Department of Philosophy
https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/40
2024-03-29T09:06:28ZHeidegger on truth and subjectivity: a nihilistic interpretation
https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/3132
Heidegger on truth and subjectivity: a nihilistic interpretation
This research offers an original interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, which can be termed 'nihilistic' with reference to Heidegger's notion of nothingness and his reception of nihilism. The interpretation contributes to Heideggerian scholarship by clearing up two controversies surrounding the interpretation of his philosophy, relating to truth and subjectivity. On the proposed reading, these two topics are related. Truth concerns the 'disclosure' of human existence, or in other words, the self-manifestation of human existence. For Heidegger, the experience of angst is insightful for this sense of truth. On his account, angst is a 'fundamental mood' that makes apparent a kind of 'nothingness', which can also be described as the 'uncanniness' of human existence. Ultimately, the interpretation proposes that these notions refer to the ineffable opacity of human existence. It makes for a conception of truth that is dialetheic, and for this reason unconventional. Countering the dogma that truth must be in opposition to falsity and re-interpreting the idea of a contradiction, uncanniness presents a sense of truth that is conflictual and self-effacing. Whereas Heidegger sees this issue as foundational to the history of philosophy, the current paradigm for Heideggerian research explicitly denounces the importance of contemplating nothingness, and in that way misrepresents Heidegger's way of thinking. The correct interpretation must be nihilistic, even if this complicates the normative character of his thinking. It may be bound by an explicit norm, but it nonetheless takes measure in reticence, being compelled to this by guilt over its own ineffability.
2023-09-29T00:00:00ZAristotle on efficient and final causes in Plato (Pre published)
https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/3100
Aristotle on efficient and final causes in Plato (Pre published)
In Metaphysics A 6, Aristotle claims that Plato only recognises formal and material causes. Yet, in various dialogues, Plato seems to use and distinguish efficient and final causes too. Consequently, Harold Cherniss accuses Aristotle of being an unfair, forgetful, or careless reader of Plato. Since then, scholars have tried to defend Aristotle’s exegetical skills. I offer textual evidence and arguments to show that their efforts still fall short of the desired goal. I argue, instead, that we can reject Cherniss’ assertation by re-examining Aristotle’s exegetical and methodological assumptions.
Vázquez, D. (2022) 'Aristotle on efficient and final causes in Plato', Elenchos, 43(1), 29-54, available: https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2022-0003.
2022-11-09T00:00:00ZGetting younger (Pre published)
https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/3099
Getting younger (Pre published)
I argue that in Plato’s Parmenides 141a6-c4, things in time come to be simultaneously older and younger than themselves because a thing’s past and present selves are equally real. As a result, whatever temporal relation is predicated of any of these past and present selves is true of the thing in question. Unlike other interpretations, this reading neither assumes that things in time have to replace their parts, nor that time is circular.
Vázquez, D. (2021) 'Getting younger', Rhizomata, 9(1), 84-85, available: https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2021-0004.
2022-11-09T00:00:00ZThe last natural philosophers in the Phaedo (Pre published)
https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/3098
The last natural philosophers in the Phaedo (Pre published)
This paper examines the possible sources of the two theories introduced by Plato in Phaedo 99b2-c6. First, it shows that the theories belong to people who remain unpersuaded by the teleology introduced by Socrates (Phaedo 97c4-6) and believe they can find a better alternative. Then, it rejects that the most proximate references could be Empedocles, Anaximenes, Anaximander or Anaxagoras. Next, it argues that Plato is most plausibly alluding to both Aristophanes’ Clouds and views held by Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus of Athens. Finally, it concludes by noting that this interpretation raises a challenge to the widespread assumption that Socrates’ abandons or modifies his teleological views.
Vázquez, D. (2022) 'The last natural philosophers in Plato’s Phaedo 99b2-c6', Mnemosyne, 1-24, available: https://doi.org/10.1163/1568525X-bja10102.
2022-11-08T00:00:00Z