strategies and objectives.[15] They were probably formed at the end of the year 1881 and they distinguished themselves by advocating political assassinations.[16] If the Kilmainham treaty, reputedly agreed between Parnell and Gladstone, seemed to offer a possible political solution to the land issue, it probably acted as a spur for the militants.[17] This was not the first time the Invincibles targeted the head of the Irish government. Indeed, they failed multiple times to kill William Forster the month before the Phoenix Park murders, without the chief secretary being aware of it.[18] It was on 2 May 1882, thus only a few days before the double assassination, that the Invincibles decided to target Burke, now that Forster had left Ireland.[19] The methods used, the few days spent at planning the murder, and the separation of the Invincibles as a group from the rest of the brotherhood might explain why the police did not uncover the conspiracy despite their close monitoring of Fenian activities.

In France, the Assommoir attack caused a great stir in the press, with at least 229 articles published between 24 October and 31 October mentioning the attack.[20] According to Marcel Massard: 'a real panic seized the people of Lyon'.[21] Indeed, the police received anonymous letters informing them of future explosions, which perpetuated a climate of terror.[22] It is not surprising that the bombing took place in Lyon: the anarchists' networks there were especially

---

[13] Deacon to Earl Spencer, 25 May 1882 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1, Folder 5).

[14] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 100.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Legendre, 'Le double meurtre de Phœnix Park', p. 138.

[17] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 100.

[18] Legendre, 'Le double meurtre de Phœnix Park', p. 140.

[19] Ibid.

[20] This number results from the search of the term 'attentat Bellecour' on the *Retronews* database between 24 Oct. 1882 and 31 Oct. 1882.

[21] Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement Anarchiste à Lyon*, p. 62.

[22] Ibid.

important.[23] At the same time, the Préfecture du Rhône was exercising a massive surveillance operation on the anarchist movement, like the one implemented by the Parisian police. Despite this failure of intelligence, both services were able to react quickly and used multiple arrests as a police tactic, relying on informants and on previously established surveillance of agitators.

As seen previously, the Lyon police was also accustomed with political policing techniques to monitor the anarchist movement.[24] As in Paris, this surveillance took the shape of agents attending political meetings or information gathering relying on informants. In the series '4M 307 – Agissements Anarchistes (1881-1883)' from the A.D.R., are numerous reports from the special commissioner of the S.G. to the secretary general of the police regarding anarchist activities. In the same box, there is also a list of 116 anarchists, with their names, addresses, and, for a few of them, their occupations.[25] They were listed as shoemakers, locksmiths, mechanics, or weavers showing the 'companions' were part of the skilled working class.[26] It is also interesting to note that thirteen of those militants were women and were also known to the police.[27] Among this list, twenty-one persons would be accused of trying to recreate the International Workingmen's Association at the 'trial of the 66' a year and a half later.[28] Two other lists from this box are also noteworthy. The first, one without any dates and entitled 'Anarchistes Lyonnais', provides the names of fourteen people, including eleven men that would be accused in the 'trial of the 66' such as Antoine Cyvoct who was later identified as the one who caused the Assommoir attack.[29] The second list entitled 'Liste des membres du parti socialiste révolutionnaire Lyonnais' contains the names and addresses of fifty-four anarchists in 1882. Nine of them were later tried at the 'trial of the 66'.[30] These lists were probably firstly established to enforce the surveillance of the militants, but they were used to arrest agitators in response to the bombing attack of October 1882.

---

[23] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 85.

[24] cf. Chapter 3.

[25] Etat des personnes ayant assisté à la réunion privée du parti socialiste révolutionnaire tenue le 17 septembre 1881, chez Célérier, rue St-Elisabeth, 108 [Status of persons attending the private meeting of the revolutionary socialist party held on 17 September 1881 at Célérier, 108 Saint-Elisabeth street] (A.D.R., 4M 307).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Trial of 66 anarchist militants taking place in Lyon in January 1883 in reaction of the Assommoir attack.

[29] Anarchistes Lyonnais [list of anarchists from Lyon] (A.D.R., 4M 307).

[30] Liste des membres du parti socialiste révolutionnaire Lyonnais [List of members of Lyon socialist revolutionary party] (A.D.R., 4M 307).

In Ireland, because the murders took place in Dublin, the D.M.P. and more specifically the G Division under John Mallon, was in charge of the investigation, that was quickly solved thanks to the superintendent networks of informants. Tom Corfe argues that Mallon 'for twenty years and more had been developing his techniques for keeping in touch with the shadier and more criminal aspects of subversive nationalism.'[31] As Corfe contends: '[Mallon's] real problem was not so much in hunting the gang and identifying the murderers as in finding the evidence that would convict them. There was no lack of information, for Mallon's acquaintance with the Dublin underworld was extensive enough to bring him many snippets of gossip and hints of names.'[32] The few files regarding the murder investigation that can be found in the N.A.I. allow us to determine the political policing practices used by the D.M.P. to find the culprits. [33] Mallon addressed a report of seventeen pages to E.G. Jenkinson – recently named assistant under-secretary for police and crime at Dublin Castle − on 30 August 1882 where he summed up the details he had uncovered since the beginning of the investigation.[34] This document also provides information on the methods employed by Mallon to gather intelligence. First, on the day of the murders, the detective despatched details on what was already known in the policing system, to stop the assassins before they left the country:

> I gathered on the spot some meagre details, the most being that the assassins 4 in number escaped on a car and I telegraphed to all the seaports and important centres in the United Kingdom, also sent detective officers on cars to the Royal Irish Constabulary stations around the Co. Dublin and arranged to have the telegraph Offices kept open on the following day (Sunday). The special superintendent R.M.s [Resident Magistrates] were also communicated with by telegraph.[35]

Then, Mallon met a series of witnesses at the park, providing him with physical details on the assassins but also on the car they used to flee the scene that the detective was able to trace.[36] He also received information from other individuals on 8 May but he 'had no doubt at the time that this story was made up or the men were drunk. They admitted they had taken some drink.'[37]

---

[31] Corfe*, The Phoenix Park murder*s, p. 151.

[32] Ibid., p. 229.

[33] cf. N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1.

[34] John Mallon to E.G. Jenkinson 'Re. Phoenix Park Murders', 30 Aug. 1882 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1, Folder 1).

[35] Ibid., p. 1.

[36] Ibid., pp 2-8.

[37] Ibid., p. 9.

To eventually establish the identity of the murderers, Mallon wrote that he 'had to work on private information.'[38] In other words, he activated his network of informants infiltrated among the Fenian milieux to move forward the investigation. Eventually, the Irish police succeeded in securing convictions of multiple agitators after the initial failure of intelligence.[39]

The French operation was rooted far more in a co-ordinated response across different parts of the country, and this was achieved with some ease due to the system in place. The investigation following the Assommoir attack illustrates the functioning of a more centralised French policing system. Right after the attack, the Rhône prefect immediately informed the minister of the interior via telegram.[40] Two days later, the minister claimed that there was 'an extreme emergency to ensure rapid and complete repression.'[41] Then, in a letter addressed to the minister of the interior on 25 October, the Rhône prefect noted that he implemented exceptional measures to look for the perpetrators of the attack and any accomplices.[42] He wrote that the anarchists were responsible and that he had taken the following action:

> I immediately reunited in my office the police commissioners from Lyon and from the Lyon agglomeration. I told them that, regarding the criminal acts that just happened, I needed more than ever to count on their ultimate support. I formally advised them to exercise an active surveillance on their respective neighbourhoods and to immediately inform me of every action or information they know of.[43]

The Rhône prefect then explained that, after a meeting with the public prosecutor, he secured the cooperation of the special commissioners of the S.G. to communicate all the information they gathered on the attack and on anarchists' activities.[44] He also went to see the military governor of Lyon – who had already taken measures in order to protect military barracks – to organise night patrols in the neighbourhoods frequented by the criminals.[45] The prefect specified that the S.G. commissioner had received the order to reinforce the surveillance of the railway stations of Lyon.[46] He concluded his letter as follows: 'I am convinced that those

[38] Ibid., p. 15.

[39] Molony, *The Phoenix Park Murders*, p. 187 and passim.

[40] Telegram from Lyon prefect to minister of the interior, 23 Oct. 1882 (A.N., F7 12516).

[41] Telegram from minister of the interior to Lyon prefect, 25 Oct. 1882 (A.N., F7 12516).

[42] Lyon prefect to the minister of the interior, 25 Oct. 1882 (A.N., F7 15943).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

measures will produce a good result, that they will make disappear the people's concerns and that they will bring the discovery of the culprit on the traces the agents believe they are following.'[47] This document is extremely valuable in understanding the reactions of the police administration in France. The French government was able to rely on its policing machinery to immediately track the attackers. It also shows that the administration relied on a variety of actors to efficiently police a political threat.

While France had at its disposal a previously established intelligence network to set up a policing strategy following the attack, the Irish operation, admittedly in a much smaller country, appeared to rely on the expertise and intelligence gathering of one individual, John Mallon. In the week following the murders, the head of the D.M.P. G Division, received the names of the potential assassins, including James Carey and Daniel Curley who 'were always moving about with workmen and their movements on 6 May could not be fixed.'[48] On 29 July 1882, a month before sending this report to Jenkinson, Mallon learned that Carey was in possession of the knives used to murder Thomas Burke and Lord Cavendish and his location.[49] This information came from Mallon's interview of James Mullet on July 1882, a major suspect in the case who provided James Carey and Daniel Curley's addresses, as indicated by the Crime Branch Special register.[50] The report from 30 August said that an inspector was sent to the place and found a Winchester rifle along with two knives that were 'just the class of weapons that would inflict the murder'.[51] The investigation kept pointing towards Carey and Curley:

> Curley was seen at the place where the weapons were found concealed the Monday after the murder, however several persons had access to it and they were not found until he was nearly a month in gaol. Carey was employed at one or two dispensaries and the School of Medicine in Peter Street, and could have procured the knives. He was a finishing fellow and would get hints on anatomy and it was the opinion of the surgeons engaged in the post mortem, that the person who inflicted the wounds knew something of anatomy.[52]

---

[47] Ibid.

[48] John Mallon to E.G. Jenkinson 'Re. Phoenix Park Murders', 30 Aug. 1882 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1, Folder 1), p. 16.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Register of Confidential Papers, entry 54, 12 July 1882 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 19).

[51] John Mallon to E.G. Jenkinson 'Re. Phoenix Park Murders', 30 Aug. 1882 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 1, Folder 1), p. 17.

[52] Ibid.

Therefore, at the time he addressed this report, the head of the D.M.P. G division seemed to have solved the Phoenix Park Murders. The main difference here between the French and Irish operations resides in the fact that Dublin was focused more on identifying the immediate perpetrators of the attack, whereas the trial of the 66 in Lyon was meant to cause a wider suppression of the anarchist movement. Even if the head of the G Division had gathered all the information necessary to solve the murders, Mallon still needed the confession of one of the perpetrators, or a betrayal. The difficulty was that informants were not willing to testify and even if after the first week he had identified most of the conspirators, the only thing Mallon was able to publicly announce was that the Fenians of Dublin, lacking the money and intelligence, did not carry out the assassination.[53] As Frederic Moir Bussy contends in his edition of Mallon's recollections:

> The task Mallon set himself was to induce an informer to come forward – to suggest by the subtlety of the questioning and the amplitude of the details at his command that he was completely advised of the constitution and the methods and movements of the 'Invincibles' and that the game was up − that there was somebody "peaching" − that the safest course was to vomit the whole wicked business and become a Government pensioner under an assumed name, rather than risk the potentialities of the rope or prolonged imprisonment.[54]

Sixteen known members of the gang were arrested for conspiracy to murder public officials on 13 January.[55] Mallon then convinced James Carey to turn Queen's evidence and inform on his co-conspirators. His declarations led to the convictions, for the murders, of Joe Brady, Michael Fagan, Thomas Caffrey, Dan Curley and Tim Kelly.[56] John Sweeney, future member of the Criminal Investigation Department 'Special Branch' at Scotland Yard, praised the personality and work of Mallon in this difficult case:

> Mallon himself was, to my mind, one of the smartest and keenest detective officers I have ever met. It will be remembered that twelve months elapsed after the committal of the Phoenix Park murders without an arrest being made in connection with them. During these twelve months Mallon was daily piecing together evidence till he had completed a chain of it, and had identified and located all the criminals,

---

[53] Corfe, *The Phoenix Park murders,* p. 214.

[54] Frederick Moir Bussy, *Irish conspiracies: recollections of John Mallon (the great Irish detective) and other reminiscences* (London, 1910), pp 84-5.

[55] Corfe, *The Phoenix Park murders,* p. 240.

[56] Molony, *The Phoenix Park Murders,* p.187 and passim.

> without their having the slightest suspicion that the police had any clue, until the eventful night when Mallon and his men secured everyone of them in one great haul, and got them all to the Exchange Court (the head office of the Dublin detective department) within a few hours.[57]

The success of the investigation earned Mallon the nickname of the 'Irish Sherlock Holmes' and at the same time justified G Division's political policing methods, specifically the use of informants to gather information on political conspiracies.

If the French intelligence network did not prevent the bombing from taking place, it was used as part of a large operation of arrests. The archives of the Rhône Préfecture reveal that an arrest warrant was delivered against three militants, Jolly, Renaud and Péjot – the latter mentioned on the 'Liste des membres du parti socialiste révolutionaire Lyonnais', on 23 October, the day after the attack.[58] However, the majority of the arrests took place on 19 November 1882, following a demonstration of 7,000 persons against the repression of the anarchists since the bombing.[59] On that day, the police arrested 27 militants for being affiliated with an International Association and not for the Assommoir attack.[60]

According to Marcel Massard, 'the public authorities were willing to implicate [the anarchists] in order to get rid of them'; the actions of 19 November were a 'haul' against the militants.[61] In the archives, a report from the special commissioner of the Lyon police, dated from 15 to 19 November, indicates the arrest of fourteen Anarchists for being 'affiliated with the International Workingmen's Association'.[62] The Lyon prefect also sent an encrypted telegram to the Ministry of the Interior, listing twenty-seven militants arrested for the same reason.[63] Therefore, the Assommoir bombing legitimated the arrest of dozens of militants in the following weeks and allowed police forces to send a signal to anarchists all over the country. The wave of arrests and the trial of the 66, following in January 1883, did not just show the public that the policing system was reacting strongly against the anarchists after the Assommoir

---

[57] John Sweeney, *At Scotland Yard; being the Experiences during Twenty-Seven Years Service* (London, 1904), p. 18.

[58] Special commissioner to general secretary of Lyon police, 24 Oct. 1882 (A.D.R., 4M 307).

[59] Gallet, *Machinations et artifices*, p. 68.

[60] Ibid., p. 69.

[61] Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement Anarchiste à Lyon*, pp 62-3.

[62] Rapport du 15 au 19 novembre 1882, le Commissaire spécial de la Sûreté au préfet [report established by the special commissioner of Lyon between 15 and 19 Nov. 1882 and sent to the Lyon prefect] (A.D.R., 4M 307).

[63] Chiffre spécial, préfet à Intérieur, non daté [encrypted telegram from Lyon prefect to minister of the interior] (A.D.R., 4M 307).

attack. It revealed the political agenda of the administration of maintaining order in the Republic.[64] While the French police was never sure that Cyvoct was responsible for the Assommoir attack – he was not even convicted for it but for an article he wrote encouraging a similar kind of attack –[65] Tom Corfe contends that Mallon, in Ireland, did arrest the 'right' people for the murder, but his difficulty was to gather evidence and convince informants to testify at the trial.[66] Becoming famous after the trial because he had denounced his accomplices, James Carey was later assassinated while travelling on a boat in Cape Town, by a Fenian named Patrick O'Donnell, because of his betrayal of the Invincibles.[67]

The Phoenix Park murders and the Assommoir attack highlight the different strategies of Dublin and Paris in responding to political violence. The French system was more developed and co-ordinated across different parts of the country involving a sophisticated network of police operatives. It was focused more on using the powers of the state to supress political radicalism. There are similarities in the Irish case but ultimately the system in Ireland was rooted more in the expertise and knowledge of particular individuals rather than a well-developed and co-ordinated system of intelligence gathering involving the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. The power of the state was mobilised to bring particular perpetrators to justice rather than a wider attempt to repress and stamp out political radicalism, which might have provoked a great level of opposition in Ireland as a result. Nevertheless, the arrest and the trial of the Invincibles did not mark the end of political violence in Ireland and England, and both countries had to adapt their methods to counter agitations.

4.2 Dealing with Fenians: The development of Irish political policing

The Phoenix Park murders highlighted the potential deficiency of the Irish police system in uncovering a plot fomented by a secret organisation. There was a lack of a specialised division centralizing information and leading the repression of political agitation. It appeared also that the Irish common law system limited the powers of the police and caused an issue of organisation, which called for a change. Dublin Castle thus attempted to develop greater central oversight and control over political policing with the creation of the position of assistant under-secretary for police and crime, while also arguing in favour of a form of greater decentralisation

[64] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 94.

[65] Gallet, *Machinations et artifices*, p. 192.

[66] Corfe, *The Phoenix Park murders,* p. 214; p. 229.

[67] Ibid., pp 258-9.

via the reform of the magistracy system. At the same time, the question of agrarian crimes was still not solved and required a reinforcement of the means of coercion.

Earl Spencer, who was appointed lord lieutenant the day before the Phoenix Park murders, was convinced that the Irish police was dysfunctional. He expressed his criticisms of the force to British Prime Minister William Gladstone: 'The case I have against the police is overwhelming. Today brings fresh evidence of incapacity and want of co-operation. I am obliged to see each Head to ensure his knowing what the other has done or is doing.'[68] He then created the position of assistant under-secretary for police and crime on 9 May 1882, just three days after the murders. The first occupant of this post was Colonel Henri Brackenbury – a British army officer who recommended the establishment of a separate secret division to counter and infiltrate Fenian organisations using policemen and informants. He resigned a few months later, because of an apparent political disagreement with Spencer and a will to rejoin the army to fight in Egypt, and E.G. Jenkinson, Earl Spencer's private secretary, took his place in August 1882.[69] Jenkinson became a police administrator and an expert in countering fenianism even though he never served as a police officer. To finance this mission, the British government invested £25,000 per annum but only over two years, which was not enough, according to Spencer, who thought it was 'absurd to expect to root out Secret Societies in 2 years.'[70]

Furthermore, the question of agrarian agitations was still not solved at the time and the measures implemented against 'secret societies' were also supposed to counter the Land League and suppress agrarian outrages. In this aim, the police force was increased for the year 1882. Indeed, the number of R.I.C. officers and men rose from 12,598 in 1881 to 14,606 in 1882, while the D.M.P. hired twenty-six new members that year going from 1,151 to 1,177. Following the Phoenix Park murders, Home Secretary William Harcourt argued in favour of an extension of police powers to carry out searches and conduct night raids. Harcourt was convinced of the necessity of this measure in the context of the Land War, but the liberal Prime Minister, Gladstone, saw this as a threat to civil liberties.[71] Nevertheless, Gladstone was defeated in

[68] Ibid., p. 198.

[69] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 294.

[70] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland*, p. 171.

[71] Ibid., p. 174.

parliament in the absence of the suspended Irish M.P.s and Dublin Castle got the power to conduct night searches.[72]

The R.I.C. members were supposed to be in possession of warrants to proceed to the searches and to have evidence of criminal activities against the person whose house was swept, but often the police acted on their own suspicion.[73] A Prevention of Crime Act was then promulgated in July 1882. According to Charles Townshend, 'it was not just the renewal of traditional coercion: it was in some ways wholly new. It established a style in criminal law amendment which was to be perpetuated with the 1887 Crimes Act.'[74] It allowed for the suppression of public meetings and the issuing of warrants to search for arms:

> His excellency is prepared to issue Search Warrants under the Prevention of Crime act to all County Inspectors and Sub Inspectors in all proclaimed Districts, to be used at their discretion (…) The Warrants will run for three months, at the expiration of which any application for the renewal of the powers of search should be made by the officers concerned.[75]

Charles Townshend argues that, despite the reforms and new regulations in place, 'the police continued to trouble Spencer.' [76] Policemen were tearing down any placard containing the word 'Land League', even if they were legal, and Parnell's manifesto denouncing the Phoenix Park murders.[77] The R.I.C. eventually issued a circular in November to counter some of its more overzealous officers:

> The Constabulary should not tear down the placards of the Irish National League as long as the placards continue of the same character as at present, or interfere in any way with its meetings, so long as they are kept strictly within legal limits, except to prevent a breach of the law.[78]

Compared to the anarchists in France, it might have been more difficult in Ireland to repress the Land League movement, because there was a considerable sympathy in Ireland for land reform

---

[72] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 203; *Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act – Search* Warrants, H.C. 1882, cclxxii. 1093-4.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid., p. 172.

[75] Inspector general to county inspectors, 20 Jul. 1882 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

[76] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland,* p. 176.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Inspector general to constabulary office, 6 Nov. 1882 (N.A.I., CSO ICR 26).

as well as for nationalist and republican political actors.[79] In France, if the repression of the anarchists following the Assommoir attack was criticized in the chamber of the deputies the newspapers cultivated the existence of an 'anarchist peril' reinforcing a feeling of fear among the public, mostly the Parisian bourgeoisie directly targeted by the anarchists.[80]

The lord lieutenant was aware that the fight against fenianism was a long-term process and could not limit itself to the policing of agrarian outrages. In November 1882 he wrote:

> Fenianism exists in the country, connects itself with outrages and is endeavouring to introduce arms with the object of being ready for a rising if opportunity comes. It has been more or less active since 1868. The Government cannot destroy it by arrests on suspicion, but must wait, and either hope that informed public opinion will gradually kill out sympathy for principles of Rebellion, or be ready to put down a rising. The first needs time, for the second we are prepared.[81]

Therefore, Spencer advocated in favour of a surveillance of suspect individuals to prevent potential Fenian attacks but ruled out the approach that was applied in France of arresting people merely 'on suspicion'.[82]

The most important issue facing the administration was regarding the efficiency and competence of the R.I.C. as an investigative force. As W.E. Vaughan argues, the police force 'worked within a carefully administered system of law' and had limited investigative power.[83] The constabulary had to maintain public tranquility while continuing to fulfill the rest of their policing duties.[84] They worked with both the local amateur magistrates and the professional Resident Magistrates (R.M.s) who were appointed by the central administration and participated in restoring order during the Land War. In law, at least, the R.I.C. were largely expected to leave the preliminary investigation of crime to the magistracy. This often served to inhibit them in taking on more investigative powers while creating an issue of dual authority for the policemen, at the same time responding to the magistracy and to the constabulary hierarchy. Indeed, the appointment of six Special Resident Magistrates (S.R.M.s) in 1881, in

---

[79] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p.49.

[80] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 111-5.

[81] Memorandum on the protection of Person and Property Act', Spencer c. July (BL, Althorp papers, K 492) quoted in Stephen Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 147.

[82] cf. Trial of the '66'.

[83] Vaughan, *Landlords and tenants in Ireland,* p. 163.

[84] Bridgeman, 'The constabulary and the criminal justice system in nineteenth-century Ireland', p. 140.

charge of reporting on the work of the R.I.C. and the application of the Protection of Persons and Property Act and the Peace Preservation Act in the most disturbed areas of the country,[85] created conflicts with the police at a local level.

Following his appointment as assistant under-secretary for police and crime, Jenkinson created, on 14 September 1882, the R.I.C. Crime Branch in charge of political policing work, distinct from the 'Ordinary branch'. Under this new Crime Branch, a divisional sub-inspector was appointed in each of the six divisions of the country and had at his disposal five or six 'special' constables operating at a local level with the mission to collect intelligence on rural 'secret societies'. This operation was supervised by the S.R.M.s, who were bound to report directly to Jenkinson's police and crime department in Dublin Castle.[86] This did not solve the issue of dual authority caused by the new divisional magistracy system and a select committee was formed in January 1883 to enquire into the policing system ahead of implementing a new police bill.[87] Robert Bruce, Inspector General of the R.I.C., testified at the committee and explained: 'the men now do not know who to look to as their superior officers… I think this system has caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among the men and consequently a great deal of indiscipline.'[88] This , highlights, to some degree, the dysfunction of the Irish 'common law system', caught between a centralized system of policing, on the one hand, and stipendiary magistrates on the other. This contrasts sharply with the more streamlined, clearly centralized system in France, with the departmental prefects reporting directly to the minister of the interior.

While defending his new position, Jenkinson declared in front of the committee that 'we should have centralization and decentralization combined.'[89] He suggested the installation of headquarters for the administration of local affairs in relation to police and crime.[90] This meant giving control of the police to the S.R.M.s. that were directly reporting to Dublin Castle. 'Decentralization' here did not provide more police power to local authorities but partially decentralised the presence of the state throughout the country to better collate and assess the information gathered on political agitators. Indeed, Jenkinson's reform increased oversight over

[85] Derek Sheills, 'The Resident Magistracy in Ireland' in *IAHCCJ Bulletin*, no.15 (1992), pp 46-7.

[86] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 298.

[87] Ibid., p. 299.

[88] Quoted in Virginia Crossman, *Politics, law and order in 19th-century Ireland* (Dublin, 1996), p. 147.

[89] Papers belonging to the report of the Committee on Police and Criminal Administration in Ireland, 1883, p. 3 (TNA, HO 144 72/A19).

[90] Ibid.

local authorities, and the use of the term 'decentralization' might have simply been a ruse to prevent accusations that his department was extending its policing powers.

Earl Spencer attempted to develop a similar form of intelligence gathering within the Irish 'common law system' by devolving power to R.M.s on a local level while centralising the intelligence gathering apparatus of the state. In a letter sent to Harcourt on 11 May 1882, he wrote: 'I want to decentralize a bit in one way with the R.M.s and centralize in one point only, viz the whole country.'[91] We may suppose he meant to give the magistracy more power to act locally, while continuing to report to Dublin Castle. According to Virginia Crossman, his objective was to have a responsible officer who had the power to coordinate police operations without the need to always refer to Dublin Castle, leading to the creation of four Divisional Magistrates in lieu of the six S.R.M.s on 1 October 1883.[92] In doing so, the system gave greater power and autonomy to centrally-appointed magistrates to oversee the exercise of policing on a local level and presumably to fill something of the gap created by the perceived failure of local authority. De facto, this resulted in greater centralization, despite Jenkinson's and Spencer's discourses.

The Crime Branch was now divided in two sections: a 'special' branch controlled by the four Divisional Magistrates who were to be dedicated to intelligence gathering on political 'secret societies' under the supervision of Jenkinson, and an 'ordinary' branch concerned with day-to-day criminal activity and agrarian unrest reporting to the inspector general of the R.I.C.[93]

[91] Spencer to Harcourt, 11 May 1882 (BL, Spencer papers, K17, f.8) quoted in Crossman, *Politics, law and order*, p. 254.

[92] Crossman, *Politics, law and order*, p.148; Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 300.

[93] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', pp 300-1.

Figure 6: Irish intelligence administration (1882-1887)



This reform had the effect of creating a dedicated Special Branch for policing political agitation, with information locally relayed to the magistracy and then gathered centrally by the assistant under-secretary for police and crime. The same was done regarding agrarian outrages and local agitation managed by the R.I.C.'s county inspectors reporting to the inspector general. The situation of dual authority persisted, but the missions of each institution was now defined, and the system marked a step towards greater co-ordination and centralization of police surveillance of political agitators. It was distinct from the French model in maintaining a strong local dimension to law and order – via the magistracy – allied to a more dedicated and centralised police response to political radicalism.

In addition of the emergency measures taken and the increase in the force, this division of the policing work coincided with a possibly related decrease in agrarian unrest. Outrages started to decrease in 1883 and by May of that year, Jenkinson affirmed that four 'secret societies' has been dismantled and 500 of its members left Ireland.[94] The Prevention of Crime Act limiting civil liberties combined with the reform of the Irish policing system, arguably

[94] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland,* pp 177-8.

served to limit political agitation in Ireland and Fenians were now targeting England with bombing attacks between 1882 and 1885.[95]

4.3 The centralization of intelligence-led policing in France

In France, too, an attempt at decentralization served to reinforce central oversight of intelligence work. The repression of the anarchist movement following the Assommoir attack in October 1882 revealed the efficiency of the French policing administration in terms of political policing. Its centralised organisation facilitated the reporting and dispatching of information, allowing for a quick and efficient response to the agitation. The Ministry of the Interior's oversight and control of intelligence-led policing also continued to grow. There was, however, an apparent attempt to limit this in 1884. At the time, a law was discussed to specify the functioning and powers of the municipalities. It was designed to increase the autonomy of the municipalities in matters of organization and their powers in terms of policing. If at first sight this could have been perceived as the triumph of the localities over the central administration, it simply redefined the attribution of police powers and instituted a new balance, in which the centralised dimension of political policing remained and allowed the Ministry of the Interior to actually reinforce its oversight and control of intelligence work. As summarized by Jean-Marc Berlière: 'The Third Republic both went further towards the decentralization of police powers and initiated the path of an irreversible centralization.'[96]

The police operation used to repress the anarchists of Lyon following the Assommoir attack indicated good communications between the different policing administrations as well as the centralization of information gathering within the Ministry of the Interior, guaranteeing its control of intelligence-led policing. Emile-Honoré Cazelles, the head of the S.G. in 1880, supported this process when he reformed the institution and reinforced its subordination to the minister of the interior.[97] In July 1882, the 1st Bureau of the S.G. reasserted the centralization of the mission of the special commissioners. The minister decided that the:

> special commissioners, attached to the [Sûreté Générale's] directorate, would oversee the surveillance of all or part of the railway network for which they have been specifically nominated. They would be in

[95] cf. Chapter 5.

[96] Jean-Marc Berlière, 'Les pouvoirs de police : attributs du pouvoir municipal ou de l'État ? Une police pour qui et pour quoi faire ? Démocratie, ordre et liberté sous la Troisième République' in *Criminocorpus. Revue d'Histoire de la justice, des crimes et des peines* (2009), p. 33.

[97] cf. Chapter 1.

> constant communication with the special commissioner of the department [actually refers to the municipal commissioners] and will centralise all the reports that would be transmitted each day by their care to the *Sûreté Générale* directorate.[98]

The circular, addressed to the departmental prefects, also declared that 'the special commissioners would be at the disposal of the prefect for any intelligence they would need and would communicate to the prefect and to the central administration the reports concerning their departments.'[99] The decree also created 'head commissioners of the network', controlling the special commissioners despatched throughout the territory and to which they communicated all information concerning the S.G.[100] According to Marie Vogel, Cazelles already had planned to establish head commissioners when he published his report in 1880.[101] They were meant to act as intermediaries between the special commissioners and the head of the S.G.[102] Therefore, there was a clear desire to centralise information relating to policing intelligence, with the special commissioners reporting to the departmental prefect and to the central administration.

The creation of the head commissioners of the network decentralized, to some extent, the organisation of the S.G., by setting-up a local relay between the policemen and the central authority, with the departmental prefects acting as the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior throughout the territory. This reminds us of the reform in Ireland with the establishment of the four Divisional Magistrates and the institution of the Special Branch. Like the Divisional Magistrates, the head commissioners of the networks were new intermediaries established between local and central policing operation, ultimately reporting to the Ministry of the Interior. In addition to the 200 special commissioners and inspectors stationed in railway stations in 1882, the S.G. employed and paid 800 municipal commissioners, stationed in cities with populations over 5,000 in 1882 and 151 special municipal commissioners in the smaller cities in 1870.[103] The central administration was thus in control of the political police and of the municipal police at the beginning of the Third Republic. In 1882, the Goblet law, from the name of the minister who supported the legislation, declared that the mayor was now to be elected by

---

[98] 'Circulaire n°259 bis' in *Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de l'Intérieur,* n°6 (1882), p. 233.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid., p. 234.

[101] Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', p. 300.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid. pp 297-8.

the municipal council in every city except in Paris.[104] Therefore, this election conditioned the nature of the municipal police powers. Until then, the mayor was appointed by the central administration and was therefore an extension of the state in its municipality. He was, however, bound to implement the policy relating to the police established in Paris. From 1884, the elected municipal mayors enjoyed great autonomy in matters of policing as their sovereignty derived from the voters and not from the government.[105] Yet, despite this apparently greater autonomy for the mayors, the municipal law of 1884 aimed to reinforce the republican government's control over political policing and information gathering, as the Ministry of the Interior feared losing its authority outside of Paris.

The Republicans' desire to centralize policing policies first appeared in November 1883 when Waldeck-Rousseau, the minister of the interior, proposed linking the budget of the P.P. to the one of the state.[106] The municipal law, voted in April 1884, was also a means of strengthening the control of the central administration over the P.P. and to maintain the Ministry as the true source of police powers. The very essence of the law was the ambiguity attached to the notion of 'decentralization of police powers.' It seemed to delegate powers but at the same time maintained central control over the police system. Sections 91 and 92 made the mayor the chief of municipal police but distinguished between his 'own' and 'delegated' powers:

> Article 91: the mayor is responsible under the supervision of the superior administration of the municipal police, the rural police and the execution of the acts of the superior authority related to them.
>
> Article 92: the mayor is responsible, under the authority of the superior administration for:
> 1. the publication and enforcement of laws and regulations;
> 2. the execution of general security measures;
> 3. special functions assigned to it by law.[107]

The reference to 'superior administration' in these two articles stresses the government's control over the municipal police.

If the municipal law of 1884 favored the decentralization of administrative and political powers by granting more liberty to local authorities, it was not the case for political policing,

[104] Berlière, 'Les pouvoirs de police : attributs du pouvoir municipal ou de l'État ?', p. 7.

[105] Ibid., p. 4.

[106] Ibid., p. 11.

[107] Ibid., p. 18.

as there was a keen desire for the central administration to maintain its control over it. A circular dated 15 May 1884 was intended to complement this centralization process. It stated that 'municipal police officers are therefore both placed under the orders of the mayor for the municipal police *and* under the orders of the prefect for the general police and therefore it is impossible to maintain that the police service is exclusively municipal.'[108] The municipal commissioners' careers were still managed by the S.G., though they were now paid by the municipalities. This created a situation of dual authority as the municipal commissioners were now under the control of the prefects and the mayor.[109] For Marie Vogel, the municipal law of 1884 limited the central administration's control over policing.[110] We argue here that it was actually very advantageous for the state: the Ministry of the Interior was keeping control of the municipal commissioners but they were now paid by the municipalities. This was sanctioned by section 136 of the municipal law of 1884, which indicates that the expenses of those services were mandatory and should be voted by the Municipal Council. The Ministry of the Interior, free from the need to finance *municipal* commissioners, could redirect all its resources towards the financing of the *special* commissioners of the S.G. The central administration would have the means to increase its investment into the Paris Préfecture but also the Rhône Préfecture – which was now in charge of the general and municipal police of Lyon according to the articles 104 and 105 of the new municipal law.[111] Thus, the municipal law of 1884 ultimately reinforced the centralization of political policing in France.

The Phoenix Park murders and the Assommoir attack revealed the differences in terms of political policing methodology and administration in the French and Irish systems. In France, a variety of institutions were implicated in the repression of the anarchist movement, led by a central administration in control of intelligence work. In Ireland, the investigation into the Phoenix Park murders was led efficiently by one detective division, but the event also shed light on the organisational issues linked to the nature of the Irish 'common law system' and led to reform. In France, the state reinforced its control of the police machinery and invested a lot of resources to stop the anarchist movement. The French system did not change much in response and was seen to work effectively. Even the reform introduced by the 1884 municipal law tended

[108] Ibid., p. 13.

[109] Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', p. 242.

[110] Ibid, p. 345.

[111] Berlière, 'Les pouvoirs de police : attributs du pouvoir municipal ou de l'État ?, pp 23-4.

to enhance central control over political policing. Whereas even though it was successful in convicting the alleged Phoenix Park murderers, the Irish system was more heavily criticised. It was also reformed to give greater central oversight over the policing of political agitation. It began to move closer to a more centralised system of political policing albeit there was still, more than in France, a compromise made between local authority and central control.

The comparison demonstrates a certain desire for greater centralization when it comes to political policing, but it also underlined a certain hybridity in the French and Irish systems, with the will to at least appear to decentralise certain police functions. While a centralised system of political policing seemed to be established in the two police cultures at the time and both had the capacity to deal with political agitators, the English police was facing a Fenian dynamite campaign challenging the organisation of its own system.

Chapter 5

From resistance to reinforcement: Central oversight of intelligence work in England and Ireland (1883-1890)

> I was much more successful in Ireland than I can ever be in England. [I] had good materials ready to hand [there] and the Force *being an Imperial one*, I was able to establish a system which could be worked by one Head (…) [it was] quite impossible [in England] to establish any system because there is no central authority over the Police and each of the Force whether in County or Town is separate from & independent of the other.[1]

Those words from E.G. Jenkinson addressed to Home Secretary Harcourt in 1884, sum up how the assistant under-secretary for police and crime felt towards the English police after he came to work for the Home Office in 1883.[2] Behind his resentment, Jenkinson highlights the difference existing between the Irish and English police cultures in terms of intelligence gathering and the lack of centralization of the latter, which is the starting point of this chapter.

While in Ireland, the Land War and the Fenian threat seemed to have been contained, partly due to legislative actions on the land question and to police reforms (as well as Jenkinson's work as assistant under-secretary for police and crime), England was once again the target of a dynamite campaign from 1883. A Fenian attempt to blow up government buildings at Whitehall and the offices of *The Times* newspaper in London in 1883 marked the beginning of a series of attacks but also of a reorganization of the Metropolitan Police Detective Department.[3] It also convinced Home Secretary Harcourt to summon Jenkinson to London to help deal with Fenians operating outside the city.[4] Eventually, in 1887, the C.I.D. 'Section D', which would become known as the new 'Special Branch', was created. The attachment of Section D to the Home Office and not to the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police reflects London's desire to make intelligence work a *national* concern. At the same time in Ireland, the specialized system of information gathering established by Jenkinson within the C.S.O. saw its existence threatened in the following years, leading the central administration in Dublin to develop strategies to secure control over intelligence work.

This period, covering the establishment of police intelligence services as state

---

[1] E.G. Jenkinson quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 54-5.

[2] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 196.

[3] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. xiii; Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 196.

[4] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 45-6; p. 196.

institutions in England, has been well covered by English historians, and we will draw on their work in this chapter. Parallel developments in Ireland and how they relate and compare to developments in England, however, have not been the subject of substantial comparative historical work. Niall Whelehan's research places the history of the dynamiters within a greater history of Irish nationalism, but views political policing in Britain as an ensemble of experiments and does not contemplate police reforms aimed at institutionalizing intelligence work in England.[5] The seminal work of Bernard Porter, on the origins and establishment of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, emphasizes on the British liberal tradition and its rejection of the idea of a 'secret police', but also considers the impact of the Fenian threat on changing this approach.[6] Vlad Solomon also connects the different dynamite attacks targeting England between 1881-86 with the development of the British political policing system, but Solomon tends to focus on the roles played by individuals charged with political policing in the failure of the English police in preventing Fenian attacks. He occasionally exaggerates their influence and comparisons with the situation in Ireland remain, at best, limited.[7]

In his study on the British response to the 1880s Fenian dynamite campaign, Shane Kenna notes that 'the British state had no central means for collecting and distributing information on Fenian suspects.'[8] Similarly, in this chapter it is argued that there was an attempt to develop institutions in charge of political policing in response to the Fenian dynamite campaign in 1883-4 but that this system was not centrally coordinated, at first, and prevented information from being communicated efficiently. In Ireland, the situation was different. Stephen Ball's editions of the memoirs of Samuel Waters, a R.I.C. officer, shed light on the creation of a 'special intelligence department for the information of the Chief Secretary [Arthur Balfour]' in 1887.[9] Material on Waters' work from this period is held at the National Archives in Kew and shows how Balfour used intelligence-led policing in the defense of his administration.[10] While Ball also retraces, in his thesis on the Land War, how the C.S.O. managed to secure control of intelligence work in Ireland,[11] this chapter explores what this meant in practice for the policemen of the R.I.C. and draws out comparisons with developments

[5] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters.*

[6] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*.

[7] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', pp 391-4.

[8] Kenna, 'The Philosophy of the Bomb', p 93.

[9] Waters, Ball (ed.), *A policeman's Ireland,* p. 62.

[10] Intelligence notes (T.N.A., CO 903/1-19).

[11] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', pp 279-311.

in England.

This chapter ultimately aims to analyze the English and Irish central administrations' attempts to secure and reinforce control over political policing and its consequences for the two police cultures, placing them within a wider comparative framework than previous historians. In particular, this chapter underlines the impact the Irish political situation had on England and how London initially struggled to respond in the same way as Dublin. This was likely because Ireland was regarded as having an 'imperial' model of policing that contained elements that were perceived as antithetical to British 'liberal' traditions. What is striking is that the English system did eventually develop a more centralized system of political policing that contained similar practices and systems to its Irish counterpart and sometimes drew on Irish expertise.

To begin, we will study the consequence of the establishment of a political policing system on the functioning of the English police before reflecting on the impact of the institutionalization of intelligence-led policing in Ireland and England and what it meant in terms of greater central oversight and control.

5.1 Networks, personalities, and conflicts: the emergence of and resistance to 'secret' policing in England

Following the Phoenix Park murders, specific measures of political policing such as the practice of 'shadowing', with agents literally following each movement of suspected individuals, were implemented in Ireland to monitor 'secret societies'. Home Secretary Harcourt, however, remained critical of the English intelligence network, especially of Robert Anderson, the Home Office Fenian specialist, who retained information relating to 'secret societies'.[12] As we shall see, there seemed to be a lack of communication between the different institutions in charge of political policing in England but also a different approach when it came to acting on intelligence.

The explosions on 15 March 1883 at the Local Government Board offices at Whitehall and at *The Times* offices in London, revealed the inefficiency of the English policing system in preventing political violence. The Irish one appeared superior to counter fenianism, which led to the summoning of E.G. Jenkinson, by the Home Office, to London on 16 March 1883, right after the attack.[13] In a memorandum from 23 March 1883 the assistant under-secretary for police and crime wrote: 'During the past year, a system for watching the movements of the

[12] Townshend, *Political violence in Ireland,* pp 177-8.

[13] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 196.

Fenians, and the operation of Secret Societies, has been established in Ireland, and a staff of specially selected Policemen, and of informants has been organised.'[14] Jenkinson insisted on the fact that the conspiracy was as important in England but with the exception of the reports furnished by the R.I.C. men stationed in London and those from Anderson, 'nothing is known of what is going on in England'.[15]

First, it was necessary to appoint detectives whose mission was to identify the conspirators. A police order issued on 19 March 1883 sanctioned the appointment of two inspectors, two sergeants and eight police constables, all with catholic backgrounds, to form the 'Irish bureau'.[16] Williamson, formerly head of the Detective branch at Scotland Yard, was named head of this new 'squad' within the C.I.D. and had 'to be relieved of the greatest part of his regular duty and to devote his time entirely to fenianism'.[17] The Irish bureau – also referred to as the Special Irish Branch – was composed of twelve men with expertise regarding Irish affairs, while most of them were Irish.[18] Williamson was to keep contact with Howard Vincent, the director of the C.I.D., Anderson, and the R.I.C. men stationed in London, and to report information to the home secretary,[19] establishing a British 'anti-fenian' intelligence network. Jenkinson was highly critical of this organisation. He praised Williamson's intelligence but had a low opinion of the rest of the detectives and of Anderson.[20] The latter was only kept in the system as he was the handler of Le Caron, an informant stationed in the USA who acted as the main source on Fenians in America and was only willing to work with Anderson.[21]

By the summer of 1883, the British 'anti-fenian' intelligence network involved men stationed in Ireland, London, the rest of Great Britain and the United States. Alongside Anderson and his Home Office liaison, Williamson oversaw the Irish bureau in London, Jenkinson gathered the information coming from Ireland, America and the continent while Major Charles Gosselin, a former Irish R.M., was put in charge of the rest of Britain based on

---

[14] Jenkinson quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 45.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 196.

[17] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 45.

[18] Bernard Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 45; Ray Wilson, Ian Adams, *Special Branch. A History: 1883-2006* (London, 2015).

[19] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 46; Wilson, Adams, *Special Branch*.

[20] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 46.

[21] Ibid., p. 47; cf. Chapter 2.

Jenkinson's recommendation.[22] A clear administrative apparatus to centralise the information reported and to coordinate police action against the Fenians on English soil was still lacking, however. This prevented the implementation of efficient measures and Harcourt was required to take further action.

Figure 7: British 'anti-fenian' intelligence network in 1883



Jenkinson was recalled to England and appointed at the Home Office as a 'sort of Minister of Police' according to *Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper* in 1884.[23] In a memorandum of 6 March 1884 – the day before his arrival in London – Jenkinson wrote that fenianism could only be controlled if he was personally in charge of the co-ordination and collation of intelligence:

> If I am to go over to England … as proposed by Sir William Harcourt it will be necessary that I should continue to keep under my own direction and control the work belonging to the Secret or Special Branch of my office in Dublin. If the work of uprooting the Secret Fenian Organisations, and of defeating the plans of the Dynamite Conspirators, is to be well and thoroughly done – Great Britain & Ireland must be treated as one. The officer who holds the threads of what is going on in Ireland must also have access to all information obtained in England or coming to England from abroad. Besides it would be very disastrous at the present moment if I were to give & to hand over to another direction of a system which I have been carefully and laboriously

[22] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 46-8.

[23] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 93.

> building up during the last two years, and which is not as yet by any means perfect or fully developed. In this view I should retain my official position in Ireland as Assistant Under Secretary, Police and Crime. [24]

Jenkinson was not only willing to accept the position in London, but he saw it as an extension of the one he already held in Ireland. He strongly argued in favour of a centralised system of information and that this centralization should be organised around his person.[25] He asked to be placed 'in exactly the same position to the Secretary of State' and that the later should 'place full trust and confidence' in him 'to issue all his orders in the particular Branch of work through' him.[26]

Harcourt was not opposed to this centralization process, and it was for this reason he recalled Jenkinson. In a minute on 8 March 1884, the home secretary defined the new role of Jenkinson in England and despite not providing him with an official position, he designated him as the person to centralise information on fenianism:

> In the urgent dangers at present existing in respect of Fenian outrages, and emissaries sent from abroad, I consider it of the greatest importance that all the information available in regard of these matters should be gathered into one focus with a view to concurrent action under the guidance of the mind of a single person to whom all information may be brought with the least possible delay … For that object I have requested Lord Spencer to allow Mr Jenkinson, who has more knowledge of these matters, than anyone else and who has the control of the Irish Police to come to London for a time to assist the Secretary of State in his efforts to grapple with these conspiracies as a whole.[27]

Harcourt could not provide the assistant under-secretary for police and crime with an official position like the one he held in Ireland, but he would put all the resources needed from the Home Office at his service.[28]

Jenkinson still used his new but unofficial position as leader of the counter-fenianism operations to implement new policing measures. On 11 March 1884, he sanctioned the monitoring and searching of British ports – not including Ireland – for explosives and suspicious persons: 'all personal luggage of persons coming from abroad […] strictly searched and examined for … explosives and apparatus connected with them.'[29] According to Bernard Porter,

---

[24] Memorandum by Jenkinson, 6 March 1884 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Harcourt's Minute to Jenkinson, 8 March 1884 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[28] Ibid.

[29] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 94.

this was an ineffective policy as no single Fenian was arrested nor dynamite found in the following eighteen months.[30] This new policy also destabilised the Irish branch at the C.I.D., as Jenkinson required nine of its men to be employed in the surveillance of the ports. The men to replace them were less experienced and only three were Irish, but the main issue was that there were not enough men to fulfil their various duties: searching bags at train stations, working the night shift, dealing with enquiries and surveillance.[31] On 26 April 1884, five new constables were added to the C.I.D. 'in place of those specially employed.'[32] At the same time, Jenkinson achieved his first success in the fight against the dynamiters in England with the arrest of the Fenians James Egan and John Daly on 11 April 1884, not thanks to his ports policy but to the work of one of Major Gosselin's I.R.B. informants.[33]

This, however, did not prevent a series of explosions from taking place on 30 May 1884: at the headquarters of the C.I.D. and the Metropolitan Police Special Irish Branch; in the basement of the Carlton Club − a gentlemen's club for members of the Conservative Party; and outside the home of Conservative MP Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn. Ten people were injured. A fourth bomb was planted at the foot of Nelson's Column but failed to explode.[34] Chief Commissioner Henderson addressed a memo to Jenkinson the following day regarding the Scotland Yard explosion:

> A Constable was specially posted on the very spot as being a dangerous place, but he appears to have observed nothing suspicious in any of the persons who entered the urinal. He was almost stationed by the explosion but does not appear to be seriously injured, but he cannot at present be questioned. Another special patrol was on duty on the other side of the yard and another in the street in front but neither did they see anything to arouse their suspicions. All the special patrols have been visited night and day by the assistant commissioner, the District and Divisional Superintendents, and the most constant vigilance has been exercised.[35]

Henderson did not question the work of his men and even insisted on the 'vigilance exercised', despite their failure to prevent the explosion. We may imagine this only increased the disdain Jenkinson felt towards the detectives of the English police and encouraged him to write that

[30] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 50.

[31] Ibid., p. 60.

[32] Police Orders, May 10, 1884 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[33] Solomon, 'Straining the Law' p. 98.

[34] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 68.

[35] Memorandum from Henderson to Jenkinson, 31 May 1884 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

'There is not a man there with a head on his shoulders' and that 'They [the men at Scotland Yard] have no information and if anything happens they all lose their heads, and everything is confusion.'[36]

The home secretary was also slowly moving away from the 'secrecy' associated with the fight against fenianism.[37] Harcourt informed Jenkinson of his strategy of 'picketing' in June 1884. This meant putting visible 'pickets' – watches – on individuals suspected of association with the dynamiters based on Jenkinson's information.[38] The Irish spy master was opposed to this idea, arguing that they needed to gather intelligence on the suspects, something he thought 'Harcourt does not believe in'.[39] Then, when Sir Howard Vincent resigned as director of C.I.D. to enter politics, Harcourt decided not to appoint a replacement, creating, instead, the position of assistant commissioner 'C' (crime) of the London Metropolitan Police, for which he nominated James Monro, an experienced policeman, on 1 July 1884.[40] While Vincent, as director of C.I.D., had previously answered directly to the home secretary, Monro's new position made him responsible to the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Two men were now in charge of the policing of fenianism: Jenkinson, who was unofficially attached to the Home Office, and Monro, under the control of the Metropolitan Police commissioner. The lack of a centralised direction to collect the information relating to the Fenians and to develop a coherent counter-terrorism methodology, combined with the two men's different approach to intelligence work, led to conflicts and more failures in regard of political policing.

On 13 December 1884 two Irish American republicans, who were planting a bomb on London Bridge, were killed when their device prematurely exploded, convincing Harcourt of the inefficiency of Jenkinson's plan and even told him that his 'system of secret working is useless. It comes to nothing.'[41] The government appeared as hopeless as ever following this new attempted Fenian bombing and did not know how to get information on the attack. From a document issued on 19 December 1884, we learn that London Corporation offered £5,000 for information on the bombing and the City Common Council also suggested that the 'government might offer a smaller reward to be given on proved facts only, accompanied with the assurance

[36] Quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 52.

[37] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 104.

[38] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 58.

[39] Jenkinson to Spencer, 12 March 1885, quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 58.

[40] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', pp 103-4.

[41] Harcourt quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 54.

that such information would be received in confidence – and kept secret'.[42] Harcourt was strictly opposed to this idea, finding rewards inefficient and even counterproductive for the investigation:

> not only is the practice ineffectual for the purpose it seeks to accomplish: it is even known to operate prejudicially in the detection of crime. As regards the action of the Police it is not considered advantageous to create in their minds a belief that the detection of crimes of peculiar atrocity is one thing distinct from their ordinary duties and to be made a subject of special inducements to performs those duties.[43]

This also underlined the home secretary's views on detective work: the detection of political crime should be part of their ordinary work and not be a 'special' duty. Harcourt defended the need to police the dynamiters no differently from other criminals, using the practices usually employed by the detectives of the Metropolitan Police.

English political policing also seemed to have had deeper issues that prevented it from functioning effectively. According to Jenkinson, the amateurism of the English police and the lack of centralization of the force were responsible for the bombing of London Bridge as explained to Harcourt on 18 December 1884.[44] Jenkinson recognized that the imperial dimension of the Irish police allowed for the establishment of a centralized system of information gathering, something that was lacking in England due to the regionalisation of the police forces.[45]

Jenkinson had informed Scotland Yard a few weeks before that London bridges were potential targets and that an attack was about to happen, but the lack of central intelligence gathering prevented the information from being considered. He also wrote a memorandum to Monro on 26 December 1884, to inform him that he had 'heard from a very reliable source that they intend shortly to make an attempt on the House of Commons.'[46] But once again, this information did not seem to have been taken into consideration as three bombs exploded in London, in the House of Commons, in Westminster Hall and in the Banqueting Room of the Tower of London on 24 January 1885. Two police officers and four civilians were injured. Two

[42] Note addressed to William Henry Clapham, 19 Dec. 1884 (T.N.A., HO 144 145/A38008).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Jenkinson quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 54-5.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Jenkinson to Monro, 26 Dec. 1884 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070) quoted in Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 111.

men, Henry Burton and James Cunningham, were sentenced to penal servitude for life as a result.[47]

Jenkinson issued another of his memoranda regarding the protection of buildings on 28 January 1885. In addition to the thousands of men already 'employed in the Metropolitan Police area on the protection of public officials and public buildings', Henderson deployed eighty-eight men in plain clothes inside a variety of public buildings in London, such as the British Museum and Westminster Abbey.[48] Jenkinson never believed this would make a difference in the fight against fenianism because, according to him, the main issue was the incompetence of the English detectives and their lack of information: 'In the whole of London they have not got a single informant and they do not know in the least what is going on.'[49]

Two views regarding the practices of political policing emerged: the necessity to gather as much information as possible in secret to arrest the dynamiters and the need to exercise a visible police surveillance on individuals suspected of fenianism. This ideological opposition was at the heart of the conflict between Jenkinson and Scotland Yard. Henderson and Monro were against the use of 'all secret agents.'[50] If they recognised the need for detectives, they saw their work as complementary and not separate from the uniformed officers' duty. In contrast, Jenkinson believed it was necessary to implement a system of secret policing, like he did in Ireland to stop the Fenian threat. This 'system' was based on secrecy, informants and infiltration, which went against the approach of Henderson and Munro and arguably the whole liberal tradition of policing in England.

When Harcourt left office in June 1885, his successor Richard. A. Cross tried to mend the relationship between Jenkinson and Monro. A memo issued on 7 July 1885 detailed how the Irish spy master and Scotland Yard should be collaborating, their specific role in the fight against fenianism and their need to communicate, in secret, all their information:

> I consider Mr Munro & Mr Jenkinson as members of a cabinet. I separate each of them entirely from everyone employed under them respectively between the two there must be the most absolute trust & confidence. They are working together in one common cause all communication between them must be of the most frank & complete character & there must be no reservation on either side, communication of course being absolutely confidential. Mr Jenkinson's province is of course entirely confined to Dynamite

[47] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 118.

[48] Memorandum by Jenkinson, 28 Jan. 1885 (T.N.A., MEPO 3/3070).

[49] Jenkinson to Spencer, 24 Feb. 1885, quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 53.

[50] Jenkinson to Spencer, 1 Jul. 1885, quoted in Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 57.

> & other Fenian or American conspirators. He has nothing whatever to do with ordinary crime or criminals. All information obtained by Mr Munro & Mr Jenkinson as to the matter of such conspiracies is to be *at once* communicated by the one to the other.[51]

Cross thus reaffirmed the position of Jenkinson as in charge of the anti-Fenian policy. Unlike Harcourt, Cross also seemed to be more open to the Irishman's 'system of secret' policing as he would allow his 'informants or secret agents (by whichever name they may be called)' to work in London without the Metropolitan Police interfering.[52] But, as Harcourt before him, Cross did not provide Jenkinson with an official position at the Home Office.[53] De facto, this prevented the establishment of a more centralised political policing system similar to Ireland (or, indeed, France) and exacerbated the conflict existing between Jenkinson and Scotland Yard.

Indeed, when Charles Warren was named commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in March 1886, he did not approve of Jenkinson, a man with no official position, employing secret agents in the territory of the Metropolitan Police.[54] In a memorandum regarding 'secret agents and informants', Jenkinson explained to the new commissioner that he put his secret agents at his service, 'to be worked by him in connection with the detectives department in Scotland Yard' but that he 'heard that [my] secret agents had been followed and examined and that a report complaining of my conduct has been sent in to the Secretary of State.'[55] The Irish spymaster defended his action in the document by making several references to Cross' minute from 7 July 1885 implying that the, by then, former home secretary – who had vacated his position in February 1886 − had settled the issue of his position and of his agents collecting information in London:

> According to the terms of Sir R. Cross Minute I was to be treated as a member of a Cabinet and truth and competence were to be placed in me. If the operation of the Scotland Yard detectives were even tempered by the movements of my secret agents, why was I never informed of that?[56]

The main issue was that Jenkinson's agents, although operating outside London, were not

[51] Copy of Sir R. Cross memorandum, 7 Jul. 1885 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[52] Ibid.

[53] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', pp 123-4.

[54] Ibid., p. 131.

[55] Memorandum by Jenkinson on 'Secret agents and informants', 31 May 1886 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[56] Ibid.

allowed to exercise their mission in the capital city as the detectives of the Metropolitan Police oversaw the policing of the Fenian movement there.

One solution might have been to place Jenkinson under the command of the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, so his agents could carry out their missions in London but neither Monro nor the new permanent under-secretary of state at the Home Office, Godfrey Lushington, believed in the efficiency of this measure.[57] Lushington eventually recommended the cessation of Jenkinson's activity in England in August 1886:

> It is obvious that the present partnership – based on the principle of territorial division, the Commissioner taking the Metropolis & Mr Jenkinson all outside the Metropolis – must be totally ineffective against Fenian Schemes unless thorough confidence subsists between the two partners. It is equally obvious that there is no such confidence and no hope of any. If then the State requires to be protected against Fenianism, there must be a change, a dissolution of this partnership…But the question is not between Mr Monro & Mr Jenkinson. The Chief Commissioner equally with Mr Monro distrusts Mr Jenkinson. This then points to the advisability of Mr Jenkinson going as the one escape out of the difficulties. The objection that this is a dangerous moment to part with an officer who has all the threads of information in his hand is of a very serious one. But for all that I recommend that Mr Jenkinson should go.[58]

Here, the under-secretary associated the failure of the counter-Fenian policy to the attitude of one individual – Jenkinson – and not the system in charge of said policy. The issue was not the existence of a dual authority in charge of the policing of Fenians in England, but the partnership between those two authorities, and more specifically blame was placed on one of the partners.

As other historians have suggested, the relationship between Monro and Jenkinson had an impact on the implementation of an efficient system of political policing in England following the Fenians bombing in early to mid 1880s.[59] Jenkinson's personality – he entered into conflicts with his colleagues whatever position he held –[60] played a role in this, but the root of his conflict with Monro in London was above all ideological. Both men had different views on how to deal with the Fenian threat. While Jenkinson promoted his model based on 'secret

---

[57] Memorandum by Monro, 1 June 1886 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757) quoted in Solomon, 'Straining the Law' p.132; Mr Lushington on proposal to place Mr Jenkinson under Chief Comm., 2 June 1886 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[58] Secret note by Lushington, 3 Aug.1886 (T.N.A., HO 144 721/110757).

[59] Clutterbuck, 'Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain', pp 103–111; Solomon, *State surveillance*, p. 259.

[60] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', pp 294-6.

agents' infiltrating the movement to gather a large quantity of information before taking further action – like in Ireland – Monro defended a more direct approach, with the police acting immediately after receiving information. The fact that Jenkinson started to keep secrets from the Metropolitan Police detectives because of this strategy antagonized Monro and contributed to the deterioration of their relationship. This conflict between the two men also underlined the lack of a centralized system, to quote Kenna, 'for collecting and distributing information on Fenian suspects.'[61] Jenkinson's mission in England was officially terminated on 10 January 1887, and, paradoxically, as we shall see, the departure of the Irish spy master who wanted to centralise political policing in England eventually allowed the English system to reorganise itself into a Special Branch to fight political agitation.[62]

5.2 Establishing organizations for intelligence work in England and Ireland

In early 1887, a Special Branch was officially set up at Scotland Yard and financed by the Home Office. The assistant-commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, James Monro, already in charge of the C.I.D., was made responsible for this new institution. He would work directly for the home secretary, which was much to the dislike of Charles Warren, the police commissioner at the time. Warren could not bear to lose control of detective work, even if he despised the secret nature of it. At the same time, he was obsessed with controlling public order, not hesitating to repress violently demonstrators, as was the case in November 1887 at Trafalgar Square following an unemployed workers' demonstration.[63] The first few years of the Special Branch were again marked by the conflict between the two higher ranking officers of the Metropolitan Police, this time between Monro and Warren. In the second half of the 1880s, the C.S.O.'s control over intelligence-led political policing was also the object of a power struggle in Ireland, between the central administration and the head of the R.I.C. Still, Arthur Balfour, appointed chief secretary for Ireland in March 1887, managed to redirect intelligence to serve the political interests of the Irish administration. Balfour charged Samuel Waters, who previously served as Jenkinson's secretary in 1885 and managed the R.I.C. Special Branch while Jenkinson was in London, to establish a special intelligence department to gather information on political groups for the use of the chief secretary.[64]

---

[61] Kenna, 'The Philosophy of the Bomb', p 93.

[62] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 219.

[63] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 81.

[64] Waters, Ball (ed.), *A policeman's Ireland,* p. 14.

In England, as already discussed, the police was suffering in the first half of the 1880s from the lack of a central structure for intelligence work. Following Jenkinson's departure from his position at the Home Office, a specialized department was set up in January 1887. The remit of this new institution was not very clear as there was no official announcement of its formation, partially because of its secret nature, partially because it was created within the C.I.D.[65] James Monro, assistant commissioner in charge of the C.I.D. at the time, requested an augmentation of the staff in charge of 'special duties' and Warren proposed the appointment of '1 First Class Inspector, 1 Second Class Inspector, both of the Criminal Investigation Department, 1 First Class Sergeant and 3 Third Class Sergeants, all of the Criminal Investigation Department, and sixteen police constables' in December 1886 to fulfill this mission.[66] On 2 February 1887, one chief inspector and three second class inspectors were 'sanctioned for the Criminal Investigation Department for special duties'.[67] Then, in a letter from 15 March 1887, Warren explained that the augmentation of staff he requested in December was 'intended for the formation of a Special Branch'.[68] This might be the first time the term 'Special Branch' was mentioned by the English policing administration. This new addition was officially known as 'Section D' and its chief inspector was John Littlechild, drawn from the ranks of the Metropolitan Police former 'Irish Branch'.[69]

In his memoirs, John Sweeney, also a member of this new Special Branch, described their duties as the policing of the following: 'political criminals, misdemeanants and suspects, watching Fenians, Clan na Gael, Anarchists and so on' and this was to be carried out from 'end to end of the United Kingdom.'[70] According to Andrew Cook, this new entity would be financed by the Home Office but could rely on the other C.I.D. sections' resources – essentially its men – to carry out its work.[71] Monro, who was still officially 'only' assistant-commissioner in charge of the C.I.D., saw his duties of superintending the Dockyards at Sheerness, Woolwich and Davenport transferred to Assistant-Commissioner Bruce on 22 March 1887.[72] This reduction

---

[65] Solomon*, State Surveillance*, p. 90.

[66] Charles Warren to under-secretary of state, 2 Dec. 1886 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[67] Charles Warren to under-secretary of state, 2 Feb. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 189/A46281).

[68] Charles Warren to under-secretary of state, 15 March 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[69] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 85.

[70] Sweeney, *At Scotland Yard*, pp 18-9.

[71] Andrew Cook, *M:MI5s first spymaster* (New York, 2004), p. 58.

[72] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 85; Clutterbuck, 'An accident of History?' p. 219; Charles Warren to under-secretary of state, 22 March 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 189/A46281).

of workload could have logically been made so the head of the C.I.D. could focus on his work at the Special Branch. He also brought back Robert Anderson to assist him in his new duties.[73] As described by Bernard Porter, four things distinguished this new entity from its predecessors -specifically the special Irish branch and Jenkinson's network of 'secret agents':

1. it was extremely confidential.
2. it was a national political police force, deployed not only in London but in the rest of the territory.
3. It monitored anarchist activities as well as the Fenians and
4. it was under the direct control of the home secretary.[74]

Thus, the new Special Branch was controlled by the central administration, while the management of public order in the metropolis was left to the authority of the commissioner. In his memoirs, John Sweeney suggested that the Special Branch was used to monitor revolutionaries' activities, keeping tabs on known militants and watching their movements. The policing of demonstrations and meetings was left to the uniformed officers of the Metropolitan Police.[75] In spite of this separation of powers, Home Secretary Henry Matthews, and Police Commissioner Warren did not agree when it came to controlling demonstrations taking place at Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square in October 1887, questioning the division of power and responsibility in matters of policing public order.

When the commissioner issued a ban on all meetings taking place in Trafalgar Square, it was cancelled by Matthews on legal grounds.[76] Warren disagreed with the home secretary, on the ground that he oversaw the uniformed officers of Scotland Yard, who were tasked with maintaining public order, as defined by the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829.[77] The commissioner eventually succeeded, as the Home Office allowed a public notice locking down the area which was published on 8 November 1887. This notice not only banned the meeting, but also warned of the police response it may provoke if not respected, as happened a few days later. An illegal demonstration denouncing unemployment and the Irish Coercions Acts going through Trafalgar Square on 13 November 1887 set off a large police operation, with 5,000

[73] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 85.

[74] Ibid., p. 86.

[75] Sweeney, *At Scotland Yard*, p. 70 quoted in Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 102.

[76] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 103.

[77] cf. Chapter 1.

policemen posted in the area, and led to a violent confrontation with the crowd.[78] In spite of the seventy-five people admitted to Charing Cross Hospital for injuries, *The Times* praised Warren's action and the Commissioner's office stated that he received so many letters supporting his work that he did not have time to answer them all.[79] The commissioner even extended the means at his disposal to reinforce public order. Indeed, the creation of a 'force of Special Constables, to be drawn from the ranks of law-abiding citizens for the purpose of assisting the regular force when called upon' was arranged at a conference between Warren and Matthews on 16 November 1887.[80]

Trafalgar Square appeared, in the eyes of the commissioner at least, as a 'public order' success owing solely to his work and of those of his uniformed constables. When it comes to maintaining order in the street, Warren seemed to have defeated the Home Office's attempt to control this aspect of police work, but the surveillance of political agitators would, as we shall see, be seen increasingly as a Home Office matter.

In Ireland, following Jenkinson's appointment as under-secretary for police and crime in 1882, his position within the C.S.O. allowed him to supervise the anti-Fenian policy and he had to be the first to receive the information gathered by the R.I.C. Special Branch regarding the agitation.[81] Therefore, political policing was supervised by a civil servant working within the central administration and not by police officials, who oversaw the gathering and transmitting of information but did not take any decisions regarding the anti-Fenian policy. However, between Jenkinson's reform in 1883 and the special intelligence department established by Balfour in 1887, management of intelligence work in Ireland was the subject of administrative uncertainty.

While he was working for the Home Office in relation to Fenian bombings, Jenkinson's position at Dublin Castle was first undertaken by his private secretary J.W.E. Dunsterville.[82] Jenkinson was, however, very critical of the state of the Irish police while he was in England, seeing the system he implemented in 1883 collapsing and not capable of dealing with political

[78] See Solomon, *State Surveillance*, pp 105-6.

[79] *The Times*, 14 Nov. 1887; Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 106.

[80] Memo as the causes which led to the attestation of Special Constables in the Metropolis in 1887 and details of the Administration, Nov. 1887 (T.N.A., MEPO 2/174).

[81] cf. Chapter 4.

[82] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 303.

agitation after the end of the Crimes Act.[83] Lord Carnarvon, the Conservative peer appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland in June 1885, appeared to share Jenkinson's view on the police system and in order for the police to recover its efficiency, he decided to abolish the Police and Crime Department and to put its staff under the supervision of General Andrew Reed, the inspector general of the R.I.C.[84] If the latter gained control of intelligence work from the C.S.O., the return of land agitation in the form of the Plan of Campaign from 1886 led to a new reorganization of the policing administration. The appointment of Sir Redvers Buller − former special commissioner previously in charge of improving the Irish policing system – as under-secretary for Ireland in December 1886 marked the will of Dublin Castle to regain control over intelligence-led policing.[85] Buller was able to redirect to his office the R.I.C.'s records relating to political crime, before the inspector general of police could access them, and consequently provide direct orders to the police regarding information gathering.[86]

In practice, the District Inspectors Crime Special (D.I.C.S.) gathered information on fenianism and 'secret societies' throughout their divisions using traditional political policing techniques, such as attending meetings and hiring informants. They submitted monthly reports to Henry Thynne, the deputy-inspector general of the R.I.C. supervising the work of the Special Branch.[87] D.I.C.S. divided their reports between information on 'secret societies' and on the Irish National League.[88] The former mostly consisted of keeping tabs on the different organizations and investigating crimes committed by Fenians, as illustrated by the monthly report of the Western Division for September 1887:

> During the past month there does not appear to have been any fresh development of Secret societies in this Division, but there has been a good deal of activity in some portions of it. In Clare, the moonlighting expedition which ended in the dreadful murder of Head Const. Whelehan is the most important outcome of secret organization; but the information has been supplied by this office on the subject. The special man in Clare seems still of the opinion that Crime in that County is the result of purely local organization and that the I.R.B. is not responsible. No doubt there may be some truth in this; but I am still of opinion that Ennis is the Head Quarters from where these orders for the Commissioner of the more serious

[83] Ibid, p. 304.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ball, 'Policing the land war', p. 306.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid., p. 305.

[88] E.g. Monthly report for May 1887, 27 June 1887 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1).

> outrages emanate. Segt. Doyle of Scarriff has an informant who states that at the races of Feakle on 24th Sept: a meeting of Invincibles and I.R.B. was held in a tent on the race-course. [89]

With regards to the National League, the R.I.C.'s mission consisted of monitoring potential meetings of local branches:

> At the meetings of the League held during the month the members present seems to have devoted their attention to framing resolutions condemning the Govt. for enforcing the Crimes Act. In Lougheed where the Branch has been suppressed the members attempted to hold a meeting but on being warned by the police they dispersed.[90]

Henry Thynne, the deputy-inspector general, then redirected the information he judged of importance directly to Dublin Castle. Thus, when Balfour appointed Ridgeway as under-secretary in October 1887, Thynne forwarded to him the latest monthly report from the Western Division: 'Under Secretary, this interesting report gives you an insight into the state of Secret Societies and of the National League in this Division (the Western). I have marked in red the more remarkable passages.'[91] Those 'passages', relying on intelligence provided by informants, mention potential outrages, organization of secret meetings, revival of secret organizations and conflict between landlords and tenants in the Western Division of the country.[92] Anything that could be the cause of potential political or agrarian agitation was thus deemed important. Ridgeway was then transmitting intelligence notes based on the R.I.C. Special Branch's report.[93] They sum-up elements on a League meeting in Tipperary, mention the situation in County Donegal, report on the 'Tenants Defense League' in County Clare and on a member of parliament named Edward Harrington, representing the Irish Parliamentary Party, among other things.[94] Information regarding agrarian outrages, evictions, but also railway traffic, and export of animals was also provided.[95] Alongside those notes, the chief secretary also received

[89] Monthly report, Sep. 1887, 8 Oct. 1887 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1).

[90] Ibid.

[91] Monthly report, October 1887, 9 Nov. 1887 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1).

[92] Ibid.

[93] Different examples found in the National Archives series Intelligence Notes Compiled for Chief Secretary (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/1-4).

[94] Notes Special Branch, Intelligence notes 16 to 30 July 1889 (T.N.A. PRO 30 60/1).

[95] Agrarian Outrages, Intelligence notes 16 to 30 July 1889 (T.N.A. PRO 30 60/1).

confidential reports from the resident magistrates stationed in the different divisions.[96] Taking the same standardized form, those documents sum up the state of the division, the activity and influence of the National League, the cases of boycotting, the situation on the estates and the prospect for the harvest.[97]

By 1887, the C.S.O. was, in practice, the recipient of intelligence-led policing, but the inspector general of the R.I.C. was still officially in charge of the Special Branch. At the same time, Chief Secretary Balfour tasked D.I. Samuel Waters with setting up another intelligence department oriented towards the political life of the country and with information that was meant to be used by the chief secretary at times of parliamentary debates regarding the Irish question.[98] Thus, he was monitoring political opponents in Ireland and was charged with uncovering compromising information on them for the benefit of the chief secretary. The results of this work are preserved under the T.N.A. series 'CO 903 – Colonial Office: Ireland. Confidential Print'.[99] This contains printed 'intelligence notes' compiled in a booklet between 1885 and 1919.[100] The second volume mostly gathered information published in nationalist newspapers detrimental to the Irish government and the 'facts as officially reported.'[101] For example, on 25 January 1888, the *Freeman's Journal* reported potential police violence taking place in Galway the previous day in an article entitled 'The Rule of the Baton in Galway':

> The injuries inflected upon several persons last night were of a graver nature than on Sunday evening (…) A young man named John Connolly, an assistant in the establishment of Mr. E.D. Burke, T.C., came to the door to close it lest anyone should rush in, and a policeman caught him at the door, dragged him out to the street and batoned him on the head so savagely that he was in a fainting condition for some time.[102]

Under the section 'Facts as officially reported', it is indicated that the article referred to an event taking place while a crowd was waiting for the arrival in Galway of two priests prosecuted under the Crimes Act and that Mr Ashe was responsible of an act of provocation:

---

[96] As an example, see Captain Plunkett's Division, Confidential reports of resident magistrates for period ended 1 July 1889 (T.N.A. PRO 30 60/1).

[97] Colonel Turner's Division, Confidential reports of resident magistrate for period ended 1 July 1889 (T.N.A. PRO 30 60/1).

[98] Waters, Ball (ed.), *A policeman's Ireland*, pp 14-5.

[99] Ibid., pp 96-7.

[100] Intelligence Notes (T.N.A., CO 903/1-19).

[101] Intelligence Notes, Miscellaneous series 1-16,1887-1892 (T.N.A., CO 903/2).

[102] 'Collision between police and people in Galway, on the 24th January, 1888', p. 24 (T.N.A., CO 903/2).

> the crowd was quietly dispersing when Mr Ashe, T.C., called out 'Three cheers for Blunt, and to hell with Balfour and his police'. The crowd forthwith cheered and became excited. Mr Ashe led them on towards the county jail, cheering and stoning the policemen who were on beat-duty on the streets. As the mob drew near to the jail they were met by a body of police. Stones were freely flung and the mob tried to force their way past the police, who thereupon charged with batons and quickly dispersed their assailants. Mr. Ashe, being a prominent ringleader of the riotous mob, got a blow of a truncheon on the head, but was not much hurt … The local correspondent of the *Freeman's Journal* made himself most prominent in the riot, and, of course, his report is highly coloured.[103]

We may suppose that this section was destined to be sent to the government and to be used in official communications, while delegitimizing the information reported by the *Freeman's Journal*. In this volume are also registered 'some notes on boycotting and the practice of "shadowing" in Ireland by the police, and by vigilance men and others.'[104] This document appears to provide arguments in defense of the practice of shadowing employed by the Irish police, as used against 'criminal conspiracies':

> Criminals of such class cannot be dealt with *by ordinary means*. The insidious form of crime demands exceptional treatment, and experience has clearly proved that "shadowing" is the only really effectual weapon which the police can bring to bear upon the perpetrators.[105]

Thus, Water's intelligence department meant to provide elements to the British government to justify the policing practices employed in Ireland.

Despite the existence of this institution and its ability to get access to the R.I.C. Special Branch most important reports, Under-Secretary Ridgeway still wanted the C.S.O. to officially supervise the Crime Department. The reason for this was that the R.I.C. was increasingly monitoring nationalist movements and particularly members of the Irish Parliamentary Party.[106] For the under secretary, the concern was if the inspector general happened to disagree with the government policy, this might prevent the C.S.O. getting access to this political intelligence. Ridgeway, therefore, argued for giving control to the Crime Branch to a civil servant,

---

[103] Ibid.

[104] Some notes on boycotting and the practice of "shadowing" in Ireland by the police, and by vigilance men and others, pp 44-47 (T.N.A., CO 903/2).

[105] Ibid., p.44 (T.N.A., CO 903/2).

[106] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 308.

independent of the police force.[107] This meant going back to the situation when Jenkinson was under-secretary for police and crime. Ridgeway and Balfour eventually secured the creation of the 'Police and Crime division' within the C.S.O. on 10 March 1890 with the executive power regaining greater supervision and control over the police administration.[108] Like under Jenkinson, this new division was divided between a 'Crime Branch Special', dealing with 'secret societies' and political agitation, and a 'Crime Branch Ordinary'.[109]

Figure 8: Irish intelligence administration (1887-1890)



From 1887, both the English and Irish central administration intended to regain control of intelligence work via institutional reform. In England, it was necessary to establish a national political section in charge of political policing to put an end to the multi-institutional and inefficient anti-Fenian network and separate it from the public order mission under the responsibility of the commissioner. In Ireland, the C.S.O. reaffirmed its control over

[107] Ibid., p. 309.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Ibid., pp 309-10.

intelligence-led policing, while Balfour established a special intelligence department at the service of his political work.

At the time of the Fenian dynamite campaign, in the first half of the 1880s, England lacked a specific and centrally co-ordinated organisation in charge intelligence work, but this did not mean that a system of political policing did not exist. It operated within a variety of institutions, thus creating a network but not a coherent or efficient structure. It was highly dependent, as Solomon demonstrates, on different individuals, in particular Jenkinson and Monro.[110] If it is necessary to examine the impact of certain personalities in this case, this chapter has shown, similar to Porter's work, that the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch in 1887 was meant to solve multi-institutional issues encountered by the English police.[111] This new organisation, directly managed by the Home Office, increased the central administration control over intelligence work, taking it from the hands of the police commissioner. In Ireland, the executive lost complete oversight of police reports to police officials following Jenkinson's departure for England. Aware of the value of this work and its benefit for the government, the C.S.O. eventually regained its control over intelligence-led policing via Balfour's special intelligence department and the setting-up of a Police and Crime division in 1890.

This comparison of the English and Irish policing system in the light of the Fenian dynamite campaign taking place in England in the 1880s brings a new dimension to our understanding of the period. Forms of policing once regarded as suitable only in an imperial context were now being applied in England and this occurred largely in response to the consequences of Irish resistance to the Empire. This also encouraged the Home Office and the C.S.O, alongside the Ministry of the Interior in France, to reinforce their policing powers by institutionalizing intelligence work under their control, which was reliant on state funding.

[110] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, pp 50-123.

[111] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 80-97.

Chapter 6

Financing and employing intelligence: England, France, and Ireland compared (1884-1891)

The agitation of the first half of the 1880s had profound consequences for political policing and its organization in the three jurisdictions. New practices and methods were implemented to prevent agrarian outrages in Ireland, the Fenian dynamite campaign in England and anarchists' bombs in France. In the three police cultures the central administrations – led respectively by the Ministry of the Interior, the Home Office, and the C.S.O. – attempted to secure their control over intelligence-led policing and to contribute to its specialization. This growing control exercised by Dublin, London and Paris, was the combined result of the efforts to gather information to prevent political violence and of the financing of intelligence-led policing.

In France, the political policing practices inherited from its imperial predecessor appeared immediately useful to a republican regime in need of political stability and legitimacy to counter political threats.[1] The Third Republic still relied on secret funds to finance those practices but there was little or no accountability over how the funds were used.[2] This sum of money, voted each year by the parliament, was allocated to the different police institutions to conduct political policing with little or no accountability. In England, the establishment of the Special Branch required a reorganization in terms of funding from the central administration. While the new organization was partially financed by a special vote – an extraordinary fund provided by central government – half of its funding came from the Metropolitan Police funds, to which the Home Office also contributed.[3] This emphasized the specific status of the Special Branch within the Metropolitan Police organization and reinforced the priority given to intelligence work. While in Ireland, Dublin Castle had a 'secret fund' at its disposal since the end of the eighteenth century and the chief secretary appeared to have a certain level of autonomy when it came to allocating the money.[4] This helped reinforce the control exercised by the C.S.O. over intelligence work in Ireland**.** In the three jurisdictions, part of this money was used to employ informants, reflecting the institutionalization of intelligence-gathering practices.

---

[1] cf. Introduction and Chapter 1.

[2] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 24.

[3] Emsley, *The English Police*, p. 27.

[4] O'Halpin, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922', pp 348-53.

To study the financing of intelligence work, we mostly relied on accounting and archival documents as the literature remains limited on the subject. In the case of the English police, the *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of the Metropolitan Police* allow us to retrace the evolution in terms of police funding.[5] Lindsay Clutterbuck, who had access to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch's registers, which have since been destroyed, brings some insights on the practices of the organization, such as its use of informants.[6] In France, Sébastien-Yves Laurent analyzed the debates of the Chamber of Deputies regarding the use of secret funds by the republican government at the end of the 1880s.[7] The accounting records of the Lyon police also show how this money was invested to hire different kinds of informants.[8] In Ireland, Eunan O'Halpin retraced the history of the secret service vote in Ireland,[9] but archival records detail who, in the Irish policing administration, benefited from it.[10] The R.I.C. registers of informants also shed light on the allocation of these secret funds.[11]

Overall, this chapter argues that greater central oversight is not only evident in the organization of policing administrations in England, France and Ireland but also in how they were financed and, in the context of the payment and use of informants, how they operated. This oversight was, however, achieved to different degrees, and in the face of different political pressures, in the three case studies. We will first reflect on the financing of intelligence-led policing in England, France and Ireland and the limits placed upon it, before comparing the institutionalization of the use of informants in the three police cultures as a form of specialization in the use of intelligence work.

6.1 Financial support for intelligence work: secret funds and special vote

The English, French and Irish policing systems all benefitted from a specific sum of money, separate from the general government budget, to finance secret policing activities. There were some debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, from the early 1880s, regarding the use of

[5] *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1885-1886,* H.C. 1886 (139) LIII, 353 and passim.

[6] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 65; p. 297; pp 309-11.

[7] Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre*, pp 260-5.

[8] cf. A.D.R., 4M 74.

[9] O'Halpin, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922', pp 348-53.

[10] cf. T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1.

[11] Register of informants arranged by police division recording names as aliases and amounts paid, 1884-1891 (T.N.A., CO 904/183).

secret funds by a republican regime[12] and the first concrete but limited reform took place in 1887. In England, the use of tax-payers' money to finance the police was already questioned at the time of the creation of the Metropolitan Police,[13] but the Home Office managed to avoid this issue when the financing of the Special Branch was set-up. In contrast, central funding for the police is something that was less of an issue for the British government in Ireland.

The French municipal law of 1884 reformed police powers between the local and central administration, reinforcing the Ministry of the Interior's control over intelligence work.[14] Moreover, the institution still benefited from secret funds especially dedicated to secret policing,[15] reinforcing its capacity in terms of intelligence work. In November 1887, a finance commission examining the Ministry of the Interior budget for the following year decided to reduce the amount of this 'secret money' and to rename it.[16] At first sight, this might have appeared as an attempt from the parliament to limit the power of the government in matters of intelligence work. As we shall see, however, it was meant in practice to adapt the use of a 'secret fund' to a republican and democratic regime, as the 'secret fund' was still associated with the government's imperial and authoritarian predecessor.

As previously discussed, since the municipal law of 1884, the central administration was no longer financially in charge of urban police forces.[17] Thus, the Ministry of the Interior was only financially responsible for the S.G. personnel, thus 238 agents in 1887.[18] There was a clear division of police powers with a real separation between the special police and the uniformed officers in charge of public order in the municipalities, which appears similar to the situation in England following the creation of the Special Branch in 1887.[19] It allowed the Ministry to cut out their spending regarding local police forces and redirect it towards the S.G. in charge of information gathering. The budget of the S.G. was raised by almost half a million

[12] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', pp 148-9.

[13] Emsley, *The English Police*, p. 27.

[14] cf. Chapter 4.

[15] Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre*, pp 260-5.

[16] Stephen Pichon, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission du budget, chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant fixation du budget général de l'exercice 1888 (Ministère de l'Intérieur),* JO, DPCh, séance du 24 novembre 1887, annexe 2130, pp 418-48.

[17] cf. Chapter 4 ; Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', pp 347-8.

[18] Pichon, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission du budget*, p. 426.

[19] cf. Chapter 5.

francs between 1880 and 1885, going from 3,992,026 francs to 4,424,855 francs, hiring 53 people in five years.[20] In Paris, a similar reform was led at the P.P. in 1887, with the head of the municipal police left with only the charge of the uniformed police – 8,188 officers – as the rest of the force (Surety Department, research squads) was put under the responsibility of the Paris police prefect and thus the Ministry of the Interior.[21]

If the government was visibly increasing the means of the political police and most importantly its control over it, the parliament was looking to reform it by reducing the discretionary fund at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior, which financed some of its secret activities. In November 1887, a commission evaluated the budget of the Ministry of the Interior for the year 1888 and proposed a reduction of the sum allocated to the 'secret spending for police surety.'[22] They argued for an overall decrease of 1.2 million francs, therefore going from 2 million francs to 800,000 francs, and renamed the expense as 'secret agents for general surety', explaining that this was meant to avoid the money being used for corrupt purposes – especially in times of elections – while having enough funds to gather information in order to ensure public safety, maintain order and enforce the law.[23]

This budgetary cut reflects the parliament's interest in transparency, and its efforts to limit the scope of secret and potentially anti-republican activities financed by the special police. Stephen Pichon, rapporteur of the Chamber of Deputies' finance commission, was not questioning the funds allocated to the Préfecture and to the S.G., recognizing their necessity for intelligence-led policing. What he targeted was the 1 million francs put at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior:

> Admitting the usefulness of the first two [the S.G. and P.P. funds]: we challenge ourselves to say what the third [the Ministry secret funds] was intended for. It is doubtless possible to assume that it was used, to a small extent, for charitable works; it is also well known that it made it possible for a long time to provide certain officials with additional allowances and gratuities. But it is clear that the greater part was spent on expenditures that were certainly immoral and perhaps even worse, useless.[24]

[20] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu,* p. 394.

[21] Ibid., p. 417; Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France*, p. 111.

[22] Pichon, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission du budget,* p. 434.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., p. 435.

Therefore, it was those 'immoral' and 'useless' expenditures that the commission aimed to suppress. It also wanted to split the spending in two with 400,000 francs for the 'secret agents of the Sûreté Générale' and 400,000 francs for the 'secret agents of the Parisian police'.[25] This was not accepted but might have also been with the aim of limiting the Ministry of the Interior's control over the secret funds. Stephen Pichon also reflected on the duality of the French policing system:

> We would have much to say about the respective role of these two police forces and about the dual institution of the *Sûreté Générale* and the *Préfecture*. If we had to decide on the principle of these two institutions, we would have to propose a complete reorganization.[26]

The commission appeared critical of this dual policing organization, both overly centralized and controlled by the government, but was not in a position to reform it and therefore attempted to limit the financial means of the special police. If the new designation 'secret agents for general surety' was adopted by the Ministry of the Interior, and its budget reduced, it was not as much as suggested by the commission. The reduction was ultimately 400,000 francs, the sum going from 2 million francs to 1.6 million francs.[27] The Ministry of the Interior, thereby, kept a certain level of control over the management of the secret funds, despite efforts at reform. Thus, this appeared as a form of political control exercised by the French parliament consistent with the republican tradition, while not actually calling into question the existence of the secret fund.

In England, the Home Office progressively became more involved in the financing of the special police of the Metropolitan Police, showing the will of the central administration to assert its control over intelligence work. To finance the latter, the strategy was to redirect funds towards secret policing instead of increasing the taxpayer's burden. While the Home Office was already partly financing the Metropolitan Police and the C.I.D.'s political policing activities, the establishment of the new Special Branch represented a shift in the money invested into intelligence work in England. Back in the early 1830s, the cost of the Metropolitan police was £207,000, a budget £70,000 higher than that of its predecessor, the parish polices forces, and,

---

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Tableau comparatif des exercices 1888-1889 *in Compte rendu du Ministère de l'Intérieur pour l'exercice 1889,* p. 158.

as a result, it was not possible to continue to fund the force from local taxpayers alone.[28] Thus, in 1833, it was decided that the Home Office would fund the new police to a quarter of its total expenses up to £60,000.[29] The rest was funded by the local parishes and constituted what was called the 'Metropolitan Police Fund.'[30] Therefore, the government was already financing the Metropolitan Police, implying some control over and responsibility for policing in London exercised by the Home Office.

This fund covered the expenses of the administration of Scotland Yard, the pay, clothing and medical expenses of the force, the purchase of furniture, taxes, and miscellaneous spending.[31] From January 1887, this fund also contributed to half of the cost 'of the increase of the Police Force rendered necessary by the employment of Police Officers for services connected with fenianism' which was estimated at £4,037 7*s* 2*d*.[32] The fact that it was still funded, in part, by the Metropolitan Police might explain why Commissioner Warren wanted to keep control over the department and how this increased the tension with Monro, the assistant-commissioner overseeing the work of the Special Branch who was himself only answerable to the home secretary.[33] The other half was paid by the Home Office's special police vote.[34] It shows the implication of the Home Office in the financing of the new Special Branch but also the existence of funds dedicated to the special police, like the secret funds in France.

In 1887 the 'special police vote' was estimated at £35,000.[35] This special police vote not only financed the C.I.D. police especially employed to counter fenianism, but also the C.I.D. police employed at ports and the new Section D staff – therefore the Special Branch staff – recruited by Monro in February 1887.[36] From 2 June 1884 to 1 March 1885, the cost of 'the Police especially Employed at Ports in Great-Britain and on the continent' was estimated at

[28] Palmer, *Police and protest,* p. 308.

[29] Emsley, *The English Police*, p. 27.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Memorandum on the Financial Position of the Police Fund by A. R. Pennefather, 26 Oct. 1889 (T.N.A., HO 45 9707/A50657).

[32] M. Johnson to under-secretary of state, 26 Jan. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[33] cf. Chapter 5.

[34] M. Johnson to under-secretary of state, 26 Jan. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[35] 'Special Police', 10 Jan. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[36] Confidential note, Oct. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 189/A46281).

£3,545.[37] In addition to that sum, £4,680 was estimated for lodging and travelling allowances for the same period.[38] In total, funding of police at ports was then estimated at £8,225 for less than a year. Regarding the agents employed to counter fenianism, the 'accounts of receipt and Expenditure of the Metropolitan Police' for the year 1887, show that the Metropolitan Police received from the Home Office the sum of £24,103 for the 'Police Specially employed'.[39] According to James Monro, this represented 372 men transferred from the Metropolitan Police fund to the Special fund to perform special duties.[40] Therefore, the Home Office did not use the special police vote to increase the special police staff, but financially took over officers from other departments to be employed for intelligence work.

Figure 9: Home Office spending for 'special police' of the Metropolitan Police (1885-1900)



Source: *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1885-1886* and following until *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1899-1900*

[37] Estimate of probable amount of the Pay and Allowances of Police specially employed at Ports in Great Britain and on the Continent, from 2 June, 1884 to 1 March 1885 (T.N.A., HO 144/133/A34848B).

[38] Police specially employed at Ports in Great-Britain and on the Continent (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B).

[39] *Accounts of Receipt and Expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1887-88,* p.4, H.C. 1888 (131) LXXXII, 633 This represented about £3,371,000 in 2023 according to this calculator: https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk/

[40] Monro to Lushington, 16 Nov. 1889 (T.N.A., HO 45 9707/A50657).

The graph above shows a significant increase, between 1885 and 1889, of the Home Office's financial involvement in the 'special police', before seeing a gradual but slight decrease until the end of the nineteenth century. The budget line associated with the Home Office participation took different names throughout the years, reflecting the evolution of the special police's missions. Between 1885 and 1887 this sum was for the 'Service of the Police specially employed in connection with Dynamite Outrage', coming directly from the special vote and representing more than £21,500 for the year 1886-1887.[41] While in 1887, the 'special police vote' was estimated at £35,000, £24,000 was designated to the 'Special Police'. [42] It was to drastically increase the following year, reaching the sum of £36,265 before decreasing slowly but never reaching less than £32,000.[43] Eventually, from 1890, the funding was again renamed as 'Home office (special police)', now defining clearly its purpose.[44]

In Ireland, a secret service vote was also essential to finance Irish intelligence activities. As Eunan O'Halpin explains, from 1797 the parliament took an annual vote 'for foreign and other secret services', though without controlling how it was spent.[45] A situation very similar to the one in France at the end of the nineteenth century. Between 1803 and 1831, the sum of £4,615 relating to secret service purposes was charged to the service list of Ireland before being charged to the secret service vote.[46] Dublin Castle received £4,516 annually from the vote, however, the C.S.O. did not hesitate to spend more than this sum in moments of political unrest.[47] As illustrated by the graph below, between 1882 and 1886, the C.S.O. spent in total £60,778 – the equivalent to what was spent between 1868 and 1882. Eunan O'Halpin contends that the Irish government had at its disposal the secret service money not spent by its predecessor and thus

[41] *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1885-1886,* H.C. 1886 (139) LIII, 353*; Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1886-1887,* H.C. 1887 (133) LXVII, 329.

[42] Special Police, 10 Jan. 1887 (T.N.A., HO 144 133/A34848B); *Accounts of Receipt and Expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1887-88*, H.C. 1888 (131) LXXXII, 633.

[43] *Accounts of Receipt and Expenditure of Metropolitan Police, 1887-88*, H.C. 1888 (131) LXXXII, 633 and passim to *Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police for the year 1889-1890,* H.C., 1890 (154) LIX, 535.

[44] Ibid.

[45] O'Halpin, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922' p. 348.

[46] Ibid, p. 349.

[47] Ibid.

used it at the time of the Land War.[48] Therefore, the use of 'secret service money' appeared to have been reserved for the policing of political agitation.

Figure 10: C.S.O. expenditure from the Secret Service Vote



Source: O'Halpin, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922' p. 353

With the chief secretary in charge of allocating this 'secret fund', it served to reinforce the centralization of intelligence work in Ireland as the head of the Irish government was at liberty to allocate this money to the different policing bodies in charge of gathering information. When William Henry Smith left the chief secretary office in February 1886, he wrote to his successor John Morley to 'hand to [him] the balance of the secret-service money placed at [his] disposal'.[49] This document also detailed the persons who benefited from this fund, especially E.G. Jenkinson, the assistant under-secretary for Ireland, who received £1,986. Out of a total of £3,120, £1,114 remained out of the secret funds when Morley took office.[50] With regards to the use of this money by the new chief secretary, it appears that Jenkinson was asked to justify his spending of £527 between 26 January and 9 February, 1886.[51] However, Jenkinson refused to do so, arguing that:

[48] Ibid.

[49] W.H. Smith to Morley, 9 Feb. 1886 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

[50] Ibid.

[51] E.G. Jenkinson to W.H. Smith, 19 Feb. 1886; W.H. Smith to Morley, 20 Feb. 20, 1886 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

> Under an arrangement which was made in 1882 when Lord Spencer was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland Secret Service money is paid to me by the Chief Secretary and I am not required to give any details of expenditure at the close of the Financial Year, or when there is a new Chief Secretary.'[52]

W.H. Smith, the recently appointed chief secretary for Ireland and Morley's successor, appeared to have been satisfied by this answer,[53] accepting to grant Jenkinson a certain autonomy in his function, probably due to his central role in the political policing administration. The inspector general of the R.I.C., Sir Andrew Reed, however, detailed how the secret-service money put at his disposal was used between 26 January and 9 February 1886, indicating a certain acceptance by the R.I.C. of a need for transparency required by the C.S.O.[54]

Table 2: Inspector general secret service money accounting, Jan-Feb 1886

Return of Secret Service money received and paid by the Inspector General of R.I. Constabulary from 26 January 1886 to 9 February 1886 both dates included	
26 January 1886 to 9 February 1886	- D.I. [...] expended in obtaining info in a murder case. - E.G. Jenkinson expenses in America in respect to a murder case. - [...] expended by members of R.I.C. in London procuring info. - Major N. Gosselin R.M. expended by members of the R.I.C. in Great-Britain. - Sgt. [...] expended procuring info at Queenstown.

Source: Return of Secret Service money perceived and paid by the Inspector General of R.I. Constabulary from 26 January 1886 to 9 February 1886 both dates included (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

[52] E.G. Jenkinson to W.H. Smith, 19 Feb.1886 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

[53] W.H. Smith to Morley, 20 Feb.1886 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

[54] Return of Secret Service money perceived and by the Inspector General of R.I. Constabulary from 26 January 1886 to 9 February 1886 both dates included, 12 Feb. 1886 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

The beneficiaries of this 'secret service money' reveal a good deal about the functioning of the Irish intelligence system. Indeed, Jenkinson, who received the highest sum of money, was still working with the Irish branch in England at the time to help deal with Fenian bombings. It shows the investment of the Irish government in maintaining its efforts to counter fenianism despite the attacks happening overseas.

Following the departure of the assistant under-secretary for police and crime from the Irish administration and the nomination of Arthur Balfour as chief secretary for Ireland in 1887, the records reveal the continuing central oversight of intelligence work through the allocation of secret service money. The most relevant documents found in the archives related to how Balfour distributed this money between December 1890 and November 1891. A cheque book and work documents detail the amount of secret fund the chief secretary provided to different individuals in the Irish policing administration and reveal the priorities in terms of intelligence work at the time.[55]

First, the R.I.C. was the institution benefitting the most from this money, especially the divisional commissioners (D.C.s), but also Inspector-General Andrew Reed and D.I. Samuel Waters in charge of Balfour's intelligence department.

Table 3: Secret service money for the use of R.I.C. personnel between December 1890 and November 1891

Colonel Turner, D.C. of Cork (South-Western Division)	£500
Captain Slacke, D.C. of Dundalk (Northern Division)	£357
Allan Cameron, D.C. (South-Eastern Division)	£350
Captain Stokes, D.C. (Midland Division)	£100
John Byrne D.C. of Athlone (Midland Division)	£60
Andrew Reed, Inspector General of the R.I.C.	£380
Samuel Waters, D.I.	£390
Total	£2,137

Source: Mr Balfour s' SS account 1891 to 7 Nov. Rough Balance; SS accounts 1891-92 advances; Check book, 1890-1891 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

[55] Mr Balfour s' SS account 1891 to 7 Nov. Rough Balance; SS accounts 1891-92 advances; Check book, 1890-1891 (T.N.A., PRO 30 60/13/1).

Therefore, members of the R.I.C. received at least £2,137 of Secret Service money between December 1890 and November 1891, showing their involvement in intelligence gathering in Ireland. Nevertheless, it was Sir William Kaye, the assistant under-secretary for Ireland, who received the largest allocation of secret service money between 31 December 1890 and 6 November 1891 equalling £800, while David Harrel was given £150 when he became under-secretary for Ireland in 1893.[56] It is also noted that A. Horne, the resident magistrate for Waterford, received £50 on 10 April 1891 while Robert Anderson, the assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London, was given £50 on 21 March 1891.[57]

Out of the three central administrations, the French Ministry of the Interior was the one investing the most in political policing. With a population of 38,343,192 people in 1891,[58] the 1,6 million francs of secret spending for police surety represented around 0.04 francs spent per head of population in France.[59] In Ireland, in 1884, the year where the most money was spent, around £18,000 the Irish population was estimated at 4,952,693 million people,[60] which meant that around £0.003 was spent per head of population. In comparison, the population of England and Wales was estimated at 27,827,700 million people in 1887,[61] the year the secret police vote represented £35,000 meant that £0.001 was spent per head of population. This spending was linked, in some respects, to a specific period of unrest in Ireland – namely, the Land War of the previous years – and underlines the will of the central authority to assert its control of political policing by increasing its financing in times of political agitation. In the three case studies, this translated into a greater specialization in policing, directed and funded from the center, that was meant to counter political agitation.

6.2 Financing informants: intelligence practices in England, France and Ireland

What was this money used for? It was certainly used to pay informants. For example, T.F. Singleton, the Town Inspector of Belfast, spent £28 on three individuals providing information

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ministère de l'Intérieur, *Dénombrement de la population, 1891* (Paris, 1892), p. 10.

[59] The franc amount was higher than the British pounds (1 franc = £25 in 1912).

[60] *Twenty-First detailed annual report of the register-general of Marriages, births, and deaths in Ireland, 1884* (Dublin, 1885), p.6.

[61] cf. https://www.gov.uk/ (13 Sept. 2024).

in 1889.[62] Indeed, more generally, this money seems to have been dedicated to the hiring of informants in England, France and Ireland and across the different intelligence services. We have already seen that the three central administrations relied on informants to gather information, though with different levels of commitment.[63] While France and Ireland appeared deeply accustomed to the practice, in England we can see the emergence a more systematic use of those individuals following the establishment of the Special Branch in 1887. An informant, as defined by Steven Greer, is someone who gives information about any matter.[64] For John Littlechild, the chief-inspector of the Special Branch, an informant was 'more or less a regular auxiliary of the detective'.[65]

In our research, informants generally appear as the first sources of information for the police on potential agitators. Those individuals, presenting themselves as militants, reporters, sometimes criminals, and often qualified as 'secret agents', participated in this information gathering mission in return for money. Unlike policemen who might be known to agitators in a locality, they could easily integrate into a party or organisation to inform on them, if they were not already members of said organisations. Some were also used as 'agents provocateurs' as they were tasked by the police to provoke agitations within political organizations. The Paris police prefect Louis Andrieux employed one to finance an anarchist newspaper, in which he suggested the attack of Adolphe Thiers's statues in Saint-Germain in 1881.[66] The British authorities relied on provocateurs at the time of the Fenian dynamite campaign,[67] before hiring one in the 1890s later to counter anarchists established in London.[68] In the three jurisdictions, traces of informants can be found in various documents produced by the policing systems, enlightening us on the regularity and nature of their work. They are often mentioned in reports, or sign reports themselves, while accounting records and registers testify to their existence but also to the institutionalization of their role at the end of the nineteenth century.[69]

---

[62] Table by T.F. Singleton, 27 March 1890 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 4).

[63] cf. Chapters 1 to 5.

[64] Steven Greer, *Supergrass: Informers and Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland* (Oxford, 1995), p. 2 quoted in Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 294.

[65] John Littlechild, *The Reminiscences of Chief-Inspector Littlechild* (London, 1894), p. 95.

[66] Andrieux, *Souvenirs d'un préfet de police*, pp 337-51.

[67] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 119.

[68] cf. Chapter 9.

[69] Register of informants arranged by police division recording names as aliases and amounts paid, 1884-1891 (T.N.A., CO 904/183); Budget-Comptabilité, 1880-1904 (A.D.R., 4M 74).

The recruiting of informants was essential to the work of the D.I.C.S. in Ireland as they were relied upon to gather information on 'secret societies'. For example, in his monthly report for July 1887, D.I. Jones of the South-Western Division wrote that his men 'have succeeded in getting three informants.'[70] To manage these auxiliary personnel, the R.I.C. held a register of informants, at least for the years 1884-1891, identifying 107 individuals exercising this function across the country during this period.[71] In this register, each section covering the country – Southwest Division, Northern Division, South-Eastern Division – provided details regarding the 'cognomen' of the informant, the date of his recruitment, his position in the 'agitation' and how much they were paid, as is clear from the example below.

Table 4: Register of informants - Southwest division

Kerry and Clare (S.W. Division)			
Cognomen of Informant	Date of Original Entertainment	Position in agitation & opinion of D.C. *(n.b. District Constable)*	Remarks
Emerald	March 1887	Ordinary I.R.B. – G.A.A. & Fenian. Give information as to I.R.B. and G.A.A..	Paid £3 in 1889

Source: T.N.A, CO 904/183

In Belfast, D.I. Singleton relied on a similar version of the register to log the information he received from his informants.

[70] Monthly report, July 1887 by D.I. Jones, 2 Aug. 1887 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[71] cf. T.N.A., CO 904/183.

Table 5: Register of informants - Belfast

N°	Cognomen	Dates of original Entertainments	Sums received during 1889 (£)	Remarks regarding value of information supplies
1	"Fox"	December 1885	3,0	Good & trustworthy = but not much going on, & informant was ill for some time
2	"Rattler"	December	3,0	Corroborative, but not important
3	"Hinnet"	October 1888	19,2	Very important and absolutely correct. In touch with all the leading members in America & Britain. Consider information most valuable.

Source: Table by T.F. Singleton, 27 March 1890 (N.A.I., CSO/RP, Other police reports, Carton 4).

It was the D.I. who recruited the informant who compiled the information and was the only individual to know the informant's real identity.[72] The payment in the example above and the mention of 'ordinary' could indicate that this individual was an 'ordinary' member of the I.R.B. and G.A.A. rather than in a leadership role and just gave information from time to time.[73] According to Elizabeth Malcolm, in 1890 the Crime Special Branch employed 105 spies operating mostly on an occasional basis 'who were paid from £3 for a specific piece of information to a regular stipend of £100 per annum.'[74] Lindsay Clutterbuck notes that the R.I.C.'s informants received between £1 and £2 a year, except for an individual named 'Nero', paid £205 a year, a very significant sum of money at the time.[75]

[72] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 309; The practice was similar in France, as the informant was not the responsibility of the police department but of the policeman who earned his trust, see Brunet, *La Police de l'ombre,* p. 78.

[73] cf. Table 4: Register of informants - Southwest division.

[74] Malcolm, *The Irish policeman,* p. 124; £3 in 1890 represented about £350 pounds in 2021, while £100 around £12 000 in 2021 according to this calculator: https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk/.

[75] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 309; £205 in 1890 represented about £24 000 pounds in 2021 according to this calculator: https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk/.

Table 6: Register of informants - Southwest division

Cognomen of Informant	Date of Original Entertainment	Position in agitation & opinion of D.C (District Inspector)	Remarks
Nero	June 1887	Col. Turner reports 'The informant 'Nero' is worth any amount of & being in good position he has really received very little.	Paid £205 in 1889. Includes one payment of £100 by special authority.

Source: T.N.A, CO 904/183

'Nero' was working in the South-Western Division as testified by the monthly report of the District Inspector Crime Branch Special in 1887-1888.[76] On 4 September 1888, DI Jones wrote:

> I have to report that during the past month we have made considerable progress in procuring information as to the working of Secret Societies in the Division. Our informant Nero has done good work. He has travelled a good deal and put us in possession of reliable information affecting other Divisions, as well as hearing on the I.R.B. working in England. I expect this informant will yet turn out very valuable. I may add his information in every instance has been tested and found perfectly accurate.[77]

This extract thus testifies to the work undertaken by Nero for the Division.

In France, informants were used by every police administration charged with undertaking political policing, but their status evolved over time. If we do not find any specific registers of informants or lines in the budget relating to the employment of those auxiliaries in the archives of the P.P., their presence appears in the various reports produced by the institution.[78] In 1887, Louis Puibaraud, deputy director of the Surety Department at the P.P., published an anonymous book – presenting himself as a journalist − to promote the Parisian institution.[79] Puibaraud affirmed that the P.P. Surety Department was not using the services of informants anymore:

[76] D.I. Jones's Monthly Report - Secret Societies, 4 Sep. 1888 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[77] Ibid.

[78] cf. Chapters 1 and 3.

[79] Louis Puibaraud, *La police à Paris, son organisation, son fonctionnement, par un rédacteur du Temps* (Paris, 1887).

> These people were considered permanent auxiliaries of the service. They belonged to the world of *camelots*, gate walkers, people without confession. They were eliminated. They would sometimes throw agents at bad cases and not fear serving their own grudges. This whole world has been swept away.[80]

The deputy director of the Surety Department, however, admitted that the Paris police préfecture sometimes relied on 'scouts', who might be rewarded financially for their information.[81] Thus, the aim of Puibaraud here was to show that the institution was not involved in a specific form of political policing, relying on criminal individuals and agents provocateurs to gather information, at a time when the parliament was trying to limit the use of secret funds by the Ministry of the Interior.

Nevertheless, even if the P.P. was trying to hide this type of practice, the police of Lyon did report it in its accounting records.[82] The institution seemed to be using informants to gather information on revolutionaries and more specifically on anarchist activities at the end of the nineteenth century. Those records reflect their activities but also their level of integration in the policing system as this extract for the month of August 1890 shows:

[80] Ibid., p. 23.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Budget-Comptabilité, 1880-1904 (A.D.R., 4M 74).

Table 7: Accounting records of the special police of Lyon, August 1890

Informants	
First - Ordinary Informants	
Anarchists	100 francs
Royalists	110 francs
Revolutionary socialists – spending such as subscription to diverse socialist committees and anarchists groups, to the association A, travel and stay in Geneva for three days for the anarchist Congress of the East Federation, purchase of socialist newspapers, postage, etc. refunded to informants	74,9 francs
Second – Special Informants	
Secret Agent Ernest	90 francs
Secret Agent Jules	80 francs
Secret Agent Gabriel C	175 francs
Secret Agent Amédée	145 francs
Secret Agent n°38	70 francs
Secret Agent Philippe	50 francs
Secret Agent n°59	100 francs
Various spending in august on the occasion of the socialist movement, of public meetings and at *Prudhomie* elections (august 1890), various allowances, newspapers purchase, etc.	267, 10 francs
Various reimbursement to the special informants above-mentioned	32,45 francs

Source: Comptabilité – Août 1890 (A.D.R., 4M 74).

As we notice here, the records divided the informants into two categories: the 'ordinary' and the 'special' informants. In the first, there is no specific individuals mentioned but a sum of money paid in exchange for information on different political groups. The information was not provided by a specific individual, but by various persons, probably members of one of the political groups mentioned. Those 'ordinary informants' could relate to the 'occasional informants' described by the historian Jean-Paul Brunet as 'individuals informing the police on

single or rare occasions.'[83] In the second case, specific individuals, designated by code names, received money for their work. We may assume that they provided information regularly on specific groups or suspected individuals. Indeed, we find their names mentioned throughout the records for the rest of the year, testifying to the regularity of the information they provided and their place within the policing system.[84] Brunet referred to these individuals as 'regular informants', recruited by the police among the 'milieu' from which they needed to gather information.[85]

It seems here that the French system, where the role of informants goes back to the sixteenth century,[86] was less centralised and more city-based than the nationally run system established in Ireland. This may be explained by the organization of the R.I.C. and the political nature of anarchism in France, necessitating the police to monitor the groups that were present in a certain territory and not in another.

In the case of England, the use of informants appeared exclusively linked to the Metropolitan Police from mid-nineteenth century, with the first evidence of the Scotland Yard policemen infiltrating radical milieux in the 1830s. This was continued by John Hitchens Sanders in the aftermath of the revolutions in continental Europe.[87] John Sweeney suggested he attended meetings of Irish nationalist associations, assuming a covert position to gather intelligence.[88] The establishment of the Special Branch in 1887 favoured an increase in the recruitment of informants, and a centralisation of a practice previously employed by E.G. Jenkinson and despised by the Metropolitan Police officers.[89]

Similar to the police of Lyon, the English Special Branch held accounting records that have been studied by Lindsay Clutterbuck in his thesis.[90] He explains that the Special Branch held three 'Special Account' ledgers in which were registered sums of money paid for

[83] Brunet, *La police de l'ombre*, p. 35.

[84] Comptabilité, 1890 [Accounting folder, 1890] (A.D.R., 4M 74).

[85] Brunet, *La police de l'ombre*, p. 35.

[86] At the time, Antoine de Mouchy was using *mouchards* to track down Protestants not yet converted to Catholicism.

[87] cf. Chapter 1.

[88] Sweeney, *At Scotland Yard,* p. 49.

[89] cf. Chapter 5.

[90] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of History?', p. 65.

informants.[91] According to Clutterbuck, between 1888 and 1901, 85 informants were employed.[92]

Table 8: Special Branch informants expenditures, 1888 to 1901

Year	Number of informants paid this year	Yearly Expenditure (£)
1888	13	621
1889	17	532
1890	13	554
1891	15	560
1892	16	553
1893	13	489
1894	14	557
1895	15	575
1896	15	477
1897	14	449
1898	12	311
1899	11	335
1900	9	320
1901	10	273
Total	85	6608

Source: Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p.311; p.314

Based on the regularity of the payment detailed on the ledgers, Clutterbuck was able to establish a typology of the informants employed by the English organisation.[93] The majority (49) were occasional informants who received one to three payments and could correspond to the category of 'ordinary informants' of the Lyon police.[94] However, the London police seem to have also favoured recruiting a small number of informants and employing them over a longer period of time: four of them received at least four payments or had been employed for a year, 14 of them

[91] Ibid., p. 65; p. 297; pp 309-11.

[92] Ibid., p. 313.

[93] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of History?', p. 313.

[94] Ibid.

were used for at least a year to seven years and 8 of them were employed for more than a year.[95]

It was in 1892 that the Special Branch employed the most informants – 16 – but this was not the year the organisation spent the most money on them.[96] Clutterbuck also explained that the highest payments informants received were between £8 and £10 a month.[97] In regards to the expense for 1892, only a few of the 16 informants received this sum of money, and based on the typology, we may assume that the majority of them were occasional informants. To compare those numbers with the Lyon police, in 1892, 27 different special informants were employed, and they were paid between 45 and 150 francs a month.[98] In total, the Lyon police spent 18,837 francs for its ordinary and special informants in 1892.[99] This show a different approach in the treatment of informants, with the French police recruiting a variety of individuals, from occasional to regular informants, and investing a certain sum of money, while London tended to rely on informants more occasionally.

Informants were clearly integrated in the three policing systems, but they did not attract the same level of investment in each country. The Lyon police did not hesitate to employ a great number of 'special' or 'regular' informants alongside 'occasional' ones to gather information on different kinds of political agitation. In Ireland, recruiting informants was part of the mission of the special police and the D.I. rewarded them in relation to the value of the information they provided. In England, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch favoured quality over quantity when it came to employing informants, not hesitating to employ some of them very occasionally or relying on the same individuals over several years. The Irish and French system, both tended to multiply the type of informants they employed, but also had more regular or special informants than the Metropolitan Police Special Branch in total because of their higher investment in this practice.

---

[95] Ibid.

[96] cf. Table 8: Special Branch Informants expenditures, 1888 - 1901.

[97] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of History?', p. 309; this represented about £1000 in 2021 according to this calculator: https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk/

[98] Budget de l'Agglomération Lyonnaise, Chapitre 54, Exercice 1892, Pièces des de Dépenses [Lyon agglomeration budget, chapter 54, financial year 1892, expenditures documentation] (A.D.R., 4M 74). 45 francs in 1901 represented about €192 in 2022 and 150 francs in 1901 represented about €640 according to this calculator: https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794

[99] Ibid.; this represented about €80414 in 2022 according to this calculator: https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794

The end of the 1880s represented a shift in terms of the institutionalization of intelligence work in the three jurisdictions, illustrated by the growing involvement of each central administration in the financing of secret policing. In France, the Ministry of the Interior was still able to implement political policing practices but in exchange had to accept some slight revision of its use of secret funds to contend with the republican regime. In England, the Home Office increased its financial involvement into intelligence-led policing, while the C.S.O appeared as the institution with the most liberty in terms of political policing spending. According to the records, part of this money was dedicated to the payment of informants infiltrating political movements threatening the French and British governments. With the development of institutions in charge of intelligence work, the role of informants increased as part of wider information-gathering practices.

The 1890s presented new challenges testing this new intelligence-led approach. If the system set-up by Balfour appeared to have helped reduce political violence to a minimum, the Irish police kept monitoring potential agitators. In France, after facing an unprecedent wave of anarchist attacks in 1892, intelligence-led policing was now focusing on far-right organizations challenging the Republic in a different way.

Chapter 7

From old to new domestic political policing challenges: Ireland and France compared (1893-1899)

By the 1890s, the three jurisdictions were fitted with functioning political policing systems in charge of intelligence work. In Ireland, R.I.C. officers provided systematic reports on the state of the different divisions in the country with the specific inclusion of reports on nationalist and republican organizations, which generally highlight a decrease in political agitation. In France, despite the financial resources of the central administration and the employment of informants reporting on anarchist activities,[1] the country endured an 'era of attacks' in 1892-93.[2] This culminated in December 1893 with a bomb exploding in the middle of parliamentary debates at the Chamber of Deputies sent by Auguste Vaillant, an anarchist militant who wanted to take revenge for the death of Ravachol, an anarchist executed a few months before.[3]

This led the French government to introduce drastic legal reforms known as the lois scélérates, but also to make some changes within the S.G. whose mission evolved towards new kinds of agitators. The Dreyfus affair – where a Jewish military captain was wrongly convicted and sentenced of spying for Germany by December 1894 – brought to light political agitators from the right. Different far-right organizations, predominantly antisemitic, used the case to make their voices heard, culminating in a potential threat to the Republic in 1899.[4] In Ireland, after a reorganization of the administration centralizing intelligence work, the C.S.O. charged the R.I.C. special men and the rest of the Irish political policing network with monitoring a potential revival of 'secret societies' and other political associations such as the Irish National League (I.N.L.).

The French literature on this period often limits itself to the S.G.'s increase of personnel following Vaillant's attack.[5] Laurent Lopez analysed the evolution of the methods employed

---

[1] cf. Chapter 6.

[2] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 212.

[3] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 164.

[4] The term 'far-right' appeared in the 1820s in France but was rarely used before 1918, as explained by the historian Nicolas Lebourg to the 'Commission d'enquête sur la lutte contre les groupuscules d'extrême droite en France' in January 2019, it is purposely employed in this chapter and the following to describe the array of organizations, some very extreme and politically subversive, threatening the integrity of the Third Republic in 1899.

[5] Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 306 ; Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', p. 312.

by the S.G. to monitor the anarchists, noticing an increase in the exchange of information between the different police forces (special commissioners, departmental prefects, P.P.) and a centralization of intelligence work by the head of the S.G.[6] Arnaud-Dominque Houte and Bertrand Joly explore the political implications of this period on French political life while insisting on the fact that the Dreyfus affair and the agitation caused by far-right organizations mostly concerned Paris and its social elites.[7] Regarding the evolution of information gathering in Ireland in the 1890s, we mostly rely on the archives available as the literature on the subject remains limited. Elizabeth Malcolm, though, mentioned the detective and intelligence gathering functions of the Irish Constabulary and the establishment of the 'Crime Branch Special' in 1890, which accumulated a large amount of information, shadowed suspects and submitted reports. She concludes that their mission was costly and delicate but crucial for the Irish government.[8] These kinds of political policing practices by the constabulary, such as reporting on political organizations active in an area, went back to the 1830s.[9] As we shall see in this chapter, the main difference in the first half of the 1890s was that there was simply less political activity to monitor but, nevertheless, an impressive surveillance infrastructure was maintained under the ultimate control of the C.S.O.

In its discussion of the Irish situation, this chapter draws on records from the National Archives of Ireland, primarily the D.I.C.S. reports, as well as the reports of the divisional commissioners and county inspectors. In France, the records of the S.G., alongside reports on the state of the anarchist movement in the early 1890s, contain a lot of material showing a systematic surveillance of the different far-right organizations at the time. Most of the information came from correspondents – or informants – the same kind of individuals used to infiltrate and report on anarchism.

In both cases, a great quantity of material was produced on potential agitators. It may be that the systematization of the reports sent by the policemen exaggerated the significance of the threat of violence. Their mission consisted of following and reporting on suspects on a regular basis, whatever their level of activity, as required by the central administration. It is important to analyze the content of those reports carefully, as they give more insight into what

---

[6] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu,* pp 269-71.

[7] Houte, *Histoire de la France contemporaine*; Bertrand Joly, *Déroulède: l'inventeur du nationalisme français* (Paris, 1998) ; Bertrand Joly, *Nationalistes et conservateurs en France: 1885-1902* (Paris, 2008) ; Bertrand Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus* (Paris, 2014).

[8] Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, pp 123-24.

[9] cf. Chapter 1.

was expected of the policemen and the perceptions and priorities of the authorities than on the reality of the threat they were monitoring. Thus, this chapter will reflect on the evolution of intelligence-led policing with the emergence of new potential agitators in Ireland and France from the mid-1890s, while questioning to what extent this surveillance was reinforced by the C.S.O and the Ministry of the Interior and ultimately served the interests of both governments.

First, we will show how the central administration reinforced their control over intelligence-led policing by increasing the centralization of the S.G. in France, before reflecting on how the R.I.C. pursued its missions of intelligence work in the absence of a significant political threat. Then, we will analyze the work of the French political police monitoring far-right organizations, relying on already existing intelligence practices.

7.1 Gathering intelligence on political agitators: the Sûreté Générale in France

The French policing system was facing a revival of anarchist activities in the first half of the 1890s, reinforcing the means at the disposal of the S.G. to carry out the repression of the dynamiters. The bomb Auguste Vaillant threw at the Chamber of Deputies on 9 December 1893, even if it only caused a few injuries, marked a turning point in the policing of the anarchist movement in France. This event revealed the limits of the French policing administration to prevent anarchists' attacks despite the heavy surveillance they exercised, while taking a new step towards the repression of the militants. According to Jean Maitron, Vaillant's attack could have been prevented but was not, due to police neglect.[10] He indicates that, from 11 December 1892, a year before the attack, a report produced by a special commissioner of the S.G. noted that the anarchists were considering a potential attack at the Chamber of Deputies.[11] Then, another report from 15 November 1893, drawn up by an informant of the P.P., indicated different places potentially targeted by the anarchists – including the Chamber of Deputies – and requiring surveillance: 'this does not mean that an attack will ultimately take place but in the state of things, the anarchists expect massive arrests; we may fear that some of them would not want to be arrested.'[12]

[10] Maitron, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 237.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Report from Nemo, 15 Nov.1893 (A.P.P., BA 78), quoted in Maitron, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 237.

According to Maitron, the police were informed by the S.G. two days before the attack that it was necessary to take policing measures to prevent any attempt of this kind.[13] Maitron contends that Vaillant had been known by the police for years and that he was subject to an important surveillance.[14] Indeed, Vaillant's name can be found on a list drawn up by agents of the P.P., which indicates that he was associated with the 'Comité Revolutionnaire Central à tendance Blanquiste'.[15] Vaillant was indeed part of this group in the 1880s.[16] Thus, this case reveals that despite the monitoring exercised over Vaillant and the information gathered and communicated by the S.G., nothing was set-up to prevent the attack. This reminds us of the situation in England at the time of the Fenian dynamite campaign in the 1880s, with the incapacity of the Metropolitan Police to act in accordance with the intelligence produced by Jenkinson and his agents.[17] This failure by the French police eventually led to the implementation of repressive measures and reinforced the centralization of political policing and intelligence work in France.

After Vaillant's attack, a clear legal response was adopted by the French government. The first anti-terrorist laws, known as the 'lois scélérates', were voted on 11 December 1893 – three days after the attack – and on 19 December 1893. The first one reformed the law of 29 July 1881, on the freedom of the press, now punishing 'indirect provocation'.[18] This meant that the author of an article targeting directly and/or indirectly the government or promoting a potential act of violence towards a location or individuals could be prosecuted. The second allowed for the repression of those affiliated with criminal associations, even if they did not commit a crime.[19] The Ministry of the Interior also proposed a policing and administrative response to the situation. While the municipal law of 1884 reinforced the control exercised by the central administration over the political police, Vaillant's attack caused an unprecedented reaction. First, the special commissioners of the S.G. were now able to expand their competences to the whole territory of the department they lived in – until then their authority was limited to the city

[13] Maitron, *Le mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 237.

[14] Ibid., p. 238.

[15] Etat des principaux groupes des diverses écoles socialistes de Paris [Status of the main groups on the various socialist schools of Paris] (A.P.P., BA 1499).

[16] Vaillant, Auguste [anarchiste], *Le Maitron.* (https://maitron.fr/spip.php?article154227) (30 Oct. 2024).

[17] cf. Chapter 5.

[18] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 166.

[19] Ibid.

they were assigned to –[20] something Cazelles had implicitly suggested back in 1880.[21] Then, David Raynal, who was appointed minister of the interior a few days after the attack, issued a circular to the prefects – including the Paris police prefect – asking them for information regarding the state of anarchist organizations in their jurisdiction.[22] The aim of this measure was to determine if an anarchist organization existed and if it could overthrow the republican regime. It was also a way to centralize the information gathered by a large network of political police that appeared to lack a certain efficiency. What the local administration noticed was the absence of a structured organization, with the militants meeting from time to time and sending letters abroad but not representing a 'serious grouping'.[23] The highest concentration of militants was found in the Bouches-du-Rhône, the Loire and Paris but the prefects there dismissed the existence of an anarchist organization, indicating that only a portion were active and might be dangerous.[24] Police informants also noticed the existence of a scission among the militants in the early 1890s, between famous anarchist personalities focusing on the philosophical theorization of the movement, and younger anarchists supporting violent terrorist actions.[25] A reality corroborated by anarchists leaders themselves, with Peter Kropotkin and Jean Grave condemning the attack of the *Liceu* theatre in Barcelona taking place in November 1893 as it did not fit with their ideology.[26]

Following the implementation of the anti-terrorist legislations and the circular sent by the minister of the interior to evaluate the state of anarchism in each department,[27] the S.G. saw its administrative powers in matter of political policing reinforced. The series of anarchist attacks targeting France in the early 1890s eventually allowed the S.G. to meet the ambitions of the head of the institution from 1880, Emile-Honoré Cazelles, namely a political police at the service of the Republic.[28] The repression of the anarchists in the 1890s coincided with a larger

[20] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*, p. 270.

[21] Laurent, *Politiques de l'ombre,* p. 271.

[22] Organisation anarchiste. Réponses à la Circulaire du 13 décembre 1893 [Anarchist organization. Answers to the circular of 13 December 1893] (A.N., F7 12504).

[23] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 167.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Report by Epié, 30 May 1890 (A.P.P., BA 76); Les Anarchistes. Bulletin de quinzaine [the anarchists, bi monthly bulletin], 5 Nov. 1891 (A.P.P., BA 77).

[26] Jean Grave, *Le mouvement libertaire sous la IIIe: Souvenirs d'un révolté* (Paris, 1930), pp 112-3.

[27] Organisation anarchiste. Réponses à la Circulaire du 13 décembre 1893 [Anarchist organization. Answers to the circular of 13 December 1893] (A.N., F7 12504).

[28] cf. Chapter 1.

police force and a budgetary increase. With regards to the money allocated to the police commissioners, the first increase occurred in 1892 and was roughly 240,000 francs and then another increase of almost 1 million francs took place between 1894 and 1895. Both coincide with the return of the anarchists' threat with the 'era of attacks' in 1892 and then Vaillant's explosion at the Chamber of Deputies at the end of the year 1893. Relying on the reports of the budget commission, Marie Vogel has estimated the number of police special agents employed at the time.[29] We can notice here an increase in 1894, right after Vaillant's attack, and those numbers remained steady until the end of the nineteenth century, never dropping back to the level of 1893. This shows a long-term investment by the central administration in the S.G. political police, reinforcing its role in dealing with the political agitation of the 1890s.

Table 9: Personnel of the Sûreté Générale – Special Police (1893-1901)

Year	Staff	Source
1893	235	Rapport Henry Boucher - 1896
1894	408	Rapport Henry Boucher - 1896
1895	434	Rapport Henry Boucher - 1896
1896	452	Rapport Lassere - 1897
1897	426	Rapport Morlot - 1905
1898	413	Rapport Morlot - 1905
1899	382	Rapport Morlot - 1905
1900	390	Rapport Morlot - 1905
1901	400	Rapport Morlot - 1905

Source: Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', p. 695

While the minister ordered the prefects to gather information on anarchists living in their locality,[30] the S.G. was given more responsibility in terms of intelligence work. As noted earlier, they were now exercising their power in the entire department where they resided. This also coincided with the creation of the first special squad or Brigade Hennion, in reference to the policeman at the head of this squad, Célestin Hennion, who was central to intelligence work and would participate in the reorganisation of the political police in France for the next twenty

[29] Vogel, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national', p. 365.

[30] Organisation anarchiste. Réponses à la Circulaire du 13 décembre 1893 [Anarchist organization. Answers to the circular of 13 December 1893] (A.N., F7 12504).

years.[31] The anarchist crises also prompted a reinforcement of the centralization of intelligence work. On 17 January 1894, Minister of the Interior David Raynal, issued a circular aimed at 'centralizing the police in the department under the authority of the prefect via the special commissioners' and requested an investigation on the structural organisation of the police.[32] The 235 special commissioners – in 1893 – of the S.G. were the first and foremost responsible for the repression of the anarchist movement. On 27 January 1894, David Raynal congratulated them on their efficiency in targeting anarchists across the country.[33]

This confidence was, however, to be shattered following President Carnot's assassination in June 1894 by an Italian anarchist while he was visiting Lyon, reorienting the special police activities towards the 'manhunt for the anarchist'.[34] As the head of the first special squad, Hennion was working directly for some ministers, especially Charles Dupuy, the chief of the government on a confidential mission.[35] This mission appears to have been the priority of the Ministry of the Interior at the time. A circular issued on 5 July 1894 detailed the measures to take regarding the surveillance of anarchists, in particular the continued investigations of and frequent visits to the militants' residences. It also indicated that the agents who did not meet expectations would be dismissed.[36] A month later, Célestin Hennion arrested anarchists planning an attack against Charles Dupuy.[37]

The position and responsibility granted to the special commissioner reinforced the centrality of intelligence work and reminds us of the mission exercised by Samuel Waters in Ireland.[38] Hennion saw his mission expanded by the mid-1890s: he was tasked with the protection of the Président de la République during official travel and of foreign sovereigns coming to France. He was also in charge of Dreyfus' protection at the time of the Rennes trial in August 1899 by monitoring far-right organizations with great potential for subversion.[39] We may also compare

---

[31] Jean-Marc Berlière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République : Célestin Hennion' in Dominique Kalifa and Pierre Karila-Cohen (eds), *Le commissaire de police au xixe siècle* (Histoire de la France aux XIXe et XXe siècles, Paris, 2008), pp 173-91.

[32] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu,* p. 270.

[33] Houte, *Les peurs de la Belle Époque*, p. 71.

[34] Berlière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République', pp 173-91.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Surveillance des anarchistes, 1883-1923 (A.N., 19940500/58 Dossiers 1084).

[37] Hennion (A.P.P., EA 25).

[38] cf. Chapter 5.

[39] Berlière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République', pp 173-91.

his role at the S.G. to the one exercised by Louis Puibaraud, at the P.P., who, according to commissioner Ernest Raynaud, was to 'save the regime from the nationalist agitation, like he already saves it from the anarchist peril'.[40] Both the S.G. and the P.P. relied on one individuals to oversee intelligence work – further proof of the greater central consolidation of power within the French policing system.

Hennion also saw his responsibilities increase because of a more pressing far-right threat at the turn of the century, while in Ireland the R.I.C. policemen kept on gathering intelligence and relying on political practices despite a limited presence of agitators in the 1890s.

7.2 Gathering intelligence on political agitators: the R.I.C. in Ireland

After a decade of agitation, land conflicts, and dynamiters targeting Great Britain, the Irish intelligence system was now facing a moment of relative political calm, while continuing its routine surveillance of 'secret societies' and political opponents. According to Donal O'Sullivan and Elizabeth Malcolm, less political agitation happened in Ireland in the 1890s in comparison to the preceding decade.[41] This was particularly the case in the countryside, with the R.I.C. confronted with less agrarian violence and focusing more on ordinary police work, which was generally accepted by the population.[42] Andrew Reed, the inspector general at the time, even put the R.I.C. into a process of de-militarization, something William Gladstone, the leader of the Liberal party in Great-Britain, publicly defended in January 1891.[43] Thomas Fennell, a member of the R.I.C. since 1875, testified to the routine aspect of his work in the 1890s: 'Depot training went much more to the making of a soldier than a policeman … but, in time, men left it behind and in ordinary circumstances became more and more stereotyped policemen.'[44]

Despite the relative lack of challenges for the police, the centralization of intelligence-led policing in Ireland also took a new turn in the early 1890s. In March 1890, the C.S.O. established the Police and Crime Division, in charge of a 'Crime Branch Special' and a 'Crime Branch Ordinary'.[45] The former was now coordinating and centralizing intelligence-led

---

[40] Ernest Raynaud, quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, p. 136.

[41] Malcolm, 'The Irish Inspectors General, 1838-1916.'; Donal J. O'Sullivan, *The Irish constabularies, 1822-1922: a century of policing in Ireland* (Dingle, 1999), pp 192-3.

[42] O'Sullivan, *The Irish constabularies,* pp 192-3.

[43] Malcolm, 'The Irish Inspectors General, 1838-1916'; O'Sullivan, *The Irish constabularies,* pp 192-3.

[44] Fennell quoted in Malcolm, 'The Irish Inspectors General, 1838-1916.'

[45] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 309; cf. Chapter 5.

policing, separately from the R.I.C.[46] According to Stephen Ball, 'the Crime Branch Special had its own registry of secret society members and political activists. The first 'S' reports supplied by provincial Special Branch officers, appeared in April 1890.'[47] Those officers were selected from the different R.I.C. divisions and were designated as 'special men' while they were still working alongside the other constabulary officers, but they were now in charge of gathering and transmitting information directly to Dublin Castle.

James Davies, the private secretary of Under-Secretary Joseph Ridgeway, oversaw the Police and Crime Division in 1891. Then, from 1893, it was decided to transfer all intelligence work, still under the authority of the constabulary office, to the Police and Crime Division, controlled by the under and chief secretaries.[48] All R.I.C. members stationed throughout the country were involved in gathering intelligence from all over the country and the Crime Special Branch had the mission to collate the information collected according to Fearghal McGarry:

> The vast bulk of intelligence gathered by Special Branch was collected by ordinary RIC men throughout the country. This material was collated at district headquarters, processed at county headquarters, and forwarded to Crimes Special Branch's small office in Dublin Castle. Until the final year of Dublin Castle's rule, there was no 'secret service' in Ireland. Special Branch did not run undercover agents, rarely recruited informers and made little effort to penetrate the organizations of its enemies.[49]

The records studied here challenge McGarry's statement. In a sense, there was no 'secret service' in Ireland as the entire police administration was involved with secret work. Intelligence was handled by all R.I.C. officers and not only by the Crime Special Branch. Indeed, the information collected by the 'special men' selected from the R.I.C. was sent to their county inspectors and summed up in the monthly reports submitted to Dublin Castle.[50] Whether the country was facing a moment of high agitation – like during the Land War in the early 1880s – or was experiencing a period of relative calm – as was the case in the 1890s – the policemen consistently relied on informants and well-established political techniques to monitor their division and collect information.

---

[46] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 310.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Fearghal McGarry, 'Introduction' in *Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921* (T.N.A., CO 904/193-216).

[50] Malcolm, *The Irish policeman*, p. 123.

Divided in different sections between 1892 and 1894, the monthly reports submitted by the divisional commissioners and county inspectors shed light on the kind of intelligence the R.I.C. men were engaged in:

> I – General State of the division
> II – Any portions more disaffected than the rest or in which there has been any improvement.
> III – Increase or decrease of outrages.
> IV- Any serious outrage deserving of special mention.
> V- Evictions and other matters bearing on the relation between landlords and tenants
> VI- Boycotting and Intimidation
> VII – National League, Labour League or any other organization for agitation/intimidation
> VIII – Any special measures for patrolling
> IX – Protection whether constants or by patrolling and whether on the increase or decrease
> X – Evicted farms
> XI – Suggestions and points of interest[51]

Those reports appeared to focus on agrarian outrages and boycotting but also on the activities of political organizations. At the time, the policemen focused mostly on the Irish National Federation (I.N.F.) and the Irish National League (I.N.L.). The former, founded in 1891, was the result of the split in the Irish Parliamentary Party (I.P.P.), contesting Parnell's leadership, and became more popular than the I.N.L. supporting Parnell.[52]

The D.I.C.S. records show that the R.I.C. was also monitoring political organizations, while continuing to report on 'secret societies', despite a lack of agitation in the early 1890s.[53] For example, the Midland Division report for May 1891 mentioned the split in the nationalist party and that 'Mr Parnell is losing ground in the Division' adding that 'The I.R.B. men in the Division are still in his favour and they may be said to form the strongest Branch of his following.'[54] District inspectors also continued to rely on informants to monitor now inactive secret societies, like in the Western Division on March 1892: 'Generally speaking, the Secret

[51] Police Reports: Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports (T.N.A., CO 904/48-66).

[52] On this see Jackson Alvin, *Ireland, 1798-1998: politics and the war* (Oxford, 1999).

[53] Reports of district inspectors Crime Special, 1887-1898 (N.A.I., CBS DICS).

[54] Monthly report, May 1891, 4 June 1891 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 4).

Societies in this Division were inactive during the month of March, and our informants agree in stating that no revival is likely to take place for some time.'[55]

From the mid-1890s, the R.I.C. was now reporting on the potential revival of 'secret societies' determined to end British rule in Ireland. This monitoring of 'secret' organizations and suspected individuals was mostly operated by informants, in continuity of what was done before by the Irish intelligence-led policing system. In the Western Division, the special officers noticed in 1894 that 'during the month of January, information was received from various sources that the I.R.B. is to be at once revived on entirely new lines by organizers from the American side' and a few months later indicated that 'Generally speaking there was considerable activity displayed by the members of Secret Societies in this Division during the month of July believed to be caused by the introduction of a new secret society "The Irish National Brotherhood".'[56] Informants confirmed to the policemen a similar situation in the South-Western Division in March 1894: 'The statements from our informants are corroborated by the reports from the special and selected men … [and] show that vigorous efforts are being made in Limerick and portions of the Counties of Kerry, and Cork'.[57] In the South-Eastern division, the district inspector noticed a revival of I.R.B. activities in 1895 in Kilkenny, a report appreciated by his superior officer as indicated to the inspector general of the R.I.C.: 'This is a very satisfactory report. The activity in the I.R.B. shall receive special attention.'[58] In the Northern division, the I.R.B. was reported to be 'very active, especially in Cavan, Louth and Meath', and this information was transmitted to Major Gosselin.[59]

As with the D.M.P., Gosselin was receiving many reports from the D.I.C.S. and was centralizing all information regarding political agitation in Ireland. For example, Under-Secretary David Harrel, sent to Gosselin the reports of the Crime Special officers of the South-Western Division in September 1894: 'The references to the new movement – Irish National

[55] Monthly report, March 1892, 4 April 1892 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1).

[56] Monthly report for January 1894 of Crime Special Officer at Athlone, 4 Feb. 1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1); Monthly report for July 1894, 7 Aug. 1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 1). Founded in 1894, the Irish National Brotherhood or INB resulted from the split of the American Clan na Gael. It was led from London by Mark Ryan and came to compete with the I.R.B. See Leon O Broin, *Revolutionary underground: the Story of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, 1858-1924* (Michigan, 1976), pp 60-83.

[57] Monthly report of the Crime Special Officer (S.W. Division) for March 1894, 4 April 1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[58] Monthly report of D.I. Pattisson C.S. for January 1895, 6 Feb. 1895 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 3).

[59] Report of Crime Special Officer for month of May 1895, 31 May 1895 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 6).

Brotherhood – contained in the annexed reports of the Crime special officers will be of interest to you'. Gosselin replied that he would like to receive the reports for the next few months.[60] This sharing of information seemed necessary as sometimes the under-secretary and the Home Office officer did not obtain the same intelligence. In December 1894, Harrel indicated that 'a union of the two wings of the Clan na Gael is evidently looked forward to by I.R.B. men in County Districts in Ireland ... [confirming] Sergt. Quinn's report recently sent to you. The latest information however received from you on the subject showed that there was no prospect whatever of such union.'[61] Gosselin indeed had different information: 'I can see no signs of Union amongst the Leaders. In fact my latest information points rather the other way.'[62] The Home Office specialist was well informed of the situation, as he had agents stationed in the US and the United Kingdom infiltrated among the different societies, well aware of the rivalries existing between them and their difficulties in conducting political actions at the time.[63]

Still, the C.S.O. seemed to grant a great importance to those 'secret societies', as testified by a Crime Special Branch précis from 1895:

> The annexed is a precis of current events in connection with Secret Societies in Ireland. The correspondence is supplied by the Crime Special Branch, which Branch is composed of Officers and men of the R.I. Constabulary, specially detailed to inquire into all Secret Societies, and report for the information of Government their positions and objects. The Secret Societies in Ireland have branches in England, Scotland and America, and though independent they are in close touch with them.
>
> The Societies are as follows:
>
> 1. I.R.B. or Irish Republican Brotherhood.
> 2. I.N.B. or Irish National Brotherhood
> 3. C.N.G. or Clan-na-Gael
> 4. A.O.H or Ancient Order of Hibernians.[64]

The R.I.C. not only noted a revival of fenianism from mid-1894, but also kept track of wider nationalist movements. On the monthly report of the divisional inspector, the policemen's observations were first recorded under the section 'VII – National League, Labour League or

[60] Harrel to Gosselin, 22 Oct. 1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[61] Harrel to Gosselin, 19 Dec. 1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[62] Gosselin to Harrel, 27 Dec.1894 (N.A.I., CBS DICS, Box 2).

[63] O Broin, *Revolutionnary underground*, pp 75-80; David Thomas Brundage, *Irish nationalists in America: the politics of exile, 1798-1998* (Oxford, 2016).

[64] Harrel to Cadogan, 31 Jul. 1895 (N.A.I., CBS PRECIS, Box 4).

any other organization for agitation/ intimidation' before being reported under section 'IV- Political societies and other organizations' from 1894. This change in the organization of the monthly report may be linked to the vote on the second Home Rule bill the year before, which was not passed as it did not get the support of the House of Lords.[65] The bill, meaning to give more autonomy to Ireland, was supported by the I.P.P., the I.N.L. and the I.N.F. Following this failure, the central administration might have feared an increase in agitation led by political parties, explaining the decision to focus on their surveillance prior to the monitoring of agrarian movements, even if the activities of the I.N.F. and I.N.L. appeared to have been limited as shown by the R.I.C. records. In the Northern Division, the divisional commissioner noted in his report of December 1892 that 'the National League has now hardly any existence in this Division' and 'The Irish National Federation has not shown much activity during the month.'[66] In January 1895, the R.I.C. mentioned different meetings held by the I.N.F. in the division, but two years later it was reported that 'Political societies of such description have been inactive'.[67] The policemen's mission mostly consisted of attending and reporting on meetings:

> During the past month 8 public meetings were held under the auspices of the I.N.F. the object for holding which was to further the interest of this association … The various branches of the I.N.L. have been very inactive during the past month, and the number of condemnatory resolutions published in the Press…from local branches, has decreased to a marked extent. The other political societies have shown little or no activity during the past month.[68]

Despite these public meetings organized by the political associations, the police argued that those organizations were not popular, nor particularly active. In the Western Division, in January 1897, the divisional commissioner reported that 'Speaking generally political societies throughout the division have shown little activity' and that 'The I.N.L. is quite inactive'.[69] Similar reports were found in the other divisions, with the exception of the South-Eastern Division in January 1892.[70] Indeed, in this report, the ordinary branch of the R.I.C. appeared to have conducted intelligence work beyond their initial policing mission. The divisional

[65] Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History 1800-2000* (Oxford, 2003), p. 97.

[66] Confidential Report of Captain Slack, D.C., northern D., January 1892 (T.N.A., CO 904/48).

[67] Northern division. Monthly confidential report of the divisional commissioner for January 1895 (T.N.A., CO 904/50); Northern division. Confidential report for January 1896, 8 Feb. 1896 (T.N.A., CO 904/51).

[68] D.C. to inspector general, Confidential report for the month of January, 8 Feb. 1895 (T.N.A., CO 904/57).

[69] Allan Cameron, D.C. to inspector general, Monthly confidential. report, 9 Feb. 1897 (T.N.A., CO 904/59).

[70] Confidential report for month of January 1892, 10 Feb. 1892 (T.N.A., CO 904/53).

commissioner writing the document mentioned an informant named Jack, who reported that money provided to the Parnellite cause came from the Clan-na-Gael society in America and the G.A.A.[71] 'Jack' can be found in the register of informants used by the R.I.C., indicating that he 'gives useful information on nationalist affairs.'[72] This, once again, show that informants were used by the Irish police to gather intelligence. A section of the report also concerned the activity of the Gaelic Athletic Association (G.A.A.):

> The G.A.A. – A convention of this society was held in this town hall at (?) on the 10th Jan …
> A convention was held at Thurles on the 30th Jan. … The meeting was a failure.
> The G.A.A. Co. Waterford is commencing to be active again … The meeting was largely attended by members of the I.R.B.[73]

The R.I.C. not only monitored political parties like the I.N.L. and the I.N.F. at the time. Founded in 1884 by Michael Cusack and Maurice Davin, the G.A.A. aimed to reorganize sport in Ireland and promote Irish games played by Irish people.[74] It initially enjoyed great success, and for some historians, most notably Neal Garnham, it was 'accessible and more relevant for the majority of the Irish population' than other sporting organizations and its appeal was mainly recreational.[75] Micheal Davitt and Charles Stewart Parnell, among others, were made patrons of the association and the many members of the I.R.B. present at its first meetings also suggest a strong political motive for the G.A.A.[76] Whether government suspicions were 'a triumph of conspiracy over reason',[77] seeing the work of 'secret societies' and revolutionaries in any kind of Irish initiative, the members of the association were keenly monitored by the policemen in charge of intelligence work. For example, the report of January 1896 produced by the Western Division indicated that the G.A.A. present in County Galway had 'the object – so it is believed – of developing secret society work.'[78]

The reports of the R.I.C. seem to indicate a revival of 'secret society' activities and a

---

[71] Ibid.

[72] South-Eastern Division (T.N.A., CO 904/183).

[73] Confidential report for month of January 1892, 10 Feb. 1892 (T.N.A., CO 904/53).

[74] Mike Cronin, Mark Duncan, Paul Rouse, *The GAA: a people's history* (Cork, 2014), pp 3-4.

[75] Neal Garnham, 'Accounting for the Early Success of the Gaelic Athletic Association' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxiv, no. 133 (2004), pp 65–78.

[76] Cronin, Duncan, Rouse, *The GAA: a people's history*, pp 3-4.

[77] Ibid., p. 4.

[78] Allan Cameron, D.C. to inspector general, 'Monthly confidential report', Feb. 1896 (T.N.A., CO 904/58).

decrease in the support of political organizations in the 1890s. At the same time, there was little political agitation in comparison to the previous decade. Despite the apparently limited activities of those different associations, according to the divisional commissioners, different members of Irish political parties and of the G.A.A. became the object of a specific surveillance from the end of the 1890s.[79] By establishing a systematic monitoring of those individuals, the aim might have been to discourage them to act, as Paris did with the anarchists in the 1880s.[80]

The R.I.C. thus continued their routine work of monitoring political organizations, both constitutional and revolutionary, by attending meetings and recruiting informants to report on some activities without ever indicating the presence of a serious threat. This shows that the Irish police maintained a coherent system of surveillance across the country, whether they encountered agitation or not. In France, meanwhile, after a short period of relative calm, the two key political policing bodies were once again tackling potential political threats from the mid-1890s, also relying on a previously established intelligence system.

7.3 New domestic challenges for the French policing administration

Paris was facing new kinds of agitation at the end of the nineteenth century. If the political policing system was still very concerned with the anarchist movement in the early 1890s, the S.G. special commissioners and the P.P.'s agents were also monitoring far-right organizations divided between different political forces − nationalist, royalist and antisemite. They started to get more vocal at the time and gathered against a Dreyfus retrial in Rennes in 1899. Hennion and the S.G. were assigned to the surveillance of this new kind of agitators, perceived as a great threat to the Republic, and relied on well-established intelligence practices to do so.

In the early 1880s, the police kept an eye on those enemies of the regime until electoral debacles came to shatter their influence in the political sphere.[81] It was from 1892, that the surveillance of far-right organizations, especially the nationalists and antisemites, became increasingly central.[82] That year, on 20 April 1892, Edouard Drumont launched his antisemite newspaper *La Libre Parole*. A few years prior to this, the journalist published *La France Juive*,

[79] Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921 (T.N.A., CO 904/193-216).

[80] cf. Chapter 2.

[81] cf. Chapter 3.

[82] cf. Ligues des patriotes, 1882-1907 (A.N., F7 12449-12452); Nationalistes et antisémites, 1884-1907 (A.N., F7 12453-12463).

an antisemite pamphlet, which sold 60,000 copies in the first year and was reissued 200 times until 1914, proof of its popularity.[83] Drumont co-founded in 1889 with Jacques de Biez the National League of Antisemites, of which the Marquis de Morès was also a member. They organized, on 14 May 1892, the inaugural conference for French Antisemites at the Tivoli Vauxhall in Paris.[84] The meeting was a failure – the biggest room in Paris was three quarters empty – but the Marquis de Morès, now at the head of his own organization called the Friends of Morès, decided to organize another meeting at the same place on 6 January 1893.[85] In the middle of the Panama Scandal – a corruption case involving the government – this event was a big success: 2,500 people attended according to the police, 5,000 according to *La Libre Parole* and 3,000 according to *Le Gaulois*, a conservative newspaper.[86] Nevertheless, fifty anarchists came to disturb the meeting: they started a fight, leading police commissioner Véron, in charge of public order that day, to clear the room.[87]

The Dreyfus affair starting in September 1894 reignited the French far-right organizations. They were still divided between Drumont's National League of Antisemites supported by the nationalists, the marquis de Morès and his armed militia, and later Jules Guérin and his Antisemitic League founded in 1897.[88] While the historians Arnaud-Dominique Houte and Bertrand Joly warn us against overstating the political importance of those far-right organizations,[89] we noticed that the police, especially the S.G. and the P.P., deployed important means of surveillance over them. Like the anarchists, the far-right organizations relied heavily on newspapers to spread their ideas, and the police kept track of those publications as part of their surveillance.[90]

---

[83] Houte, *Le triomphe de la République*, pp 215-52.

[84] Éric Fournier, *La cité du sang* (Paris, 2008), p. 54.

[85] Ibid., p. 57.

[86] Ibid., p. 58.

[87] Ibid., pp 59-61.

[88] Houte, *Le triomphe de la République*, pp 215-52.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 238.

Table 10: Far-right organizations memberships

Name	Date of foundation	Leader (s)	Political position	Numbers estimated
The Patriots League	1882	Paul Déroulède	Republican - plebisitary	18,000
The Antisemitic League	Early 1897	Jules Guérin	antisemitic	3000
The French Patrie League	End of 1898	Jules Lemaitre François Copée	moderate	40,000
The Antisemitic Youth	1894	Edouard Dubuc	antisemitic	400

Source: Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 238.

Following Zola's publication of *J'accuse* in Clémenceau's newspaper *l'Aurore* regarding new revelations concerning the Dreyfus affair in January 1898,[91] antisemitic demonstrations and anti-Jewish expeditions organized by the Villette's butchers took place in Paris. [92] At the same time, in Algeria, where Drumont was elected representative of the Chamber of Deputies Jews were persecuted.[93] A lot of different parties and individuals were involved with the far-right and thanks to a large network of correspondents – the term used by policemen to refer to their informants – the police kept track of these different groups. While a potential revision of Dreyfus' trial was hovering in the air, one of those correspondents reported that:

> If until then their attempt did not result in the desired outcome, the militants of those parties (royalist, imperialist, clerical, revisionist, patriots and revolutionaries) do not lose hope in succeeding in their project and they are currently trying to take advantage of the doubts agitating people's minds, with the aim of social destruction and to better achieve a revolution.[94]

This report gave the police information on all the far-right organizations involved in political agitation and their goal, namely the overthrow of the republican regime. The police were also aware of the divisions existing between the different sections. A report from a correspondent,

[91] Zola denounced the army for covering the real culprit Walsin Estherhazy, who was the one spying for Germany.

[92] Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900* (Paris, 2023), pp 98-9.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Note to S.G. directorate, 21 Sept. 1898 (A.N., F7 12451).

Nerac, from 15 October 1898, indicated the dissent now existing between Drumont's *Libre Parole* and Guérin's Antisemitic League which had previously been allied.[95]

The P.P. also monitored the far-right organizations as they were particularly active in Paris, deeming them a particular threat, and communicated its information to the head of the S.G. For example, the Paris police prefect transmitted a report on a meeting of Déroulède's Patriots' League taking place in Paris on 5 December 1898.[96] In the same report, he also gave a summary of the public conference held by the anarchist Sébastien Faure on that same day, where he denounced the anti-terrorist legislations, defended Dreyfus, and detailed a confrontation with Déroulède's patriots at the end of the meeting.[97]

The death of the president Felix Faure in February 1899, who had been opposed to a Dreyfus retrial, stimulated the rumors of a conspiracy led by Déroulède, Guérin and their friends to overthrow the regime.[98] Bertrand Joly contends that the rumors were false, but managed to create an atmosphere of tension.[99] Thus, the policing administration anticipated potential agitation. Jean France, an agent of the S.G., wrote in his memoirs that the 'Hennion squad' itself went to Versailles, where the election was to take place, the day before, on 18 February 1899.[100] Jean France was tasked with identifying far-right militants and monitoring them, alongside some specialists of the P.P..[101] However, the S.G. policeman was quite critical of his Parisian colleagues, suggesting their collusion with antisemitic leaders.[102] He denounced the antidreyfusard sympathies of the P.P.'s officers, arguing that they did not intervene when demonstrations erupted after the election – hinting at the potential dangers inherent in forms of centrally-controlled political policing.[103] Eventually, Paul Déroulède, nationalist militant and founder of the Patriots' League attempted a coup on 23 February 1899, which was a complete failure. Raids then took place at different far-right newspapers and militants home addresses:

---

[95] Note from Nerac, 15 Oct. 1898 (A.N., F7 12451).

[96] Préfet de Police to DSG, 6 Dec. 1898 (A.N., F7 12451).

[97] Ibid.

[98] Joly, *Déroulède*, p. 279.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Jean France quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, p. 130.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Jean France quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, pp 134-5.

> The police searches … were operated following the Déroulède's case (Caserne de Reuilly) on 23 February 1899. Their aims were to look for correlations existing between the actions of the patriots league, the antisemite league, the orleanist party and the bonapartist party.[104]

According to Ernest Raynaud, P.P. commissioner, the police searches did reveal the existence of a conspiracy against the security of the state.[105] The office of Jules Guérin's newspapers, *l'Anti-juif,* was raided on 26 February 1899, three days after Déroulède's military coup attempt, where documents relating to the Antisemitic League were found and seized by a Parisian policeman.[106] Guérin was not the only one targeted by the Parisian police on that day. A list revealed that at least fifteen individuals connected to the league were searched.[107]

The S.G. archives expose the use of similar methods employed against the anarchists when it comes to the policing of far-right organizations, such as surveillance of meetings, extensive use of 'correspondents' and the drawing up of lists. Practices first adopted mainly to counter political agitators coming from the left were now applicable to the ones coming from the right, demonstrating an adaptation of police work to produce intelligence on all kinds of enemies of the regime.

In the mid-1890s, Paris and Dublin could rely on their policing systems to repress the anarchist movement, in the case of the former, and to continue monitoring secret societies, in the case of the latter. In Ireland, the R.I.C. appears to have faced a much less substantial threat (there were no political assassinations or coup attempts) but they remained in charge of monitoring 'secret societies' and increasingly exercised surveillance over mainstream political movements, in a period where no real political threats to the security of the state emerged. Like the special commissioners of the S.G., the officers of the Crime Special Branch continued to rely on informants to gather information, a method previously employed in the 1880s to counter

---

[104] Note, 26 Feb. 1899 (A.P.P., BA 1108). Both anti-republican movements, the Orleanist party supported a constitutional monarchy while Bonapartists supported an imperial regime run by a member of the Bonaparte family.

[105] Ernest Raynaud quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900,* p. 136.

[106] Paul Guérin to Préfecture de Police, 26 Feb.1899 (A.N., F7 12459).

[107] Procès-Verbaux des Perquisitions opérées le 26 Février 99 [Minutes of searches operated on February 1899](A.N., F7 12459).

fenianism. In France, the intelligence gathered by the police was eventually used to repress far-right organizations, before they could become a menace to the republican regime.

The measures adopted in the 1880s were no longer simply temporary or exceptional but were becoming institutionalized elements within wider police operations and were being increasingly extended to include wider political movements beyond the twin radical threats of fenianism and anarchism. The Dublin administration continued to use the policing institutions under its control to monitor potential enemies of the government, even if the threat they represented to public order was rarely obvious or compelling. In both countries, the constant monitoring exercised by the police and the great amount of information they gathered in consequence might suggest a greater level of threat from agitators than was the case. In France, Laurent Lopez noticed a decrease in anarchist activities after the vote of anti-terrorist legislation but surveillance continued, with a very high policing presence in localities, even where there were no more agitators.[108] It might be that this systematic surveillance also discouraged potential agitators from taking action. Similarly, the level of the threat might have been exaggerated to encourage the police to increase its surveillance. Still, in both countries, intelligence-led policing was more established than ever, and its use was again extended at the beginning of the twentieth century.

[108] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu,* p. 273.

Chapter 8

Intelligence led-policing: Repression of revolutionary agitators or the monitoring of legitimate political movements? France and Ireland compared (1899-1910)

The turn of the century brought its share of new challenges for the French and Irish administrations. The far-right organizations continued to pose a threat in 1899, but Paris did not hesitate to put intelligence-led policing at the service of the Republic, to arrest and put agitators on trial. In Ireland, the Second Boer War in South-Africa contributed to the reconciliation of the I.P.P. and also the creation of Cumann na nGaedheal, which later merged with other groups to form Sinn Féin.[1] In both France and Ireland, the mission of police forces in charge of intelligence expanded to other kinds of suspects at the time.

The agents of the S.G. were now monitoring socialists organizations, whose importance grew in the French political landscape at the beginning of the twentieth century.[2] Georges Clemenceau, the new minister of the interior, then decided to use intelligence-led policing to counter all kinds of agitation, from social movements to criminal activities.[3] While, in Ireland, the C.S.O.'s Police and Crime Department allocated its resources to monitor information on nationalist political party leaders, who were looking to increase their influence in parliament.[4]

Literature on the Second Boer War and the Irish involvement in the conflict tends to focus on the role played by Major John MacBride and the Irish commandos and less on the impact the conflict had on the reorganization of Irish nationalism in the following years.[5] In France, the history of the Socialist party is the subject of extensive research, but not specifically on the surveillance the police exercised on the political movement.[6] Building on our analyses

---

[1] Donal Lowry, '«A Fellowship of Disaffection »: Irish-South African Relations from the Anglo-Boer War to the Pretoriastroika 1902-1991', in *Études irlandaises*, n°17-2 (1992), p .107.

[2] Houte, *Le triomphe de la République*, pp 235-85; Société d'études jaurésiennes, 'Les débuts de la SFIO', *Cahiers Jaurès*, n°187-88 (2008).

[3] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, pp 430-1.

[4] Richard P. Davis, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Féin* (Dublin, 1974), p. 21; Jackson, *Ireland 1798-1998*, p. 186.

[5] Anthony Jordan (ed.), *Boer War to Easter Rising: The Writings of John MacBride* (Westport, 2006); Donal P. McCracken, *MacBride's Brigade: Irish Commandos in the Anglo-Boer War* (Dublin, 1999).

[6] E.g. Jacques Girault (ed.), *L'implantation du socialisme en France, XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris, 2001); Georges Lefranc, *Le Mouvement socialiste sous la Troisième République, 1875-1940* (Paris, 1977); Michel Winock, *Le socialisme en France et en Europe: XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris, 1992).

of the surveillance and repression of agitators making use of political violence in France and Ireland, this chapter tackles the question of the monitoring of legal political parties at the turn of the century by both intelligence-led policing systems.

This chapter relies mostly on the Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921 subseries attached to the CO 904 (T.N.A) to show the evolution of the political policing of Irish nationalism in the early 1900s. Reports from the R.I.C., the D.M.P., Nicholas Gosselin – the Fenian specialist attached to the Home Office − and the under-secretary reveal the role played by the British intelligence-led policing network in the monitoring of public figures. The A.P.P. and the documents compiled for the trial of the far-right members, help us understand how intelligence-led policing was used in this matter.[7] The files of the S.G. (A.N.) also show the reinforcement of the monitoring of the socialist movement over the anarchists in the early twentieth century,[8] alongside the progressive administrative evolution and centralization of the policing organization during this time.

In Paris, the monitoring of far-right organizations publicly attempting to destabilize the republican regime may have been justified. In contrast, the use of S.G. resources to gather information on socialist politicians, adversaries of a moderate government and not representing an obvious threat to public order, may be questioned. As previously established, the P.P. and the S.G. kept files on both perfectly mainstream politicians and subversive groups constituting a definitive threat to political order.[9] Regarding socialists' organizations, if in the early twentieth century they were participating in the democratic political life, many socialists' militants took part in the Paris Commune and were perceived as a menace to the republican order alongside anarchists in the following years.[10] Thus, it is not surprising for the police to continue collecting information on a very broad range of activists and organizations, including the socialists, and not distinguishing between 'mainstream' and 'extremist' political activities.

Similarly, in Ireland, the R.I.C. 'special men' were tasked with monitoring potential agitators in a period of political calm in the mid-1890s, before using the same methods to gather information on nationalist politicians and public figures raising questions about how the Irish

[7] A.P.P., BA 1108; Haute Cour de Justice*, Affaire Buffet, Déroulède, Guérin et autres*. *Inculpés de complot* (Paris 1899).

[8] Surveillance du mouvement socialiste, 1893-1911 (A.N., F7 12496).

[9] cf. Introduction, Chapters 1 and 3.

[10] The term 'socialiste' is often found in the P.P. and S.G. archives folders titles alongside documents concerning anarchists from the early 1880s.

government made use of intelligence-led policing. Thus, this chapter interrogates how systems put in place ostensibly in response to threats of often extreme political violence came increasingly to be employed, more generally, to police political opponents who operated largely within legal and constitutional frameworks.

To begin, we will interrogate the use of intelligence gathering for political purposes in France by analyzing the trial of far-right leaders for 'conspiracy against the regime' in the summer of 1899, before reflecting on how France and Ireland adapted their systems of intelligence-led policing to monitor legal political movements, and how Minister of the Interior George Clemenceau expanded those practices to track a larger range of agitators.

8.1 Intelligence-led policing to repress political agitators in France

In France, the Ministry of the Interior, relying on a system that had proved successful against the anarchists, was now using the same methods to remove an increasing far-right threat. The announcement of a second Dreyfus trial served to increase the imminence and seriousness of the threat for the republican regime, leading the government to act. Paris experienced new agitation following the court decision to reverse Dreyfus' conviction and the organization of a new trial in Rennes in August 1899.[11] First, President Loubet was assaulted by a monarchist militant at the Auteuil's racetrack on 4 June 1899.[12] This led to a republican demonstration in defense of Dreyfus and of the government on 11 June 1899 in Longchamp, which was violently repressed by the police and caused the resignation of Minister of the Interior Charles Dupuy.[13] He was replaced by Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau, who also became head of government and decided to form a cabinet of 'republican defense' on 22 June 1899, reuniting Republicans and one Socialist politician to face the increasing powers of the anti-republican far-right movement.[14]

Waldeck-Rousseau was determined to tackle the question of the threat posed by far-right organizations on the eve of the second Dreyfus trial taking place in Rennes in August 1899. He agreed to take the lead role in the government and asked for the return of Louis Lépine at the P.P., which Lépine had left in 1897.[15] Waldeck-Rousseau charged the Paris police prefect

[11] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 114.

[12] Ibid., pp 139-44.

[13] Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, pp 144-5.

[14] Houte, *Le triomphe de la République*, pp 215-52.

[15] Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, pp 144-5.

on 7 July with investigating on a potential conspiracy against the Republic.[16] Lépine quickly reported to Waldeck-Rousseau that the different leagues met in secret between May and June 1899 to attempt a coup, which worried the head of government who had learned similar information from another source.[17] This source was probably Alger, an informant potentially in a high place among the Patriots' League who regularly transmitted information to the S.G.[18] While Bertrand Joly argues that this alliance was never completed, [19] the attempt of the leagues to unite themselves, between 15 and 21 June 1899, might have suggested they were planning a conspiracy against the state.

On 21 June, a report indicated that Déroulède was preparing a new 'coup'.[20] We do not know if this refers to a state coup or another kind of political action. This meant that the police was aware Déroulède had a plan, something that could legitimately worry the government, regarding what the head of the Patriots' League attempted in the past.[21] Then, on 19 July, Alger reported words spoken by Déroulède in a private meeting held in his office: 'The time has come to shake France; my discourse from last Sunday had an enormous success and we must not wait any longer to spread propaganda by all means existing and organise provincial sections'.[22] Those types of declarations may have indicated a potential coup, but more organized than the first time – at Felix Faure's funeral − with the different far-right organizations working together. Indeed, the informant suggested that Guérin was to prepare the provincial sections of the antisemitic league to merge with sections of the Patriots' League.[23] Dreyfus' second trial in Rennes appeared as the perfect occasion for far-right militants to initiate their agitation: 'The militants of the Patriots' League, the Antisemitic Youth and the Antisemitic League have been advised to not leave Paris during the trial; at this time they will be receiving orders.'[24]

This potential for agitation was also recognized by Hennion, who was put in charge of the protection of Dreyfus and stayed in Rennes to supervise the police ahead of and during the

[16] Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 520.

[17] Lépine quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, p. 146.

[18] Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 519; cf. A.N., F7 12451.

[19] Joly, *Déroulède*, pp 307-8.

[20] Haute Cour de Justice, *Affaire Buffet, Déroulède et autres*, p. 30

[21] cf. Chapter 7.

[22] Note from Alger, 19 Jul. 1899 (A.N., F7 12451).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

trial.[25] After some disturbances caused by demonstrations organized on 13 and 14 July, Hennion reported that more trouble was to be expected and this would necessitate the mobilization of policemen in the streets.[26] In a report, three days later, the special commissioner mentioned the different police forces involved in preventing potential agitation. Alongside his own agents *en bourgeois* (in plainclothes), the local gendarmerie and the municipal police were also involved, though in case of the latter, Hennion asserted that they were unreliable.[27] If the S.G. oversaw the surveillance of far-right organizations, the institution gathering intelligence had to collaborate with local forces when it came to maintaining order in the streets. Hennion's agents' first mission remained the shadowing of far-right members arriving in Rennes, and to keep themselves informed of their projects, like Déroulède looking for a room to hold a conference in the city.[28] Hennion, who had 'the absolute trust in the devotion of his personnel', was not worried about the ability of his immediate subordinates to deal with the presence of Déroulède in Rennes.[29]

From 28 July, the police knew about the plans of the far-right organizations for Paris at the time of Dreyfus' trial in Rennes. On 6 August 1899, the informant Alger confirmed and detailed Déroulède's planned coup.[30] According to Bertrand Joly, Waldeck-Rousseau was not actually convinced of the existence of a conspiracy against the state but needed the support of the rest of the ministers to arrest the far-right leaders.[31] We have not come across any evidence supporting or denying Joly's theory. It could have been a show of strength from the head of state, worried about the league's capacity to overthrow his government at the next election and needing a way to remove them. Waldeck-Rousseau still made use of the policing administration and of the intelligence gathered by the S.G. and the P.P. in the previous months to try to prove the existence of the conspiracy.

Officially, Célestin Hennion drew up a report on 4 August, submitted by Lépine, stating that the different far-right organizations were working together to overthrow the government, thus revealing the seriousness of the threat. The Paris police prefect was however only able to provide the head of the government with some unrelated documents on the different leagues,

---

[25] Berlière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République', pp 173-91.

[26] Hennion to head of the S.G., 14 Jul. 1899 (A.N., F7 12473).

[27] Hennion to head of the S.G., 17 Jul. 1899 (A.N., F7 12473).

[28] Hennion to head of the S.G., 22 Jul. 1899 (A.N., F7 12473).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Joly, *Déroulède*, p.308 ; Haute Cour de Justice, *Affaire Buffet, Déroulède et autres*, pp 32-4.

[31] Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 521.

with little to corroborate the existence of a conspiracy.[32] As noted earlier, according to Bertrand Joly, Waldeck-Rousseau exaggerated the information available to convince the rest of the government to launch the repression.[33] Eventually, a few days after the beginning of Dreyfus' second trial in Rennes, the head of the government issued an arrest warrant against far-right leaders for conspiracy against state security and forty-one people were arrested on 12 August 1899,[34] replicating the tactic of mass arrests that had been previously employed against anarchist militants. Lépine, in Paris, was in charge of apprehending fifteen individuals, including Déroulède and Jules Guérin, who resisted and took refuge at the headquarters of the Antisemitic League in Chabrol Street.[35] It was the beginning of the Fort-Chabrol siege, led by Guérin and thirty of his supporters, monitored by the agents of the P.P. for thirty-eight days.[36] Lépine wanted to enter and take it down but Waldeck-Rousseau feared that this could result in rioting and was waiting for Guérin to surrender. Therefore, the P.P. deployed a large police presence around 51 Chabrol Street, while a crowd gathered close by, intrigued by the event.[37]

All the agents of the Parisian police were involved in the surveillance of the perimeter around the siege.[38] Among them were the commissioners of the research squads, who were used to gather information on political agitation. The third research squad oversaw monitoring of the boulevard and faubourg Montmartre – close to Chabrol Street – on 15 August 1889 and addressed a report to the head of the Direction Générale des Recherches, Louis Puibaraud.[39] The commissioner in charge of the squad reported the presence of anarchist groups and far-right militants, yelling slogans at each other.[40] If no important incident was noticed on that evening, these kinds of demonstrations pre-empted a violent riot a few days later. The crowd gathered around the Fort Chabrol were more radicalized, composed of nationalists and of butchers from the Villette slaughterhouse, Guerin's own private militia.[41] A report drawn by

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Houte, *Les peurs de la Belle Époque*, p. 126 ; Fournier, *La cité du sang*, pp 114-5.

[35] Lépine quoted in Berlière, *La police à Paris en 1900*, p. 146.

[36] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 115.

[37] Ibid., pp 115-6.

[38] Files with details of police activities each day of the siege from 14 august 1899 (A.P.P., BA 1108).

[39] Police commissioner, chief of the 3rd Brigade, to directeur général des recherches, 16 Aug. 1899 (A.P.P., BA 1052).

[40] Ibid.

[41] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 123.

S.G.'s informant in August 1899 warned the police of Guerin's supporters: 'Jules Guérin, in times of demonstrations, is always accompanied by thirty butchers or stevedores from the Villette, convinced partisans, bold and violent, always ready to start a fight.'[42] The butchers started to engage in violence on the evening of 17 and 18 August, burning newsstands and fighting groups of Dreyfus' supporters and seriously injuring numerous people.[43] The anarchists, led by Sebastien Faure, decided to address these provocations by organizing a demonstration on the night of 19 August but this was repressed by the police.[44]

On 20 August the butchers' violence culminated in a direct confrontation with Lépine and his agents.[45] The telegrams sent by the different policemen securing Fort Chabrol on that day allow us to follow the events hour by hour until a riot erupted.[46] On the morning of 20 August, a policeman from the 10th district reported that 'ordinary service is set up'.[47] From 2pm to 6pm, 'no incident took place on Chabrol street'.[48] At the same time, Sébastien Faure and the anarchists were reunited at the Place de la République: the police estimated there were between 3,200 and 4,000 individuals.[49] They were joined by 200 nationalists at 4.15pm, dispersed by the police before they rejoined at Chabrol Street.[50] The clash between the far-right militants and the police started around 5pm on the Boulevard Magenta.[51] According to the general inspection of the P.P., it was the anarchists who started the riots, screaming 'A bas Guérin, Vive la sociale', and provoking their repression by the first research squad.[52] The police managed to restore public order around 7pm, but at 9.30pm more than one thousand butchers blocked the boulevard Magenta, facing Lépine and his agents.[53] A brutal confrontation started between the police and Guérin's militia.[54] A gunshot was heard in front of 86 Boulevard Magenta.[55] The police

[42] Unsigned report, Aug. 1899 (A.N., F7 12459).

[43] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, pp 125-6.

[44] Ibid., pp 126-7.

[45] Ibid., pp 128-30.

[46] cf. Affaire Dreyfus (A.P.P., BA 1052); Affaire Jules Guérin (A.P.P., BA 1108).

[47] 10th district to head of the municipal police, 20 Aug. 1899, 8.40 am. (A.P.P., BA 1108).

[48] 10th district to head of the municipal police, 20 Aug. 1899, 6 pm. (A.P.P., BA 1108).

[49] Contrôle Général. Manifestations (3h30) (A.P.P., BA 1052).

[50] 10th district to head of the municipal police, 20 Aug. 1899, 4.15 pm. (A.P.P., BA 1052).

[51] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 128.

[52] Contrôle Général. Manifestations sur le Brd Magenta, 21 Aug. 1899 (A.P.P., BA 1052).

[53] Lépine quoted in Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 128.

[54] Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 129.

[55] Contrôle Général. Manifestations sur le Brd Magenta, 21 Aug. 1899 (A.P.P., BA 1052).

managed to resist and Lépine dispersed the agitators himself around 10pm.[56] Calm returned around midnight.[57]

The police ultimately arrested ninety-one people between 20 and 21 August.[58] Guérin and his partisans eventually surrendered on 20 September to end the Fort Chabrol siege. The head of the Antisemitic League and other far-right leaders arrested on 12 August 1899 would be charged in front of the Haute-Cour 'for conspiracy against the security of the State'.[59] Ahead of the trial, the head of the Haute-Cour's commission, Senator Béranger, indicated to Waldeck-Rousseau that there was not enough evidence to prove the conspiracy. The chief of the government thus asked Hennion to prepare a report – backdated to 4 August – to justify the arrests of 12 August.[60] According to Bertrand Joly, Hennion's pseudo-report did not convince the government to act against far-right organizations, but the information transmitted by the informant Alger did.[61] The trial was a relative failure: despite the documents presented by Hennion, the conspiracy fomented by the far-right organizations to overthrow the Republic could not be proved. The final repression was limited: only fifteen individuals were convicted, among them Déroulède, condemned to be exiled for ten years, and Guérin, imprisoned for ten years.[62]

The relative failure of the trial can be explained by the difficulty of proving the existence of a conspiracy, supposed to be secret in nature. Despite the tardiness of Hennion's report, the documents compiled by the special commissioner reporting information indicated an imminent agitation.[63] The case was not only based on this report but on the intelligence work by the policemen of the S.G. and Direction des Recherches monitoring the activities of the different leagues (patriots, royalists, antisemites) as the rest of the documents presented at the trial show.[64] The government acted on policing intelligence, whether it believed in the existence or not of the conspiracy. Intelligence work appeared as a necessity to repress a potential attack

[56] Ibid.; Fournier, *La cité du sang*, p. 130.

[57] 10th district to head of the municipal police, 20 Aug. 1899, 00.40 am. (A.P.P., BA 1108).

[58] Arrestations du 20 Août 99 [Arrest of 20 Aug. 1899]; Arrestations du 21 août 1891 [Arrest of 21 Aug. 1899] (AAP, BA 1052).

[59] Joly, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus*, p. 521.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., p. 522.

[62] Ibid., p. 523.

[63] Haute Cour de Justice*, Affaire Buffet, Déroulède et autres,* pp 8-38.

[64] Haute Cour de Justice*, Affaire Buffet, Déroulède et autres.*

against the Republic orchestrated by a reunion of far-right organizations. In this case, the Ministry of the Interior did not hesitate to use all the means at its disposal to protect the regime even when the threat to the government was difficult to estimate.

After relying on intelligence-led policing to take down a political enemy presenting an immediate risk for the Republic, the French central administration redirected the S.G. resources towards a socialist movement, enjoying increasing political traction at the turn of the century. Similarly, in Ireland the monitoring of 'the enemy from within' switched from members of 'secret societies' to elected politicians and public figures supporting Irish nationalism.[65]

8.2 Monitoring legal political movements in France and Ireland

In both countries, intelligence-led policing had been used in the previous decade to counter political agitators promoting and making use of political violence and representing a threat to the state in France and Ireland. Agrarian crimes, assassinations, anarchist and Fenian bombs also clearly constituted threats to public safety. Thus, when institutions in charge of political policing started to monitor legal political organizations, it puts in a different perspective the reforms of the previous years that reinforced Paris and Dublin's control over intelligence work.

In France, the S.G. saw its responsibility regarding intelligence work increased at the turn of the century. Following the military failure in the Dreyfus case, the policing institution was put in charge of counterespionage on 20 August 1899 and Célestin Hennion was first named 'special commissioner extra-class' in March 1900 before Waldeck-Rousseau created especially for him the position of 'principal commissioner'.[66] The mission of the special commissioners also evolved at this time. Their accounting records from 1899 – the earliest available at the A.N. − retrace the reimbursement of the policemen's spending as part of their work and illustrates this evolution.[67] In the expenses covered by the administration of the special commissioner of Ajaccio for February 1900, 'fees for informants' were mentioned.[68] In

[65] McGarry, 'Introduction' in *Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921* (CO 904/193-216).

[66] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*, p. 424; p. 426

[67] Comptabilité des Commissaires Spéciaux, 1899-1900 (A.N., F7 12626).

[68] Etat des avances faites pendant le mois de Février 1900 par Mr Simon, Commissaire spécial à Ajaccio pour les besoins du service [Statement of advances made during the month of February 1900 by Mr Simon, special commissioner in Ajaccio for the needs of the service] (A.N., F7 12626).

Fontan, spending was used to create a section of territorial intelligence for national defence.[69] Around Nice, in the Maritimes-Alpes region, the special commissioners were charged with shadowing suspected individuals but also to identify the houses belonging to foreigners living on the shore.[70] In Ajaccio, Corsica, the S.G. was monitoring foreign war ships and suspected Italians and German individuals.[71] In Epinal, the special commissioner was charged with the military mission of setting up a network of information in case of a war.[72] In Cherbourg, he was also charged with a counter-espionage mission. The S.G.'s agent monitored and shadowed the foreigners who arrived via ocean liners and gathered intelligence on the new organisation monitoring the English shore.[73]

Regarding the anarchists, the anti-terrorist legislations of 1893 and 1894 had a clear impact on the movement in France, and the head of the S.G. delegated the surveillance of the movement to local police forces,[74] another proof of the institution's central position in the organization of intelligence-led policing. Information was now coming from the departmental prefects, the municipalities and the gendarmerie squads.[75] This reorganization regarding the monitoring of the anarchists combined with the decrease of their activities, may explain why we notice less reports produced by the agents of the S.G. on the matter in the early twentieth

---

[69] Etat des dépenses faites dans un but de défense nationale pour la création du Service de renseignement territorial à Fontan [State of expenditure for national defence purposes for the creation of the territorial intelligence service in Fontan] (A.N., F7 12626).

[70] Etat des avances faites dans Nice et dans le camps retranché, à l'occasion de fonctionnement du secteur, par M. Benet, Commissaire spécial pendant le mois de Février 1900 [State of advances made in Nice and in the entrenched camps, on the occasion of operation of the sector, by M. Benet, special commissioner during the month of February 1900] (A.N., F7 12626).

[71] Etat des avances faites pendant le mois de Février 1900 par Mr Simon, Commissaire spécial à Ajaccio pour les besoins du service [Statement of advances made during the month of February 1900 by Mr Simon, special commissioner in Ajaccio for the needs of the service] (A.N., F7 12626).

[72] Etat des frais de déplacement et de séjour soumis à l'approbation du préfet du département des Vosges par M. Marchal, Alfred Commissaire Spécial de police à Epinal [Statement of travel and subsistence expenses submitted to the approval of the prefect of the department of Vosges by Mr. Marchal, Alfred special olice commissioner in Epinal (A.N., F7 12626).

[73] Etat des frais déplacement et de séjour soumis à l'approbation du Préfet du département de la Manche par M. Oudaille, Commissaire spécial de police à Cherbourg [Travel and subsistence expenses submitted for approval by the prefect of the Manche department by Mr. Oudaille, special commissioner of police in Cherbourg] (A.N., F7 12626).

[74] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*, pp 273-4.

[75] Ibid.

century.[76] The police, under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and the government, was less focused on political agitators disturbing public order than on organized political movements presenting candidates at general elections.

From the mid-1890s, the special commissioners were monitoring and gathering intelligence on the socialist movement.[77] Day to day, the activity of the militants was reported to the head of the S.G.[78] To monitor the socialists, the policemen used similar techniques to when they gathered information on anarchists and far-right organizations. The information not only concerned Paris but came from all over the country thanks to the network of the S.G. agents. In July 1899, the special commissioner of Calais was updating Paris on the split among the socialist movement between Jules Guesde and Jean Jaurès.[79] On 20 January 1900, a correspondent who blended into the socialist movement, political and corporate, gave his assessment on the actual situation of the movement.[80] The informant, probably a socialist himself, mentioned the two factions existing withing the movement and the political strategy of the electoral committee attempting to regain control over the labour union to gain support for future elections.[81] The document concluded as follows: 'Here it is, without any comments, the appreciations of a correspondent'.[82]

As was the case with anarchism, special commissioners were using militants within the movement to gather information from the inside and submitted this information to the head of the S.G., to be cross-referenced with other reports. If most of the policemen relied on informants, like they had always done, their mission shifted from the monitoring of anarchists or far-right organizations at the turn of the century towards foreign agents and socialist politicians.

In Ireland, the start of the Boer War in 1899, a conflict opposing the South-African Republic and the Orange Free State to the expansion of the British Empire in South-Africa, acted as a spur for Irish nationalism. Irish leaders like Charles Stewart Parnell had already expressed their support to the South African Republic against British annexation during the first Boer War in

[76] Police générale, 1902-1916 (A.N., F7 12722).

[77] Renseignements généraux sur les socialistes, 1894-février 1900 (A.N., F7 12885).

[78] Ibid. ; Surveillance du mouvement socialiste, 1893-1911 (A.N. F7 12496).

[79] Special commissioner to head of the SG, 19 Jul. 1899 (A.N., F7 12496).

[80] La situation actuelle chez les socialistes, 20 Jan. 1900 (A.N., F7 12496).

[81] Ibid.

[82] Ibid.

1881.[83] Identifying themselves with the situation in South Africa, Irish citizens organized an important pro-Boer movement in Europe.[84] Irish miners, established in South-Africa, set-up two Irish brigades to fight alongside the Boer, and Irish-American volunteers also joined from the United States to support the independent republics.[85] One of these Irish brigades was led by Major MacBride, husband of Maud Gonne, who led a campaign against the recruitment of Irishmen to fight for the British army.[86]

At the time, while still monitoring the activities of 'secret societies' in Ireland,[87] the C.S.O. relied on the R.I.C. to gather information on public figures and members of legal political parties. If nationalist and republican suspects were already monitored by Samuel Waters' intelligence department back in the 1880s,[88] the entire Irish intelligence network seemed to be involved in this surveillance from the early twentieth century as testified by the CO 904 records.[89] John Daly, a member of the I.R.B. and amnesty campaigner, was monitored by the R.I.C., and his 'Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects' file seems to have been opened following his election as mayor of Limerick, in February 1899, as the first document dates from December 1899.[90] Furthermore, it was not only the R.I.C. that was involved in the surveillance of such republican suspects, but also the wider network of British intelligence, especially when it came to important political figures. Maud Gonne, because of her political activities supporting parliamentary nationalism in Ireland and her husband John MacBride because of his implication in the Boer war,[91] were both subject to heavy surveillance as testified by the many documents compiled by the British intelligence network.[92]

---

[83] Lowry, '«A Fellowship of Disaffection »', p. 105.

[84] Ibid., p. 106.

[85] Anthony Jordan, *Major John MacBride, 1865-1916: MacDonagh, and MacBride, and Connolly, and Pearse* (Westport, 1991).

[86] Lowry, '«A Fellowship of Disaffection »', p. 105.

[87] cf. N.A.I., CBS Precis.

[88] cf. Chapter 5.

[89] Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921 (T.N.A., CO 904/193-216).

[90] Daly, John, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://www.dib.ie/biography/daly-john-a2382) (23 Aug.2023); Daly, John (T.N.A., CO 904/198/13).

[91] MacBride, (Edith) Maud Gonne, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://doi.org/10.3318/dib.005110.v1) (23 Aug. 2024).

[92] Gonne, Miss Maud (T.N.A., CO 904/202/166) McBride, Major J (T.N.A., CO 904/208/258).

As a result of her travels throughout Europe, all the police institutions were mobilized to monitor Maud Gonne's movements.[93] The D.M.P. reported on 28 September 1899 that Gonne was organizing a meeting to be held at Beresford Place on 1 October 1899 and John Mallon submitted a copy of a poster about said meeting the next day.[94] The D.M.P. was also aware of her travel outside Ireland:

> 25th October, 1899. Chief Commissioner, D.M. Police reports per file 5364, that Maud Gonne attended a meeting of Transvaal Committee at 32 Lower Abbey St on 21st October, 1899, and left on 24th October for Liverpool en route to France, taking Boer flag with her to be presented to Irish Brigade.[95]

If the D.M.P. appeared to have been the leading supplier when it came to information on Maud Gonne, the R.I.C. also participated in this surveillance to track her movements outside of Dublin:

> R.I.C. Ballina report per file 76 S. 25274, that Maud Gonne attended meeting at Ballina on 5th November, 1899, where she denounced John Dillon, M.P., and others, and she assisted in distributing leaflets warning men against enlisting in British Army, and asked to have recruiting Sergeants watched and young men warned against enlisting. [96]

This information was centralized by the R.I.C. Crime Department Special Branch directly controlled by the under-secretary. Indeed, Gonne appeared to have been a major concern for Dublin Castle, leading Major Gosselin to take part in her surveillance:

> I have been aware for some very considerable time of your views about this person, and, as the result of an interview with you, I placed the matter before the Under Secretary, Home Department, just previous to the changes following the General Election, I also saw the Officer in charge of the Military Intelligence Department, and the Assistant Commissioner, L.M. Police. … On receipt of your minute I brought it to Sir Kenelm Digby and requested him to take it to the Foreign Office and consult the Under Secretary in order to ascertain whether we could expect assistance from them. The result was negative. The person who usually did such work was not available. The Assistant Commissioner, L.M. Police was also interrogated and with like result. I then saw Sir John Ardagh who told me that they had a man in touch

[93] Gonne, Miss Maud (T.N.A., CO 904/202/166).

[94] Inspector general to under-secretary, 2 April 1900, Summary of Maud Gonne's movement (T.N.A., CO 904/202/166).

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

> with Miss Gonne, and it was hoped and believed good results would accrue … Should it be so, an immediate report will be made to me. I saw His Excellency, the Lord Lieutenant, on the 18th instant and explained what I have said here, as I was uneasy about the delay and my apparent apathy; he promised that if necessary he would see Mr Ritchie, and Lord Salisbury also if desirable.[97]

Here, the Home Office agent was responding directly to the Irish under-secretary's request regarding the necessity to monitor Maud Gonne's movements. Gosselin thus transmitted Harrel's concerns regarding Gonne to the rest of the British intelligence network including those working in the Home Office, the Military Intelligence Department and the London Metropolitan Police. Major Gosselin was involved in this surveillance, as he reported on the time Maud Gonne spent in Liverpool to give a lecture in December 1900 and on the information transmitted by John Mallon to the under-secretary on 13 December 1900: 'Miss Maude Gonne returned from Liverpool yesterday morning and left for Limerick in the afternoon. Egan accompanied her to the railway station.'[98]

Gonne was a very active militant, and her activities appear to have constituted a more important threat than inactive 'secret societies' or land associations. This explains the involvement of the entire Irish political policing network, including David Harrell, John Mallon and Nicholas Gosselin. Gonne was also aware of the surveillance exercised over her, something that seemed to amuse her, as she explained the strategies developed to get rid of the 'G men' following her in the streets in her memoir.[99]

If Maud Gonne's activities rendered her a logical subject of police intelligence, the Sinn Féin and Republican Files revealed the range of individuals that were monitored by the British policing network in the early twentieth century.[100] William K. Redmond, Irish nationalist, Parnell supporter, member of parliament and critic of the Boer War in 1899,[101] was subject to surveillance.[102] Relying on newspapers, the British Consul of San Francisco reported to the foreign office on 30 August 1905 that Redmond had established a new branch of the United

---

[97] Gosselin to under-secretary, 20 Nov. 1900 (T.N.A., CO 904/202/166).

[98] Mallon to under-secretary, 13 Dec. 1900 (T.N.A., CO 904/202/166).

[99] Maud Gonne, Alexander Norman Jaffares, Anna MacBride White (eds), *The Autobiography of Maud Gonne: A Servant of the Queen* (Chicago, 1995), p. 101.

[100] Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921 (T.N.A., CO 904/193-216).

[101] Redmond, William Hoey Kearney, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://doi.org/10.3318/dib.007609.v1) (30 Oct. 2024).

[102] Redmond, W. (T.N.A., CO 904/213/368).

Irish League in the city.[103] The Consul noted that: 'It is satisfactory to note that his remarks have been of a much more moderate nature than those of Irish members in the States on former occasions', thus presenting Redmond as a moderate and arguing that this new Branch did not represent a threat.[104] The letter and the newspaper extract mentioned were then transmitted by the Foreign Office to the C.S.O., illustrating the functioning of the British intelligence-led policing network across continents.[105] A few weeks later, on 26 September 1905, the British Consul of New York reported to the Foreign Office the organization of a reception of the United Irish League for Redmond, attaching newspaper extracts but also detailing names of people present and 'a series of resolutions carried unanimously' transmitted by a 'reliable source'.[106]

If the file on Redmond was limited to these two reports from the United States, the one concerning another Irish member of parliament, Thomas Power (T.P.) O'Connor, contained eighty-eight documents produced between 1906 and 1909.[107] All were issued by the British consulate of New York, reporting the visit of O'Connor there and the relations of the Irish parties with Indian nationalists.[108] The authorities appeared to have kept an eye on the connections existing between Home Rule supporters in Ireland and the movement opposed to the British government in India. The British consul suspected that Clan-na-Gael were behind a series of articles published in the newspaper *The Gaelic American* between December 1905 and February 1906 reporting on 'a new spirit of revolt against British rule… overspreading India.'[109] If the British consul doubted the involvement of Irish nationalist when the movement in favor of Indian self-determination reached New York in January 1908,[110] he continued the surveillance of Irish and Indian natives in New York and of T.P. O'Connor when he happened to be there.[111]

Public servants were also monitored. John Kelly, master of Edenderry workhouse, was subject to the monitoring of the Irish police because he was a member of the political

[103] Consul-General C.W. Bennett to the Marquees of Lansdowne, 30 Aug. 1905 (T.N.A., CO 904/213/368).

[104] Ibid.

[105] Under-secretary of state for foreign affairs to Under Secretary, Dublin Castle, 18 September 1905 (T.N.A., CO 904/213/368).

[106] Consul-General C. Clive Bayley to Sir H.M. Durand, 26 Sept. 1905 (T.N.A., CO 904/213/368).

[107] O'Connor, T.P. (T.N.A., CO 904/211/328).

[108] Ibid.

[109] Sanderson to Durand, 5 Oct. 1906 (T.N.A., CO 904/211/328).

[110] Bennett to Grey, 17 Jan. 1908 (T.N.A., CO 904/211/328).

[111] O'Connor, T.P. (T.N.A., CO 904/211/328).

organization Cumman na nGaedheal, which aimed to 'advance the cause of Ireland's Sovereign Independence'.[112] A few years later, when John Kelly made a speech at a Sinn Féin meeting on 18 June 1911, the C.S.O. notified the Local Government Board and encouraged them to ask for Kelly to provide an explanation and to decide if his political engagement was compatible with his position at the Edenderry workhouse.[113] The case of John Kelly thus illustrates the fear of the British government in Ireland of nationalist ideas among public servants.

Another Irish personality monitored was Dr Douglas Hyde, president of the Gaelic League at the time and future first president of Ireland,[114] and whose file concerned a reception organized in Dublin on his return from America on 25 June 1906.[115] A report produced by the D.M.P. G Division details the event, mentioning the presence of the lord mayor and members of different organizations, among them Cumman na nGaedheal, the G.A.A., the Wolfe Tone Committee and Gaelic League branches.[116] The meeting was about the missions Dr Hyde pursued for the Gaelic League in America, which according to the report was to collect money 'to be devoted to the advancement of Sinn Féin policy.'[117]

Still, it is important to note that some files compiled on the most imminent individuals of Irish nationalism were sometimes quite thin, like the ones concerning Fenian leader John O'Leary and James Connolly, a key figure in Irish socialism and republicanism.[118] In other cases, documents only concerned their activities after the Easter rising of 1916, like Arthur Griffith, journalist supporting the Boer campaign in South-Africa and later founder of Sinn Féin,[119] whose file contains over a hundred documents from the years 1918 and 1920.[120] It did not mean that those personalities were only subjected to police surveillance from that time, only that their files were compiled in relation to specific events.

The British network of intelligence-led policing not only monitored Irish nationalist politicians but also individuals that promoted their ideas via their organizations, exercising a certain influence within Irish society. Similarly, in France, the Ministry of the Interior after

---

[112] Kelly, John (T.N.A., CO 904/205/221).

[113] Ibid.

[114] Hyde, Douglas, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://doi.org/10.3318/dib.004185.v1) (30 Oct. 2024).

[115] Hyde, Dr Douglas (T.N.A., CO 904/204/199).

[116] Report from John Lowe Chief Inspector, 25 June 1906 (T.N.A., CO 904/204/199).

[117] Ibid.

[118] Connolly, James (T.N.A. CO 904/197/69), O'Leary, John (T.N.A., CO 904/212/340).

[119] Griffith, Arthur Joseph, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (https://doi.org/10.3318/dib.003644.v1) (30 Oct. 2024).

[120] Griffith, Arthur (T.N.A., CO 904/203/175).

extending its use of intelligence-led policing to monitor socialist politicians, eventually employed it to repress a range of agitators, from political enemies to ordinary criminals.

8.3 Clemenceau, 'first cop of France': The use of intelligence-led policing to repress a new range of agitators

In the early twentieth century, the anarchists and conservatives were seen as a distant threat for Paris. Indeed, the republican government was now turning its full attention to a labor movement, which had been active since the 1880s but was benefiting from a new political context in the early twentieth century. They were supported by the S.F.I.O. (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière), a party unifying the socialist movement in 1905 led by Jean Jaurès and supporting the strikes and unrest caused by workers, [121] something that might have caused the police to increase its focus on labor action. The country was also experiencing a period of 'insecurity' at the time with an increase in robberies and attacks caused by 'Apaches',[122] unemployed working class youth the police associated with organized criminals. In March 1906, Georges Clemenceau, the journalist from the Radical party who defended the anarchists at the Chamber of Deputies in the 1880s,[123] was named minister of the interior. He quickly became a strike breaker, not hesitating to violently repress the workers.[124]

In 1906, the social movement reached its peak with strikes multiplying and taking place all over the country.[125] In Paris, the P.P. second research squad attached to the Direction Générale des Recherches participated in 'monitoring all conflicts that could prejudice public order, security, public tranquility, attacks on people or property.'[126] Most of its work consisted of monitoring social conflict taking place in the workplace.[127] Furthermore, while Paris police prefect Lépine managed to develop an efficient way to maintain order when demonstrations were organized in public places, the situation appeared more tense for the agents deployed in the rest of the country.[128]

---

[121] Bernard Hautecloque, *La République face à la rue. De la Commune à la Grande Guerre (1871-1914)* (Paris, 2022), pp 133-41.

[122] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, pp 422-8.

[123] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 113.

[124] Hautecloque, *La République face à la rue*, pp 133-41.

[125] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 434.

[126] Budget report, 1911 (A.P.P., DB 44).

[127] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 434.

[128] Ibid., pp 434-9.

The Courrières mine disaster took place on 10 March 1906 in the north of France with around 2,000 workers losing their lives due to a coaldust explosion, and led to an important strike movement.[129] Clemenceau understood and promised to respect the right to strike 'on the condition that the strikers, as good citizens, respect the laws and the rights of the non-strikers', but at the same time, he arrested one of the trade union leaders.[130] The unions at the time adopted the method of 'direct action' – meaning the use of violent and sometimes illegal strikes – and organized an important demonstration on 1 May 1906.[131] To counter this action Clemenceau and Lépine gathered more than forty police regiments, not in Paris directly, but in strategic suburbs around the capital city.[132] Though, according to Lépine, his men were not meant to intervene:

> Whatever happens, you will not meet the bayonet and open fire only by my order. You probably won't have to, because you won't be in contact with the protesters. It is not your business ... You are there to occupy strategic points, before the demonstrators, and to impose by your presence. That's all.[133]

In this case, the police had a preventative and not a repressive function. Moreover, on 30 April, the police arrested 146 participants to undermine the movement.[134] Clemenceau allowed a meeting to take place in Place de la Bourse but the rest of the surrounding streets were patrolled by the agents of the P.P. to prevent the demonstration.[135] Some agitations took place in the east of the city but always handled by the policemen. Still, the minister of the interior deliberately cultivated the feeling that Paris was on the edge of revolution on that day to justify his repressive politics.[136] This was only the start of a general movement of strikes taking place in the factories in the early twentieth century, a conflict replicated at the Chamber of Deputies between Jaurès, the socialist, defending the rights of the workers and Clemenceau, the new minister of the interior, repressing their strikes.[137]

---

[129] Houte, *Les peurs de la belle époque*, pp 201-4.

[130] Ibid., p. 204.

[131] Hautecloque, *La République face à la rue*, p. 135.

[132] Ibid., p. 137.

[133] Quoted in Hautecloque, *La République face à la rue*, p. 137.

[134] Hautecloque, *La République face à la rue*, p. 139.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Ibid., p. 140.

[137] Houte, *Les peurs de la belle époque*, p. 207.

The mission of the special commissioners of the S.G. evolved in this moment of strikes and workers' agitation. The policemen tried to prevent social conflict before it turned into violent confrontation between the workforce and their employers or between the workforce and the policemen in charge of maintaining order. At the time of a strike at the Hennebont forges in the north of France in July 1906, the S.G. had the mission to find a way for a barge filled with goods to leave the smithy while 'avoiding a bloody conflict'.[138] In a report that appeared to have been written by an agent of the S.G., it is said that the strike was divided into two sides, with on one side 'very calm workers, willing to accept minimal concessions' and, on the other side 'a company that refuses with a violent authoritarianism, not only any concession, but even any kind of discussion'.[139] The policeman then warned his superior of the consequence of letting the barge out: 'And then, the question for the *Administration* [the state] is to know if it can allow this kind of exit, risking a conflict to which the consequences are unpredictable.'[140]

The policeman not only gathered as much information as he could to shed light on the situation but also offered a reflection on the potential violent outcome of this social conflict:

> And then really the state cannot argue in favor of a higher general interest? Will we find judges to say that it was necessary to risk the death of a man to transport goods and provide deliveries that his contractually not obliged to provide? I await here the great argument: what about freedom of trade? By not allowing the barge to leave, you are encouraging the free movement of the goods of the Forges society. And after? Is it the first time that we restrict freedom in the public interest? When after a meeting, rather calm, as is the case in Hennebont since the beginning of the strike, we filter the workers by small packages by forcing them to disperse immediately, when we forbid them to circulate or to park in the public view, even in small groups, are we not also infringing on freedom of movement? And when they yield to it, do we not respond to them by reasons drawn from the general interest, by the fear of violent conflicts that may arise from their gatherings?[141]

Therefore, in this case, the information gathered by the S.G. not only described the situation and the party involved in the strike but was meant to be used to control a social conflict and restrict the need for police action in this case. The agent also provides an interesting reflection on policy and good governance.

---

[138] Report, 16 Jul. 1906 in Forges Hennebont conflict file (A.N., F7 14605).

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Ibid.

In a sense, the report on the Hennebont forges aligned with Clemenceau's vision of intelligence-led policing but contrasted with his hardline approach to the strikers. In line with his previous engagement, the minister of the interior denounced the political police as anti-democratic and complained about the lack of a police force to investigate criminal offences and arrest perpetrators in October 1906.[142] The evolution of the mission of the S.G. can be seen in its budget allowance in the early twentieth century. The salaries of the commissioner, their travel allowance and other expenses were first reduced by 245,000 francs between 1897 and 1904 and experienced a second decrease of 100,000 francs in 1905.[143] With regards to 'the secret agents of the Sûreté Générale', their budget was also cut by 200,000 francs in 1905.[144]

In a spirit of reforming the policing institutions, Clemenceau decided to name at the head of the S.G. the special commissioner Célestin Hennion, a first innovation from the minister of the interior, as this position until then was occupied by a career civil servant.[145] This choice may appear contradictory from the public position of Clemenceau, naming an expert in political policing when he was always himself opposed to this kind of practice.[146] The reason for this choice can be explained by the following factors. Hennion was a policeman known for his expertise, his professional skills and his policing success, in particular the trial of far-right leaders at the time of the Dreyfus affair. As a special policeman, he served different governments, always defending the interest of the Republic against political agitators. Despite being an expert in political policing, he shared Clemenceau's vision of policing, protecting citizens from criminals while being loyal to the government in power.[147] It was on 28 February 1907 that Clemenceau announced the nomination of Hennion to the Chamber of Deputies and the future creation of a mobile judicial police to exercise its authority all over the country to counter an increase in criminality. This was after four representatives had drawn up a terrible vision of insecurity and criminality in their respective districts.[148] The minister managed to

[142] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*, p. 429; Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 125.

[143] Circular from head of the S.G. to departmental prefects, 15 April 1905 (A.P.P., DB 354).

[144] Ibid.

[145] Belière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République', pp 173-91.

[146] In March 1879 at the Chamber of Deputies, Clemenceau intervened to critic de Marcère discourse defending the need to have a political police to protect the Republic.

[147] Belière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République', pp 173-91.

[148] Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des polices en France*, pp 121-2.

convince the deputies to support this new police force and later to vote the credit necessary for its financing.[149]

The first step in this reform was the creation in March 1907, within the S.G., of the Contrôle Général du Service des Recherches in the departments, under the management of Jules Sébille, state commissioner of the Lyon police. This service was meant to coordinate the future sections of the judicial police and centralize and communicate the information gathered on criminals all over the country.[150] This testified to an adaptation of political policing practices to the need of the future judicial police, whose mission was to arrest common law criminals, and the necessity for the central administration to keep control over intelligence-led policing at a time when the Republic was experiencing periods of unrest.

Hennion insisted on the importance for the special and municipal police commissioners to respect this centralization process, as it would allow them to catch recidivist criminals that first escaped the police:

> It is essential, in the interest of public safety, that this work be completed and kept up to date by sending the information, concerning the same category that reach you daily. In the future, you will have to send me a notice, in accordance with the model annexed to my circular, on all the offenders who will be reported to you and who will appear to be classified in the category of professional criminals who are used to travelling. The archives of the *Contrôle général des Recherches* were created with the aim of providing the judicial police of the territory with all the useful information on the criminals who, after having committed a crime or an offence, disappear to commit other mischief in areas where they are unknown. It is therefore important that you keep the *Contrôle général des Recherches* informed of all the facts that can be used to discover these individuals … As I have recommended in my previous instructions, all documents concerning criminals must be sent to the Directorate of the Sûreté Générale under special envelope, marked *Police Judiciaire – Contrôle générale des Services de Recherches*.[151]

According to Hennion, the communication of information gathered allowed the S.G. to centralize more than 30,000 files on criminals throughout the country.[152] Those files appearing as a tool to promote the efficiency of this centralized system implemented by the new head of the S.G. Eventually, on 30 December 1907, Clemenceau created twelve regional squads of mobile police forces soon known as the 'brigades du tigre'. The head of government and

[149] Ibid., p. 125.

[150] Ibid., Hennion (A.P.P., EA 25).

[151] Hennion to special commissioners and municipal commissioners, 27 Jul. 1907 (A.P.P., DB 354).

[152] Ibid.

minister of the interior declared that those policemen were not 'agents of information' but 'agents destined to protect the province against the Apaches.'[153] In other words, those policemen were meant to combat insecurity and had at their disposal the 30,000 files centralized by the Contrôle Général des Recherches of the S.G., to arrest common criminals. Clemenceau, opposed to the political police, did not hesitate to adapt reliable information gathering to develop a form of intelligence-led policing to counter all kinds of criminals and not only political agitators. This policing innovation also led to a reformation within the P.P., which Lépine managed to present as a model for French and foreign policemen.[154] He thus created an elite squad, the Brigade Criminelle (Criminal Squad) to also participate in the repression of common crime in the capital city, relying on the scientific techniques developed by the Identité Judiciaire section of the P.P.[155] Thus, after publicly repudiating the 'dirty' methods of secret policing, Celemenceau was relying on them to monitor and repress social movements and reform police institutions to adapt them to the policing of *all* kinds of criminals in the early twentieth century, reflecting even greater central oversight and use of intelligence-led policing in France at the time.

At the turn of the century, intelligence-led policing seemed to fully serve the interests of the French and Irish central administrations. Both governments were not simply limiting themselves to monitoring political agitators making use of political violence but relied on their resources to gather information on politicians, public figures and even sporting organizations. In France, commissioners' reports were centralized by Célestin Hennion from 1907, and intelligence-led policing was then used to repress criminals. In both cases, the 'Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects' files and the reports of the S.G. commissioner reflect the increasingly centrally-controlled dimension of intelligence work. This reflects a continuity and a reinforcement of intelligence-led policing put at the service of both governments. It was, at this time, however, that a very real anarchist resistance movement re-emerged, highlighting the necessity of international policing collaboration to face a renewed transnational threat.

[153] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 431.

[154] cf. Chapter 10.

[155] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 431.

Part III

International collaboration? The limits of European political policing: England and France compared, 1891-1910

Chapter 9

Policing co-operation in Dublin, London and Paris (1891-1898)

In the early 1890s, intelligence-led policing was, as we have seen, clearly established in the three jurisdictions. It was not just an array of *ad hoc* methods but an institutionalised set of practices rooted in particular systems. In England, the integration of the Special Branch within the Metropolitan Police in 1887 represented a shift in terms of ideology: England now had an institution dedicated to the surveillance and repression of actors using political violence, something at odds with Peel's 'preventive policing' principles as conceptualised in the early decades of the 1800s. In France, while the Republicans adopted and adapted the previously existing imperial policing administration, they reinforced the powers of the S.G. in terms of political policing. In Ireland, since the emergence of the Fenian movement in the 1860s, the C.S.O. set up a system capable of gathering information to try and eliminate the political threat of fenianism.

Fenian activities in England strongly decreased at the end of the nineteenth century. As this constituted the main reason behind the Special Branch's existence, the *raison d'être* of the institution was questioned at the end of the 1880s. Nevertheless, political violence intensified in continental Europe with an anarchist movement multiplying actions everywhere and seeking shelter in England.[1] As noted in previous chapters, London had been dealing with political refugees since the mid-nineteenth century, first letting revolutionaries, fleeing authoritarian European powers in the 1850s, enter the United Kingdom, then letting anarchists settle in the capital city afterwards.[2] As this continued in the context of the early 1890s, considered as the *ère des attentats*, the police in England found themselves at the centre of the repression of this new political threat and justified the continuing activity of the Special Branch and its future head, William Melville.[3]

This also reinforced the connection between the institution and its European counterparts, especially the French police who had been dealing with an increase in acts of propaganda of the deed in early 1890.[4] At the same time, in Ireland, Dublin was becoming the

[1] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 98-113; Solomon, *State Surveillance,* pp 127-8.

[2] Bantman, *Un premier exil libertaire*; cf. Chapters 1 and 3.

[3] Cook, *M*, p.80.

[4] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République'*,* p. 153; p. 204.

new target of Fenian bombings between the end of the year 1891 and 1893,[5] leading John Mallon to collaborate with the British intelligence network. Irish policemen and their political policing expertise also contributed to the repression of the anarchist movement in England.

If the anarchist waves of the 1890s have been the subject of various studies, especially in France,[6] the role of the English police in their repression is less well investigated, except for the work of Vlad Solomon and Constance Bantman.[7] They both demonstrate that effective co-operation between police forces took place at times of anarchist attacks.[8] In comparison to the Fenian dynamite campaign in England, the D.M.P. and the explosions of the early 1890s have not been the subject of an extensive literature. Anastasia Dukova related this episode in her study of the D.M.P, relying on newspapers sources, as did Niall Whelehan in his book on the dynamiters.[9] Based on the existing D.M.P. files, the Crime Branch Special records held at the N.A.I., and relevant Home Office documents relating to the explosions held in Kew, we can see how Dublin dealt with the events in connection with the experience of other British institutions.[10] This chapter also relies on records from T.N.A. and the P.P. to shed light on the relations between the P.P. and Metropolitan Police when it came to policing collaboration.[11]

If Dublin was not targeted to the same extent as London by the dynamiters, the D.M.P. could rely on a British network of intelligence to counter any agitation. At the same time, a wave of anarchist attacks forced both London and Paris to adapt their methods of political policing but also to collaborate in the early 1890s, despite mutual suspicion and a growing sense of policing rivalry. Thus, this chapter argues that the presence of movements using political violence targeting England, France and Ireland favored growing cross border links in police collaboration.

First, we will analyse the connections existing between the English and Irish police, thanks to a British network of intelligence-led policing aiding their co-operation. Then, we will

---

[5] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. xiv.

[6] Among others: Bouhey, Levillain, *Les anarchistes contre la République*; Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France*; Gallet, Massard, *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste à Lyon.*

[7] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', pp 381-403; Bantman, *Un premier exil libertaire*, pp 216-36 ; Solomon, *State Surveillance,* pp 127-60.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Dukova, *History of the Dublin Metropolitan Police*, pp 132-4; Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, pp 128-9.

[10] N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 9-14; N.A.I., CBS S Files, Box 5; T.N.A., HO 144 248/A54847; T.N.A., HO 144 357/B15410.

[11] A.P.P., BA 1508-1510; A.P.P., BA 1693; T.N.A., 144 587/B2840C; T.N.A., HO 144 485/X37842.

discuss how London and Paris reinforced their intelligence-led policing system to counter a resurgence of lethal anarchist attacks in the early 1890s, before showing how both institutions collaborated to arrest militants crossing borders, despite some mutual suspicion and criticism.

9.1 A British intelligence network? Dublin, London and the development of international police co-operation

The Metropolitan Police underwent some changes in the early 1890s. Following Monro's resignation, relations among the personnel of the London institution and with the Home Office improved. Robert Anderson was now assistant commissioner and head of the C.I.D., Edward Bradford was named commissioner in 1890, Matthews remained as home secretary until 1892, while John Littlechild oversaw the work of Section D.[12] At the same time, fenianism was not a major threat anymore, at least not in London. Between 1891 and 1893, Dublin became the target of a dynamite campaign. This represented a new challenge for the D.M.P., which had not dealt directly with a serious outbreak of republican-inspired violence since the Phoenix Park murders in 1882.

A first bomb exploded at the National Press office in Abbey Street, Dublin on 26 October 1891, the second that same year on 31 December in a cellar of Dublin Castle. In 1892, Dublin Castle was once again the target of the dynamiters, on 24 December. This time a D.M.P. detective was killed. On the anniversary of the Phoenix Park murders, there was another explosion at Dublin's Four Courts, on 6 May 1893. The last reported attack concerned a small explosion at an army barracks on 25 December 1893.[13] The explosion taking placing place on the last day of 1891, even if it only caused minimal damage, led the British government to believe that this could announce a new Fenian bombing campaign.[14] Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Cundill, inspector of explosives attached to the Home Office, was summoned by Dublin Castle to help with the investigation.[15] In his report, the investigator noticed that 'it was obvious that some explosive of a violent nature had gone off just inside the manhole' and concluded that 'The result of the investigation only serves to establish that: A violent explosive was used.'[16]

[12] Solomon, *State Surveillance,* p. 127.

[13] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. xiv; pp 128-9.

[14] Ibid., p. 128.

[15] Cundill to secretary of state, 4 Jan. 1892 (N.A.I., CBS S Files, Box 5).

[16] Ibid.

The secretary of state received Cundill's conclusion in a report confirming the deliberate nature of the explosion:

> Colonel Cundill's Report entirely disposes of the suggestion that the explosion was one of gas, or of an accidental character; on the contrary, it was clear that it was an explosion of an Explosive properly so-called, contained in a case of tinned iron, and there seen no grounds to doubt that the Explosive was a high Explosive as distinguished from Gunpowder. It is also perfectly clear that the Explosive must have been deliberately deposited in a position, which may be fairly described as well-chosen, and that such choice must have been effected by a person with intimate knowledge of the local locality.[17]

A few months later, John Mallon of the D.M.P. was reporting a potential revival of fenianism in Dublin.[18] Mallon did not describe an urgent threat, because of the difficulty for members to meet in public due to the surveillance exercised by the police, but he claimed, perhaps self-servingly, that 'Fenianism could be pulled together at any time, on short notice.'[19]

Another explosion took place at Dublin Castle on Christmas Eve 1892, killing one constable. Cundill was sent back to Dublin and concluded, like in 1891, it was a deliberate dynamite attack: 'the explosion was due to an "infernal machine" of some sort, maliciously placed in the court by some person or persons at present unknown.'[20] The inspector of explosives also pointed out the resemblance with the previous attack and the potentiality that the perpetrators were the same:

> It may be interesting to remark that this explosion appears to possess some features in common with those which were present at the explosion in the Castle on New Year's Eve, 1891 … Further it seems likely that the person who effected the present explosion was – as undoubtedly he must have been in the former one – familiar with the locality and able to time his visit with the least risk of detection.[21]

Lieutenant Colonel Cundill was not the only member of the Home Office to participate in the investigation. Major Nicholas Gosselin, Irish military officer, former member of the Metropolitan Police Special Irish Branch, now employed on special duty by the Home Office, wrote to David Harrel, the chief commissioner of the D.M.P., to furnish information on the

[17] Report to secretary of state, 4 Jan. 1892 (N.A.I., CBS S Files, Box 5).

[18] Report by Mallon, 'Revival of Fenianism in Dublin', 26 Jul. 1892 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 12).

[19] Ibid.

[20] Majendie and Cundill to secretary of state, 26 Dec. 1892 (N.A.I., CBS S Files, Box 5).

[21] Ibid.

potential perpetrators of the attack, expressing his belief that more outrages could follow.[22] The Home Office was involved in the investigation and reports were directly addressed to the secretary of state, showing London's concern regarding the explosions, but also the administration's role in centralizing intelligence when it came to dynamite attacks on British territory. This event led to the reinforcement of police protection around public buildings in London.[23]

It appeared that the surveillance of suspected individuals and 'secret societies' also expanded in the years following the Fenian explosions that took place in Dublin between 1891 and 1893. John Mallon, now assistant commissioner of the D.M.P., was receiving information on the imminence of 'an outrage of some serious character' in April 1894.[24] Information coming from Belfast indicated that an attack could take place in Dublin on 6 May 1894, the anniversary of the Phoenix Park murders.[25] The assistant commissioner consulted the different institutions in charge of intelligence work in Great Britain to confirm the information before communicating with his subordinates:

> I sent for you this evening by direction of the Chief Commissioner to tell you that an outrage of a very serious character is likely to be committed between this and Monday morning. It may be that some public official or a person suspected of being an informer will be shot, or that some public building or concern occupied by people prominent in politics will be blown up. … A man in Dublin who is in my confidence says that the commission of an outrage is imminent. A report from Scotland Yard confirms this information. A report from the Home Office is in the same tenor … A report from the Police at Belfast is of the same character … You all know the public places in your respective Divisions and you must exercise your direction and be responsible for anything that may occur.[26]

Mallon then deployed a system of surveillance in the capital city to prevent potential explosions on 5 May 1894:

> The few prominent persons under observation were particularly active on last evening … I have had the superintendents here each evening during the week and went over the different public buildings in their respective Divisions that would be required to be looked after. Tonight and tomorrow night I will have 16 or

[22] Gosselin to Harrel, 26 Dec. 1892 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 12).

[23] Whelehan, *The Dynamiters*, p. 129.

[24] Mallon to Supt. of D.M.P., 10 April 1894 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

[25] City of Dublin. Alleged contemplated explosion on the night of the 6th May (the anniversary of the Phoenix Park Murders). Information received from Belfast (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

[26] Memo by Mallon, 3 May 1894 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

> 18 men of the G Division patrolling in different parts from 9 pm until 1 am. The descriptions of the men said to be dangerous are in the hands of Divisional Officers. If suspicious men are observed in the vicinity of public buildings the Police will exercise their authority to arrest for loitering[27]

Alongside the assistant commissioner of the D.M.P., Major Nicholas Gosselin, the Irish specialist attached to the Home Office, relied on his extended international network of informants to provide to David Harrel, now under-secretary for Ireland, information on individuals who might be linked with anarchism.[28] Mallon also requested the expertise of the Home Office intelligence officer in September 1894, regarding the value of information he received on Fenians.[29] The two men also exchanged information concerning a potential meeting of the I.R.B. taking place in early 1896.[30]

Thus, a British network of intelligence between the D.M.P., the Home Office and the C.S.O. and involving three Irish men − John Mallon, Nicholas Gosselin and David Harrel – was set-up to counter political agitation in Dublin, although Fenian-inspired political violence remained exceedingly rare. Meanwhile, fenianism was fading in London in the early 1890s, but anarchist refugees started directly planning attacks on English soil. A concern the Metropolitan Police shared with its French counterparts at the time.

9.2 London and Paris: coordinating intelligence work to counter anarchism

It was a native of Kerry, William Melville, who had at his disposal another intelligence network also involving Irishmen, to now counter a new political threat in England. The policing of revolutionary refugees became the *raison d'être* of the Special Branch and gave William Melville the legitimacy to manage the organization in 1893. That same year, Louis Lépine became Police prefect and undertook reform to reinforce the means at the disposal of the Parisian institution to pursue its intelligence-led policing mission.

---

[27] Mallon to chief commissioner, Movements of persons suspected of concocting outrage, 5 May 1894 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

[28] J. Hately of New York Jos. O'Neill of Paris & H.M. Clarke of London. Recent visit to Dublin supposed to be in the interests of anarchism or for political purposes. Inquiries being made by Major Gosselin, 28 April 1894 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

[29] Mallon to under-secretary, Re Private Information, 12 Sept. 1894 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

[30] Mallon to Gosselin, Anticipated important meeting of I.R.B., 3 Jan. 1896; Gosselin to Malon, 5 Jan. 1896 (N.A.I., DMP Files, Box 13).

Since the 1848 revolutions and the Commune of Paris in 1871, London had been a land of asylum for political figures critical of continental European regimes.[31] While anarchist attacks were taking place in the rest of Europe, supporters of the revolutionary ideology continued to find refuge in England and started to stage plots from there. Constance Bantman has suggested that in the early 1880s anarchists in London benefitted from a 'limited tolerance'.[32] When they started to directly target British soil in the 1890s, however, the Special Branch had no choice but to start policing the revolutionary refugees, who first came to England to escape repression from other countries.

In January 1892, three men were arrested at Walsall because they were in possession of an explosive device.[33] Despite the agitators being discovered before an attack could take place, newspapers announced the beginning of a potential international revolutionary plot.[34] Indeed, the liberalization of the press in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century participated in the massive diffusion to the public of an alleged 'anarchist plot'.[35] However, there was a possibility that the affair was a set-up organised by William Melville, chief inspector of the Special Branch, with the aim of ensuring the sustainability of the Intelligence Department.[36] It was established that an informant employed by the Special Branch named Auguste Coulon reported the Walsall attempt.[37]

Was he an *agent provocateur* used to provide Melville with a *raison d'être* for the Special Branch? The policeman did not deny the fact that he used informants as part of his work but did not confirm or dismiss the fact that Coulon was one of them.[38] The role played by Coulon in this affair is still subjected to interrogation today, with Vlad Solomon contending that it was possible that he acted as an agent provocateur but that it was not provable. Andrew Cook argued that Melville was responsible for the plot, while Bernard Porter was not convinced that his informant orchestrated it.[39] Nevertheless, in February 1892, the Conservative Home Secretary

---

[31] cf. Chapter 1.

[32] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 371.

[33] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 128.

[34] Ibid., p. 189.

[35] Ibid., p.129.

[36] Ibid.; Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 130.

[37] Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 424. Clutterbuck indicated that Coulon's name appeared on the Special Branch accounts ledgers registering the Metropolitan Police informants.

[38] *Reg.* v. *Charles and others*, p. 84 (T.N.A., ASSI 6/27/9) quoted in Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 132.

[39] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 135.

Henry Matthews was forced to declare that the 'employment of agent provocateurs … was forbidden.'[40] The Walsall case was still an important victory for the men of the Special Branch and their informants. On 1 July 1892 Bradford even used money from the Secret Service Fund to reward the individuals involved in the case:

> The prosecution was one of exceptional importance, and I have to recommend that the sum of £120 may be placed at my disposal: £60 from the Secret Service fund to remunerate the Informants, and £60 from the Metropolitan Police Fund to be divided as Gratuities amongst the Officers of this Force who were concerned in the case.[41]

This failed plot, whether it had been orchestrated by Section D or not, gave a second wind to the Special Branch since the disappearance of the Fenian threat and aided Melville's ascension.[42] In April 1893, he was made head of the institution following John Littlechild's resignation.[43] From that time, intelligence work was oriented towards the anarchist refugees in London, while Melville managed to centralize all the information concerning the revolutionaries' activities.

Indeed, in the records concerning the monitoring of anarchists in England, we notice the predominance of Melville's writing. He appears to have been deeply involved in the surveillance of the militants, relying on a large network of informants, but compiling and reporting himself the information gathered. In the system of intelligence functioning in London in the early 1890s, Melville was the one controlling the information collected and the one to decide how the Special Branch was processing the data gathered via political policing.

Similarly, Robert Anderson – assistant-commissioner of the C.I.D. – appears to have overseen the diplomatic aspect of intelligence work ensuring communication with the Home and Foreign Offices regarding political refugees. On 17 April 1894, Anderson transmitted information to Under-Secretary of State Godfrey Lushington concerning Victor Burh, a German anarchist expelled from France.[44] He noted that his letter was 'With reference to Home Office letter of 4 May 1892 N°B 2840/3/C respecting the arrival of expelled Anarchists in this

[40] 'An "Anarchist" Prosecution', H.C. 1892, II.698.

[41] Bradford to under-secretary of state, 1 Jul. 1892 (T.N.A., HO 144 242/A53582).

[42] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 135.

[43] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 119.

[44] Anderson to Lushington,17 April 1894 (T.N.A., HO 144 587/B2840C).

country.'[45] It indicates that the Home Office asked to be kept informed of anarchist activity from at least May 1892, right after a wave of anarchist attacks hit France at the time.[46]

Even if the frontier was always thin between the C.I.D. and the Special Branch – the first had given birth to the second – there was a distinction here between the political intelligence managed by Melville and the information relating to diplomatic questions. In the summer of 1894, Melville oversaw the reporting on Countess Clementine Hugo, who might have had contact with active revolutionaries, while John Maguire and Patrick Quinn, employed by the C.I.D., were following the movement of two Austrian anarchists, and trying to establish if they meant to leave London for abroad.[47] In the report drawn up by the head of the Special Branch, his proximity with the anarchist milieu was obvious:

> I have spoken to the Countess a few times, principally on Anarchism, when she was eloquent in denouncing outrages … She is however to my knowledge, intimately acquainted with Louise Michel, Malato, and other leading Anarchists, but I believe this is due in a great measure, if not entirely, to the fact those persons are generally in a chronic state of want, and the Countess invariably assists them, even when her means are very slender. The Countess loses no opportunity of denouncing what she calls the mad ideas of Louise Michel and those acting with her, at the same time she says she has much sympathy with the poor classes who she says have been badly treated, but I do not think she would go beyond this.[48]

C.I.D. agents did gather other information on the individuals they were shadowing – and their reports were quite exhaustive – but in comparison to Melville they appeared to have kept a distance from them, not having the same familiarity with the militants:

> I beg to report that I have made inquiries and have ascertained that two of the persons mentioned Wannia and Poliaka have been residing for a considerable time with a very advanced German anarchist named Seifert. Until March last the latter lives at 4 Warrington Place Camden Town when he changed his residence and went to N° 6 Windmill Street, Tottenham Court Road, the premises of the now defunct "Autonomie Club", where he still lives … I have endeavored to ascertain if it is their intention to leave London for abroad but amongst their immediate companions it is not considered probable … It appears that they do not mix very much with the other foreign groups partly owing to their not having a knowledge of the language and also owing, it is thought, to the fact of them being very cautious men. It is therefore

[45] Ibid.

[46] See section below.

[47] Report by Melville, 24 Jul. 1894; Report by John Maguire & P. Quinn, 10 Aug. 1894 (T.N.A., HO 45 9739/A54881).

[48] Report by Melville, 24 Jul. 1894 (T.N.A., HO 45 9739/A54881).

> possible that they have made arrangements to leave London, if so it has not transpired among their companions.[49]

We may suppose they made enquiries to their informants to get information on anarchists they might have never come across before. Still, the intelligence gathered is quite detailed, with a particular interest in the potential departure from London of the militants. This confirms that the movement of foreign radical refugees was the main concern of the political police at the time.

Later, on 5 December 1894, Anderson transmitted various information on 'dangerous characters' deported from Belgium:

> In this connection I have studied the Belgian official return of persons expelled for political reasons given in the H.O. file B16586, i.e. the list, "Etat No 1" given at page 5 of the return … N°1 is Henri Dupont whose arrival in this country was reported to the Secretary of State by my letter of the 13th March 1893. This man is a French subject, and was formerly editor of the Anarchist Paper "Le Père Peinard", and was sentenced to 5 years P.S. "in default" in France. He is still in London and continues to be an active anarchist. Nos 5 and 6 on this list are François Birdisol and Louis Antoine whose arrival was reported to H.O. in my letter of the 25th April 1894. These men told my Officers that they had asked to be sent to Germany, but their fares were paid to Dover, where they were landed with by 10/- in money between them.[50]

This demonstrates once again that Anderson was in permanent communication with the Home Office with regards to the question of foreign revolutionaries established in London – a liaison Jenkinson never maintained at the time of the Fenian threat –[51] but also that the C.I.D. preserved the police at ports set up by Jenkinson and were monitoring and established a direct contact with the individuals who were on their way to England.

We also see the presence of Irish expertise at the service of intelligence work at the time. Patrick Quinn, Patrick McIntryre and John Sweeney were Irish born and all members of the original Special Irish Branch, before joining Section D and were all working under the supervision of the Irish native, William Melville, from 1893. This also shows the continuity between the organisations that were dealing with Fenians in the 1880s and those dealing with anarchists in the early 1890s. The fact that former members of the Irish bureau were promoted

[49] Report by John Maguire & P. Quinn, 10 Aug. 1894 (T.N.A., HO 45 9739/A54881).

[50] Report by Anderson, 19 Sept. 1894 (T.N.A., HO 144 587/B2840C).

[51] cf. Chapter 5.

to the Special Branch led to the employment of similar practices and methods to police the anarchists and other revolutionaries in the 1890s.

According to Bernard Porter, twenty-one Special Branch men dealt with the anarchist threat at the end of 1891, before four more officers joined them in December 1894.[52] This reveals the value placed on the English police system attached to the repression of anarchists in the 1890s, a marked change in comparison to the previous years. This specialised work involved a restricted number of men, preserving the secrecy of the institutionalization of political policing practices and reinforcing the increasingly centrally-controlled nature of intelligence work in England.

An increase in central oversight of intelligence work also took place in Paris at the time. Like the Special Branch and the nomination of Melville in 1893, the P.P. saw a change in leadership that same year. Louis Lépine was made Paris police prefect in July 1893, and his nomination was synonymous with reforms in terms of policing techniques and of intelligence work. He created the Identité Judiciaire section and nominated Alphonse Bertillon, who invented a new method of reporting suspects, to manage it.[53] The P.P. employee had developed an anthropometric way to identify criminals. Based on taking different measures of suspects, processed by the Parisian institution, then reported on index cards, Bertillon established a way to identify recidivists.[54] Then, in order to signal a suspect to the police force, the service developed Alphonse Bertillon's method of the *portrait parlé*: 'meticulous descriptions of an individual made especially in order to identify them in public places'.[55] Using hundreds of terms to describe precisely elements of the nose, the ears or the forehead of a suspect, this *portrait parlé* aimed to find suspects that might have previously crossed the path of the P.P. agents.

The creation of a service to promote Bertillon's identifying techniques was not the only *fait d'arme* of Louis Lépine following his arrival at the head of the Parisian institution. On 24 February 1894, the research squads of the P.P. – the service in charge of political policing – were grouped together with the rest of the civil service of the Parisian institution under the Direction Générale des Recherches. This was an important reform, as noted in a 1911 Budget report:

---

[52] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state,* p. 118.

[53] Budget report, 1909*,* p. 83 (A.P.P., DB 47).

[54] Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 403.

[55] Alphonse Bertillon quoted in Milliot (ed.), *Histoire des polices en France*, p. 404.

> Formerly autonomous and rigorously specialized, these active services are, since 1894, placed under the authority of a superior head, the *directeur général* who directs and controls their operations, centralizes the product, and distributes surplus work, which may fall to one or both. These elements thus grouped preserved their particular attributions, but they entered into contacts and their action was strengthened by a regime of collaboration most favorable to the negotiation of the cases. As a whole, the *Direction Générale des Recherches* is a powerful body of information and repression made available to the Administration and the Law.[56]

According to Berlière and Lévy, this new department combined 'all the means, all the civil agents, all the brigades, all the files, all the informants.'[57] Above all, it was now controlling the third research squad, at the avant-garde of the repression of anarchism:

> The third research squad deals especially with individuals who, under the guise of political opinions, commit attacks that can deeply disturb the security of the inhabitants and guests of Paris. Several thousand French or foreign anarchists (the greatest number are on the foreign side) are constantly present in the capital. It is important that they are constantly monitored to ensure that they are aware of their actions to the extent possible and to prevent their criminal projects from being carried out. When attacks are carried out despite its vigilance, the third research squad continues its repression, and its research is greatly facilitated by its special documentation resulting from its daily observations. Because of this specialization, it is still responsible for ensuring the protection, during their stay in the capital, of sovereigns threatened or considered threatened with anarchist attacks. [58]

Louis Puibaraud was made head of this service, as directeur général des recherches, and the third research squad, managed by commissioner Fédée, had as its disposal a hundred detectives in charge of monitoring and gathering information on the anarchists.[59] Alphonse Bertillon and his Identité Judiciaire section was also attached to Puibaraud's directorate, providing photographs and index cards on suspects and criminals to the already powerful Direction des Recherches.[60] The technological innovation of the P.P. was, therefore, put at the service of the central administration to track down anarchists, not only in Paris but also abroad. Indeed, the head of the S.G. transmitted reports to the Paris police prefect about the London anarchists.[61]

---

[56] Budget report, 1911, pp 274-5 (A.P.P., DB 44).

[57] Berlière, Lévy, *Histoire des police en France*, pp 311-2.

[58] Budget report, 1911, pp 275-6 (A.P.P., DB 44).

[59] Jensen, *The Battle against anarchist terrorism*, pp 75-6.

[60] Ibid, p.76.

[61] For example, on 16, 17 and 27 June 1894 and on 9 July 1894 (A.P.P., BA 1509).

This does not mean that the communication between the two institutions was one-sided. On 8 October 1894, the Police prefect addressed a letter to Charles Dupuy, head of government and minister of the interior, to keep him informed of the presence of French anarchists who had settled in London.[62]

Thus, both policing administrations appeared to have been fully equipped to deal with the anarchist agitation in France and England in the early 1890s. Like the Metropolitan Police, the P.P. took advantage of the resurgence of anarchist attacks to innovate in terms of intelligence work. This led the two institutions to collaborate on matters relating to transnational anarchism, despite some tensions arising from policing and diplomatic competition.

9.3 The 'era of attacks': the development of collaboration between London and Paris

In France, historians have characterised the early 1890s as 'an era of anarchist attacks', as the result of an economic crisis affecting the country at the time.[63] Five bombing attacks took place in 1892, two of them being the work of an anarchist known as Ravachol.[64] The anarchist terrorist was arrested on 30 March 1892, after being reported by Jules Lherot, an employee at the restaurant Véry in Paris.[65] This place became the next scene of anarchist violence, with a bomb exploding there on 25 April 1892, killing a client and the owner of the venue.[66] The case of the restaurant Véry offers a good example of the collaboration taking place in the aftermath of the bombing between the French and English police at the time. It also reveals that Great Britain was still considered a safe place for political refugees even if the Special Branch was increasingly monitoring the movement of the militants entering London, especially those coming from France.

On 21 May 1892, the assistant commissioner of police, C.I.D., Robert Anderson, transmitted to Marie-François Goron, the head of the P.P. Surety Department, a list of the French anarchist refugees in London and the club where the militants used to go.[67] An agent of the Surety – Mr Houlier – visited the assistant commissioner to get the information regarding

---

[62] Préfet de police to président du Conseil, 8 Oct. 1894 (A.P.P., BA 1509).

[63] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 212; Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 153.

[64] Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 204.

[65] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 213.

[66] Ibid., p. 215.

[67] Assistant commissioner to Goron, 21 May 1892 (A.P.P., BA 1508).

the French anarchists on behalf of Goron and the Police prefect.[68] If a potential collaboration existed between the two police forces, the P.P. also did not hesitate to rely on informants in London to monitor the anarchist refugees. In the records of the Parisian institutions, there are reports produced by different informants, especially from 'Z n°2', 'Pépin' and 'Zéro'.[69] According to Andrew Cook, 'n°2' and 'Zéro' also collaborated with William Melville at the time.[70] Indeed, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch appeared to have been well informed of the movement of the foreign anarchists in London. Melville produced many reports on the French anarchists that came to London at the time, re-enforcing the idea that he was their 'nemesis',[71] but also confirming that the Special Branch was now fully focused on the surveillance of the militants.

Melville, who was part of the port police in Le Havre earlier in his career, was the perfect agent to track down the French anarchists in London due to his knowledge of the language and of the recent history of the militants.[72] On a report from June 1892, Melville referred to a French anarchist named 'Dufournel' who had been moving between London and the continent and gave precise information on the individual:

> Dufournel is a very advanced Anarchist and is by trade an electrician. Some few years back he was tried at Lyons for being concerned with several others in manufacturing explosives, but owing to his youth at the time he was acquitted. On the occasion Prince Kropotkine was for the same offence sentenced to five years imprisonment.[73]

Another report from 13 July 1892 – like the one produced by the agents of the P.P. in the 1880s –[74] demonstrates the extended information Melville had been able to gather among the French anarchist milieu in London:

> I beg to report that during the past month four foreign Anarchists have arrived in London from abroad having fled their respective countries in consequence of their connection with Anarchism. Their names etc. are as follows:

---

[68] Ibid.

[69] cf. A.P.P., BA 1508.

[70] Cook, *M,* p. 87.

[71] A term used by Bantman, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 383.

[72] Cook, *M,* p. 46.

[73] Report by Melville, Anarchist arrival. Dufournel, 7 June 1892 (T.N.A., HO 144 587/B2840C).

[74] cf. Chapter 3.

> "d'Axa", Editor of the Parisian weekly newspaper "L'Endehors", who is now residing at 53 London St. Fitzroy Square. The newspaper is still published in Paris and d'Axa sends his correspondences from London. This man has recently been condemned in Paris to forms of imprisonment amounting in all to four years (per contumace) and fine of Frs 6,000 for writing articles in his newspaper derogatory of the army and inciting the soldiers to become Anarchists.
> "Louis Joseph Groléau", mechanic native of Angers, France, and
> "Jean Baptiste Barrière", commercial traveller, native of Tulle, France.
> These men left France to avoid imprisonment in connection with Anarchism and made their way to Antwerp where they were apprehended on 24th of April last, but were set at liberty the following month by being reconducted across the frontier into France. They subsequently arrived in London and are now residing at 30 Fitzroy Street, Soho, in the house of a well known Anarchist named Delbecque.[75]

Those reports show that Melville relied on informants among the French anarchist milieu – probably 'Zéro' and 'Z n°2' – but also that he kept himself informed of potential prosecutions and trials, probably via French newspapers.

With regard to Meunier, the suspect in the case of the bombing of the Véry restaurant, the agents of the Special Branch were aware of his presence in the city.[76] A warrant of extradition for Meunier was issued on 27 June 1892 by John Bridge, Chief Magistrate for London, on behalf of the French government.[77] It appeared that Meunier had fled to Argentina before the end of the summer of 1892 but François, his suspected accomplice in the bombing of the restaurant Véry, also travelled to London and was staying off Tottenham Court Road.[78] To help the English police with its investigation, the head of the P.P. Surety Department, Marie-François Goron, who had previously worked with the C.I.D., transmitted the – however incomplete and obsolete – files on the two anarchists in August 1892.[79]

Constance Bantman identified three or four regular French 'agents' who came to London especially to monitor the anarchists between the end of 1892 to the end of 1894, though they appeared to have been quite incompetent.[80] Not being able to rely on the informants who infiltrated the French anarchist's milieu, Melville and his colleague of the Special Branch favoured the old Irish technique of shadowing using a series of disguises and eventually were

---

[75] Report by Melville, arrival of Foreign Anarchists in London, 13 Jul 1892 (T.N.A., HO 144 587/B2840C).

[76] cf. T.N.A., HO 144 485/X37842.

[77] Warrant issued by John Bridge, 27 June 1892 (T.N.A., HO 144 485/X37842).

[78] Solomon, *State Surveillance,* p. 137.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Constance Bantman, *The French Anarchists in London, 1880–1914: Exile and Transnationalism in the First Globalisation* (Liverpool, 2013) quote in Solomon, *State Surveillance,* p. 295.

able to arrest François, who was then extradited to France.[81] According to Vlad Solomon François' 'arrest and expulsion from Britain had shown that Special Branch was capable of keeping the foreign anarchists in London under control'.[82] Furthermore, the work of Melville and his colleague was rewarded, each of them receiving £15 for the arrest of François.[83]

This case thus illustrates the evolution of English policing regarding authors of political crimes and the working relationship existing between the London and Paris policing administrations. Despite François' extradition, it appears that French anarchists continued to seek refuge in England, something the French police seems to have been aware of. On 21 November 1892, the P.P. and Melville's informant 'Z n°2' reported that French police agents were seen and recognized in Charlotte Street by two anarchists companions, Mathieu and Charveron, as they were potentially looking for the preparator of the last attack.[84] We may suppose that this relates to the lethal explosion that took place in the police station on La Rue Des Bons-Enfants on 8 November 1892 and perpetrated by Emile Henry.[85] Though we have not found traces in the archives of the presence of Henry in London after the attack, according to the *Times*, Henry had been seen at 30 Fitzroy Street, a place where Meunier used to live, a few weeks before travelling to France where he set-up the attack on the Café Terminus on 12 February 1894.[86]

On 15 February 1894, Martial Bourdin died in the explosion of a bomb he had just set up in Greenwich Park, London. This failed bombing by a French anarchist represented the first direct attack on English soil. If the militant happened to have been the only victim of the explosion, his actions raised questions about the capacity of the intelligence department if the anarchists started to target Great Britain. The comments in the conservative press, published in *The Times* and the *St James Gazette*, raised the potential existence of an anarchist conspiracy now targeting England, questioned the capacity of the police to arrest those kinds of agitators, and the British policy of welcoming political refugees.[87]

---

[81] Solomon, *State Surveillance,* p. 138.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Report from Z n°2, 21 Nov. 189*2* (A.P.P., BA 1508).

[85] Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France,* p. 214; Gaillat, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République', p. 158.

[86] *The Times,* 16 Feb. 1894, quoted by Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 145.

[87] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 146.

Anderson defended the police arguing that 'to track [Bourdin] was impracticable. All that could be done was to send out officers in every direction to watch persons and places that he might be likely to attack.'[88] It was thus time for Melville and his men to strike a blow against the anarchist refugees and the head of the Special Branch raided the Autonomie Club on the evening of 16 February 1894 –[89] an act similar to the actions of the French police following the Assommoir attack in Lyon in 1882.[90] Furthermore, this led the French and English police forces to meet in London on 20 February 1894 'concerning the measures to be taken for keeping the foreign Anarchists in this country under constant surveillance.'[91] The bombing thus leading to yet more collaboration between the London and Paris police.

The conservative press was still very critical of the Metropolitan Police, and this was also a way to indirectly target the Liberal government, *The Times* arguing that the police held no information on the foreign anarchist refugees in London,[92] something we established was not in fact the case. Colonel Majendie, a British engineer and expert in explosives, still contended that the issue was the lack of knowledge concerning the techniques used by the dynamiters and that he should go to Paris, where they were more advanced on the subject, to familiarize himself with 'the precautionary measures adopted for dealing with emergencies.'[93] According to Majendie, the problem of the English police was technical and not related to intelligence gathering in this case, the technicalities of explosives being something its French counterpart happened to have expertise in.

In another case, the P.P. asked Melville for information on anarchists on 24 April 1894 and the head of the Special Branch got back to him on 8 June 1894 (probably the time needed to gather intelligence on the individuals).[94] He provided the Parisian police with detailed information on Fornaro and Polti, two Italian anarchists, but also on other individuals implicated in the movement, especially French anarchists. However, the object of this correspondence was the potential extradition of Meunier and how his return to France should be organized.[95] The London police also transmitted details on various French anarchists who

---

[88] Robert Anderson, *The lighter side of my official life* (London, 1910), p. 176.

[89] Solomon, *State Surveillance*, pp 146-7.

[90] cf. Chapter 4.

[91] *The Times,* 23 February 1894 (T.N.A., HO 144 257/A55660).

[92] Solomon, *State Surveillance,* p. 148.

[93] Majendie quoted in Solomon, *State Surveillance*, p. 151.

[94] Melville to head of 3rd division, 8 June 1894 (A.P.P., BA 1509).

[95] Ibid.

had settled in the capital city. A document 'translated from English' was transmitted to the directeur general des recherches, Louis Puibaraud, in September 1894. François and Emile Henry are specifically mentioned and their journey in London is particularly detailed.[96]

The political violence used by the anarchist movement appeared to be a central concern for the English and French intelligence-led policing systems in the early 1890s and the internationalization of the movement led the two police forces to co-operate. Despite this evident collaboration, a certain mutual disdain remained between the two police institutions.

First, London seemed to dismiss any comparison with its Parisian counterpart, not wanting to be associated with French forms of secret policing. On the contrary, London wanted, ironically perhaps, to preserve the secrecy surrounding its employment of similar practices. When Préfet Lépine contacted Commissioner Bradford to understand better the functioning and organisation of the Metropolitan Police, the answer of the English policeman really highlighted the differences between the two institutions.[97] He wrote: 'as I should desire owing to the fact that no reliable or even approximate basis of comparison can be set up between the cost and duties of the two Forces such as you wish to make.'[98] He argued that the Parisian police had more power than its London counterpart and that the two institutions performed different duties:

> The Local Government Board is the regulating and governing authority in all matters of Municipal Government and in the administration of the law affecting the public health; and paupers and destitute persons … The Metropolitan Police on the other hand perform duties, which do not appear to come within the scope of the work of the Paris Police. Amongst these are the protection of the Royal Family and Royal Palaces; Dockyards; Arsenals; Military Establishments (other than Barracks) not merely in the Metropolis but also in the provinces. In the Metropolis they also deal with infringements of the Customs and Inland Revenue Laws.[99]

Therefore, according to Bradford, the scope of responsibility of the two institutions were too different to be the object of a comparison. Thus, based on this correspondence, the P.P. attempted to find potential similarities with its English counterpart, something the Metropolitan Police seemed to dismiss. If there were definite differences between the two institutions in terms of organization and policing mission, there might also have been a will from London to separate

[96] From police commissioner to directeur général des recherches, L'anarchie, comment Henry et François ont été reçus à Londres, 16 Sept. 1894 (A.P.P. BA 1509).

[97] Commissioner Bradford to Lépine, 7 May 1894 (A.P.P., BA 1693).

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

itself from the political dimension of its Parisian counterpart, despite being in control of intelligence work in England and thus accustomed with political policing techniques. This highlighted a form of competition existing between the two institutions, with London presenting itself as superior to Paris, by defending its practices but also keen to preserve its secrets.

Second, French detectives sent to London to monitor anarchist activities, circa 1895, appeared very critical of their English counterparts. In a report entitled 'surveillance on anarchists in England' the author of the document expressed his view on the methods employed by the Metropolitan Police:

> We often complained that anarchists were badly monitored in France. In England, they are not monitored at all. In all the United Kingdom, they do what they want. In 1892-1893 they met and discussed in public places; they studied without being troubled in the "making of the best engine". In 1894, after the Greenwich explosion killing the anarchist Martial Bourdin, they decided to start tracking down the anarchists. M. Melville raided the Club Autonomy. We were led to believe that they were eventually going to use the resources available. They didn't.[100]

This was an unfair assessment. If it is true that the Greenwich explosion had a great impact on public opinion in England and forced the central administration to strengthen its policy towards the anarchists, records show that Melville was tracking down refugees years before and, thanks to a large network of informants, gathered a great amount of information on them. This report nevertheless accused the English system of not considering the danger represented by the anarchist threat but also criticized the lack of cooperation with the countries suffering from the attacks:

> The English man, everyone knows that, is extremely selfish. What would it matter to him that people considered as dangerous in France came to his country to conspire to blow up the rest of the world? While its safety is not threatened, while he can come and go as he please, drink his "stout", his "gin" or his "Scotch whisky", he doesn't care. The Universe could crumble, he wouldn't mind … This proves that in England, only one-thing matters: keeping the tranquillity in all the United Kingdom, without any consideration for the rest of the world.[101]

The exchanges that took place between London and Paris the previous years show, on the contrary, the English police's will to cooperate with other powers to police the anarchists.

[100] L'Anarchie à Londres (A.P.P. BA, 1510).

[101] Ibid.

Therefore, the author of this document appeared to criticize the English police, and especially Melville, while not being aware of the intelligence work exercised by the Special Branch and the C.I.D. in the policing of the militants and their potential extraditions. There were evident tensions between the two police forces, but a general willingness to co-operate on certain key matters prevailed at this time and probably helped to prevent more serious violence from arising.

The 1890s were still a period marked by political violence in France, England and Ireland. Dublin relied on a network of intelligence based on Irish men present all over the United Kingdom to prevent a revival of political violence. The French and English police reviewed their approach in terms of political policing and adapted themselves to an anarchist movement more dangerous than ever before. London and Paris were, at this time, able to rely on a centralized administration in charge of intelligence to monitor and repress the revolutionary militants. Furthermore, the wave of anarchist attacks gave the Metropolitan and the Parisian police opportunities to implement innovative techniques of political policing and intelligence. Melville and the Special Branch in London and Puibaraud and the Direction des Recherches in Paris were at the *avant garde* of the policing of an anarchist movement terrorizing all Europe. Both institutions reinforced their control over intelligence work.

When an anarchist movement, now targeting heads of state all over the world, appeared more threatening than ever at the turn of the century, the necessity for international coordination of police efforts came again to challenge the French and English systems. And, with the necessity to preserve the secrecy of political policing but also to co-operate to stop a movement making use of political violence, policing rivalries accelerated at the end of the nineteenth century.

Chapter 10

Anarchism and International competition: the limits of police co-operation. England and France compared (1898-1910)

The turn of the twentieth century represented a shift in terms of political agitation on an international scale. The threat of anarchism was still present in Europe and abroad but was less of a direct concern for England and France. While in France the activities of the militants decreased in the second half of the 1890s, London was still welcoming individuals expelled from their home country or who had fled because of their political views, despite being the target of attacks in 1892-94.[1] The anarchist movement was still internationalizing itself and the murder by an Italian anarchist, Luigi Lucheni, of the Empress Elizabeth of Austria on 10 September 1898 led to the first attempt to coordinate anti-anarchist action across Europe. Organized by the Italian government, the 'International anti-anarchist conference' took place in Rome from 24 November to 21 December 1898. If different measures were drawn up and police co-operation encouraged by the parties present at the conference, neither France nor Great Britain were ready to implement a network of transnational policing to meet the transnational threat of anarchism. Both countries were protective of the secrecy surrounding their methods of political policing and fought against developing forms of international coordination of policing efforts for fear that it would undermine their own security. This was a time when national sovereignty and security was key and international co-operation was increasingly met with suspicion.

Constance Bantman, who has discussed the question of police collaboration between Great Britain and its European counterparts, concludes that it was restrained by diplomatic issues but also because of the necessity for England to protect the secrecy of its policing system.[2] Richard Bach Jensen researched the international dimension of the fight against anarchism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and reflected on the limits of the Rome anti-anarchist international conference to implement a transnational policy but acknowledged its role in increasing communication between European police forces.[3] Mathieu Deflem, a

[1] cf. Chapter 9.

[2] Bantman, *Un premier exil libertaire,* pp 235-40.

[3] Richard Bach Jensen 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol', *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (April 1981) pp 323-347; Jensen, *The Battle against anarchist terrorism*, pp 131-184.

specialist in the historical foundations of police co-operation, argues that the lack of independence of the police forces from their central administration prevented the implementation of lasting collaboration at the time of the conference.[4] The recent research of Thomas Bausardo and Thomas Beugniet stressed the position of France in this collaboration, pointing to the existence of bilateral agreements with other Europeans countries but the refusal of the French government to implement an international organization coordinating the fight against anarchism.[5]

Correspondence between Philipp Curie, British ambassador in Italy representing Great Britain at the anti-anarchist conference in Rome, and the prime minister, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, Marquess of Salisbury, and the report of the debates – written in French − sent by the ambassador, provide important insights on the event.[6] The précis of the proceedings of the conference produced by Howard Vincent, former head of the C.I.D. and representing Great Britain in Rome, summed-up the position of his country concerning the repression of anarchism.[7] In this document, he explains that the police delegates of each country met at the conference but that no notes were taken during those exchanges.[8] If the French government was restricting policing collaboration when it came to the repression of the anarchists, the archives of the S.G. and the P.P. show that exchanges between the French institutions and its foreign colleagues have been set in the early twentieth century.[9]

The aim of this chapter is to understand English and French reluctance to implement permanent legislation and common processes with their European counterparts, while the continent was facing a proven transnational threat – in this case anarchist terrorism. We will argue that this was the result of the necessity, for Paris and London, to preserve their independence in matters of political policing, while it also reflects their need to protect the secrecy of their system and to promote its superiority abroad. This chapter first analyzes the

[4] Deflem, *Policing world society*, pp 72-3.

[5] Thomas Bausardo, 'Les coopérations internationales de la France dans la lutte contre le terrorisme (fin XIXe siècle-1989)' (PhD thesis, Paris IV, 2015); Thomas Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) » et les débuts d'une coopération internationale contre le terrorisme de la fin du XIXe siècle à la Première Guerre mondiale' (MA thesis, Université de Nantes, 2016).

[6] cf. T.N.A., FO 881/7179.

[7] Précis of the proceedings at the anti-Anarchist conference convened at Rome in November 1898 presented by Howard Vincent at the House of Commons, 6 Jul. 1906 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[8] Ibid., p.2.

[9] cf. A.N., F7 14605; A.P.P., DB 47.

question of police co-operation by England and France with other nations in the fight against a transnational threat through the anti-anarchist conference taking place in 1898, before reflecting on how London attempted to limit police co-operation to preserve the secrecy of its intelligence system, while Paris was finding ways to present itself as the champion of policing in Europe.

10.1 The Rome Anti-Anarchist Conference, December 1898

If in France the threat of anarchism decreased from the mid-1890s, militants kept planning attacks all over Europe and were now targeting heads of state. The French President, Sadi Carnot, was assassinated by an Italian anarchist in Lyon in June 1894 and there was, as mentioned, the killing of the Empress Elizabeth of Austria on 10 September 1898. The nationality of the empress' assassin and the anti-Italian riots taking place in Austria and Switzerland following the event, led Rome to take the initiative of organizing the conference.[10] The Italian government saw the emergence of a socialist party trying to emphasize its distance from violent anarchist movements and used the event as an opportunity to repress anarchism and limit the influence of socialism.[11]

Although, as we saw in the last chapter, the English were willing to co-operate in particular cases with their French counterparts, they were, initially at least, reluctant to participate in wider forms of international co-operation. When the Spanish government sent an offer to London 'to enter into arrangements for common international action against Anarchists' in December 1893,[12] this was refused by the British government for reasons stated by Foreign Secretary Lord Rosebery:

> Our laws are strong enough to deal with anarchism if directed against our own government … Persons committing acts of violence abroad and fleeing to England would be extradited unless the offence were deemed political, and this I feel sure it would not be if the offence were anything like the bomb throwing into the Barcelona theatre.[13]

At the time, London was still defending its liberal policing towards the anarchist refugees. The situation was different five years later. According to Richard Bach Jensen, London was more willing to take part in the conference because of the emotional reaction the murder of the

[10] Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »', p.52.

[11] Ibid., pp 85-93.

[12] Foreign Office to the under-secretary of state, Home Office, 7 Dec. 1893 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450).

[13] Minutes by Godfrey Lushington, 8 Dec. 1893 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450).

Empress caused within public opinion in Great Britain and the cordial relations existing between the British and Italian governments.[14] Salisbury and the Conservatives, in power at the time, were more concerned than their predecessors with immigration issues and the fear of England being isolated from the rest of Continental Europe.[15]

In a letter sent to Salisbury on 17 November 1898 – a few days before the conference – F.R. Plunkett, the British ambassador in Belgium, mentioned that he recently met F. Latour, the secretary general of the Belgian Department of Justice, and that he would be the second Belgian delegate at the event.[16] The British civil servant wrote that:

> on most points, the position of Belgium, as to the possible means of combatting Anarchism, would be similar to that of Great Britain. [Latour] added, however, that the British Delegates would have probably to meet a determined attack from the great majority of the Continental Powers in regard to the freedom, which was allowed in England, to foreign refugees for concerting and preparing criminal attempts to be executed abroad.[17]

This represents the feelings of other European countries towards British liberalism when it came to the policing of anarchism and the potential repressive policies that might be proposed at the conference. Indeed, the British government appeared reluctant to engage in potential changes to legal principles:

> H.M.'s Government do not anticipate that Parliament would be disposed to sanction any legislation involving a material departure from these principles, and they feel it their duty to make a reservation on this point at the outset, in order to avoid all cause of subsequent disappointment or misconception.[18]

Twenty-one European countries sent at least one delegate to the conference: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, Turkey.[19] Ireland was not directly concerned with the subject and was represented

---

[14] Jensen, *The Battle against anarchism terrorism,* pp 149-50.

[15] Ibid., p. 152.

[16] Plunkett to Salisbury, 17 Nov. 1898 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450).

[17] Ibid.

[18] Précis of the proceedings at the anti-Anarchist conference convened at Rome in November 1898 presented by Howard Vincent at the House of Commons, 6 Jul. 1906, p. 2 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[19] Correspondence respecting the Anti-Anarchist conference held at Rome in 1898*,* pp 8-9 (T.N.A., FO 881/7179).

as part of the United Kingdom. Great Britain sent Sir Philip Curie, the British ambassador in Italy, Godfrey Lushington, the permanent under-secretary, and Howard Vincent, former head of the Metropolitan Police C.I.D. to the conference.[20] France, for its part, sent its ambassador stationed in Italy, Camille Barrère, Léopold Vigué, the head of the S.G. and Georges Boutet, Avocat Genéral à la Cour d'Appel de Paris.[21]

Bausardo and Beugniet, who closely analyzed the French position at the time of the anti-anarchist conference in their respective theses, both rightly argue that Paris approached the coordination of the fight against anarchism as a diplomatic issue and not as a policing one.[22] If Vigué appears as a logical choice regarding the S.G. role in the surveillance of anarchists in France, the French ambassador had first proposed Louis Puibaraud from the P.P., but this was rejected by the head of the government arguing that the object of the conference went beyond the powers of the Parisian institution.[23] If the P.P. was actually at the *avant garde* of the fight against anarchism[24], the French government preferred to appoint Vigué in charge of an institution present all over the territory. Still, Léon Leleux, deputy chief of the Parisian prefect, was sent to the conference as co-delegate, challenging this explanation.[25] Indeed, Thomas Beugniet argues that the decision to pick Vigué instead of Puibaraud relates to the personality of the directeur général des recherches. [26] Puibaraud was known and identified as a champion of covert methods of policing, never hesitating to act in secrecy to achieve aims.[27] His presence at an event promoting transparent co-operation between European powers would thus be sending the wrong diplomatic signal.[28]

We may also interrogate the motivation of the British government not to appoint William Melville, the head of the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, as their police delegate and to choose a retired policeman, Howard Vincent. Former head of the Metropolitan Police C.I.D.

---

[20] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et Anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 419.

[21] Correspondence respecting the Anti-Anarchist conference held at Rome in 1898, p. 8. (T.N.A., FO 881/7179).

[22] Bausardo, 'Les coopérations internationales de la France dans la lutte contre le terrorisme', pp 68-70 ; Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »', p. 211.

[23] Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »', pp 124-5.

[24] cf. Chapter 9.

[25] Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »' p.125.

[26] Ibid., pp 125-6.

[27] Notice biographique Louis Puibaraud, *Société française d'histoire de la police* (https://www.sfhp.fr/index.php?post/2009/05/02/Notice-biographique-Louis-Puibaraud) (9 Nov. 2024).

[28] Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »', pp 125-6.

who left the police for a political and military career in 1884, Vincent was trained as a lawyer, and was known for his policing expertise, not only in England but also in France as he studied the Parisian police in the 1870s.[29] Due to his position, the former agent might also have a more global approach of political policing.

According to Richard Bach Jensen: 'The Rome Congress's first problem was to arrive at a legal definition of what was "anarchism". This was crucial, since no parliament or court in Europe had clearly resolved this question'.[30] At the beginning of the conference, the Russian ambassador argued that 'anarchism could not be considered as a political doctrine', something agreed unanimously by the delegates.[31] This way, anarchist action was not considered as a political action but as a common law crime to be prosecuted as such. The key issues for the conference were detailed as follow:

> 1. Establishing the facts characterizing the anarchist act, either concerning the individual or his actions.
> 2. Suggesting, in term of police legislation, the means best adopted to repress the anarchist act and propaganda, while obviously respecting the legal and administrative autonomy of each state.
> 3.Researching if any anarchist act that can be considered as an offense, as it is, and whatever the reason or form, be subjected to extradition treaties.
> 4. Examining the means to maintain the surveillance of the anarchists by the police and if necessary, proceed to their expulsion or extradition.
> 5. Studying the most suitable means while respecting the legal spirit of each State, to avert or prevent the diffusion of printed anarchist propaganda.[32]

The first point relates to the need to define legally what 'anarchism' meant. The second theme reflects on the most relevant legislative and policing means to repress anarchism, while respecting each country's legislative and administrative autonomy. The conference also debated whether anarchist acts should be the object of extradition treaties. The parties were also to study the most relevant means to prevent the circulation of anarchist documentation while respecting the 'social spirit' of each state involved.

If most discussions focused on the legal actions that the parties could implement to counter anarchism, Vincent explained that a sub-committee, formed on his suggestion,

---

[29] cf. Chapter 2.

[30] Jensen, 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898', p. 327.

[31] Beugniet, '« La conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome (1898) »', p. 138.

[32] Correspondence respecting the Anti-Anarchist conference held at Rome in 1898, p. 7 (T.N.A., FO 881/7179) – Translated from French.

discussed 'the details of police intercommunication … and consisted only of the direct representatives of the sixteen police forces taking part in the Conference … without minutes or written reports.'[33] This was the result of the discussion:

> It declared that the close surveillance of anarchists was necessary, and recommended:
>
> (a) That each Government should appoint a central authority for the purpose.
> (b) That such central authorities of all countries should enter into direct relations with each other, and reciprocally communicate all useful information.
> (c) That unless the legislation of the country expelling an individual was opposed thereto, an expelled anarchist should be taken to the frontier of his own country, and that intermediate authorities should facilitate such transport – the police authorities giving each other timely warning.
> (d) That the "portrait parlé," in use by the French police, be used as the international descriptive form. (This has practically been done. See Police Code, 12th ED., p.61).[34]

Besides these propositions formulated by the sub-committee, Vincent insisted on the benefit of collaboration between the different forces: 'I have little doubt that the result of these confidential meetings of Heads of Police will do good, if only by forming reciprocal friendships leading to greater co-operation.'[35] The former head of the C.I.D. still expressed his concern that the result of the conference would be to make England 'a depôt for the expelled of all countries', as foreign governments would be able to send anarchists abroad, something not possible for London as English legislation prevented evicting criminal foreigners.[36] The British government was, however, not supportive of a shared policy in regards to the repression of anarchists:

> There is no less desire in Great Britain than elsewhere, to do everything possible to prevent perpetration of violent crimes against Heads of States from foreign countries. These kinds of acts are crimes according to the law of the United Kingdom, and the English police, in the measures she takes against the persons suspected in carrying out [those acts] already cooperate with foreign police forces. But the Queen's government will see, I believe a serious difficulty to recognize, formally or officially, a combined action, as suggested here, with the policing of other countries. We consider that these kinds of arrangements should be left at the discretion of each government.[37]

---

[33] Précis of the proceedings at the anti-Anarchist conference convened at Rome in November 1898 presented by Howard Vincent at the House of Commons, 6 Jul. 1906, p. 4 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[34] Ibid.

[35] Correspondence respecting the Anti-Anarchist conference held at Rome in 1898, p. 70 (T.N.A., FO 881/7179).

[36] Ibid.

[37] Correspondence respecting the Anti-Anarchist conference held at Rome in 1898, p. 58 (T.N.A., FO 881/7179) – Translated from French.

A difference seems to exist here between the British central administration and its police representative at the conference, the latter keen to extend co-operation and alliances with its counterparts, while politicians seem to favour bilateral diplomatic relations in this matter. If this can be explained by a desire of the British government to keep its independence with regards to the prosecution of individuals responsible for political violence, it was not, however, simply in defense of common law rights. Indeed, London saw this internationalization of policing not so much as a threat to conventional English values but something that risked revealing to the world and to its own citizens its extensive use of political policing. As Constance Bantman argues, 'the British specificity remains in its reluctance to publicly claim its use of political surveillance' in attempting to defend its liberal superiority and maintain its exceptionality in the European policing landscape.[38] Clive Emsley contends that this was both linked to preserving the idea of a 'different and non-political' British police, but also to the minor impact anarchists had in England compared to the rest of continental Europe.[39]

At the end of the conference, all the countries signed the protocol except for Great Britain and France. This was a limited diplomatic success, especially, as Richard Bach Jensen argues, as the protocol was not transformed into legal and practical actions.[40] The historian still contends that the *portrait parlé* − a method of identifying criminals relying on a database of physical features −[41] was adopted in several countries.[42] Thus it can be seen as a partial policing success and resonates with Vincent's opinion on the event:

> I am not of the opinion that a Diplomatic Conference, meeting with much publicity, and responsible to Governments and Parliaments, can do much to repress violent anarchism. But, on the other hand, nothing but good can come out of International Police Conferences. Their very mystery inspires criminal conspirators with fear, and the exchange of views and mutual confidence engendered are conductive to successful activity and co-operation which, with the rapidly increasing means of locomotion, the spread of information, and the incendiary influences of publicity and notoriety are more and more essential.[43]

---

[38] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et Anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 381.

[39] Clive Emsley, 'Nineteenth-Century Britain: A Country without political police?' in *National security as a transnational issue. The nineteenth-century origins*, Contemporanea, 4/2019, p. 650.

[40] Jensen, 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898', p. 333.

[41] cf. Chapter 9.

[42] Jensen 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898', p. 333.

[43] Précis of the proceedings at the anti-Anarchist conference convened at Rome in November 1898 presented by Howard Vincent at the House of Commons, 6 Jul. 1906, p. 8. (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

The former C.I.D. agent therefore argued for a policing solution in this case and not a diplomatic one.

The outcome of the Rome conference was mixed, with the failure to have a protocol adopted by all parties and the lack of implementation of legal action afterward. It might, however, have reinforced the connection between the European police forces as suggested by Howard Vincent but most importantly opened doors for future collaboration, such as the anarchist protocol of St Petersburg in 1904. There were, however, clearly limits to collaboration and co-operation.

10.2 The limits of collaboration: the protection of the English system of secret policing

The anarchist movement appeared as less of a direct concern for France and England at the turn of the century and, as noted, neither Paris nor London signed the anti-anarchist protocol drawn up at the Rome conference in 1898. Both countries appeared, in theory, to support police co-operation with their foreign counterparts to monitor the agitators travelling to their country. Those principles were tested in the early twentieth century, however, with England adopting an ambiguous position when it came to sharing information. The refusal of the British government to sign the anti-anarchist conference protocol was linked to the limited actions of anarchists in England but also to a British self-perception of exceptionalism rooted in a supposed liberal tradition that allowed for relative freedom of political dissent and therefore, crucially, wanting to keep its use of political policing a secret. While Howard Vincent was promoting cooperation between the different European police forces at the time of the Rome conference,[44] London stood out for its isolationism at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The assassination of US President McKinley in September 1901 by an anarchist reactivated the need to coordinate the repression of anarchism at an international level. Count Lamsdorff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, wrote to the English ambassador in Russia in November 1901, encouraging the creation of a central bureau, as suggested in the Rome conference's resolutions in 1898 'with the aim of establishing a rigorous surveillance on the Anarchists.'[45] He also argued in favor of exchanges of information and of an international regulation to expel anarchists.[46] In terms of policing collaboration, the Rome conference also

[44] Ibid.

[45] Count Lamsdorff to British ambassador, 23 Nov. 1901 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450) – Translated from French.

[46] Ibid.

instituted the use of Alphonse Bertillon's *portrait parlé* as well as the monthly circulation of a list, drawn up by each European country and sent to the others, of expelled individuals and the reason for their expulsions.[47] The British government still contended that they did not benefit from this practice.[48] London refused to expand their policing collaborations, arguing that this might reveal the identities of informants,[49] individuals essential to any kind of intelligence work at the time. At the same time, Scotland Yard gave up the system of *portrait parlé* (first adopted in 1898) in favour of the fingerprint system of identification.[50] Originally developed by William Herschel, a British officer in India, it was popularized by Francis Galton in the early 1890s who established that fingerprints were permanent and unique to each individuals. At the same time, Bengal police officials developed a system of fingerprints classification and set up the first fingerprint bureau in Calcutta. Later, in 1901, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Edward Henry, who studied the system while he was stationed in Bengal a few years beforehand, set up the first fingerprints files to be used by the police to identify recidivist criminals.[51]

Different foreign governments expressed the desire to observe the police methods employed by the English police to protect members of the royal family in the early twentieth century.[52] When German police detectives made the request to study Metropolitan Police operations, the Commissioner Edward Bradford made his objections known, basing his argument on the 'extremely delicate nature' of the mission and the impossibility for the German officer to meet the agents involved in this mission, at the risk of putting said agents – probably by revealing their identities to potential agitators − in danger.[53] Bradford also dismissed the request by pointing out the differences in both policing systems, making this visit useless:

> With regard to the general work of the Criminal Branch, the laws which govern the work of the Metropolitan Police are so different from those in force in Germany, that I fail to see how any useful result could be attained by the proposed visit.[54]

---

[47] Beugniet, '« La Conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome »', p. 194.

[48] Ibid., p. 195.

[49] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et Anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 422.

[50] Beugniet, '«La Conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome »', p. 205.

[51] For more details on this see: G. S. Sodhi and Jasjeet Kaur, 'The forgotten Indian pioneers of fingerprint science' in *Current Science*, lxxxviii, no. 1 (2005), pp 185–91.

[52] Police - Metropolitan: Requests by Foreign Governments for facilities to study police methods especially protection of the Sovereign, 1900-1901 (T.N.A., HO 144 527/X79683).

[53] Bradford to under-secretary of state, 2 Aug. 1900 (T.N.A., HO 144 527/X79683).

[54] Ibid.

If the protection of the British agents in charge of the security of the royals appeared as a comprehensive argument in this case, defending an incompatibility of policing systems went against the principles outlined at the anti-anarchist conference of Rome in 1898. Collaboration between the states and police organizations was seen as necessary to put an end to the anarchist international plot targeting sovereigns. Thus, this refusal from the Metropolitan Police commissioner may be interpreted as designed to maintain the secrecy of the English system – and its 'dirty secrets' – and a sign of his distrust towards the German government, something explaining their refusal to sign the agreement in 1898.

At the time, the rivalry between Germany and Great Britain was growing: they had a different point of view regarding the European order, but also different colonial, industrial and military interests, culminating in a naval arms race ahead of the First World War.[55] As Constance Bantman contends, London was suspicious of foreign police forces and the British authorities feared becoming the victim of political spying,[56] thus explaining their unwillingness to collaborate with Berlin. A few months later, relying on the same arguments of 'police incompatibility', Bradford refused the request made by the Dutch Councillor Snyder van Wissenkerke to study the organization of the Metropolitan Police.[57]

At the same time, the English police, while protecting its own methods of surveillance, was also denouncing the lack of collaboration from its European counterparts. In a memorandum from January 1902, Edward Henry, the assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, defended the English police and its actions against anarchists:

> Since 1887, the observation of anarchists has been entrusted to the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police who work under their own officers, their reports being submitted through their Superintendents. In this way the needed amounts of centralizations have been secured. Their work, however, has been carried out under difficulties the Special Branch receiving but little assistance from the Continental Police. It is true that periodically they receive from France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Greece, Switzerland and Holland reports from either the Police or the Minister of Justice regarding the anarchist movement in these countries and when expulsions are made the fact is occasionally noticed but such expulsions are often made weeks before the reports arrive. The last list of expulsed received from France is dated December 1901, the preceding lists have come in January of that year. No such list has, at any time, been

[55] For more detail on this, see Paul Kennedy, *The rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, 1982), pp 157-290.

[56] Bantman, 'Anarchismes et Anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne', p. 391

[57] Bradford to under-secretary of state, 22 Feb. 1901 (T.N.A., HO 144 527/X79683).

> sent by Germany, Russia, Spain or Italy. In no instance has a foreign Government given us notice of their intention to expel or of the impending arrival in this country of expulses.[58]

Henry promoted the efficiency of the administrative structure of the English police, suggesting the non-necessity of implementing a 'central bureau' in London to gather and share information with its European counterparts, while noting the lack of information transmitted by foreign governments regarding expelled agitators coming to England.[59] The assistant commissioner insisted on the difficulty of the work of the Special Branch who 'had to depend upon their own enquiries for ascertaining the individuals to be brought on the Anarchists' Register with a view to a more or less strict surveillance being maintained.'[60] Refusing to recommend alterations to English law, Henry was still open to co-operation 'within well-defined limits, between the Police forces of the several States'.[61]

A few months later, Edward Bradford, the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, reaffirmed the autonomy of his institution regarding the monitoring of anarchists, as most of the militants resided in the capital city, following a memorandum addressed by the German government.[62] Refusing to circulate the information the Special Branch gathered on the anarchists to foreign police forces by insisting on the impossibility of evaluating the reliability of intelligence provided by informants and the need to protect them, Bradford was still willing to give some information on criminal foreigners:

> While putting forward these objections to communicating all information concerning Anarchists which may reach them, the Metropolitan Police fully realize that the obligation rests upon them of communicating at once to the authorities concerned any credible intelligence they may receive of action contemplated by alien residents here against the public tranquility of other countries or against the lives of persons residing there, and that it is their duty to spare no efforts to obtain such information.[63]

Bradford then concluded that he could share with Germany, and other countries concerned, information on the movement of 'dangerous Anarchists whose arrival here has been notified

---

[58] Memorandum by Edward Henry, 7 Jan. 1902 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450).

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Bradford to under-secretary, 29 April 1902 (T.N.A., HO 45 10254/X36450).

[63] Ibid.

and whose signalment or photograph or particulars to antecedents have been forwarded'.[64] In other words, London was only collaborating when it came to anarchist individuals that had been signaled as criminal, but not regarding militants wanted because of their political values and views. This was once again in accordance with English values, but also a way to protect the nature of the political policing practices used by the Metropolitan Police from becoming too well known to other powers or, indeed, the British public.

While Bradford was proposing this form of collaboration, the Italian ambassador in Great Britain sent on a memorandum indicating a potential anarchist plot with its roots in London and arguing in favor of a collaboration between the police forces:

> From certain information received by Anarchists in Italy it would appear that some serious conspiracies have for some times been watched by their companions in London with a view to the perpetration of outrages to be attempted simultaneously in Italy, Belgium and Spain … Given the importance of such information received by the Italian police authorities, it would be desirable that the London Police be especially warned in order that measures may be taken to increase the vigilance over respected persons and, if possible, to obtain and communicate to the Italian Government particulars of the plots above mentioned. [65]

With regards to the European dimension of the threat, the Italian representative thus promoted a collaboration between Rome and London to prevent the plot. Furthermore, the ambassador also proposed the organization of a 'special Police service of surveillance over the anarchists residing in London' at the time of the festivities for the Coronation, relying on an Italian police commissioner working in London since July 1901:

> It is further suggested in the Memorandum that a Commissaire of the Italian Police, who has been in London since July last, might be placed in direct communication with Scotland Yard, and that he might procure the attendance of some Italian detectives, acquainted with the Italian Anarchists, during the Coronation festivities.[66]

Bradford was aware of the presence of the Italian policeman:

---

[64] Ibid.

[65] Memorandum communicated by the Italian Ambassador on the 23rd of April 1902 (T.N.A., HO 144 545/A55176).

[66] Sanderson to under-secretary of state, 15 May 1902 (T.N.A., HO 144 545/A55176).

> I may remark that the presence in London of an Italian Government Agent has been known to the Special Branch of the Criminal Investigation Department from the date of his arrival; and having also been aware of the agency he employed, they have been in a position to appraise the value of the information he received and transmitted to his Government.[67]

The 'agent' mentioned by Bradford was Gennaro Rubino, also known as Rubini, an Italian 'anarchist' acting as an 'agent provocateur' but also a double agent who attempted to kill the Belgian king.[68] Employing 'agents provocateur' was a *modus operandi* officially condemned by the police commissioner to preserve the liberal image of the British government even though they were used in relation to Irish nationalism years before:

> I hold very strongly that the arrangements made by the Italian Government seriously aggravated the danger they are designed to check. It is quite certain that the police everywhere must rely upon private agency for news as to what occurs at the secret meetings where matters of importance come under discussion. It is equally certain that so long as there is distrust as to the manner in which information will be dealt with, persons in position to supply it will refrain from doing so through dread of the vengeance of comrades which would follow upon their connection with the authorities being suspected.[69]

The commissioner concluded his notes by acknowledging the offer of the Italian ambassador and assuring his government that the Metropolitan Police would communicate any information that could be of use.[70]

Both examples – Berlin and Rome – show the will of the British intelligence administration to limit itself to diplomatic exchanges, never taking the steps of a concrete and official policing collaboration or implementing a legal change to their extradition policies. Like Rome, other governments offered to collaborate with London regarding the repression of anarchism in the early twentieth century. Brussels, for instance, was willing to communicate information on anarchists – of any nationality – leaving Belgium for England, on the condition that the Metropolitan Police would provide information on the anarchists leaving England for Belgium.[71] London was still, however, refusing to establish official police channels to repress anarchism. Great Britain, like France, did not sign the Secret Protocol against anarchists

[67] Memorandum by Bradford, 24 May 1902 (T.N.A., HO 144 545/A55176).

[68] Memorandum by Henry, 16 March 1903 (T.N.A., HO 144 545/A55176).

[69] Memorandum by Bradford, 24 May 1902 (T.N.A., HO 144/545/A55176).

[70] Ibid.

[71] Favereau to Constantine Phipps, 13 Jan. 1903 (T.N.A., HO 144 668/X84164).

established at St Petersburg in 1904 and thus did not set up a bureau to exchange information between each countries' central bureaus.[72] The British government affirmed that 'The Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, London, is the official with whom foreign police authorities should communicate, when necessary, on this subject' and therefore did not require a specific bureau to deal with this.[73] As explained by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, the Marquess of Lansdowne, this left London at 'full liberty to modify their own arrangements for the repression of anarchical crime as occasion may arise.'[74] This way, the British government kept its independence in terms of policing the anarchists and did not have to share its intelligence techniques.

Furthermore, in August 1906, Edward Henry, now commissioner of the police of the metropolis, was opposed to the visit of Spanish detectives 'to study the system adopted by the Metropolitan Police in dealing with Anarchists and other extremists.' He insisted that the work of the Special Branch relied mostly on informants and that this operation could compromise the sources necessary to infiltrate anarchist networks.[75] The British government was strongly opposed to the visit of foreign police to London, something Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Edward Grey reaffirmed following a request from the Spanish government in September 1906.[76]

The Metropolitan police commissioner was also opposed to encoding the communications sent to the Russian police relating to the militants:

> The new departure suggested of communications being made direct to the Police of St. Petersburg is not expedient, since the change suggested, involving the use of a cipher, could not result in any material saving in time, while the risk of serious results arising from the possible mis-spelling of difficult Russian and Polish names would be increased and much additional work would be thrown upon the Police Department here by placing the Russian and Metropolitan Police in direct communication, and no doubt other Governments would soon seek equal facilities, and a situation of great embarrassment might result.[77]

If this appears as a legitimate cost issue, this once again probably also relates to the desire to maintain a certain secrecy around the employment of political practices by the English police

[72] Secret Protocol signed at St Petersburgh, March 1, 1904 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[73] The Marquess of Lansdowne to Count Benckendorff, 17 June 1904 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[74] Ibid.

[75] Henry to under-secretary of state, 21 Aug. 1906 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

[76] Sir Edward Grey to Herbert Gladstone, 5 Sept. 1906 (T.N.A., FO 800/97, Folio 17).

[77] Henry to under-secretary of state, 1 Dec. 1906 (T.N.A., HO 144 757/118516).

and the potential embarrassment if the English government and police were seen to co-operate in political repression with an autocratic regime.

Despite Vincent's support for forms of international police co-operation at the Rome conference in 1898, in practice the English police collaboration was limited to diplomatic communication and had to be in London's interests and not solely in favor of the repression of the anarchist or other political movements. London seemed to favour informal arrangements to meet the demands of foreign governments rather than relying on official policing structures or legal accords. The French approach, as we shall now see, was somewhat different.

10.3 The French approach: making use of political agitation to expand policing influence

Like London, Paris did not ratify the Rome protocol, but its approach was different. If the Rome conference was the scene of a policing competition with each country trying to impose its system as the best, Paris, in the interest of maintaining the assumed superiority of its police system, kept collaborating with foreign forces with the aim of promoting its policing methods. If the French government supported the repressive legislation adopted by the conference as it was based on its own laws, it was the administrative measures that appeared to be an issue.[78]

Paris agreed that each state needed to monitor the anarchists present in its territory, something France had been doing for years.[79] Regarding the central authority in charge of surveillance, the French government contended that this was the role of the head of the S.G. and that he already communicated, unofficially, information on anarchists to foreign counterparts.[80] To sanction by an international agreement those communications between the different governments, however, 'could be interpreted by public opinion as the creation of an international policing service.'[81] The French government wanted to avoid a political issue, as a European central police authority would have raised serious concerns that could be exploited by the opposition and feared by the public on the basis that it was incompatible with a liberal republican regime.

If Paris was not willing to be controlled by a central bureau it was, unlike London, more inclined to share information with its European neighbors and to welcome them in France. This

[78] Statement from French Republic government, 20 April 1899 quoted in Beugniet, '«La Conférence anti-Anarchiste de Rome »', p. 211.

[79] Note sur les polices étrangères fonctionnant en France, 19 Juin 1914 [Note on foreign police forces working in France, 19 June 1914] (A.N., F7 14605).

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

was done in the interests of international co-operation to repress anarchism. The Ministry of the Interior allowed the prefects to directly communicate information to the Italian consul in regard to the militants on 27 June 1899:

> Following the request expressed by M. the Italian Ambassador, for the purpose of ensuring in a common interest the rapidity of the information communication relating to the monitoring of anarchists, you [the prefects] are now allowed to communicate directly with the Italian consul relating to your department, anything that concerned the Italian anarchists. Nevertheless, I recommend you keep me updated on those communications.[82]

Thus, Waldeck-Rousseau permitted a more direct cooperation than in England with the Italian authorities but asked to be informed of this collaboration, a way to keep centralizing the intelligence circulating throughout the country and abroad. In the case of Paris, the Italian anarchists appeared to be heavily monitored and, from the 1890s, Italian policemen were working in France in a clandestine way but with the tacit agreement of the French authorities.[83] A French policeman was also sent to Milan following the assassination of King Umberto I to help his Italian counterparts. He recognized and welcomed their willingness to collaborate.[84] Thus, at the turn of the century, this policing collaboration took on a more official aspect between France and Italy.

But the official and systemic nature of this cooperation was still limited. Like England, the French government did not sign the St Petersburgh protocol in 1904, which made mandatory those communications between the Europeans authorities: 'It does not seem necessary to sanction the requirement of this correspondence by an international protocol, which could cause disadvantages on political aspects'.[85] Like London, Paris was unwilling to regulate and legalize policing collaboration due to the secret and sometimes *illegal* nature of their intelligence work. The Parisian police was, however, open to sharing its policing techniques with other police forces and, in this way, establish itself as a model for its international counterparts at the beginning of the twentieth century.

---

[82] Ibid.

[83] Bausardo, 'Les coopérations internationales de la France dans la lutte contre le terrorisme', pp 138-9.

[84] Report from special commissioner in Milan to head of the S.G., 11 Aug. 1900 (A.N., F7 12905) quoted in Bausardo, 'Les coopérations internationales de la France dans la lutte contre le terrorisme', p. 139.

[85] Note sur les polices étrangères fonctionnant en France, 19 Juin 1914 [Note on foreign police forces working in France, 19 June 1906] (A.N., F7 14605).

As discussed in chapter nine, the organization of political policing at the P.P. was reformed in the mid-1890s, during the first term of Lépine, with the creation of the Direction des Recherches under the control of Puibaraud from 1894.[86] At the same time the Identité Judiciaire section was organized and managed by Alphonse Bertillon, whose method of *portrait parlé*, if disregarded in England, was adopted in much of the rest of Europe following the anti-anarchist conference of Rome in 1898. Besides, in 1909, the S.G. adopted the use of onomatology – a science relating to the study of names to determine the origin of individuals – but also other methods of investigation used by the Identité Judicaire section – among them anthropometry and the use of photography.[87] The policemen of the S.G. were trained at the P.P.:

> All the agents of the new research squads of the Ministry of the Interior came to the city services to follow a class of three months filled with numerous practical training sessions. After that, they take an exam sanctioned by a certificate cosigned by M. Lépine and M. Mouquin, *directeur general des recherches.* The number of diplomas delivered this way to the agents of the *Sûreté Générale* was around a hundred for this year.[88]

The P.P. also trained public servants from foreign countries in this method: the coroner of Valencia, Juan Petet (1900); a penal law professor from Florence, Scipio Siphele (1908), police commissioners and inspector from Madrid and Barcelona; the general inspector of the Constantinople police, Sureya Bey; the criminal police commissioner of Berlin named Veiss; a professor from the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia; Persifor Frazer and Borgheroff, working at the Justice minister in Brussels (1908).[89] Between 1902 and 1912, it had 2,627 students who followed the class of *signalement descriptif*; the large majority coming from the P.P. but 420 were policemen of the S.G. and 70 were from foreign public services.[90] Thus, while London was limiting its cooperation with foreign police forces, favouring the diplomatic exchange of information rather than working directly with other intelligence administrations, Paris appeared more moderate on the subject, still unwilling to adopt formal means of international collaboration but also proud to share its system, making it a model at the European level.

---

[86] cf. Chapter 9.

[87] Budget report, 1909 (A.P.P., DB 47).

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Lopez, *La guerre des polices n'a pas eu lieu*, p. 304.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the anarchist threat crossed borders and thus required a European-wide response in the form of the 'International anti-anarchist conference' in 1898. According to Richard Bach Jensen, this event 'was significant (…) because it played a key role in a twenty-five-year anti-anarchist campaign waged in greater or lesser degree by all the rulers of Europe.'[91] In terms of results, this meeting between the different representatives of the European powers concerned with the threat of anarchism favoured certain extradition practices but most importantly represented a moment of policing cooperation and exchange at the end of the nineteenth century, opening the door for future collaborations.[92] This chapter though argues that the conference also revealed the limits of political policing co-operation.

Paris and London wanted to protect but also to prove the superiority of their system and were both reluctant to implement common processes regarding the anarchist attacks taking place all over the world in the early twentieth century. The English authorities were not willing to collaborate, formally, with its Europeans counterparts, despite the willingness of the policemen themselves to develop international links, showing the control exercised by the central administration over political policing. In contrast, Paris was more willing to share information on a regular basis and the P.P. was keen to promote its policing knowledge and innovative techniques, making the French system a model abroad.

London, which has always cultivated its political independence, eventually made some concessions to its European neighbors by developing its immigration policy to place restrictions on entry, which has an indirect effect on anarchist terrorism. This occurred when limitations were placed on immigration in August 1905 by the Aliens Act. It essentially provided the Home Office with the power to make an expulsion order.[93] This immigration procedure targeted condemned criminals and was founded on legal basis. It did not require the application of political policing methods to investigate potentially dangerous anarchists to prevent their arrival, thus preserving the appearance of British liberalism by not condemning individuals for their political opinions. Constance Bantman argues that the anarchists were not the primary target of the law; indeed, it primarily concerned Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe.[94] But its symbolic impact was undeniable, marking a crisis in British liberalism and ending a century

[91] Jensen, 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol', p. 323.

[92] Ibid., p. 324.

[93] '3. Power of Secretary of State to make an expulsion order', Aliens Act, 1905.

[94] Bantman, *Un premier exil libertaire,* pp 254-5.

of a relatively welcoming policy towards political refugees.[95] The solution the United Kingdom came up with was ultimately legislative restrictions on immigration (rooted, to some degree, in antisemitism) rather than policing co-operation and collaboration across borders to tackle transnational anarchism.

[95] Ibid., p. 284.

Conclusion

This dissertation compares policing in England, France and Ireland over forty years, contextualizing relevant literature and a wide range of archival material, to reflect on the growing central control of intelligence-led policing at the time. We described the practices of surveillance employed by the policemen, how they collated and reported information, how much they relied on informants, their own perception of the political threats they were monitoring, and their views on co-operating with foreign counterparts. This research then shed light on the networks existing withing each policing system, the different institutions and individuals involved while reflecting on policing collaboration and its limits caused by the process of centralization taking place in the three jurisdictions.

Building on the already excellent work on the history of the police in this period, this PhD is the first comparative study of intelligence-led policing in England, France and Ireland at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is the first comparison of this scale in matters of policing history and an original one as it brings together themes that are more commonly found in other disciplines, such as contemporary intelligence studies, political science and sociology.

By comparing how England, France and Ireland policed political agitation between 1870 and 1910, this research points out that the C.S.O., the Home Office, and the Ministry of the Interior reinforced their central oversight and control over intelligence-led policing and used it as an instrument of social and political control. This work started with the existing English, French and Irish models of policing in 1870 and ended with three systems of institutionalized secret policing by 1910. The increasing acceptance and institutionalization, on a national level, of political policing practices also led to the failure of growing and nationally-focused central authorities to develop international structures for policing co-operation ahead of the Great War.

The rise of intelligence-led policing under the direct control of central administrations occurred most clearly in France where there was already a history of 'political policing' that facilitated the reinforcement of central oversight, control and funding of the policing of political agitation. In Ireland, which had a similar ‘imperial’ policing culture, the role of the Dublin administration in gathering, supervising and using police intelligence was clearly developed by the end of the 1880s. In England it was a more halting process but, driven by expertise from

the Irish experience and Fenian resistance to imperial control, centrally-controlled intelligence-led policing eventually emerged.

These developments were ostensibly in response to the twin threats of fenianism, in England and Ireland, and anarchism in England, France, and Europe, more broadly. The development of the policing systems put in place, however, long outlived and arguably outpaced both threats, suggesting a greater and continuing utility for more centralized forms of political policing in each state. In France and Ireland, this police surveillance of political agitation was, for instance, eventually extended to other, arguably more mainstream, political threats from nationalists, socialists but also subversive groups such as far-right organizations. In England, the anti-political policing discourses and the lack of professionalism among the English detectives, gave way to an institutionalized secret service willing to police, at its convenience, potential agitators.

Intelligence-led policing under the direct control of central administrations failed, however, to develop into more sustained international forms of political policing. France and the United Kingdom would collaborate with each other, and other powers, within certain limits regarding the anarchist threat, but both fought against developing international structures coordinating policing efforts for fear that it would undermine their own security. In an era when national sovereignty and security was key, and foreign powers were met with suspicion, international diplomacy and co-operation were neglected in favor of growing national self-assertion rooted in increasingly centrally-controlled power.

The first element this thesis highlights is the causal relationship existing between the presence of political threats, whether they were concrete or potential, and the operations of the three policing systems. Evidence of potential threats emerged at the end of the 1870s, when Dublin, London and Paris were facing political movements challenging the established order and perceived as great threats to security. The presence of Fenians in England and Ireland, who had made use of political violence in past decades,[1] and of anarchist militants in France, led to the development of more overtly political policing methods. It also revealed a difference in approach when it came to policing political agitators: in both France and Ireland, significant resources and a network of police institutions were used to monitor the movement and activities of, respectively, anarchists and Fenians, despite no attacks taking place at the time. In contrast, the police in England did not possess institutions to implement surveillance practices as in

[1] cf. Chapter 1.

France and Ireland, which was revealed to be a weakness in the early 1880s when the country was targeted by a first Fenian dynamite campaign.[2] It thus underlines that the French and Irish possessed more sophisticated and more centralized systems of political policing in comparison to their English counterparts.

In Ireland, the Land War (1879-1882) saw Irish policemen adapt political policing practices previously used against fenianism and develop new ones in connection with the specificity of the agitation. The policing of this agitation, which was largely rural in nature, was entrusted to the R.I.C., who led various missions at the time of the Land War. Besides overseeing maintaining order in the most disturbed parts of the country, R.I.C. officers were to report all agrarian outrages to the C.S.O., attend meetings of the Land League and keep an eye on Fenians that might take advantage of the agitation.[3] Dublin Castle, worried about the risks associated with the agitation, implemented a series of coercive laws to repress the agitators.[4] The police were now also charged with ensuring those laws were respected - in other words, that no Land League association tried to re-form itself and organise meetings. Thus, the Land War had a determining role in the policing of Ireland, favouring both the adaptation and development of practices put in use every time the country was confronted with political agitation.

In France, the special commissioners of the S.G. were monitoring anarchists' activities throughout the territory, but in the early 1880s, the P.P. appeared as the most involved policing institution in the monitoring of militants, deploying systematic surveillance in Paris, other parts of France and also abroad.[5] The practices used were the following: heavy surveillance of militants, drawing up of 'profiles', reporting on meetings, financing newspapers and relying on informants to gather as much information as possible on those potential agitators. The number of files regarding the anarchists found in the archives of the P.P. might have exaggerated the threat the movement represented at the time but might have also been a way for the French central administration to make sure they prevented any potential attacks by always keeping track of the militants.

London's approach to policing in England was quite different to the ones of France and Ireland. If traces of the use of political policing can be found throughout the nineteenth century

[2] cf. Chapter 2.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', p. 2; O'Callaghan, *British high politics and a nationalist Ireland*, p. 2.

[5] cf. Chapter 3.

in England, there was not, in the early 1880s, a fully implemented system dedicated to this kind of police work.[6] This was in accordance with the ideological perspectives of powerful elements within British political and social life which regarded political policing as necessary only when political agitation was a proven direct concern for England and expressed via overt acts of political violence.[7] Political policing, where allowed, was to be largely reactive rather than proactive. This explains the absence of a policing system in charge of monitoring Fenians, but also of socialist and anarchist militants that found refuge in the territory from the mid-nineteenth century.

In the following years, key events came to directly challenge the policing systems in the three jurisdictions, having a major effect on the development of intelligence-led policing and the growing control of central authorities over it. The Phoenix Park murders in May 1882 and the Assommoir attack in October 1882, allow for a comparative examination of the reactions of the French and Irish policing systems when a potential threat turned into politically-motivated violence, and their ability to respond to it.[8] In this case, France could rely on a previously established network of centralized policing institutions to arrest and try sixty militants in January 1883. In Ireland, the Phoenix Park murders led to reform but also specialisation within the Irish policing system, with the development of political policing practices to counter 'secret societies' but, most importantly, the centralization of information gathered on Fenians by the assistant under-secretary for police and crime. This position, held by E.G. Jenkinson from August 1882, was directly attached to the C.S.O. and thus controlled by the government and not police officials, underlining the political nature of the new function. This system revealed itself to be efficient, at least in the eyes of the Home Office, with Home Secretary Harcourt summoning Jenkinson to help deal with a wave Fenian bombing attacks taking place throughout the United Kingdom at the time.

Thus, the central administrations were increasing their control over intelligence-led policing, but that process encountered resistance that was not fully overcome until the end of the 1880s. In England, Jenkinson arrived in 1883 with the mission to centralise information gathered by the 'anti-fenian' British intelligence network and put an end to Fenian attacks on English soil. However, his position always remained unofficial, leading him to collaborate with a variety of institutions, while his more 'imperial' methods and his personality quickly clashed

[6] cf. Chapters 1-3.

[7] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, pp 1-18.

[8] cf. Chapter 4.

with the Metropolitan Police officers' views on secret policing.[9] It was after Jenkinson's departure that the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was established to deal exclusively with political agitation, under the control of the Home Office. This reflected a growing control of the central administration over intelligence-led policing in England.

Still, the centralization of intelligence work by the Home Office was the result of negotiation with the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The Home Office managed the Special Branch and was the recipient of the information it gathered, but the uniformed force in charge of maintaining public order was administrated by the commissioner, without the government interfering.[10] Similarly, in the case of Ireland, the C.S.O, aware of the value of political information in a moment when Irish nationalism was growing in strength, found ways to keep intelligence-led policing under its control. After losing this prerogative to the benefit of police officials when the Conservatives came back in office in 1885, Chief Secretary Balfour set up an intelligence department directly at the service of his political work, before a Police and Crime Department controlled by the central administration was re-instated in 1890.[11] Thus, in both England and Ireland, there was resistance to and limits to greater C.S.O. and Home Office power but, ultimately, both institutions managed to increase their control over intelligence-led policing.

In France, the municipal law of 1884 provided local administrative control over their police forces, but the cost reductions it brought in matters of day-to-day policing benefited the central administration, increasing its financial capacity regarding the S.G. and de facto intelligence work – which was under the full control of the Ministry of the Interior.[12] If the parliamentary reform concerning the use of secret funds in 1887 seemed to limit the financial power secured by the government to pursue its political mission, it only shaped it to make it more compatible with a republican regime. The increasing participation of the Home Office in the financing of the Special Branch and the money of the secret vote at the entire discretion of the chief secretary also contributed to the growing ministerial control of intelligence-led policing in England and Ireland. In the three jurisdictions, this money was used to finance

[9] cf. Chapter 5.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] cf. Chapters 4 and 6.

informants, the central actors of political policing, highlighting how the policing administrations operated.[13]

France and Ireland also extended the use of intelligence-led policing to not only monitor radical political agitation, but all kinds of individuals considered suspect by Paris and Dublin. First, information gathered by the S.G. was manipulated by the French government in 1899 to stop a far-right, predominantly antisemitic, conspiracy against the republican regime. Then, intelligence work was used to monitor members of the legitimate socialist party and repress social movements in the early twentieth century. Similarly, in Ireland, after a reform of the C.S.O., the Irish police was using political policing techniques to monitor and gather information on nationalist politicians and nationalist sporting organizations.[14] On the whole, the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed the utilization of intelligence-led policing by the French and Irish central administrations, with political policing now used to surveil legitimate political movements participating in parliamentary life and challenging both governments at the time.

The individuals in charge of intelligence-led policing also contributed to or were willing to contribute to the process of centralization of intelligence-led policing in England, France and Ireland. In his thesis, Vlad Solomon describes the British model of political policing as a 'network of state agents tasked with identifying and policing subversion.'[15] This network involved various institutions: the detectives of the Special Branch and the head of Scotland Yard, the home secretary and high-ranking members of the Home Office, the chief commissioner of the metropolis, some private informants and army officers.[16] Solomon insists on the importance of the role individuals played during affairs 'which often led to situations in which perceived political threats were dealt with surreptitiously, outside of the proper chain of command − once again reinforcing the centrality of extra-legality and of individual agency.'[17]

In England, in a moment where political policing was not yet institutionalised, E.G. Jenkinson was one of those individuals attempting to set up a centralized system of intelligence. Despite his tendency of retaining rather than sharing information, and his lack of social skills,[18]

[13] cf. Chapter 6.

[14] cf. Chapters 8 and 7.

[15] Solomon, 'Straining the Law', p. 14.

[16] Ibid., p. 20.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ball, 'Policing the Land War', pp 294-296; Clutterbuck, 'An accident of history?', p. 216.

the Irish civil servant was deeply involved in his mission in England. In the many reports drawn up at the time, he detailed his work relating to the policing of 'secret societies' and always insisted on the need for London to have an individual 'centralizing' all information relating to fenianism in England.[19] By 'individual' he meant himself, leading him to constantly denounce his lack of official position at the Home Office, which he believed prevented the Metropolitan Police from efficiently countering the agitators. The establishment of the Special Branch after Jenkinson's departure from London might hint that, if the British central administration agreed with this necessity of setting-up an organization in control of intelligence work in times of political agitation, he was not considered the right person for the job.

When Jenkinson came back to Ireland in 1887, the position of under-secretary for police and crime, aiming at centralizing information regarding fenianism and 'secret societies', no longer existed and the head of the R.I.C. was now managing both the ordinary and special police branches.[20] Still, British authorities in Ireland remained aware of the stakes that existed in controlling intelligence work, especially the Chief Secretary Arthur Balfour, who saw it as an advantage to his government. He recruited a policeman, Samuel Waters to manage his 'special intelligence department' in 1887, which consisted of centralizing political information for the use of Balfour.[21] Similarly, Celestin Hennion in his police career always participated in reinforcing central administrative control over intelligence work.[22] The first policeman to be nominated at the head of the S.G. in 1907, he finished his career as Police prefect in 1913-14, where he redefined the missions of the police: maintaining order, criminal work and general intelligence.[23] In England, the counterpart of Waters and Hennion was William Melville, earning a central position when it became necessary for the British government to police the anarchists present in its territory in an international context.[24] The importance of Melville for the British central administration is illustrated by his recruitment by the War Office in 1903 to set up a new intelligence department.[25]

Those three individuals were all policemen, and not civil servants, and their work served directly the central administration. Hennion's position was used to produce documents proving

[19] cf. Chapter 5.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Waters, Ball (ed), *A policeman Ireland*, p. 62.

[22] Berlière, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire de police', pp 173-191.

[23] Ibid.

[24] cf. Chapter 9.

[25] Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm*, p. 6.

the conspiracy against the regime fomented by far-right organizations, at the demand of the French government, while Samuel Waters was compiling intelligence notes for the chief secretary.[26] Concerning Melville's work, he did not produce as much documentation as Jenkinson, but he always aimed at summing up information relating to foreign anarchism in a context of growing international anarchist threat. Another individual, halfway between civil servant and policeman, needs to be mentioned when it comes to the centralization of intelligence-led policing: Louis Puibaraud. Chief of staff of Police Prefect Ernest Camescasse between 1881 and 1885, acting director of the P.P. Surety Department before becoming directeur general des recherches of the Parisian institution in 1884, [27] he was known to promote political policing practices and its central importance for the functioning of the P.P.[28]

Those individuals in charge of political policing generally worked together within their own institutions, and sometimes also with their counterparts in other jurisdictions. If Jenkinson had difficulties collaborating with his colleagues from the Metropolitan Police when he was in London, and especially James Munro, he seemed to have no issues working with John Mallon at the time of the investigation of the Phoenix Park murders.[29] This was probably due to the two Irishmen's similar approach in terms of political policing, something we also noticed when it comes to the Irish police from the early 1890s. At that time, John Mallon, head of the D.M.P., Major Nicholas Gosselin, Fenian specialist attached to the Home Office, and Under-Secretary David Harrell, appeared to be fully co-operating to monitor any potential revival of fenianism and other kinds of nationalist agitation in Ireland.[30] The fact that these were all Irish and police officers with long-term experience with political policing – Gosselin was a resident magistrate for a year in 1882 and Harrel Chief Commissioner of the D.M.P. between 1883 and 1893 – probably facilitated their collaboration.

Similarly, in London, an Irish connection appeared to take control of intelligence-led policing following the establishment of the Special Branch in 1887. Robert Anderson was working as assistant commissioner since 1888 – following Monro's nomination as commissioner of the Metropolitan Police – [31] and his position led him to work closely with the

---

[26] cf. Chapters 5 and 8.

[27] Notice biographique Louis Puibaraud, *Société française d'histoire de la police* (https://www.sfhp.fr/index.php?post/2009/05/02/Notice-biographique-Louis-Puibaraud) (9 Nov. 2024).

[28] Puibaraud, *La police à Paris. Son organisation, son fonctionnement*, pp 89-96.

[29] cf. Chapter 4.

[30] cf. Chapters 7 and 8.

[31] cf. Chapter 5.

Home and Foreign Offices regarding political refugees. William Melville, a native of Kerry, first worked for the Special Irish Branch and its successor, the Special Branch, before taking charge of the organization in 1893. Alongside him were at least three other Irishmen: Patrick Quinn, Patrick McIntyre and John Sweeney, all members of the Special Irish Branch before pursuing their missions at the Special Branch. Those men never worked in Ireland and started their careers at Scotland Yard but their experience at the Special Irish Branch in London and abroad and the connections they developed through these years was valued by the English policing administration when it came to intelligence work.

If there were logical exchanges between England and Ireland and their policing institutions, this thesis, via its comparative and transnational approach, also reveals obvious connections existing between England and France. Howard Vincent, the first director of the C.I.D., enrolled at the faculty of law of the Paris University, investigated the functioning of the P.P., something that helped him to be chosen for this new position.[32] William Melville also worked in France, for the Metropolitan Police, and was posted at Le Havre port with the mission to monitor the movements of suspected individuals at the time of the Fenians bombings in 1883-4.[33] Later, as head of the Special Branch, he collaborated with the French police regarding anarchist terrorists travelling between the two countries in the 1890s.[34] Yet, while police officers from the Metropolitan Police and the P.P. appeared to be willing to collaborate, London and Paris were reluctant to be associated with each other, in a context of mutual suspicion and growing political rivalry. There was clearly a wider political reluctance to encourage collaboration with other powers.

In the case of England, there were three main reasons to limit collaboration with its French counterpart. First, the necessity to not be associated with the French imperial, authoritarian, secret policing system, as a signal to its own citizens attached to the liberal system of their nation. Second, the fact that the English police resembled more and more the French police, due to the political agitation of the last two decades, was not publicly acknowledged. Third, the fear of secret policing practices becoming known to potential diplomatic enemies – especially Germany at the time – but also the prospect of putting at risk sensitive policing operations.

---

[32] Porter, *The origins of the vigilant state*, p. 42.

[33] Cook, *M*, p. 46.

[34] cf. Chapter 9.

The international anti-anarchist conference of Rome in 1898 exacerbated mutual suspicion and police competition. While police officers were willing to co-operate with their foreign counterparts in the fight against anarchist terrorism, politicians in France and England were arguing in favor of diplomatic exchanges over *direct* policing collaboration.[35] This was due to the reasons previously mentioned, namely preserving the secrecy of their political policing practices but, also in the case of France, to maintain its advantage in a moment of policing competition. At the time, the Préfecture was at *the avant-garde* of police innovations and was encouraging its European counterparts to note its advancement.[36] If said innovations were to be centralized by an international collaborative structure to be put at the service of the repression of political agitation, Paris would be losing its position as a leader and model for policing in Europe.

By reflecting on the development and institutionalization of political policing in England, France and Ireland, this thesis fills a gap in the literature in the field of comparative policing history. The comparative dimension of this research came to challenge the self-referential dimension of the British and French historiographies. If studies to date have focused on the regionalized and centralized nature of English, French and Irish via national studies of policing this dissertation tackles the international and comparative dimensions of the subject. It shows a similar pattern of institutionalization of political policing practices and an increasing control exercised over intelligence work by central administrations in the three jurisdictions, while being confronted with similar political groupings making use of political violence. It also underlines the strong links existing between the English and Irish policing administrations and the influence of Dublin over London regarding the implementation of intelligence-led policing. It thus opens a new window for reflection on the place of Ireland within the United Kingdom and what it means in terms of a colonial approach. Finally, this dissertation also show that the British and French powers tend to publicly compare themselves to each other when it comes to policing in a broader context of international competition. If the international nature of the threat they faced – in the form of an extremely subversive anarchist movement in the early twentieth century – sometimes led police forces to collaborate, the growing control exercised by central administration over intelligence led-policing prevented the development of international structures of co-operation. The methodologies and insights developed in this

[35] cf. Chapter 10.

[36] Ibid.

research could also be applied to different countries, over different times periods and to different but related issues.

It would be worthwhile, in future research, to analyze the growth of nationalism in Ireland in the early twentieth century, the failure of the Irish police regarding the easter rising in 1916, and the use of intelligence-led policing (or not) in the repression of labour and social movements in England and France. In connection with this, there is room to study extensively the S.G. commissioners accounting records in the early twentieth century to see how their missions evolved materially through time.[37] Increasing control by the central administration over intelligence-led policing could also be explored within the rest of the English regional police forces, but also within Scotland and Wales. Furthermore, the comparison could also be pursued by focusing only on Dublin, London and Paris, and reflecting on what it means to police a capital city at the time and the different extended powers the institutions held. This research also opens doors to explore the emergence of domestic and external threats in the early twentieth century in England and France and the use of police-intelligence in the context of World War One. This study can also provide the basis for further comparison of the policing of political threats in other European countries like Italy and Belgium also confronted with the anarchist menace at the time and having strong relations with the French police. Researching policing exchanges and co-operation in this context, similarly to Thomas Beugniet's current PhD on the presence of the Italian police in foreign territory to repress anarchism,[38] would also align with this perspective. This dissertation tackled many questions but there are still many more to answer and the value of this research remains in its contribution to further opening and extending the field of the comparative history of policing.

[37] Comptabilité des commissaires spéciaux (1894-1913) (A.N., F7 12626-12640).

[38] Thomas Beugniet, 'La police italienne en territoire étranger : une répression internationale de l'anarchisme italien de l'Unité à la Première guerre mondiale' (Phd thesis, Université de Nantes, in progress).

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Manuscript material

England

The National Archives (T.N.A.)

Colonial Office records (CO)

CO 903 Colonial Office: Ireland, Confidential Print

CO 903/1-CO 903/7 Intelligence Notes

CO 903/2 Intelligence Notes - Miscellaneous series 1-16 (1887-1892).

CO 903/4 Intelligence Notes - M series 19-35.

CO 904 Ireland: Dublin Castle Records

CO 904/48 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – Northern Division reports (1892 Jan-1893 June).

CO 904/51 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – Northern Division reports (1896 Jan-1897 June).

CO 904/53 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – South Eastern Division reports (1892 Jan-1893 Feb).

CO 904/57 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – South Eastern Division reports, Nov-Dec 1896; Western Division reports, June 1894 - Mar 1895 (1894 June-1896 Dec).

CO 904/58 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – Western Division reports (1895 Apr-1896 May).

CO 904/59 Divisional Commissioners' and County Inspectors' monthly confidential reports – Western Division reports (1896 June-1897 June).

CO 904/183 Register of informants arranged by police division recording names as aliases and amounts paid (1884-1891).

CO 904/193-216 Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects - 1899-1921.

Foreign Office records (FO)

FO 800 Foreign Office, Private Offices: Various Ministers' and Officials' Papers

FO 800/97/4 Folio 17: Letter from Sir Edward Grey to Herbert Gladstone concerning: Anarchist crimes in Spain: information obtained by police, suggested replies regarding British Police methods. (1906 – Sept 5).

FO 881 Foreign Office: Confidential Print (Numerical Series)

FO 881/8754X General: Memo. Anarchists. (Sir G. Lushington). Bound: General 67 (1898).

FO 881/7179 General: Corres. Anti-Anarchist Conference at Rome. Bound: General 67 (1898).

Home Office records (HO)

HO 45 Home Office: Registered Papers

HO 45/7799 Ireland (Fenians): Arms: seizure at Liverpool; some volunteer arms lost by drunken volunteers (1866).

HO 45/9707/A50657 Police - Metropolitan: Augmentation of Metropolitan Police Force (1889-90).

HO 45/9739/A54881 Foreign: German Ambassador requests information re Autonomic Club and newspaper. Police report on activities of this Anarchist Club not supplied to Germans. (1893).

HO 45/9741/A55680 Explosives: Construction of buildings for examination and detonation of bombs on Duck Island, St. James' Park. (1894-96).

HO 45/10254/X36450 Extradition: International Action for the suppression of Anarchism (1892-1902); Explosives: International Action for the suppression of anarchism. (1892-1902).

HO 144 Home Office: Registered Papers, Supplementary

HO 144/72/A19 Ireland - Fenians: Miscellaneous papers re Irish Affairs (1880-1889).

HO 144/77/A3385 Disturbances: Trial of Johann Most, dynamite Anarchist; Criminal: Most, Johann; Court: Central Criminal Court; Offence: Inciting to Murder; Sentence: Judgment Respited. (1881-1906; 1881 May).

HO 144/133/A34848B Ireland - Fenians: Searching of passengers' baggage between England and Ireland and from abroad by Customs. Augmentation of police at ports in connection with Fenianism; Police - Metropolitan: Searching of passengers' baggage between England and Ireland and from abroad by Customs. Augmentation of Police at ports in connection with Fenianism. (1884-1887).

HO 144/145/A38008 Ireland - Fenians: Dynamite outrage at London Bridge (1884-1891).
HO 144/189/A46281 Police - Metropolitan: Augmentation for special duties in connection with Fenianism, approved (1887-1888).
HO 144/242/A53582 Disturbances: Prosecution of Walsall Anarchists at Stafford Assizes (1892-1898).
HO 144/248/A54847 Ireland - Fenians: Dynamite explosion at Four Courts, Dublin (1893).
HO 144/257/A55660 Disturbances: Anarchist Bomb explosion in Greenwich Park and funeral of M Bourdin (1894).
HO 144/259/A55860 Disturbances: Arrest and trial of Italian Anarchists (1895).
HO 144/357/B15410 Explosives Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin; Ireland - Fenians: Explosion at Aldborough Barracks, Dublin (1893-1894).
HO 144/485/X37842 Extradition Anarchist Meunier accused of murder, etc. in France. Judicial affirmation, on appeal, that crime was not political; Crimina Meunier, T.J.C; Sentence: Extradition to France. (1892-1894; 1892 June).
HO 144/485/X37842B Disturbances: Contemplated insurrection by international Anarchists in Paris, January 1893; Extradition: Contemplated insurrection by international Anarchists. Paris, January, 1893 (1892-1893).
HO 144/527/X79683 Police - Metropolitan: Requests by Foreign Governments for facilities to study police methods especially protection of the Sovereign (1900-1901).
HO 144/545/A55176 Disturbances: International Anarchists. Activities including proposed and active attempts on the lives of European Royalty. (1893-1905).
HO 144/587/B2840C Aliens: Foreign Anarchists coming to U.K; Disturbances: Foreign Anarchists coming to U.K. (1892-1906).
HO 144/668/X84164 Aliens: Control and supervision of foreign anarchists in U.K. Cases of Rubina and Jaffa (1901-1903).
HO 144/721/110757 Ireland (Fenians): Duties etc. of Mr. Jenkinson, temporarily attached to H.O. to control action against Fenians and disputes with the Metropolitan Police about responsibilities and methods. (1883-1887).
HO 144/757/118516 Disturbances: Anarchism (1904-1907).
HO 144/1537/1-4 Nationality and Naturalisation: Papers of Sir Robert Anderson (Advisor on Political Crime, Home Office, 1868; Assistant Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1888-1901) concerning various Fenian activities etc.

HO 144/1538/4-8 Nationality and Naturalisation: Papers of Sir Robert Anderson (Advisor on Political Crime, Home Office, 1868; Assistant Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1888-1901) concerning various Fenian activities etc.

Metropolitan Police records (MEPO)

MEPO 1 Metropolitan Police: Office of the Commissioner: Letter Books.

MEPO 1/48 Metropolitan Police: Office of the Commissioner: Letter Books. Confidential and Private. Vol.5 (1867 Dec. 31-1891 Apr. 6).

MEPO 2 Metropolitan Police: Office of the Commissioner: Correspondence and Papers

MEPO 2/43 Arrivals of Aliens in the UK (1851-1858).

MEPO 2/134 Reorganisation of the Branch (1869-1880).

MEPO 2/174 Trafalgar Square Meetings: Special regulations (1886-1903).

MEPO 2/260 Aliens (Immigration of destitutes). Metropolitan Police reports on immigration into London at the end of the 19th century. Indication of the growing public hostility toward immigrants at this time. Newspaper clippings from articles in the Daily Mail denouncing immigration. (1887-1904).

MEPO 3 Metropolitan Police: Office of the Commissioner: Correspondence and Papers, Special Series

MEPO 3/3070 Fenians: reports and correspondence about Fenian activity and measures taken to combat it (1867-1886).

MEPO 38 Metropolitan Police: Special Branch: Registered Files

MEPO 38/159 Naturalisation enquiries: correspondence between the Secretary of State (Home Department) and New Scotland Yard (CID) on the question of conducting naturalisation cases (1880).

Public Record Office (PRO)

PRO 30/60 Arthur James Balfour, 1st Earl of Balfour and Gerald William Balfour 2nd Earl of Balfour: Papers

PRO 30/6/62 Ireland (Lord Lieutenancy), Edward George Jenkinson, Assistant Under-Secretary for Crime and Police (Case). (1885 July-1886 Jan).

PRO 30/60/1 Intelligence notes compiled for chief secretary (1889 June-Dec).

PRO 30/60/4 Intelligence notes compiled for chief secretary (1891 Feb-Sept).

PRO 30/60/13/1 Secret Service Papers: Cypher and decipher code words.

Treasury records (T)

T 1 Treasury: Treasury Board Papers and In-Letters

T 1/11689/25138 Foreign Office. Provision for the Secret Service in the Estimates, 1914 - 1915. [Massive wartime increase] (1914).

France

Archives Nationales (A.N.)

Sous-Série F/7 – Police (1789-1985)

F7 12412-12427 Correspondance de la Sûreté générale: enregistrement (1871-1886).

F7 12449-12452 Ligues des patriotes - 1882-1907.

F7 12453-12463 Nationalistes at antisémites – 1884-1907.

F7 12473 Notes de police et coupures de presse (1894-1904).

F7 12496 Surveillance du mouvement socialiste (1893-1911).

F7 12504 Agissements anarchistes- Mesures de surveillance et tournées de conférence (1882-1898).

F7 12516 Autres attentats anarchistes. Classement départemental et dossiers particuliers (1882-1900) - Rhône (1882-1900) ; Seine (1892-1900).

F7 12517 Autres attentats anarchistes. Classement départemental et dossiers particuliers (1882-1900) - Seine, suite (1893-1895).

F7 12626 Comptabilité des commissaires spéciaux. Années 1899-1900.

F7 12722 Agitation cléricale et politique. Police générale (1902-1916).

F7 12885 Partis socialistes. Renseignements généraux sur les socialistes (1894-février 1900).

F7 12905 Attentats anarchistes l'étranger (1892-1914).

F7 14605 Sûreté générale (1871-1917).

Service central d'identification ou fichier central. – Fonds dit « Panthéon » (v.1890-v.1939).

F7 15943 Cyvoct (Antoine-Marie), anarchiste déporté au bagne (1882-1905).

Intérieur ; Direction générale de la sûreté nationale (1800-1940).

19940500/57-19940500/59 Surveillance des activités et manifestations politiques.

Archive de la Préfecture de Police (A.P.P.)

Série B : Cabinet du préfet de police (1869-1970)

BA Affaires générales

BA 30 Congrès socialiste International tenu à Londres, Mai 1881

BA 73-80 Anarchistes (Affaires) (1882-1895).

BA 81-91 Rapports quotidiens du préfet au ministre de l'Intérieur (1880 – 1882)

BA 435 L'Internationale en Angleterre. 1873-1882.

BA 1108 Affaire Jules Guérin.

BA 1051-1052 Affaire Dreyfus (1899).

BA 1499 Menées anarchistes (1907-1914) ; Menées anarchistes en Province (1892-1894) ; Listes et état des menées anarchistes jusqu'en 1893.

BA 1508- 1510 Anarchistes en Angleterre (1893-1911).

BA 1693 Police étrangères. Renseignements fournis à différentes puissances étrangères sur le fonctionnement de la préfecture de police.

Série D et E : Administration de la préfecture de police et documentation associée.

DB Police administrative

DB 44 Direction générale des recherches. Brigade des recherches. Direction de la police judiciaire.

DB 45 Service de sureté, brigade mobile ; agents mis à la disposition de la société des chasseurs pour la police de la chasse

DB 47 Service de l'identité judiciaire.

DB 353 - 354 Police spéciale des chemins de fer et police administrative des chemins de fer.

EA Documentation.

EA 25 Hennion

Archives départementales du Rhône (A.D.R.)

4M - Police

4M 74 Budget – Comptabilité (1880-1904).

4M 307 - Agissements des anarchistes ; poursuites contre Joseph Bonthoux et Crestin ; rapports de police (1881-1883).

Ireland

National Archives of Ireland (N.A.I.)

Chief Secretary's Office registered Papers (CSO/RP)

Fenian A Files (1864-1883)

Files 252-435, Carton 3

Files 500-620, Carton 4

Files 621-706, Carton 5

Files 707-784, Carton 6

Fenian Papers

Fenians police reports, Carton 4

Police & Crime records

Irish Land League and Irish National League (1879-88), Carton 1

Irish Land League and Irish National League (1879-88), Carton 9

Other Police reports (c.1850-1920), Carton 1

Other Police reports (c.1850-1920), Carton 4

Police and Crime; Crime Branch Special, 1887-1917

Reports of District Inspectors Crime Special (CBS DICS) (1887 - 98) - Western Division, Box 1.

Reports of District Inspectors Crime Special (CBS DICS) (1887 - 98) - South-Western Division (including Clare), Box 2.

Reports of District Inspectors Crime Special (CBS DICS) (1887 - 98) - South-Eastern Division, Box 3.

Reports of District Inspectors Crime Special (CBS DICS) (1887 - 98) - Northern Division, Box 6.

Precis of Information relating to secret societies (1894 - 1905) (CBS PRECIS) - RIC, Box 4

Chief Secretary's Office: Irish Crimes records, 1848-1893 (CSO/ICR)

CSO/ICR 26 Royal Irish Constabulary circulars (1879-84) - Miscellaneous

CSO/ICR 19 Crime Branch Special register of confidential papers (B files) (1880-1883).

Crime Branch Special 'S' Files
CBS S Files, Box 5

DMP Files
DMP Files, Box 9
DMP Files, Box 11
DMP Files, Box 12
DMP Files, Box 13

Newspapers

Belfast Morning News
Le Révolté
The Times

Printed Contemporaneous Material

England & Ireland

Accounts of receipt and expenditure of Metropolitan Police [1885-1900]
*'*An Act for the Union of Great Britain and Ireland' (39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 67)
'An act for the appointment of constables, and to secure the effectual performance of the duties of their office, and for the appointment of magistrates, in Ireland, in certain cases' (3 Geo. 4, c. 103)
'An Act to amend the Law with regards to Aliens' (5 Edw. 7. c. 13)
'An act to consolidate the laws relating to the constabulary force in Ireland' (6 Will. 4, c. 13).
Committee on Police and Criminal Administration in Ireland, 1883
'An "Anarchist" Prosecution', H.C. 1892, II.698.
Constabulary force. (Ireland). A bill to amend an act passed in the present session of Parliament for consolidating the laws relating to the constabulary force in Ireland, H.C. 1836, II.351
Dublin Police. (Ireland). A bill for improving the police in the district of the Dublin metropolis, H.C. 1836, III.195
Dublin Police. (Ireland.) A bill for improving the Dublin Police, H.C. 1842, II.249
Return for each month of 1879 and 1880, of Land League meetings held and agrarian crimes reported to Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary, H.C. 1881, lxxvii.793
Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 25)

Report of Departmental Committee on Metropolitan Police Force, 1868
Twenty-First detailed annual report of the registrar-general of Marriages, births, and deaths in Ireland, 1884 (Dublin, 1885)

France

Assemblée Nationale, *Commission d'enquête sur la lutte contre les groupuscules d'extrême droite en France*, Compte rendu n°3 (Paris, 2019).
Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de l'Intérieur
Compte rendu du Ministère de l'Intérieur pour l'exercice [1878-1900]
Journal Officiel de la République Française
Haute Cour de Justice*, Affaire Buffet, Déroulède, Guérin et autres*. *Inculpés de complot* (Paris, 1899)
Ministère de l'Intérieur, *Dénombrement de la population, 1891* (Paris, 1892)
Pichon, Stephen, *Rapport fait au nom de la commission du budget, chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant fixation du budget général de l'exercice 1888 (Ministère de l'Intérieur),* JO, DPCh, séance du 24 novembre 1887, annexe 2130, pp 418-48.

Memoirs

Andrieux, Louis, *Souvenirs d'un préfet de police* (Paris, 1885)
Anderson, Robert, *The lighter side of my official life* (London, 1910)
Bussy, Frederick Moir, *Irish conspiracies: recollections of John Mallon (the great Irish detective) and other reminiscences* (London, 1910)
Gonne, Maud, Jaffares, Alexander, Norman, MacBride, White, Anna (eds), *The autobiography of Maud Gonne: a servant of the queen* (Chicago, 1995)
Grave, Jean, *Le mouvement libertaire sous la 3ème république: souvenirs d'un révolté* (Paris, 1930)
Kropotkine, Pierre, *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1898)
Littlechild, John, *The reminiscences of Chief-Inspector Littlechild* (London, 1894)
Puibaraud, Louis, *La police à Paris, son organisation - son fonctionnement, par un rédacteur du Temps* (Paris, 1887)
Sweeney, John, *At Scotland Yard: Being the Experiences During Twenty-seven Years' Service of John Sweeney* (London, 1904)
Waters, Samuel, Ball, Stephen (ed.) *A policeman's Ireland: recollections of Samuel Waters, RIC* (Cork, 2005)

Secondary Sources

Articles and Books

Aan de Wiel, Jérôme, *East German intelligence and Ireland, 1949-90: espionage, terrorism and diplomacy* (Manchester, 2017)

---, 'Irish Police Intelligence, 1820's-1922' in Ball, Simon (ed.), *Cultures of Intelligence in the Era of the World Wars* (Oxford, 2020), pp 129-44

Adams, Ian, Wilson, Ray, *Special Branch: a history: 1883-2006* (London, 2015)

Aldrich, Richard, *British intelligence, strategy and Cold War, 1945-51* (London, 1992)

Anderson, Malcolm, *In Thrall to Political Change: Police and Gendarmerie in France* (Oxford, 2011)

Andrew, Christopher, *Secret service: the making of the British intelligence community* (Sevenoaks, 1987)

---, *The defence of the realm: the authorized history of MI5* (London, 2012)

Bantman, Constance, *Un premier exil libertaire: les anarchistes français à Londres, 1880-1914* (Montreuil, 2024)

Bayon, Nathalie, 'Personnels et services de surveillance de la préfecture de police: de la constitution des dossiers de surveillance à la mise en forme du politique (1870-1900)' in *Cultures & conflits*, no. 53 (2004), pp 83–98

Beattie, J. M., *The first English detectives: the Bow Street Runners and the policing of London, 1750-1840* (Oxford, 2014)

Becker, Jean-Jacques, Candar, Gilles (eds), *Histoire des gauches en France. Volume 1, L'héritage du XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2005)

Berlière, Jean-Marc, 'Du maintien de l'ordre républicain au maintien républicain de l'ordre ? Réflexions sur la violence' in *Genèses. Sciences sociales et histoire*, xii, no. 1 (1993), pp 6–29

---, *Le préfet Lépine: vers la naissance de la police moderne* (Paris, 1993)

---, *Le monde des polices en France: XIXe-XXe siècles* (Bruxelles, 1996)

---, 'La carrière exceptionnelle d'un commissaire spécial sous la Troisième République: Célestin Hennion' in Kalifa, Dominique, Karila-Cohen, Pierre (eds), *Le commissaire de police au xixe siècle* (Histoire de la France aux XIXe et XXe siècles, Paris, 2008), pp 173–191

---, 'Les pouvoirs de police : attributs du pouvoir municipal ou de l'État ?. Une police pour qui et pour quoi faire ? Démocratie, ordre et liberté sous la Troisième République' in *Criminocorpus. Revue d'Histoire de la justice, des crimes et des peines* (2009)

---, *La police à Paris en 1900* (Paris, 2023)

Berlière, Jean-Marc, Lévy, René, *Histoire des polices en France: de l'Ancien régime à nos jours* (Paris, 2013)
Berlière, Jean-Marc, Vogel, Marie, 'Aux origines de la police politique républicaine' (2008)
Bouhey, Vivien, Levillain, Philippe, *Les anarchistes contre la République, 1880 à 1914: contribution à l'histoire des réseaux sous la Troisième République* (Rennes, 2008)
Bridgeman, Ian 'The constabulary and the criminal justice system in nineteenth-century Ireland' in McAuley, Finbarr, O'Donnell, Ian, *Criminal Justice History: themes and controversies from pre-Independence Ireland* (Dublin, 2003)
Brun, Olivier, Poirot, Jérôme, *Le renseignement français en 100 dates* (Paris, 2022)
Brundage, David Thomas, *Irish nationalists in America: the politics of exile, 1798-1998* (Oxford, 2016)
Brunet, Jean-Paul, *La Police de l'ombre: indicateurs et provocateurs dans la France contemporaine* (Paris, 1990)
Bull, Philip, *Land, politics and nationalism: a study of the Irish land question* (New York, 1996)
Calvez, Florent, Jobard, Fabien, *Global police: la question policière dans le monde et l'histoire* (Paris, 2023)
Clutterbuck, Lindsay, 'Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function' in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, xviii, no. 1 (2006), pp 95–118
Colantonio, Laurent, 'De Phoenix Park (1882) à Croke Park (1920): Luttes nationales et attentats politiques en Irlande' in *La Révolution française. Cahiers de l'Institut d'histoire de la Révolution française*, no. 1 (2012)
Comerford, R. V., *The Fenians in context: Irish politics and society, 1848-82* (Topics in modern Irish history, Dublin, 1985)
Conley, Carolyn, *Melancholy accidents: the meaning of violence in post-famine Ireland* (Lanham, 1999).
Cook, Andrew, *M: MI5's First Spymaster* (New York, 2011)
Corfe, Thomas, *The Phoenix Park murders. Conflict, compromise and tragedy in Ireland, 1879-1882* (London, 1968)
Critchley, T. A. (Thomas Alan), *A history of police in England and Wales* (New Jersy, 1972)
Cronin, Mike, Duncan, Mark, Rouse, Paul, *The GAA: a people's history* (Cork, 2014)
Crossman, Virginia, *Politics, law and order in 19th-century Ireland* (Dublin, 1996)
Davis, Richard, *Arthur Griffith and non-violent Sinn Fein* (Dublin, 1974)
Dawson, Norma M., *Reflections on law and history: Irish Legal History Society discourses and other papers, 2000-2005* (Dublin, 2006)

Deflem, Mathieu, *Policing world society: historical foundations of international police cooperation* (Oxford, 2002)
Deluermoz, Quentin, *Policiers dans la ville: la construction d'un ordre public à Paris (1854-1914)* (Paris, 2012)
Deluermoz, Quentin, *Commune(s), 1870-1871: une traversée des mondes au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 2020)
de Maillard, Jacques, *Comparative Policing* (London, 2022)
de Maillard, Jacques, Skogan, Wesley (eds) *Policing in France*, (New York, 2021)
Dukova, Anastasia, *History of the dublin metropolitan police and its colonial legacy* (London, 2017)
Emsley, Clive, 'La légitimité de la police anglaise: une perspective historique comparée' in *Déviance et société*, xiii, no. 1 (1989), pp 23–34
---, *Gendarmes and the state in nineteenth-century Europe* (Oxford, 1999)
---, *Crime, police, and penal policy: european experiences 1750-1940* (Oxford, 2007)
---, *The English police: a political and social history* (New York, 2014)
---, 'Nineteeth-Century Britain: A Country without political police?' in *Contemporanea*, no. 4 (2019)
---, 'Police, maintien de l'ordre et espaces urbains: une lecture anglaise', *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine (1954-)*, vol. 50, no. 1, (2003), pp 5–12.
Emsley, Clive, Weinberger, Barbara (eds), *Policing western in Europe: politics, professionalism, and public order, 1850-1940* (New York, 1991)
Emsley, Clive, Shpayer-Markov, Haia (eds), *Police detectives in history, 1750-1950* (Burlington, 2006)
Faure, Alain, Vigier, Philippe (eds), *Maintien de l'ordre et polices: en France et en Europe au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1987)
Flanagan, Kieran, 'The Chief Secretary's Office, 1853-1914: A Bureaucratic Enigma' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxiv, no. 94 (1984), pp 197–225
Fournier, Éric, *La cité du sang* (Paris, 2008)
Gallet, Laurent, *Machinations et artifices: Antoine Cyvoct et l'attentat de Bellecour (Lyon, 1882)* (Lyon, 2015)
Garnham, Neal, 'Accounting for the Early Success of the Gaelic Athletic Association' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxiv, no. 133 (2004), pp 65–78

Girault, Jacques (ed.) *L'implantation du socialisme en France au Xxe siècle : partis, réseaux, mobilisation: actes de la Journée d'études du Centre de recherches sur l'espace, les sociétés et les cultures, Université de Paris 13, Villetaneuse, 20 mai 1999* (Paris, 2001)

Griffin, Brian, *Crime and the Criminal Classes in Ireland, 1870–1920 (*Cork, 2024)

Groenemeyer Alex, Jobard, Fabien, *Déviances et modalités de contrôle: la France et l'Allemagne en perspective* (Genève, 2005)

Guisnel, Jean, *Histoire secrète de la DGSE* (Paris, 2022)

Hautecloque, Bernard, *La République face à la rue. Volume 1, De la Commune à la Grande Guerre (1871-1914)* (Paris, 2022)

Healy, Róisín, 'Nationalist Violence in Ireland and Western Ukraine: Political Assassinations Compared, 1882-1934' in Ireland and Ukraine' in Stephen Velychenko, Ruane Jospeh and Hrynevych, Ludmilla (eds), *Essays in Comparative History and Politics* (Stuttgart, 2022), pp 330–46.

Herlihy, Jim, *The Royal Irish Constabulary: a short history and genealogical guide: with a select list of medal awards and casualties* (Dublin, 1997)

---, *The Dublin Metropolitan Police: a short history and genealogical guide; with notes on medal awards and casualties and lists of members connected with the London Metropolitan Police, the Irish Revenue Police, the (Royal) Irish Constabulary and the British Army* (Dublin, 2001)

Hoppen, Theodore K., *Elections, politics, and society in Ireland, 1832-1885* (Oxford, 1984)

Houte, Arnaud-Dominique, *La France contemporaine. 4, Le triomphe de la République, 1871-1914* (Paris, 2018)

---, *Propriété défendue: la société française à l'épreuve du vol, XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris, 2021)

---, *Les peurs de la Belle Époque: crimes, attentats, catastrophes et autres périls* (Paris, 2022)

---, *Citoyens policiers: Une autre histoire de la sécurité publique en France, de la garde nationale aux voisins vigilants* (Paris, 2024)

Jackson, Alvin, *Ireland, 1798-1998: politics and the war* (Oxford, 1999)

---, *Home rule: an Irish history, 1800-2000* (New York, 2003)

Jackson, Peter, *Beyond the balance of power* (Cambridge, 2013)

Jeffries, Charles, *The colonial police* (London, 1952)

Jensen, Richard Bach, 'The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol' in *Journal of Contemporary History*, xvi, no. 2 (1981), pp 323–347

---, *The battle against anarchist terrorism: an international history, 1878-1934* (Cambridge, 2014)

Jobard, Fabien, *Les violences policières: état des recherches dans les pays anglo-saxons* (Paris, 1999)
Johansen, Anja, 'Violent Repression or Modern Strategies of Crowd Management? Soldiers as Riot Police in France and Germany, 1890–1914' in *French History*, xv, no. 4 (2001), pp 400–420
---, 'A Process of Civilisation? Legitimisation of Violent Policing in Prussian and French Police Manuals and Instructions, 1880–1914' in *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, xiv, no. 1 (2007), pp 49–71
---, 'Keeping up appearances: Police Rhetoric, Public Trust and "Police Scandal" in London and Berlin, 1880-1914' in *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies*, xv, no. 1 (2011), pp 59–83
---, 'Lost in Translation: The English Policeman through a German Monocle, 1848–1914' in *History*, xcviii, no. 333 (2013), pp 750–768
---, '"Citizens" Complaints and Police (un)accountability: the Career of a Parisian Commissaire de Police of the Belle Epoque' in Nash, Anne-Marie, Nash, David (eds), *Law, Crime and Deviance since 1700* (London, 2016), pp 173–190
---, 'Policemen in the Dock' in *Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies*, no. vol. 23, n°2 (2019), pp 51–75
---, 'Beyond the Reach of Law? Criminal Prosecution of Parisian Police Personnel, 1872–1914' in *The Journal of Modern History*, xcii, no. 3 (2020), pp 485–520
Joly, Bertrand, *Déroulède: l'inventeur du nationalisme français* (Paris, 1998)
---, *Nationalistes et conservateurs en France: 1885-1902* (Paris, 2008)
---, *Histoire politique de l'affaire Dreyfus* (Paris, France, 2014)
Jordan, Anthony, *Major John MacBride, 1865-1916: MacDonagh, and MacBride, and Connolly, and Pearse* (Westport, 1991)
---, (ed.) *Boer War to Easter Rising: The Writings of John MacBride* (Westport, 2006)
Jordan, Donald E., *Land and popular politics in Ireland: County Mayo from the plantation to the Land War* (Cambridge, 1999)
Kaur, Jasjeet, Sodhi, G. S., 'The forgotten Indian pioneers of fingerprint science' in *Current Science*, lxxxviii, no. 1 (2005), pp 185–191
Kelly, James (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 3: 1730–1880* (Cambridge, 2018)
Kenna, Shane, *The Invincibles: the Phoenix Park assassinations and the conspiracy that shook an Empire* (Dublin, 2019)

Kennedy, Padraic, ‘The secret service department: a British Intelligence Bureau in mid-Victorian London, September 1867 to April 1868’ in *Intelligence and National Security*, xviii, no. 3 (2003), pp 100–127

Kennedy, Paul M., *The rise of the Anglo-German antagonism, 1860-1914* (London, 1982)

Kenny, Kevin (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, 2004)

Laurent, Sébastien-Yves, *Politiques de l’ombre: État, renseignement et surveillance en France* (France, 2009)

---, *Le secret de l’Etat: surveiller, protéger, informer XVIIe-XXIe siècle* (Paris, 2023)

---, *Etat secret, état clandestin: essai sur la transparence démocratique* (Paris, 2024)

Le Quang, Jeanne-Laure, ‘Une « police officieuse » ? Le rôle des mouchards dans le contrôle du Paris napoléonien’ in *Revue d’histoire moderne & contemporaine*, lxix–ii, no. 2 (2022), pp 61–85

Lefranc, Georges, *Le mouvement socialiste sous la troisième République* (Paris, 1977)

Legendre, Ludovic, ‘Le double meurtre de Phœnix Park, 6 mai 1882’ in *Etudes irlandaises*, xvii, no. 2 (1992), pp 135–45

Levine, Philippa, ‘Is Comparative History Possible?’ in *History and Theory*, liii, no. 3 (2014), pp 331–347

Lopez, Laurent, *La guerre des polices n’a pas eu lieu: gendarmes et policiers, co-acteurs de la sécurité publique sous la Troisième République, 1870-1914* (Paris, 2014)

---, ‘Servir la République après avoir juré fidélité à Napoléon III’, *Histoire & mesure* [Online], XXIX-2 (2014), pp 107-33

Lowe, W. J., Malcolm, Elizabeth, ‘The domestic action of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 1836–1922’ in *Irish Economic and Social History*, xix (1992), pp 27–48

Lowry, Donal, ‘«A Fellowship of Disaffection »: Irish-South African Relations from the Anglo-Boer War to the Pretoriastroika 1902-1991’ in *Études irlandaises*, n°17-2 (1992), pp 105-21

Maitron, Jean, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France. Des origines à 1914* (France, 1975)

Malcolm, Elizabeth, ‘Investigating the “Machinery of Murder”: Irish Detectives and Agrarian Outrages, 1847-70’ in *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, vi, no. 3 (2002), pp 73–91

---, *The Irish policeman: 1822-1922* (Dublin, 2006)

---, ‘The Irish Inspectors General, 1838–1916: Leading Dublin Castle’s constabulary “machine”’ in Stevenson, Kim, Cox, David, Channing, Iain (eds), *Leading the Police: A History of Chief Constables 1835–2017* (London, 2017).

Massard, Marcel, Gallet, Laurent *Histoire du mouvement anarchiste à Lyon (1880-1894)* (Lyon, 2016)
McCracken, Donal P., *MacBride's brigade: Irish commandos in the Anglo-Boer War* (Dublin, 1999)
McDowell, R. B., *The Irish administration, 1801-1914* (London, 1964)
McEldowney, John F., 'Legal Aspects of the Irish Secret Service Fund, 1793-1833' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxv, no. 98 (1986), pp 129–37
McGee, Owen, *The IRB: the Irish Republican Brotherhood, from the Land League to Sinn Fein*, 2007
Milliot, Vincent (ed.), Blanchard, Emmanuel, Denis, Vincent, Houte, Arnaud-Dominique, *Histoire des polices en France: des guerres de Religion à nos jours* (Paris, France, 2020)
Molony, Senan, *The Phoenix Park Murders: Conspiracy, Betrayal & Retribution* (2006)
Newsinger, John, *Fenianism in mid-Victorian Britain* (London, 1994)
O'Broin, Leon, *Revolutionary underground: the story of the irish republican brotherhood, 1858-1924* (Dublin, 1976)
O'Callaghan, Margaret, *British high politics and a nationalist Ireland: criminality, land and the law under Forster and Balfour* (Cork, 1994)
O'Halpin, Eunan, 'The Secret Service Vote and Ireland, 1868-1922' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxiii, no. 92 (1983), pp 348–53
O'Sullivan, Donal J, *The Irish constabularies, 1822-1922: a century of policing in Ireland* (Dingle, 1999)
Palmer, Stanley, *Police and protest in England and Ireland 1780-1850* (Cambridge, 1988)
Porter, Bernard, *The refugee question in mid-Victorian politics* (Cambridge, 1979)
---, *The origins of the vigilant state: the London metropolitan police special branch before the first world war* (London, 1987)
Rafferty, Oliver P., *The church, the state and the Fenian threat, 1861-75* (Basingstoke, 1999)
Salas, Denis, 'Louise Michel déportée politique au bagne de Nouvelle-Calédonie (1874-1880) Une expérience de l'écriture' in *Histoire de la justice*, xv, no. 1 (2002), pp 239–49
Sheills, Derek, 'The Resident Magistracy in Ireland 1860-1922' in *IAHCCJ Bulletin*, no. 15 (1992), pp 39–53
Simkins, Anthony, Hinsley, Francis*, British intelligence in the Second World War* (London, 1979)
Sinclair, Georgina, 'The "Irish" policeman and the Empire: influencing the policing of the British Empire-Commonwealth' in *Irish Historical Studies*, xxxvi, no. 142 (2008), pp 173–187

Sloan, Geoff, 'The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An Intelligence Failure or a Failure of Response?' in *Intelligence and National Security*, xxviii, no. 4 (2013), pp 453–94
Smith, Philip Thurmond, *Policing victorian London: Political policing, public order, and the London metropolitan police* (Westport, 1985)
Société d'études jaurésiennes, 'Les début de la SFIO', *Cahiers Jaurès,* n° 187-188 (2008)
Solomon, Vlad, *State Surveillance, Political Policing and Counter-Terrorism in Britain* Woodbrige, 2021)
Taylor, Miles, 'The 1848 Revolutions and the British Empire' in *Past & Present*, no. 166 (2000), pp 146–180
Townshend, Charles, *Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1848* (Oxford, 1983)
Vaughan, W. E, *Landlords and tenants in Ireland, 1848-1904* (Dublin, 1994)
Waddington, David P., Fabien Jobard and Mike King, *Rioting in the UK and France, 2001-2006: A comparative analysis* (Cullompton, 2009)
Whelehan, Niall, *The Dynamiters: Irish nationalism and political violence in the wider world, 1867-1900* (Cambridge, 2015)
Winock, Michel, *Le socialisme en France et en Europe: XIXe-XXe siècle* (Paris, 1992)

Unpublished thesis

Ball, Stephen, 'Policing the Land War: official responses to political protest and agrarian crime in Ireland, 1879-91' (PhD thesis, University of London, 2000)
Bantman, Constance, 'Anarchismes et anarchistes en France et en Grande-Bretagne, 1880-1914: échanges, représentations, transferts' (PhD thesis, Université Paris 13, 2007)
Bausardo, Thomas, 'Les coopérations internationales de la France dans la lutte contre le terrorisme (fin XIXe siècle – 1989)' (PhD thesis, Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2015)
Berlière, Jean-Marc, 'L'institution policière en France sous la 3ème république (1875-1914)' (PhD thesis, Université de Bourgogne, Dijon, 1991)
Beugniet, Thomas, '« La conférence anti-anarchiste de Rome (1898) » et les débuts d'une coopération internationale contre le terrorisme de la fin du XIXe siècle à la Première Guerre mondiale' (M.A. thesis Université de Nantes, 2016)
---, 'La police italienne en territoire étranger : une répression internationale de l'anarchisme italien de l'Unité à la Première guerre mondiale' (PhD thesis, Université de Nantes, in progress)

Clutterbuck, Lindsay, 'An accident of history?: the evolution of counter terrorism methodology in the Metropolitan Police from 1829 to 1901, with particular reference to the influence of extreme Irish Nationalist activity' (PhD thesis, University of Portsmouth, 2002)

Gaillat, Amélie, 'L'administration de la coercition légitime en République: les institutions de l'État face à l'anarchisme dans les années 1880' (M.A thesis, Institut d'études politiques, Paris, France, 2019)

Griffin, Brian, 'The Irish police, 1836-1914: a social history' (PhD thesis, Layola University Chicago, 1991)

Kenna, Shane, 'The philosophy of the bomb: the Fenian dynamite campaign and the British counter response 1876-1885' (PhD thesis, Trinity College Dublin, 2011)

Manfredonia, Gaetano, 'Études sur le mouvement anarchiste en France: 1848-1914' (PhD thesis, Institut d'études politiques, Paris, 1990)

Solomon, Vlad, 'Straining the Law: The Creation of a British Model of Political Policing, 1881-1914' (PhD Theisis, Mc Gill University, Montreal, 2016)

Vogel, Marie, 'Les polices des villes entre local et national : l'administration des polices urbaines sous la Troisième république' (PhD thesis, Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble, 1993)

Internet sources

Dictionary of Irish Biography (https://www.dib.ie/)

Gov.UK (https://www.gov.uk/)

Insee (https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/2417794)

Le Maitron (https://maitron.fr/)

MeasuringWorth.com (https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ppoweruk/)

Retronews (https://www.retronews.fr/)

Société Française d'Histoire de la Police (https://www.sfhp.fr/)

The Open University International Centre for the History of Crime, Policing and Justice, 'History from police archives' (https://www5.open.ac.uk/arts/research/policing/resources)

Other

McGarry, Fearghal, 'Introduction' in *Sinn Féin and Republican Suspects, 1899-1921*

National Archives of Ireland, *Guide to documents relating to Fenianism, 1857-1883*, prepare by Breandan Mac Goille Choille in June 1969

Appendices

Appendix 1: Registers of Correspondence, Sûreté Générale, 1880-1881

Sent on 10 March 1880		
Recipient	Subject	Classification
Isère (name of a French department, so to the Prefect of Isère actually)	Regarding the organisation of a revolutionary socialist newspaper and of a political association in the Department of Isère and in all the South-East region under the name 'Chambre syndicale fédérale ouvrière'	Chambres syndicales (trade-union central body) Isère

Source: A.N., F7 12421

Sent on 12 October 1880		
Recipient	Subject	Classification
Police (Parisian police)	Ask for the list of public meetings taking place in Paris since 1 May 1880.	Meetings Seine (Department of the Seine on which the P.P. has jurisdiction)

Source: A.N., F7 12421

Sent on 26 November 1881		
Recipient	Subject	Classification
Police (Parisian police)	Transmitting 'signalements' [descriptive information on persons] of Malatesta & Caffiero travelling with the Russian nihilist Kropotkine	Kropotkine

Source: A.N., F7 12422

Appendix 2: R.I.C. returns

Summary of agrarian offences, County Clare, 1879-1880

SUMMARY of AGRARIAN OFFENCES Committed from 1st January 1879 to 31st January 1880.

OFFENCES.	Number of Cases in which Offenders were Convicted.	Number of Cases in which Offenders were made Amenable but not Convicted.	Number of Cases in which Offenders are Awaiting Trial.	Number of Cases in which Offenders were neither Convicted nor made Amenable.	Total Number of Agrarian Outrages.
Offences against the Person:					
Homicide and Murder	- -	1	- -	- -	1
Assault endangering life	1	1	- -	- -	2
Offences against the Public Peace:					
Intimidation by threatening letters or notices	- -	- -	- -	16	16
Intimidation otherwise than by threatening letters or notices	- -	- -	- -	1	1
Injury to property	- -	- -	- -	1	1
Firing into dwellings	- -	- -	- -	1	1
TOTAL	1	2	- -	19	22

Year.	Month.	Number of Cases.
1879	April	1
	June	3
	July	3
	September	3
	October	1
	November	7
	December	3
1880	January	1
	TOTAL	22

I certify that I have personally examined this Return and Summary, and that they are correct.

Ennis, 6 March 1880. *H. Smith*, 1st County Inspector.

The Inspector General.

Source: *Return for each month of 1879 and 1880, of Land League meetings held and agrarian crimes reported to Inspector-General of Royal Irish Constabulary,* H.C. 1881, lxxvii.793

Appendix 3: English central administration

Prime Minister				Home Secretary			
Name	Term of Office		Political Party	Name	Term of Office		Political Party
William Ewart Gladstone	3 December 1868	17 February 1874	Liberal	Henry Bruce	9 December 1868	9 September 1873	Liberal
				Robert Lowe	9 September 1873	20 February 1874	Liberal
Benjamin Disraeli	20 February 1874	21 April 1880	Conservative	R. A. Cross	21 February 1874	23 April 1880	Conservative
William Ewart Gladstone	23 April 1880	9 June 1885	Liberal	Sir William Harcourt	28 April 1880	23 June 1885	Liberal
Robert Gascoyne - Cecil	23 June 1885	28 January 1886	Conservative	R. A. Cross	24 June 1885	1 February 1886	Conservative
William Ewart Gladstone	1 February 1886	20 July 1886	Liberal	Hugh Childers	6 February 1886	25 July 1886	Liberal
Robert Gascoyne - Cecil	25 July 1886	11 September 1892	Conservative	Henry Matthews	3 September 1886	15 September 1892	Conservative
William Ewart Gladstone	15 September 1892	2 March 1894	Liberal	H.H. Asquith	18 September 1892	25 June 1895	Liberal
Archibald Primrose	5 March 1894	22 June 1895	Liberal				
Robert Gascoyne - Cecil	25 June 1895	11 July 1902	Conservative	Sir Matthew White Ridley	29 June 1895	12 November 1900	Conservative
				Charles Ritchie	12 November 1900	12 July 1902	Conservative
Arthur Balfour	12 July 1902	4 December 1905	Conservative	Aretas Akers-Douglas	11 September 1902	5 December 1905	Conservative
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman	5 December 1905	3 April 1908	Liberal	Herbert Gladstone	11 December 1905	19 February 1910	Liberal

Appendix 4: Metropolitan Police administration

Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police			Assistant-Commissioner C (Crime) - First Assistant			Head of the Special Branch		
Name	From	To	Name	From	To	Name	From	To
Sir Richard Mayne	1855	1868						
Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas Labalmondière (Acted as)	1868	1869				Adolphus Williamson	1883	1887
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Edmund Henderson	1869	1886	James Monro	1884	1888			
			Robert Anderson	1888	1901	John Littlechild	1887	1893
						William Melville	1893	1903
Major-General Sir Charles Warren	1886	1888						
James Monro	1888	1890						
Colonel Sir Edward Bradford	1890	1903						
			Sir Edward Henry	1901	1903			
Sir Edward Henry	1903	1918	Melville Macnaghten	1903	1913	Patrick Quinn	1903	1918

Appendix 5: Dublin Castle administration

Lord Lieutenant		Chief Secretary for Ireland				Under-Secretary	
Name	Date of appointment	Name	Term of Office		Political Party	Name	Term of Office
The Earl Spencer	18 December 1868	Marquess of Hartington	12 January 1871	17 February 1874	Liberal	Thomas Henry Burke	1869-1882
The Duke of Abercorn	2 March 1874	Sir Michael Hicks-Beach	27 February 1874	15 February 1878	Conservative		
The Duke of Marlborough	11 March 1876	James Lowther	15 February 1878	21 April 1880	Conservative		
The Earl Cowper	4 May 1880	William Edward Forster	30 April 1880	6 May 1882	Liberal		
The Earl Spencer	4 May 1882	Lord Frederick Cavendish (Murdered at Phoenix Park alongside Thomas Burke)	6 May 1882	6 May 1882	Liberal		
		George Trevelyan	9 May 1882	23 October 1884	Liberal	Sir Robert George Crookshank Hamilton	1882-1886
		Henry Campbell-Bannerman	23 October 1884	9 June 1885	Liberal		
The Earl of Carnarvon	27 June 1885	Sir William Hart Dyke	25 June 1885	23 January 1886	Conservative		
		William Henry Smith	23 January 1886	28 January 1886	Conservative	Sir Redvers Henry Buller	1886-1887
The Earl of Aberdeen	8 February 1886	John Morley	6 February 1886	20 July 1886	Liberal		
The Marquess of Londonderry	3 September 1886	Sir Michael Hicks Beach	5 September 1886	7 March 1887	Conservative		
		Arthur Balfour	7 March 1887	9 November 1891	Conservative	Sir Joseph West Ridgeway	1887-1893
The Earl of Zetland	30 July 1889	William Jackson	9 November 1891	11 September 1892	Conservative		

The Lord Houghton	18 September 1892	John Morley	22 September 1892	21 June 1895	Liberal		
The Earl Cadogan	29 June 1895	Gerald Balfour	1895	1900	Conservative	Sir David Harrel	1893-1902
		George Wyndham	9 November 1900	12 March 1905	Conservative		
The Earl of Dudley	11 September 1902					Sir Anthony MacDonnell	1902-1908
		Walter Long	12 March 1905	4 December 1905	Conservative		
The Earl of Aberdeen	11 December 1905	James Bryce	10 December 1905	23 January 1907	Liberal		
		Augustine Birrell	23 January 1907	3 May 1916	Liberal	Sir James Brown Dougherty	1908-1914
						Sir Matthew Nathan	1914-1916

Appendix 6: Irish police administration

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Inspector-General of the R.I.C.</th><th colspan="2">Chief Commissioner of the D.M.P.</th><th colspan="2">Assistant Commissioner of the D.M.P.</th></tr>
<tr><th>Name</th><th>Date of appointment</th><th>Name</th><th>Date of appointment</th><th>Name</th><th>Date of appointment</th></tr>
<tr><td>Colonel Sir John Stewart Wood</td><td>8 May 1865</td><td rowspan="3">George Talbot</td><td rowspan="3">1877</td><td rowspan="3">John A. Connolly</td><td rowspan="3">1877</td></tr>
<tr><td>Lieutenant Colonel George E. Hillier</td><td>19 September 1876</td></tr>
<tr><td>Colonel Robert Bruce</td><td>12 May 1882</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Sir Andrew Reed</td><td rowspan="2">21 September 1885</td><td>Sir David Harrel</td><td>1883</td><td colspan="2">No Assistant-Commissioner</td></tr>
<tr><td>John Joseph Casimir Jones</td><td>1893</td><td>John Mallon</td><td>1893</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Colonel Sir Neville F.F. Chamberlain</td><td rowspan="2">1 September 1900</td><td rowspan="2">Sir John Forster George Rose of Bladensburg</td><td rowspan="2">1901</td><td rowspan="2">William Vesey Harrell</td><td rowspan="2">1902</td></tr>
<tr><td>W.M. Davies (Acting Commissioner)</td><td>1915</td><td>Fergus Quinn</td><td>1915</td></tr>
</table>

Appendix 7: French central administration

Head of government	Term of office		Minister of the Interior	Term of office	
Adolphe Thiers, President of the Republic					
Jules Dufaure	19 February 1871	24 May 1873	Ernest Picard	19 February 1871	5 June 1871
			Félix Lambrecht	5 June 1871	8 October 1871
			September Casimir-Perier	11 October 1871	6 February 1872
			Victor Lefranc	6 February 1872	7 December 1872
			Eugène de Goulard	7 December 1872	18 May 1873
			September Casimir-Perier	18 May 1873	25 May 1873
Patrice de Mac Mahon, President of the Republic					
Albert de Broglie	24 May 1873	18 May 1874	Charles Ernest Beulé	25 May 1873	26 November 1873
			Albert de Broglie	26 November 1873	22 May 1874
Ernest Courtot de Cissey	22 May 1874	10 March 1875	Oscar Bardi de Fourtou	22 May 1874	20 July 1874
			François de Chabaud-Latour	20 July 1874	10 March 1875
Louis Buffet	10 March 1875	23 February 1876	Louis Buffet	10 March 1875	10 March 1875
Jules Dufaure	23 February 1876	2 December 1876	Jules Dufaure	23 February 1876	9 March 1876
			Amable Ricard	9 March 1876	11 May 1876
			Émile de Marcère	15 May 1876	12 December 1876
Jules Simon	12 December 1876	16 May 1877	Jules Simon	12 December 1876	16 May 1877
Albert de Broglie	17 May 1877	19 November 1877	Oscar Bardi de Fourtou	17 May 1877	23 November 1877
Gaetan de Rochebouet	23 November 1877	24 November 1877	Charles Welche	23 November 1877	13 December 1877
Jules Dufaure	13 December 1877	30 January 1879	Émile de Marcère	13 December 1877	4 February 1879
Jules Grévy, President of the Republic					
William Waddington	4 February 1879	21 December 1879	Émile de Marcère	4 February 1879	4 March 1879

Charles de Freycinet	28 December 1879	19 September 1880	Charles Lepère	4 March 1879	17 May 1880
Jules Ferry	23 September 1880	10 November 1881	Ernest Constans	17 May 1880	14 November 1881
Léon Gambetta	14 November 1881	26 January 1882	Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau	14 November 1881	30 January 1882
Charles de Freycinet	30 January 1882	29 July 1882	René Goblet	30 January 1882	7 September 1882
Charles Duclerc	7 September 1882	28 January 1883	Armand Fallières	7 September 1882	21 February 1883
Armand Fallières	29 January 1883	17 February 1883			
Jules Ferry	21 February 1883	30 March 1885	Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau	21 February 1883	6 April 1885
Henri Brisson	6 April 1885	29 December 1885	François Allain-Targé	6 April 1885	7 January 1886
Charles de Freycinet	7 January 1886	3 December 1886	Ferdinand Sarrien	7 January 1886	11 December 1886
René Goblet	11 December 1886	17 May 1887	René Goblet	11 December 1886	30 May 1887
Maurice Rouvier	30 May 1887	4 December 1887	Armand Fallières	30 May 1887	12 December 1887
Sadi Carnot, President of the Republic					
Pierre Tirard	11 December 1887	30 March 1888	Ferdinand Sarrien	12 December 1887	3 April 1888
Charles Floquet	3 April 1888	14 February 1889	Charles Floquet	3 April 1888	22 February 1889
Pierre Tirard	22 February 1889	13 March 1890	Ernest Constans	22 February 1889	1 March 1890
Charles de Freycinet	17 March 1890	18 February 1892	Léon Bourgeois	1 March 1890	17 March 1890
			Ernest Constans	17 March 1890	27 February 1892
Emile Loubet	27 February 1892	28 November 1892	Émile Loubet	27 February 1892	11 January 1893
Alexandre Ribot	6 December 1892	10 January 1893	Alexandre Ribot	11 January 1893	4 April 1893
Charles Dupuy	4 April 1893	23 November 1893	Charles Dupuy	4 April 1893	3 December 1893
Jean Casimir-Perier	3 December 1893	22 May 1894	David Raynal	3 December 1893	30 May 1894

Charles Dupuy	30 May 1894	25 June 1894	Charles Dupuy	30 May 1894	1 July 1894
Jean Casimir-Perrier, President of the Republic					
Charles Dupuy	1 July 1894	15 January 1895	Charles Dupuy	1 July 1894	26 January 1895
Félix Faure, President of the Republic					
Alexandre Ribot	26 January 1895	28 October 1895	Georges Leygues	26 January 1895	1 November 1895
Léon Bourgeois	1 November 1895	23 April 1896	Léon Bourgeois	1 November 1895	28 March 1896
Léon Bourgeois	1 November 1895	23 April 1896	Ferdinand Sarrien	30 March 1896	29 April 1896
Jules Méline	28 April 1896	15 July 1898	Louis Barthou	29 April 1896	28 June 1898
Henri Brisson	28 June 1898	1 November 1898	Henri Brisson	28 June 1898	1 November 1898
Charles Dupuy	1 November 1898	18 February 1899	Charles Dupuy	1 November 1898	18 February 1899
Emile Loubet, President of the Republic					
Charles Dupuy	18 February 1899	12 June 1899	Charles Dupuy	18 February 1899	12 June 1899
Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau	22 June 1899	3 June 1902	Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau	22 June 1899	3 June 1902
Emile Combes	7 June 1902	24 January 1905	Emile Combes	7 June 1902	24 January 1905
Maurice Rouvier	24 January 1905	18 fevrier 1906	Eugène Etienne	24 January 1905	12 November 1905
Armand Fallières, President of the Republic					
Maurice Rouvier	18 fevrier 1906	7 March 1906	Fernand Dubief	12 November 1905	7 March 1906
Ferdinand Sarrien	14 March 1906	20 October 1906	Georges Clemenceau	14 March 1906	20 October 1906
Georges Clemenceau	25 October 1906	20 July 1909	Georges Clemenceau	25 October 1906	20 July 1909

Appendix 8: French police administration

Police Prefect			Directeur de la Sûreté Générale		
Name	From	To	Name	From	To
Emile de Kératry	4 September 1870	11 October 1870	Arthur Ranc	26 October 1870	6 February 1871
Edmond Adam	11 October 1870	2 November 1870			
Guillaume-Ernest Cressson	2 November 1870	11 February 1871			
Albert Choppin	11 February 1871	15 March 1871			
Louis Ernest Valentin	15 March 1871	17 November 1871	Philippe-September Cattelain	18 March 1871	28 May 1871
Léon Renault	17 November 1871	8 March 1876	Edmond-Louis de Nervaux	18 November 1871	18 February 1874
			Amable Burin des Roziers	25 February 1874	9 February 1876
Félix Voisin	8 March 1876	1 December 1877	Georges de Boislisle	9 February 1876	19 May 1877
			Paul Le Roux de Bretagne	19 May 1877	18 December 1877
Albert Gigot	17 December 1877	4 March 1879	Alfred Boucher-Cadart	18 December 1877	9 March 1880
Louis Andrieux	4 March 1879	16 July 1881			
Ernest Camescasse	16 July 1881	23 April 1885	Emile-Honoré Cazelles	9 March 1880	1 May 1882
			Eugène Schnerb	1 May 1882	30 September 1884
			Paul Wallet	30 September 1884	16 April 1885
Arthur Gragnon	23 April 1885	17 November 1887	Isaïe Levaillant	16 April 1885	10 April 1888
Léon Bourgeois	17 November 1887	10 March 1888			
Henri Lozé	10 March 1888	11 July 1893	Arthur Gragnon	10 April 1888	2 April 1889
			Emile-Honoré Cazelles	3 April 1889	8 March 1890
			Arthur Christian	8 March 1890	25 March 1890
			Emile-Honoré Cazelles	25 March 1890	29 February 1892
			Henry Soinoury	4 March 1892	7 March 1893
			Alfred Fournier	7 March 1893	6 October 1894

Louis Lépine	11 July 1893	14 October 1897			
			Henri Poirson	6 October 1894	25 June 1896
			Charles Blanc	25 June 1896	14 October 1897
Charles Blanc	14 October 1897	23 June 1899	Léopold Vigué	14 October 1897	20 November 1899
Louis Lépine	23 June 1899	29 March 1913	René Cavard	21 December 1899	16 March 1906
			Henry Huard	16 March 1906	30 January 1907
			Célestin Hennion	30 January 1907	29 March 1913
Célestin Hénnion	31 March 1913	2 September 1914			

Appendix 9: Chronology

1749: Bow Street Runners formed by Henry and John Fielding in London.

27 March 1782: British Home Office, also known as the Home Department, established.

17 February 1800: Establishment of the Préfecture de Police de Paris (P.P.).

18 May 1804: First Empire in France established under Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon I).

1814: *Bill to provide for the better Execution of the Laws in Ireland*, creates a 'preservation of the peace' force in Ireland.

5 August 1822: Irish Constabulary Act establishing the County Constabulary, Ireland's first country-wide police force.

19 June 1829: Metropolitan Police Act establishes the Metropolitan Police in London.

1833: Parliamentary Committee on Police as Spies set-up following the Popay Case (Police Officer William Popay accused of 'spying' as he was working in plain clothes).

4 July 1836: Dublin Police Act, 1836.

20 May 1836: Constabulary (Ireland) Act, 1836.

17 August 1839: Metropolitan Police Act marks the end of the Bow Street Runners.

31 May 1842: Dublin Police Act, establishes the D.M.P. detective branch known as the G Division.

15 August 1842: Detective Department of the Metropolitan Police established.

14 January 1852: Second French Empire, ruled by Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (Napoleon III).

21 June 1853: Direction de la Sûreté Générale (S.G.) established.

March 1867: Fenian Rising in Ireland.

6 September 1867: Irish Constabulary became Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) in recognition of its role in the suppression of the Fenian rising.

13 December 1867: Explosion at Clerkenwell Prison in London, planned by Irish Fenians.

April 1868: Robert Anderson becomes special adviser to the Home Office, in charge of monitoring the Fenian threat.

4 September 1870: Proclamation of the Third Republic in France.

18 March - 28 May 1871: Paris Commune.

24 October 1877: 'Trial of the Detectives', following a bribery scandal including members of the Metropolitan Police Detective Department.

8 April 1878: Criminal Investigation Department (C.I.D.) established; Howard Vincent appointed as Director of Criminal Investigation; Chief Superintendent Williamson appointed as head of the Detective Department.

20 April 1879: Beginning of the Land War in Ireland.

30 June 1880: Cazelles report argues for the creation of a political police at the service of the Republic in France.

23 January 1881: Fenian office created within the C.I.D.

30 March 1881: German anarchist Johann Most arrested in London, following an article published in the *Freiheit*.

5 May 1881: Explosion at Chester Barracks, caused by Fenians.

16 May 1881: Explosion at Liverpool Barracks, caused by Fenians.

10 June 1881: Explosion at Liverpool City Hall, caused by Fenians.

14 - 20 July 1881: London Social Revolutionary Congress.

13 October 1881: Protection of Persons and Property (Ireland) Act, also called the Coercion Act. Allows for the internment without trial of those suspected of involvement in the Land War in Ireland.

6 May 1882: Phoenix Park murders, the assassination of the two heads of the Irish government in Dublin.

12th July 1882: Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act.

August 1882: E.G. Jenkinson named assistant under-secretary for police and crime at Dublin Castle.

14 September 1882: R.I.C. Crime Branch established.

22 October 1882: Assommoir attack in Lyon, fomented by anarchists, killing one person.

8 June – 19 January 1883: Trial of the '66' anarchists militants, taking place in response to the Assommoir attack.

15 March 1883: Explosions at Local Government Board offices at Whitehall and at *The Times* offices in London.

16 March 1883: Jenkinson summoned by Harcourt in London to counter the Fenian dynamite campaign; Special Irish Branch founded, working within the C.I.D.

7 March 1884: Jenkinson returns to London to work for the Home Office but in no official position.

30 May 1884: Three bombs exploded in London: at the headquarters of the C.I.D. and the Metropolitan Police's Special Irish Branch; in the basement of the Carlton Club, a gentlemen's club for members of the Conservative Party; and outside the home of Conservative M.P. Sir Watkin Williams-Wynn.

5 April 1884: Municipal law defining the police power of the state and of the cities in France.

13 December 1884: Two Irish American republicans, who were planting a bomb on London Bridge, are killed when their bomb prematurely exploded.

24 January 1885: Three bombs exploded in London: in the House of Commons chamber, in Westminster Hall and in the Banqueting Room of the Tower of London. Two police officers and four civilians are injured. Two men, Henry Burton and James E. Gilbert, were sentenced to penal servitude for life as a result.

January/ February 1887: Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police established from the remnants of the Special Irish Branch and other anti-Fenian forces. Given responsibility for all political crime.

13 November 1887: Bloody Sunday at Trafalgar Square, London.

1888: The Anthropométrie Judiciaire section established at the P.P.

26 October 1891: Bomb exploded at the National Press offices in Abbey Street, Dublin, planted by Fenians.

31 December 1891: Bomb exploded at Dublin Castle, planted by Fenians.

6 January 1892: Walsall anarchists arrested by William Melville in London.

24 December 1892: Fenian attack targeting Dublin Castle.

30 March 1892: Anarchist Ravachol arrested at the Véry restaurant in Paris.

25 April 1892: Explosion at the Véry restaurant in Paris, the day before Ravachol's trial.

8 November 1892: Bomb exploded at the police station on Bons-Enfants Street in Paris, carried out by anarchist Émile Henry.

11 August 1893: The Identité Judiciaire section established at the P.P., managed by Alphonse Bertillon.

6 May 1893: Explosion at Dublin's Four Courts on the anniversary of the Phoenix Park murders.

8 September 1893: The Government of Ireland Bill, known as the Second Home Rule Bill, rejected by the House of Lords.

9 December 1893: Anarchist Auguste Vaillant throws a bomb in the Chamber of Deputies in France, no casualties.

11 and 15 December 1893; 28 July 1894: Lois scélérates passed, repressing anarchist actions in France, in response to Vaillant's attack.

21 December 1893: Circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the prefects, calling for an increased surveillance of anarchists.

25 December 1893: Small explosion at an army barracks in Dublin.

12 February 1894: Attack of the Terminus café at Saint-Lazare station, perpetrated by Émile Henry.

15 February 1894: Explosion in Greenwich Park, London, kills the perpetrator Martial Bourdin, a French anarchist.

20 February 1894: Direction Générales des Recherches established within the P.P., under the management of Louis Puibaraud.

24 June 1894: French president Sadi Carnot assassinated in Lyon by an Italian Anarchist, Sante Caserio.

27 September 1894: The 'Dreyfus Affair' begins in France.

10 September 1898: Empress Elizabeth of Austria assassinated by an Italian anarchist in Switzerland.

24 November to 21 December 1898: International anti-anarchist conference, Rome.

23 February 1899: Paul Déroulède's coup attempt at Felix Faure's funeral in Paris failed.

7-19 August 1899: Dreyfus' second trial in Rennes.

12 August - 20 September 1899: Fort Chabrol siege in Paris.

18 September 1899 - 4 January 1900: Haute-Cour trial for conspiracy against the security of the state.

6 September 1901: US president William McKinley assassinated by an anarchist.

1-14 March 1904: Secret Protocol for the International War on Anarchism, known as St. Petersburg Protocol.

10 March 1906: Courrières mine disaster.

30 December 1907: Clemenceau creates twelve regional squads of mobile police known as the 'brigades du tigre'.

Appendix 10: List of key figures

Robert Anderson (1841-1918): Born in Dublin, barrister, Fenian specialist attached to the Home Office from 1868, then assistant-commissioner of the Metropolitan Police between 1888 and 1901.

Louis Andrieux (1840-1931): Préfet de Police de Paris from 1879 to 1881. Used informants to spy on the anarchist milieu.

Arthur Balfour (1848-1930): Member of the Conservative Party, chief secretary for Ireland between 1887 and 1891, in favour of intelligence-led policing, opposed to Home Rule.

Thomas Miller Beach aka Henri Le Caron (1841-1894): English spy, Robert Anderson's informant, infiltrated Fenian networks in north America. His career stop following his testimony at the Parnell Commission in 1889.

Alphonse Bertillon (1853-1914): Head of the Identité Judiciaire section at the P.P., specialist of the anthropometry techniques and inventor of the *portrait parlé*.

Adolphe Billaut (1805-1863): Minister of the interior under Napoleon III, participated in reforming the police.

Edward Bradford (1836-1911): British Army officer, Metropolitan Police Commissioner from 1890 to 1903.

Sir Redvers Buller (1839-1908): British Army officer, sent to Ireland in 1886 as special commissioner to investigate the most disturbed portion of the country and appointed temporary under-secretary for Ireland between 1886-1887. In favour of police reform and control of intelligence-led policing by Dublin Castle instead of the R.I.C.

Thomas Burke (1829-1882): Under-secretary for Ireland, assassinated during the Phoenix Park murders for his support of the Irish Coercion Acts at the time of the Land War.

Lord Frederick Cavendish (1836-1882): Liberal politician, assassinated on the day he was named chief secretary for Ireland alongside Thomas Burke during the Phoenix Park murders.

Emile-Honoré Cazelles (1831-1908): Head of the S.G., wrote a report where he theorized the idea of the need for the republican regime to have a political police at its service.

Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929): Journalist, elected radical deputy, supportive of the communards amnesty and defended the anarchists in the early 1880s. Minister of the interior in 1906, reputation as a strike breaker, responsible for the creation of twelve regional squads of mobile police in 1906 to fight criminality outside of Paris.

Auguste Coulon: Anarchist informant suspected of being an agent provocateur who fomented the Walsall plot in 1892.

Antoine Cyvoct (1861-1930): Anarchist militant, first accused of being responsible for the anarchist attack of the Assommoir, eventually condemned for publishing an article encouraging this kind of attack to fourteen years in Caledonia before being pardoned in 1898.

Michael Davitt (1846-1906): Irish republican leader, member of the I.R.B., in favour of Home Rule, cofounded the Land League with Charles Stewart Parnell, joined the anti-Parnellite Irish National Federation following the split in the Irish Parliamentary Party in 1891.

Emile De Marcère (1828-1918): Minister of the interior in 1879 in favour of the use of political policing to protect the Republican regime.

Paul Déroulède (1846-1914), Edouard Drumont (1844-1917), Jules Guérin (1860-1910): Antisemitic leaders. Drumont wrote an antisemitic best-seller *La France Juive* in 1886. Déroulède attempted a coup in February 1899, Guérin locked himself in his organization's offices for a month during the siege at Fort Chabrol, refusing to be arrested by the police for conspiracy against the surety of the state.

Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935): French Jewish military officer wrongly accused of being a German spy. Led to a national case, involving the increased expression of antisemitism in France, recognized innocent and rehabilitated in 1906.

William Forster (1818-1886): Liberal civil servant, chief secretary of Ireland between 1880 and 1882 at the time of the Land War and the suppression of the Land League.

Joseph Fouché (1759-1820): Head of the Ministry of the Police Générale under Napoleon I, in charge of monitoring the country and gathering information to protect the regime.

William Gladstone (1809-1898): Leader of British Liberal Party, prime minister of England for twelve inconsecutive years between 1868-1894, in favour of Home Rule for Ireland but defeated by the House of Commons in 1886 and the House of Lords in 1893.

Major Nicholas Gosselin (1839-1917): Irish born, first appointed as a resident magistrate in 1882, employed by the Home Office to gather information on Fenian in Glasgow and northern England for the Special Irish Branch from 1883, before being employed on 'special duty' by the Home Office until his retirement in 1904.

Jean Grave (1854-1939): Anarchist militant, owner of various newspaper, supporter of Kropotkine's view on anarchism.

Jules Guesde (1845-1922), Jean Jaurès (1859-1914): Leaders of the French socialist movement with opposed political strategies.

Marie-François Goron (1847-1933): Head of the P.P. Surety Department in 1887, before becoming a private investigator in 1895 and author of police novels.

E.G. Jenkinson (1835-1919): Lord Spencer's private secretary and named assistant under-secretary for police and crime in August 1882. In charge of reforming the police and the magistracy system. Became the Irish expert on fenianism, called on by Harcourt, first in 1883, then in 1884 to deal with the Fenian dynamite campaign in London while keeping his position at Dublin Castle. His mission at the Home Office ended in early 1887 because of relationship issues with Metropolitan Police officials. Retired afterwards.

William Harcourt (1827-1904): Member of the Liberal Party, home secretary between 1880 and 1885 at the time of the London Fenian bombing. Called E.G. Jenkinson to the Home Office to help counter the Fenian threat.

David Harrel (1841-1939): Joined the R.I.C. in 1859, resident magistrate of County Mayo in 1879 then appointed chief commissioner of the D.M.P. in 1883 until 1893, when he was named under-secretary for Ireland until 1902. Worked closely with John Mallon and Nicholas Gosselin to counter Irish nationalism.

Edmund Henderson (1821-1896): Metropolitan Police Commissioner between 1869 and 1886.

Célestin Hennion (1862-1915): Policeman charged with political policing mission by the S.G., taking the head of the institution in 1912 and Préfet de Police de Paris between 1913-1914. Known for his modernization of the French police alongside the Ministry of the Interior, Georges Clemenceau.

François Koenigstein known as Ravachol (1859-1892): Anarchist, responsible for a series of dynamite attacks in the early 1890s, condemned and executed for his crimes in 1892.

Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921): Russian anarchist, theorized the idea of anarchist communism, exiled in Switzerland following the Paris Communes (1871), arrested and condemned at the 'trial of the 66' in January 1883. Released from prison for health reasons in 1886, he moved to London and continue to write on anarchism.

Louis Lépine (1846-1933): French civil servant, Préfet de Police de Paris, first between 1893-1897 before being recalled in 1899 to deal with the conservative's threat. Known for modernizing the police's work. He created the bicycles brigades, was responsible for installing phone warning systems in police stations and promoted forensic science and criminology.

John Littlechild (1848-1923): Detective of the Metropolitan Police since 1871, number two of the Special Irish branch set up in 1883 before being put in charge of the Special Branch in 1887, resigned from the Metropolitan Police in 1893 to work as a private investigator.
Godfrey Lushington (1832-1907): British civil servant, permanent under-secretary of state at the Home Office from 1886 to 1895.

Gustave Macé (1835-1904): Head of the P.P. Surety Department between 1879-1884.

John Mallon (1839-1915): Policeman, head of D.M.P. G Division from 1874, in charge of the Phoenix Park murders investigation, promoted to chief superintendent in 1883, considered as the specialist on the revolutionary movement in Ireland.

Henry Matthews (1826-1913): Conservative Party member, home secretary between 1886 to 1892, in conflicts with Charles Warren, the Metropolitan Police commissioner, regarding demonstrations and the maintenance of public order.

Richard Mayne (1796-1868): Barrister, first joint commissioner of Police of the Metropolis before being sole commissioner in 1855, inclined to use detectives and covert practices of policing.

William Melville (1850-1918): Irish born, member of Special Irish Branch, then member and head of the Special Branch in 1893, in charge of policing anarchist refugees in London in the 1890s. Resigned in 1903 to set up a new secret intelligence section at the War Office.

Louise Michel (1830-1905): Teacher, anarchist militant heavily monitored by the police and especially Louis Andrieux when she came back to France in 1881 after being exile in Caledonia following the Paris Commune.

James Monro (1838-1920): Lawyer, named head of C.I.D. in 1884 at the time of the Fenian dynamite campaign, before being put in charge of the newly created Special Branch in 1887. Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police between 1888 and 1890.

Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa (1831-1915): Fenian leader, member of the I.R.B. based in America, organizer of the Fenian Dynamite campaign taking place in Great Britain in early 1880s.

Robert Peel (1788-1850): Chief secretary of Ireland (1812-1818) where he established the Peace preservation force, laying the basis for the county constabulary established in 1822. Home secretary (1822-1830) established the Metropolitan Police of London in 1829, a uniformed and unarmed police force.

Stephen Pichon (1857-1933): Journalist, member of the Chamber of Deputies (1885-1893) and rapporteur of the finance commission of 1887 in which he defended the renaming and reduction of secret funds for the Ministry of the Interior.

Louis Puibaraud (1849-1903): Appointed head of the Direction Générale des Recherches at the P.P. in 1894, known for his use of political policing techniques.

David Raynal (1840-1903): Minister of the interior between 1893 and 1894 at the time of the lois scélérates.

Andrew Reed (1837-1914): Policeman, assistant inspector general in 1882, sent to county Athlone as divisional magistrate in 1883, before being appointed inspector general of the R.I.C. in 1885 until 1900.

Joseph West Ridgeway (1844-1930): British civil servant, under-secretary for Ireland between 1887-1892, supported the control of Dublin Castle over the R.I.C. special branch.

Charles Rowan (1782-1852): British Army officer, first joint commissioner of Police of the Metropolis alongside Richard Mayne.

Jules Sébille (1857-1942): State commissioner of the Lyon Police, named by Hennion as the head of the Contrôle Général du Service des Recherches dans les Départements at the S.G. in 1907.

John Poyntz Spencer (5th Earl Spencer) (1835-1910): Member of the British Liberal Party, lord lieutenant of Ireland between 1868 and 1874 then 1882 and 1885, reformed the police system following the Phoenix Park murders to counter ‘secret societies’.

Henry Thynne (1838-1915): Deputy-inspector general of the R.I.C. supervising the work of the R.I.C. special branch in 1886-1890.

Auguste Vaillant (1861-1894): Anarchist, author of an attack in the Chamber of Deputies in December 1893 to seek revenge for the execution of Ravachol. Despite only causing slight injuries, he was condemned to death in 1894. His attack encouraged the government to adopt the lois scélérates in 1893 and 1894.

Léopold Vigué (1855-1915): Head of the S.G. between 1897-1899, police delegate for France at the anti-anarchist conference in 1898.

Howard Vincent (1849-1908): Lawyer, studied at the Law faculty of the university of Paris and investigated the Prefecture de Police. Named as Director of C.I.D. in 1878. Left the Metropolitan Police in 1884, police delegate at the anti-anarchist conference of Rome in 1898.

Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau (1846-1904): Minister of the interior between 1881-1882 and 1883- 1885, in charge of municipal law of 1884. Head of government and Minister of the interior between 1899 and 1902, he successfully repressed a conservative agitation in August 1899.

Charles Warren (1840-1927): British Army officer, Metropolitan Police commissioner between 1886-1888, responsible for the repression of the Trafalgar Square demonstration in October 1887.

Samuel Waters (1846-1936): District Inspector of the R.I.C., charged by Arthur Balfour with setting up a special intelligence department at the service of the Chief Secretary in 1887.

Adolphus Frederick Williamson (1830-1889): Joined the Metropolitan Police as detective in 1850, member of the Special 'foreign' Branch in the 1850s. Named head of the Detective Department in 1869 and then chief constable of the C.I.D. in 1886, until his death in 1889.