Now showing items 1-3 of 3
Self-other contingencies: enacting social perception
(Springer Netherlands, 2009)
Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot, because intentions and emotions ...
Enactive theorists do it on purpose: on why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.
(Springer Netherlands, 2007)
The enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to “action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, no definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not ...
Doing it and meaning it (and the relationship between the two) (pre-published version)
(John Benjamins, 2005)
A number of related approaches to cognition and consciousness have been gaining momentum in the literature in recent years, emphasizing the active, embodied nature of the mind and grounding mental states and processes in ...