Now showing items 1-6 of 6
Self-other contingencies: enacting social perception
(Springer Netherlands, 2009)
Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot, because intentions and emotions ...
Perceptual modalities: modes of presentation or modes of interaction?
(Imprint Academic, 2010)
Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which ...
Situated agency: the normative medium of human action
(Croatian Philosophical Society, 2014)
In this paper the notion of individual agency is critically examined in light of the enactive approach to understanding the mind. It is argued that following the work of Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese and ...
Enactive theorists do it on purpose: on why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.
(Springer Netherlands, 2007)
The enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to “action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, no definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not ...
Doing it and meaning it (and the relationship between the two) (pre-published version)
(John Benjamins, 2005)
A number of related approaches to cognition and consciousness have been gaining momentum in the literature in recent years, emphasizing the active, embodied nature of the mind and grounding mental states and processes in ...
Enaction and psychology (pre-published version)
(American Psychological Association (APA), 2013)
The enactive approach to cognitive science aims to provide an account of the mind that is both naturalistic and nonreductive. Psychological activity is viewed not as occurring within the individual organism but in the ...