Autonomy in Education: Implications for the Institution and the Subject

By

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Abstract

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Author: Brian Collins

Like many other philosophers and educationalists, Durkheim and Habermas understand education to have a political function. Education is understood as a means to assure socio-political stability and to secure collective aspirations. Education must serve a collective interest and in this way it also serves the interest of the individual. Durkheim argues that science must be the arbiter of the educational function, providing an objective evaluation of the proper means and ends for education. In the view of both Durkheim and Habermas, the student’s capacity for an autonomous existence within society will depend on the internalisation of the moral values and interests of that society. However, Heidegger’s writings on being and time reveal tensions between the ideas of collective and authentic existence. In addition, Foucault has shown that ‘sciences’ like psychology and the social sciences have a different foundation and function from that of natural sciences like physics and biology, because the former are normative and inextricable from a moral and political position. This thesis questions the role that the human and social sciences have come to play within modern education.

Foucault understood education to be a disciplinary function that constitutes a form of social control. Philosophically, this thesis explores what socialisation involves for the student and asks can education function as a policing apparatus and equally serve the interests of all its students. In particular, it looks at the socialisation of those whose bodies and lives apparently most contradict the collective interest, norms and dominant aesthetic judgements. Through Deleuze and Foucault it will argue that socialisation is an indoctrinatory function that needs to be distinguished from education. If one imagines a space dedicated to the inculcation of values and beliefs, a space that suggests a threat in order to eradicate the unpredictability entailed in thinking, a space that rewards agreement and punishes resistance, is this really a space dedicated to education? Through Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Hengehold and Foucault, this thesis aims to show how education is a distinct practice from socialisation. It questions whether it really is educational or even beneficial for those who are most marginalised within a society to be exposed to socialisation techniques that aim for that population to internalise and ‘own’ values and beliefs often espoused in the interest of those who benefit most from a social ordering, rather than to have an experience of genuine education.
Author’s Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation represents my own work and has not been submitted, in whole or in part, by me or another person, for the purpose of obtaining any other credit / grade. I agree that this dissertation may be made available by the College to future students and for research purposes.

Signature: 

Brian Collins

Date: 20\textsuperscript{th} March 2014
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction

This thesis will consider how integral autonomy is for our understanding of education, and whether developing an understanding of the question of what autonomy in education means will help us to determine the parameters that distinguish education from indoctrination. For example, are we to understand education as another, or possibly even the primary apparatus for indoctrination into the dominant social episteme, as Foucault might put it? To find an answer to this question it will be necessary to define what it is that can be properly understood as education, not simply limiting it to as that which takes place within an educational setting, but rather asking what we might consider to be ‘genuine’ education. To begin with this inquiry examines two speculative assumptions: firstly, that autonomy and how we conceptualize it is integral to our understanding of the distinction between education and indoctrination; secondly, it assumes that some practices currently represented under the rubric ‘education’, can be more accurately interpreted as indoctrination. In order to explore these assumptions this thesis will analyze the function of education and that of socialization in their closest proximity and their most stressed manifestations. Education within the prison will therefore be a significant feature of this thesis. This line of inquiry leads to a further assumption that socialization is a form of indoctrination, or at least it is a good deal closer to what we might consider indoctrination than ‘genuine’ education. A less provocative way of expressing this suggests that when the primary aim of education is seen as one of socialization this does not allow for a sufficient degree of autonomy, that is, individual agency for the student or independence of the institutional apparatus to be properly understood as ‘genuine education’. Broad and narrow conceptions of education inculcate ‘ways of thinking’ and ‘dispositions’ in individuals. Within educational research and policy, education is sometimes advocated as a means to achieve a progressive, harmonious, and (often) homogeneous conception of societal inclusion. It is important to make a clear distinction between education and socialization. Ultimately the intention of this thesis is to bring about a comprehension of education that can be considered as ‘genuine’. The purpose is to denote for educators and students alike what a
transgression of the education space would involve and it offers a vision of education that is valued for itself and the possibilities it offers to the student.

Because this thesis attempts to avoid siding with any particular political position it does not make reference to some of the most prominent thinkers on the philosophy of education such as Ira Shor, Michael Apple, and Paulo Freire, whose writings are related to the issues under consideration, but who are considered too politically entrenched to allow for a depoliticised conception of education; no doubt their writing on education has contributed to the thesis in other ways, sometimes through what they don’t say. In this thesis, the first chapter mobilises the writings of Durkheim and Foucault to highlight two distinct ways of thinking about the relationship between the subject and society. These positions are intended to indicate how the way in which the social context is perceived can mean that different roles for the education function may come to be envisioned. How society is envisioned affects how education functions. Chapter Two challenges the scientific credentials of what Foucault terms the Psy-function, here extended to include the various socialisation and psychologising functions that are intended to influence the psyche of the subject as student. Jacques Lacan is singled out for scrutiny, not because Lacan or psychoanalysis is considered to be particularly egregious, but simply because Lacan explicitly attempts to ground psychoanalysis in science. Chapter Three offers an alternative to how the human subject might be understood; it grounds human subjectivity in an ontological and an ontic comprehension of time. The thinking of Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger on time is used to contextualise the nature of the relationship between the subject and the collective, and also between the student and the institution. Chapter Four, through Durkheim and Foucault, offers a more detailed analysis of the nature of the social forces that can influence the social setting and therefore the educational context. It is an elaboration on the positions set out in the first chapter. Chapter Five sets out to define what education is. It looks at education in the prison in order to highlight a distinction between medicalized and criminological forms of discourse, and educational discourse. Chapter Six introduces Jürgen Habermas as a more contemporary representation of the Durkheimian position. Through Habermas the socialising role for education is examined. Chapter Seven, the final chapter, offers a critique through Foucault of the socialisation role in education and an understanding of Foucault’s conception of the role power that plays in how
humans attain knowledge. It attempts to define indoctrination and explain what would constitute genuine education. As has been said, the purpose of this is to juxtapose definitions of both education and indoctrination in order to gradually expose a transgression of the education space. This thesis asserts that a generalisation of the psychologising and socialisation functions in education represents such a transgression.
Chapter One

The Positions
Chapter One: The Positions

This thesis is particularly interested in the relationship between autonomy and morality. One strand of the history of philosophical thought, influenced by Hobbes, distinguishes between 1. existence in a state of nature as an absolute negative liberty which in Hobbes’s view “is Unguided, without Designe, and inconstant” (Hobbes, 2006, p13), that is, an existence without deference or recourse to a authority other than the desire to preserve one’s existence, and 2. societal existence, whereby an individual relinquishes his absolute autonomy for security or, as Durkheim would argue, he embraces the authority of a democratic society thereby reclaiming his autonomy in a higher positive sense. Isaiah Berlin conceptualised liberty in two forms, negative and positive, negative liberty being freedom to proceed unimpeded by others, with only the individual’s natural abilities representing a limitation. Positive liberty is recognition of liberty or freedom in the assimilation of social and moral values as one's own.

It is safe to say that humankind requires a form of co-operative existence in order to survive, let alone flourish. Mutually recognizable values that entail prohibitions have often been seen to be a necessary prerequisite for such an existence. Any conception of morality predicated on a value system that functions as a mechanism for cohesion within society raises the question of responsibility: What can be reasonably expected of each member of a society in order that society functions effectively? If, for example, an individual were to exist in isolation, were that even possible, for such an individual neither autonomy nor morality could have any reason to exist as concepts. On the basis of this realisation, it could be argued that both autonomy and morality are conceptual artefacts that owe their manifestation to existence in the world with others. It could further be argued that without responsibility there could be no communal existence and therefore no conception of autonomy. Therefore we could conclude that autonomy is inextricably linked to morality and responsibility, in fact, it could be argued that its very existence as a concept is dependent on both these notions, these values. For example, Emile Durkheim writes:

"It is evident that the education of our children should not depend upon the chance of their having been born here or there, of some parents rather than others. But even though the moral conscience of our time would have
received, on this point, the satisfaction that it expects, education would not, for all that, become more uniform. Even though the career of each child would, in large part, no longer be predetermined by a blind heredity, occupational specialization would not fail to result in a great pedagogical diversity” (1956, p68).

However, in light of this inherent ordering in education, which places, classifies, orders and ranks people, maybe we should dispense with this imaginary state of nature and conceptualize autonomy on the basis that there is more to the nature of societal values, traditions, morality, and responsibility than merely a co-operative existence. Maybe we would be better served if we thought of autonomy and its relation to responsibility in terms of the agency of the individual who has no choice but to exist within a ubiquitous societal structure and thus evaluate autonomy in relation to the structuring within a society rather than seeking to re-conceptualize it on the basis of a (specious) agreement. Durkheim and Foucault emphasise contrasting concerns with regard to the relationship between the private individual and the state. While Foucault argues for a critical appraisal of the disciplinary forces that shape individuality: for the subject to be his or her own invention he or she must reject the type of individualisation to which he or she is assigned, for Durkheim the context of his thinking was a concern for the preservation of the French nation in the wake of the disastrous 1870 Franco-Prussian war and of the fragile and anticlerical Third Republic of which he was a member. In France the educational system had been considered a failure therefore it needed to be made into a mechanism for national cohesion and scientific innovation. This can be seen to be a cause of tension in Durkheim’s thinking on education. As Pickering and Walford state:

“Another reason that made the training of teachers so important in the eyes of the French government in Durkheim’s day was the policy that the ideals of the state should be implemented by teachers themselves. It was these instituteurs and institutrices of the Third republic who, it was hoped, would supplant the curé as the moral leader, not only in towns, but in the thousands of villages of rural France. The policy was to replace a rigid ecclesiastical morality with a secular one” (1998, p2). Durkheim recognised the moral nature of psychology therefore “psychology had a legitimate place in studying the development of children” (ibid, p6). Morality was very important to Durkheim “indeed there was something of a Puritan in him” (ibid). Discipline, obedience and sacrifice were values that Durkheim espoused and
education in its capacity to socialise had its primary function in instilling these values therefore for Durkheim education had a sociological end. Yet it must also be noted that for him “the school must never be an instrument of ideological manipulation. The child must never be a pawn in the ideological ambitions of the teacher” (ibid, p10).

Durkheim is considered to be a founding figure of sociology, positioning the social sciences as serious academic and scientific disciplines. Durkheim was also an educator and lecturer on education who regarded the fundamental function of education to be to bring about social cohesion. As both sociologist and educator Durkheim thought of education as the primary vehicle for a secular morality that was to be rooted in a society’s traditional values. For Durkheim, morality is the link, the continuity, which binds one generation to the next. Durkheim argued for the acknowledgement of societal rituals on the basis of his functionalist sociological position. Cohesion is a necessary requirement for any society and as a historicist Durkheim indicates the acknowledgement of communal performance, ritualized through evolving traditional values and practices which are necessary, indeed indispensible, for ongoing social harmony. These rituals vary from society to society but the phenomenon itself is universal. For Durkheim such rituals are the functional prerequisites of any social system. They are representative of universal societal needs that become interpreted in different ways by specific cultures. It is this understanding which is according to Stephen Fox “the context of his discussion when he speaks of education as answering social needs; he did not reify any particular set of actions, but, rather, stressed ‘institutional compatibility’ among the constituent elements of a going social system” (Fox in Durkheim, 1956, p18).

Education for Durkheim has a specific objective; a child’s early education was to be a preparation for a vocational education as, in his view, life was too short for a general education which he regarded to be mere dilettantism. Each child needed to be evaluated on the basis of his mental ability and “geared to his specific milieu and destiny” (Pickering and Walford, 1998, p4). For Durkheim this was the only acceptable criterion of diversity because the purpose of education was to develop the physical, intellectual and moral faculties that a political society demanded. The
school must be a reflection of the community in which it is located, a microcosm of the social unit it reflected.

“In sum, education far from having as its unique or principal object the individual and his interests, is above all the means by which society perpetually recreates the conditions of its very existence. Can society survive only if there exists among its members a sufficient homogeneity? Education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in advance, in the mind of the child, the essential similarities that a collective life presupposes. But, on the other hand, without a certain diversity, would all co-operation be possible? Education assures the persistence of this necessary diversity by becoming diversified and by specializing. It consists, then, in one or another of its aspects, of a systematic socialization of the young generation” (Durkheim, 1956, pp123-124).

For Durkheim the well-being of each individual is dependent on the health of the society and education is essential to the promotion of this well-being. Durkheim reasoned that no society could exist without a system of morality embedded in concepts of responsibility, duty, and a common set of values. For Durkheim, there is a link between his emphasis on responsibility and duty towards a society's values and the realization of the individual’s autonomy. It was as a means of attaining this autonomy that education had the role of encouraging the love of moral behaviour for its own sake. The individual is dependent on society and is partly derived from the social mores of forbearers as well as the traditional values of the social group that make up part of the individual. Durkheim conceptualizes a duality of beings; one is the individual and “is made up of all the mental states that apply only to ourselves and to the events in our personal lives: it is what might be called the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, sentiments and tendencies which express in us, not our personality, but different groups of which we are a part; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or professional traditions, collective opinions of every kind. Their totality forms the social being” (Fox, 1956, pp28-29). It is this anthropomorphic persona that is to take precedence over the actuality of the sensible individual, that is, the perceiving sensate subject that possesses a unique awareness. Education must instil the discipline necessary for the individual to obtain freedom within his society, a freedom that can only develop if the individual embraces society's values as his own; it is only then that an individual can be autonomous. It is in this way that an impersonal authority becomes accepted within the psyche of the subject.
In his essay ‘Emile Durkheim and moral education in a pluralistic society’ Mark S. Cladis asks, “To what extent do Durkheim’s theories permit conflict between the autonomy of individuals and the good of society?” (1998, p19). Durkheim was an advocate for both individual rights and the common good. He argued for the dignity and sacredness of the individual, saying that the individual should never be a mere tool of the state. The term Durkheim used to describe what he argued for was ‘moral individualism’. Cladis states, “A central aspect of Durkheim’s principled understanding of moral education is that it should engender this social ideal, the autonomous individual or, more generally as Durkheim put it moral individualism” (ibid, pp22-23). Durkheim was heavily influenced by Rousseau’s notion of a transformation of the individual for moral and civic participation. For Rousseau those in a state of nature possess self love (amour de soi) but necessity compels them to associate and so they develop a sense of self-aggrandizement (amour proper) where they develop their sense of self worth in proportion to how well they are doing in relation to others. Such an antagonistic form of association only brings about decline to a state worse than that of a state of nature. According to Rousseau those who have gained property have gained it by means of fact rather than right and it is in their interests that Rousseau’s famous contract is drawn up as a means of securing for themselves their right to property, a right enshrined in law. Rousseau proposes an authentic contract where “each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole” (Rousseau, 1998, p15). Members of such a moral collective have a duty to obey the law which they have imposed on themselves. Derek Matravers explains that “there are two steps, therefore, to acquiring moral liberty. First, people’s characters need to be altered to pursue the right goals. Second, liberty is identified with the pursuit of those goals” (2006, p195). There is an important caveat to Rousseau’s theory, which is, “that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body; which means nothing else than that he shall be forced to be free” (Rousseau, 1998, p18).

Because Durkheim regarded education to be the institution or mechanism that re-creates the conditions of a society's very existence, he reasoned that it is socialization and not private self-expression that ought to be the aim of education. “Thus, it is society as a whole and each particular social milieu that determines the
ideal that education realizes” (Durkheim, 1956, p70). As socialization is an inherently moral endeavour, Durkheim needed to develop a theory that linked autonomy with morality, a theory that was dependent on the individual’s adoption of an identity that would be congruous with the societal norm, the internalisation of an abiding impersonal authority that ought to be owned rather than perceived as something external. Durkheim argues:

“There is no people, indeed, among whom there do not exist a certain number of ideas, sentiments and practices which education must inculcate in all children indiscriminately, to whatever category they belong. It is precisely this common education which generally passes for true education. It alone seems fully to deserve to be called by this name. One grants to it, over all the others, a kind of pre-eminence” (ibid, p119).

Durkheim didn’t think all education was moral. In his opinion scientific education only provides a clarification of how the world is, and it is therefore amoral: moral education imparts values about how the world ought to be. For Durkheim these morals are public because as Cladis states, “they contribute to the creation and re-creation of the world about us. They are inescapable” (1998, p21). In Durkheim’s view, moral education is the most important education, as education, according to him is ‘genuine’ only when it has the capacity to exert a moral influence, exerting a form of behaviourism, and controlling the nature of change. “An education whose sole aim is to increase our mastery of the physical universe is bound to fail in its central task” (ibid, p21). It is because of this centrality of morality in education that Durkheim argued that it could not be reduced to merely a ‘daily course’; it must be the primary function of education.

Durkheim credited the modern education of his time with fostering in the individual an autonomous personality; it engendered an apprehension of a social ideal within the disposition or psyche of the autonomous and therefore moral individual. Though Durkheim was concerned about the effects of modernity, he thought it necessary for education to be secular in order to combat ‘intellectual servitude’ and allow the fostering of the autonomous personality in a way that allows the societal norm to be owned, a development he considered necessary to facilitate participation in a liberal society. For Durkheim discipline is a requirement of morality. Cladis states that, “The discipline found in moral education in liberal democracies, according to Durkheim, ought to be directed at
furthering the values and goals of moral individualism which give moral education its content” (ibid, pp23-24). This was not to be a slavish form of discipline, but rather a component of self-mastery and in that sense not only compatible but even necessary for autonomy. Durkheim’s argument for compatibility between discipline and autonomy is based on congruence between the individual’s adoption of moral imperatives in the Kantian sense and in the sense of a society’s laws and ideals. As autonomy is a concept that is reliant on a plurality of persons, central to Durkheim’s conception of autonomy based on society and Kant’s based on man-made law, is the necessary notion of autonomy within a collective of persons. This conception of autonomy within a collective requires a fundamental law that has a universal applicability. For Kant autonomy was derived from the idea that the moral law was made by man himself for himself, the law itself is empty, whilst for Durkheim it was based on a “free, enlightened acceptance of the nature of the moral world” (Miller, 1998, p74). The Kantian notion of autonomy is based on an inherent human nature and a man-made law that is adoptable by everyone “as something inherent in our nature and interrelationships.” (Miller, 1998, p76) This is close to Durkheim’s conception of autonomy through enlightened acceptance., “Kant, like Durkheim, sets up autonomy as an idea that cannot be fully realized, at least not by limited mortal humans” (ibid, p76). Though Durkheim rejects the notion of a universal human nature in favour of societal determinatives of dutifulness, self-discipline and loyalty derived from the notion of society itself as a moral end, nevertheless a code or felt signification initiating morality needs to remain extant in human nature or human relations. This is discoverable and recognizable within society and the idea of justice for Durkheim, and within humanity and reason for Kant. For Durkheim this recognition is to be found within the historical evolution of a society, within a cultural tradition. As Miller points out, “autonomy might mean that we make the law, but not that we just make it up” (ibid, p76). The law for Durkheim is indicative of the values and morals that carry the weight of tradition and vice versa. Durkheim’s link between discipline and autonomy is predicated on a specific definite conception of what reason is. Durkheim differs from Kant in that he rejects a transcendental and constitutive conception of pure reason and instead argues that our reason “is implicated in society” (Cladis, 1998, p25). The more rational an individual becomes the more congruent his individuality will be with his society, which in turn renders him an
autonomous agent. It is in this sense that autonomy becomes such an integral component of education for Durkheim. Education is the means to ensure lesser virtues become greater virtues, justice is derived from self-discipline which is derived from loyalty and dutifulness and as Miller points out “dutifulness is about the inculcation, internalization and almost unthinking acceptance of pre-established rules” (1998, p82).

“The man whom education should realize in us is not the man such as nature has made him, but as the society wishes him to be; and wishes him as such as its internal economy calls for” (Durkheim, 1956, p122).

Durkheim argues that an egalitarian and absolutely homogeneous education would be impossible, “it would be necessary to go back to pre-historic societies, in the structure of which there is no differentiation; and yet these kinds of societies represent hardly more than one logical stage in the history of humanity” (ibid, p69). In educational practice the reality is that poor education is for poor people as education reflects the social milieu; this is a feature of educational practice that has persisted throughout the ages, as Durkheim notes, “what a difference between the culture that the young page received, instructed in all the arts of chivalry, and that of the villein, who learned in his parish school a smattering of arithmetic, song and grammar!” (ibid, p68). For Durkheim it is sociology alone that can play the role of relating education to the social conditions that it must reflect. It is the forum from which we can discover what the public conscience is “when the public conscience, disturbed and uncertain, no longer knows what it should be” (ibid, p129). It is Durkheim’s interpretation of sociology as a ‘science’ that gives him an entitlement to argue that social scientists in their capacity as scientists are to be properly understood as teachers of their peers. As education is but a microcosm of society, then it is the sociologist who must reveal to the pedagogue the true end of education. For Durkheim, pedagogy is a sort of hybrid, it is neither fully a science nor an art, but something in between. “Now, the science which has as its object the description and explanation of the individual man is psychology. It seems, then, that it should suffice for all the needs of the pedagogue” (ibid, p116). But the prototype for the construction of the technique of education does not reside in the individual but in the collective. Durkheim points out that education would not have benefitted past societies if they had tried “to make the individual an autonomous
personality” (ibid, p64). Throughout history education has been predicated on the requirements of the society, for example:

“The Christian societies of the Middle Ages would not have been able to survive if they had given to free inquiry the place that we give it today. There are then, ineluctable necessities which it is impossible to disregard. Of what use is it to imagine a kind of education that would be fatal for the society that put it into practice?” (ibid, p64).

Therefore it is sociology and not psychology which must construct and develop this prototype. In short, psychology is the means and sociology is the end of education. As Durkheim states, “at a time when, in all spheres of human activity, one sees science, theory, speculation, that is to say, in sum, reflection, penetrating practice more and more and enlightening it, it would be too strange that only the activity of the educator should be an exception” (ibid, p136).

Durkheim acknowledges that change is necessary for societies to survive, “it is a matter of knowing when some disciplines become yokes of slavery” (Cladis, 1998, p24). He maintained that societies needed to change gradually and that a more reflective and critical ownership of societal values would prevent a static morality, a dogmatism, in favour of a steady continuity and a morality that is “perpetually in the process of becoming” (ibid, p26). Durkheim opposed the idea of a ‘parrot-like' internalization of moral values as this precluded the conditions for change. Cladis acknowledges that this preparation of the child for change, must, in order to be perceptible, entail an infusion of sociology into education. Indeed, an education which is primarily predicated on a preparation of the student's disposition for moral advancement suggests internalisation and a much deeper emphasis on sociological goals rather than pedagogical advancement in education. Durkheim is quite transparent in his argument for the social sciences and psychology as the predominant or at least decisive influences over the future shape of education. In fact, his argument has proved to be quite prescient one. Today the social sciences and psychology or what Foucault calls the Psy-function have become dominant features on the educational landscape.

Durkheim is correct when he maintains that education is too important for the State not to be involved, but we must make a distinction between what Durkheim thought he was advocating in relation to the historical context in which his ideas
were formulated and the reality of the type of socialization that occurs in Western societies today, where, as Foucault argues:

"Discipline allows nothing to escape. Not only does it not allow things to run their course, its principle is that things, the smallest things must not be abandoned to themselves. The smallest infraction of discipline must be taken up with all the more care for it being small" (Foucault, 2007, p45).

Sociology was in its infancy when Durkheim wrote and lectured. Today the social sciences of which Durkheim was a founding figure, and had placed so much confidence in, are increasingly becoming an essential apparatus for state control. This is a development to which Durkheim would have been vehemently opposed, yet its inevitability was always entailed in the naivety of his thinking on education, that is, the view that ‘science’ precluded agency. There is a tension between Durkheim’s suspicion of a state monopolized education, which he thought was a “threat to democratic morality,” (Cladis, 1998, p28) and his conception of a socializing moral primacy in education. For Durkheim both the social sciences and psychology were to be thought of as objective, that is, impartial, and therefore authentic, scientific disciplines that were in the process of maturation. Durkheim thought of a socializing moral education as an ameliorative to both the authoritative state and the particularistic family. However, he was aware that

"The average man is eminently plastic; he can be equally well used in widely varied occupations. If, then, he specializes in a given form rather than in some other, it is not for reasons which are within him; he is not forced to it by the necessities of his nature. But it is society which, to be able to maintain itself requires that labor to be divided among them in a given fashion rather than another. This is why it creates for itself, by means of education, the specialized workers whom it needs. It is, then, for and through society that education is thus diversified” (Durkheim, 1956, p118).

This suggests education as a disciplinary apparatus for maintaining a social order, a socialised education that is intended to suggest a natural ordering to class distinctions. It also suggests an overtly political predetermination into the functioning of education by sociological means, a functioning that predicts the *modus operandi* of socialization practices in education today and a development that was recognized by Foucault. Durkheim argues that though social force is to be thought of as impersonal, it implies the idea of power:

"In fact, it implies the idea of power which in its turn, does not come without those of ascendancy, mastership and domination, and their
corollaries, dependence and subordination; now the relation expressed by all these ideas are eminently social. It is society which classifies beings into superiors and inferiors, into commanding masters and obeying servants; it is society which confers upon the former the singular property which makes command efficacious and which makes power” (ibid, p64).

In contrast, Michel Foucault’s analytical approach to how we comprehend the human situation is predicated on a subtle but profound shift in emphasis in respect of how we humans might think about ourselves and our situation. In relation to human subjectivity, Foucault suggests we should not ask the question, Why? but instead ask the question, How? Do not ask the question ‘why’ this was thought, but instead ask the question ‘how’ this was thought. Ask, what has occurred so as to give rise to a particular way of thinking? What is its provenance? How is it that we think this way? What is the genealogy of this current comprehension? Foucault directs his model of analysis at external events rather than attempting to fashion some existential or psychological a priori. His is an analysis of discourses, types of knowledge, reason and thought that both bring about and reflect categories of comprehension. His is not an analysis that focuses on the biological determinates of individuals and species, and it rejects conjecture from any purported underlying psychological universalities. Instead of trying to extrapolate an ideal society, existence, or citizen from a concept of an underlying universal human nature, or something quintessential in the constitution of all human beings but inaccessible to articulation, as Paul Rabinow reminds us, Foucault prefers to ask, “How has the concept of human nature functioned in our society?” (Rabinow, 1984, p4) because, in Foucault’s view, an appeal to some universal quality or determinate is an appeal to a ‘Knowledge’ that is external to history and society; and therefore it is an appeal to something that doesn’t exist. As Rabinow points out, for Foucault, “there is no external position of certainty, no universal understanding that is beyond history and society.” (ibid, p4) First principles, utopias, or general principles have no place in Foucault’s approach. In fact, for Foucault these have for too long masked reality and kept us in “the dark about the concrete functioning of power in Western societies.” (ibid, pp5-6) For him it is time to cast aside universalistic notions of first principles and utopian schemes intended to build models of a just society “and ask instead how power actually operates in our society.” (ibid, pp5-6)

Foucault is interested in how power affects the subject and gives birth to the individual. “There are two meanings of the word subject’, he writes, ‘subject to
someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to” (ibid, p21). At first glance it would be easy to form the impression that Foucault has focused his interest solely on the issue of power, that the objective of his analysis is primarily to understand how it functions, but closer scrutiny will reveal that his real objective was not simply to analyze power but to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (ibid, p7). Foucault is interested in investigating the techniques of distributing power in an uneven though imperceptible manner, which in his view, maintain the foundation of modern societies. He becomes intrigued by the way techniques of control function as “the humble but concrete form of every morality, whereas they are a set of psycho-political techniques” (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1984, p213). Influenced by Nietzsche’s writing, he shows how the genealogy of modern society can trace the provenance of its moral code back to these small techniques of discipline, to what Foucault refers to as “those apparently insignificant tricks that it has invented, and even those ‘sciences’ that give it a respectable face” (ibid, p213). This helps explain why he pays so much attention to the development of social practices, and the development of these disciplines around subjectivity. These practices, disciplines, or ‘sciences’ represent for Foucault the greatest threat to human beings as autonomous agents. The subject becomes the ‘object’ of study and intervention for politicised movements within the social sciences, which, whilst presenting themselves as ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’, have a history of dividing those most marginal to society into classifications and categories. Therefore, “his strategy has been to focus his work, both political and intellectual on what he sees as the greatest threat – that strange, somewhat unlikely, mixing of the social science and social practices developed around subjectivity” (ibid, p7). Foucault is interested in how disciplines function as power, or to be more precise, as particular modalities of power with various techniques and procedures of application. The social sciences among other social practices around human subjectivity constitute a mode of this disciplinary power with specific targets. They serve a political function through which dominated groups are medicalized, stigmatized, and normalized; these groups are subjected to ‘truths’, truths that play a specific role within each manipulating technology. The ‘truths’ around which these disciplinary
technologies evolve in turn form an internal and esoteric coherence that facilitates an autonomy that invests specialized modes of inquiry with a claim to a scientific validation. They give rise to discourses that are specific to the institution, to evaluations that articulate only one voice, that of the ‘scientist’, and they claim through ‘science’ an unquestioned authority to preside over truth claims normally on the basis of a moral evaluation.

Foucault considers his project to be “the exact opposite of Hobbes’ project in *Leviathan*” (Foucault, 1994, p35). The purpose of *Leviathan* was to examine the constitution of a fabricated man, that of the sovereign. Instead, Foucault wants to examine how individuals, subjects, are gradually and progressively constituted. He wants to examine the constitution of actual man in relation to the effects of power. It is in this way that he becomes interested in the study of power in its external, direct, and immediate relationship with the objects it targets. It is in relation to actual man that power’s field of application resides, and it is here that it produces its effects. He conceptualizes power as a network, a mesh, not a concatenation of hierarchies of power. Every individual is subjected to power and is also an instrument of power. In order to understand what it is that forms the subject, Foucault traces the genealogy of the practices and apparatuses that have emerged in modern states which have developed to form mechanisms of power that are both individualizing and totalizing. He shows how the older monarchical use of sovereign power with its emphasis on territory, shifts over time to new types of power, such as that of governmentality, with its fixation on population sciences, and he maps the ways in which these shifts can affect the nature of human beings, their values, and their relations with others and with their environment. He shows how through this governmentality of the individual and the population that individualization techniques and totalizing procedures exercise power. The compilation of statistics leads to a series of socialising practices, allowing the centralized State to develop both the ‘science of the state’ and ‘the art of government’. A new political rationality arises through the art of government with the accumulation of empirical knowledge of the state’s resources and condition, through statistics, “a rationality, Foucault assures us, from which we have not yet emerged” (Rabinow, 1984, p16).
Foucault suggests that we should not think of power as a commodity but instead begin to think of how “individuals are vehicles of power, not its points of application” (Foucault, 1994, p36). The individual is not a passive atom to which power becomes attached, or a kind of inert atom animated by the context of its existence. What is central and crucial to Foucault’s conception of the individual is:

“In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (ibid, p37).

Power is exercised through the production of truths which require the functioning of a discourse. Relations of power cannot be “established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation, and functioning of a discourse” (ibid, p31). Society demands and pressures individuals to speak and reiterate accepted truths through professional and institutional apparati of acceptability and reward. This in turn facilitates the production of wealth, shapes laws, the way in which we are judged, what social strata we are destined to inhabit, and ultimately the circumstances of our life and death. Foucault became intrigued by these rules of power, how it is that these truths are established and propagated and pursued, and how they give credence to the demands of society. For example, Foucault boldly states, “I believe the king remains the central personage in the whole legal edifice of the West” (ibid, p33). He traces the provenance of the legal system back to the revitalization of Roman law in the twelfth century and asserts that modern democracies still function according to the same underlying principles. Today as in the past the sovereign power had to be invested with an entitlement, a right which extended as far as the limitation placed on it. There must be a right of sovereignty and its limit demarcates the extent of that right. “The essential role of the theory of right, from medieval times onwards, was to fix the legitimacy of power; that is the major problem around which the whole theory of right and sovereignty is organized” (ibid, p33). For Western societies the problem of the theory of right has been and still is how to disguise this mode of domination that has its basis in an a priori entitlement and make it appear legitimate. What this means is that the consequence of this right to power must never be attributed to

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the reality of its source. With regard to the entire discourse on right Foucault states, "my aim therefore, was to invert it, to give it due weight, that is, to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality" (ibid, p33).

Foucault argues that if we want to understand how power functions we must consider it from the bottom up. We need to look at asylums, prisons, and the family, and consider the logic behind the mechanisms of power at the lowest level. We must think about the techniques of exclusion, "the apparatuses of surveillance, the medicalization of sexuality, of madness, of delinquency, and all the micromechanisms of power, that came, from a certain moment in time, to represent the interests of the bourgeoisie" (ibid, p39). We must ask how these local mechanisms, techniques, and procedures of power have become incorporated into the social episteme, that is, the surface layer of knowledges that for a society determine conceptions of true and false and have come to represent the inverse of reality. As Foucault points out, the bourgeois are interested in political advantage, economic utility, and the consolidation of power. They have no use for or interest in the mad, in delinquents, in controlling infantile sexuality, or in the rehabilitation of prisoners. We perceive things to be the inverse of what they really are because the ideologies of education, of monarchy, and parliamentary democracy are appropriated local manifestations of power, conceptualized as centralized values, and reintroduced through institutional discourse as truths. They organize and put into circulation knowledge which they accumulate through research, investigation, and registration, and observation. They are in fact "apparatuses of knowledge; which are not ideological constructs" (ibid, p40).

Hence Foucault's interest in how the apparatuses, institutions and regulations of domination are affected by and affect the inter-relations between individuals in their everyday mutual relations, that is, "the multiple forms of subjugation that have a place and function within the social organism" (ibid, p34). Education since the classical age has used technologies of discipline to infuse within the family a disciplinary question that at its core is predicated on "the question of the normal and the abnormal" (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1984, p206). But for Foucault, it was the parasitic entry of psychiatry and the social sciences into the legal deliberations and mechanisms of control from the nineteenth century which brought into existence apparatuses for normalization; they compiled statistics in
relation to human beings, statistics validated on the basis of a ‘scientific’ instrument, an instrument that first conjures a conception of the norm around which individuals were then ushered to where they were to belong and reside on an orchestrated spectrum of acceptability. As Rabinow states:

“An essential component of technologies of normalization is the key role they play in the systematic creation, classification, and control of ‘anomalies’ in the social body. Their raison d’être comes from two claims of their promoters: first, that certain technologies serve to isolate anomalies; and second, that one can normalize anomalies through corrective or therapeutic procedures, determined by other related technologies” (1984, p21).

For Foucault, these disciplines that have developed as a concomitant necessity of population growth, economic wealth, scientific practices, and industrialization have become a sort of counterlaw; they have become mechanisms for control by distributing little segments of power which have "the precise role of introducing insuperable asymmetries and excluding reciprocities" (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1984, p212). In short, there is always a surplus power at one side of group relations that cannot be reversed. It in effect brings about a non-reversible subordination. “A multiplicity, whether in a workshop or a nation, an army or a school, reaches the threshold of a discipline when the relation of one to the other becomes favourable” (ibid, p210). Disciplinary power is a power that can operate on the other side of the law, and it can be universal in its effect because its object is always the object of a gaze. It is the asymmetries of the non-reciprocal power relation that allow the disciplinary mode of power undermine “the limits that are traced around the law” (ibid, p212).

“The system of right, the domain of law, are permanent agents of these regulations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates” (Foucault, 1994, p34).

Foucault avoids an analysis of the mechanisms of power at their centralized location; he accepts them for what they are. Instead he examines how power manifests at its outermost destinations, its extremities in this sense, “with the points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions” (ibid, p34). Because for Foucault, this is where power surmounts its limitations, it is here that it exceeds the rules of its legitimated right, what can be
thought of at least as its theoretical and legalized right. This power invests “itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention” (ibid, p34). Foucault shows how bio-power posited the body as an object for manipulation and control, how it functions at both the level of the individual and that of the population through the use of ‘scientific’ categories. In this arrangement education not unlike prisons have a role to play - through schools the technologies of discipline become effective apparatuses in the production of docile bodies essential to the organization of individuals in space and time in the ordering of a grid of humanity. Their purpose is to distribute and control subjects in space and time, to prescribe their location and the amount of time a body must occupy its enclosure under supervision in order to be productive. This way of operating Foucault points out, though not necessarily the creation of the capitalist economic model was an essential prerequisite for it. The assignment of bodies raised productivity and reduced the risk of dangerous crowds.

To understand how power functions in relation to the formation of subjects it becomes necessary to consider power in its most infinitesimal mechanisms, to conduct what Foucault terms an ‘ascending analysis of power’. To understand the history, the techniques, the trajectory and the tactics of power ascending from its most local manifestations, the power that derives from inter-individual discourses, through familial relations, through professional techniques, and finally to understand how power ultimately becomes invested in, and colonized, and utilized “by ever more general mechanisms and forms of global domination.” (ibid, p37) The reason that Foucault thinks that this approach will provide a more fruitful analysis of how power works in relation to the subject is because the basic levels of power are more autonomous in comparison to the more legitimized and in this sense limited, functioning of power at its more centralized core. This is the whole point of analyzing the techniques and procedures that are brought into play by these localized mechanisms of power. Power is less disguised at this lower level.

Rabinow explains that for Foucault “Bio-power, ‘brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of the transformation of human life.’” (Rabinow, 1984, p17) It was as a result of administrators that this new mode of political manipulation came into existence.
Foucault has shown how bio-power posited the body as an object for manipulation and how Western societies have come to be particularly universalizing and dominant with respect to others while cultivating a destiny on the basis of permanent elements such as the acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom. He states,

“Now the relations between the growth of capabilities and the growth of autonomy are not as simple as the eighteenth century may have believed. And we have been able to see what forms of power relation were conveyed by various technologies (whether we are speaking of productions with economic aims, or institutions whose goal is social regulation, or of techniques of communication): disciplines, both collective and individual, procedures of normalization exercised in the name of power of the state, demands of society or of population zones, are examples. What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from intensification of power relations?” (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1984, p48)

This is a central concern for this thesis. Foucault brings attention to how these technologies of normalization assumed the role of impartial techniques for dealing with dangerous social deviations which just happened to be a manifestation contemporaneous with the emergence of categories of anomaly such as ‘deviant’ and ‘pervert’. The problem is technologies of discipline that are designed to eliminate these anomalies never do so, because these are the same technologies that also function as mechanisms for the creation and implantation of perversions. Precise measurements and the prescription of codes of conduct actually bring anomalies into existence. As Rabinow states, “The end of good government is the correct disposition of things - even when these things have to be invented so as to be well governed.” (Rabinow, 1984, p21) The accumulation of “precise dossiers (that) enable authorities to fix individuals in a web of objective codification,” (ibid, p22) is predicated and justified on the principle of the population’s welfare, which is ultimately the concern of good governance. Each codification in turn brings about an even finer criterion of normalization; measurements are taken, statistics are compiled, descriptions are made, and groups are categorized. “The power of the state to produce an increasingly totalizing web of control is intertwined with and dependent on its ability to produce an increasing specification of individuality.” (ibid, p22) The gaps between individuals are calculated, there is an ordering in the distribution of power/knowledge and knowledge/power relations. Foucault suggests a possible solution would be to refuse what we are and to
imagine what we could be; we need to liberate ourselves and our institutions from the state and its current type of individualization. Socialisation techniques in education are specifically intended to inhibit such liberation, but Foucault reminds us that this current type of functioning of power is not yet total, nor is it ineluctable. The questions we need to ask are; “how are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjected who exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” (Foucault cited in Rabinow, 1984, p49)
Chapter Two

Language and Scientific Credibility
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As we have seen in the first chapter, Durkheim wanted to assign a primacy to psychology over pedagogy as the means of education because in his view it brought with it a ‘scientific’ knowledge of the individual. Therefore, it seems appropriate to evaluate this scientific claim for psychology and assess whether it can be justified, and to also question the rationale for the impetus behind such a claim. This chapter focuses on the individual, as the subject of psychology and as the potential and actual object of education. It was Durkheim’s view that pedagogy as a practice should not be entrusted with determining the means or the end of education because pedagogy could not be considered a science as ultimately its basis and its authority rested on mere opinion, which Durkheim would have interpreted as less democratic (impartial) than the authority that would be derived from an objective and empirical grounding in a science. This thesis is concerned with attributing such weight to one side in a pseudo- or quasi-scientific discourse, that is, where one of the interlocutors is entitled to make authoritative and unquestioned decisions that determine the possibilities of the interlocutor who is without science and therefore reduced to silence, that is, left without recourse. But what is this claim to ‘science’? This thesis makes little distinction between the Psy-functions because its concern is with the authoritative nature of the relationship between interlocutors rather than the rationalisations that are based on this authority.

Jacques Lacan recognized Freud’s failure to find a biologically based scientific validation for psychoanalysis. For Lacan this failure provided an impetus to try to find another ground of scientific validation for psychoanalysis. Without it Lacan realised that psychology as a discipline could not escape the type of ritualistic and magical epithets linked to the religious. Intentionality and its concomitant relation with meaning meant, Lacan argued, that to search for this scientific basis for psychoanalysis within the methodology of the natural sciences was futile, “since there can be no intrinsic or objective mark of mental disorder, any psychiatry which looks towards natural science must ignore the role of interpretation in the very definition of its object” (Dews, 2007, p61). Lacan has argued that there needed to be a necessary distinction between how we interpret nature, that is, phenomena in nature, and causality in human nature. The natural sciences trace
causal factors in order to explain the natural world, but for Lacan this approach cannot suffice if we wish to understand human nature because intentionality is characteristic of human processes and events. It is true that Lacan’s interpretation of how psychology ought to be practiced and grounded is not representative of mainstream psychology but this can be attributed to his views on how psychoanalysis ought to be scientifically validated. His concern about the prevailing lack of explicit validation serves as an interesting critique of psychoanalysis as it has come to be practiced today. Lacan’s quest for a platform for psychology grounded in more than mere opinion is analyzed in order to assist our need to evaluate this ‘scientific’ relationship of psychology to education and whether psychology ought to function in the role suggested by Durkheim. Because without the fig leaf of objectivity that is scientific credibility it becomes necessary to question the agendas and interests that are being served through an orchestration of the educational milieu.

We also require a conception of the subject as an individual, as an ontological entity and later through Foucault as an epistemological entity that can be correlated with degrees of autonomy in relation to both education and indoctrination. Therefore another persuasive reason for Lacan's inclusion is based on how a critique of his conception of the ‘unconscious’ might help us arrive at a plausible conception of a non-bifurcated individual, and understand how the individual in Foucault’s sense becomes the expression of exterior influences, and then to develop a different understanding of the human subject, that is, the subject is time itself, is its constancy. It matters little that Lacan’s account is not representative of psychoanalysis in general as his attempt at a scientific validation reveals the sometimes authoritative claims to validation (often propelled by political expediency as we will see in Chapter Six) that mainstream affective and prescriptive psychology have increasingly come to rely on. The issue in question here is not especially related to Lacan - he is simply an example of an attempt to ground psychoanalysis in science. The issue is not specifically psychoanalysis nor even any of the myriad brands of psychology. The real issue is what all these functions attempt to do, which, as is argued here, is to shroud morality in a veil of scientific vocabulary and ritual. Pavlov, Thorndike, and Skinnerian behaviourism would have offered a more obvious target for criticism but the point being made here is, that because of their moralistic underpinning, all of what
Foucault terms the Psy-functions are embedded in behaviourism, some more implicitly than others, and are often more insidious and pernicious for that fact. As Foucault states in his *History of Madness*:

“For Western culture such as it has evolved over the course of the last three centuries, has founded a science of man by turning the previously sacred into the moral” (2006, p94).

Philosophically, it is interesting how Lacan’s approach is indicative of how external intellectual and political currents can shift thought, which will be worth keeping in mind as Foucault’s argument unfolds, particularly in the chapters that are related to ‘discursive formations’. In Lacan what can be witnessed is a shift in discourse from a Freudian conception of the unconscious to one that is conceptualised in relation to the intersubjectivity of language, in relation to structuralism. In Lacan we can witness an intellectual inquiry that is grounded in transcendental phenomenology, that is, it has its basis in a notion that there is an undercurrent of existential influence beyond human consciousness, an *a priori* that is universal in its fundamental dynamic, although imperceptible to the subject himself or herself, which moves towards structuralism, that is, to Lacan’s view that the cause or the lack that initiates this universal dynamic is to the trained and privileged eye manifest in the transindividual structure of language through symbolism. Lacan, influenced by Lévi-Strauss thinks of the significance of the incest taboo in ritual matrimonial exchange as the foundation for sociality: it is the primordial, that is, original symbolic function. Lacan states, “The marriage tie is governed by an order of preference whose law concerning the kinship name is, like language, imperative for the group in its forms, but unconscious in its structure” (1977, p66). This becomes a claim for psychoanalysis as the ‘scientific’ practice with a ‘privileged access’ to an understanding and ‘knowledge’ of the human ‘unconscious’ through an interpretation of the symbolic in language, and it becomes the basis of a diminution of the interlocutor in discourse. Lacan’s theory like all theories was formulated in relation to the intellectual influences of his time. Though Lacan moved closer to structuralism and Levi-Strauss, he remained grounded in phenomenology and Hegel in order to pin his universal determinate on a comprehension of a Hegelian form of desire. What is proposed here is a re-conceptualisation of Lacan’s account of the ‘unconscious’ in order to strip it of its unnecessary elaboration.
For Lacan desire is the driving force of the human subject. Desire is transformed into something uniquely human, as opposed to ‘need’ which is attributed to a more animal, biological necessity. This transformation is achieved through a mutual or reciprocal identification and acknowledgement of the object of desire, which in relation to human self-formation, is always the other. It is through this process of the recognition of desire in relation to objects that all objects are made objects knowable to man; it is what gives objects their value. “For Kojeve “a primitive otherness is included in the object, in so far as it is primatively an object of rivalry and competition” (Dews, 2007, p73). The ‘ego’, which this thesis will argue has become a reified heuristic is, for Lacan, a reference to the cumulative effect on the subject at any point in time of the affirmation and negation that is reflected by the external, that is, by others. This is a process that masks the intrinsic existential discordance that is inaccessible to the analysand and for Lacan is a correlate of which resides in the unsaid in speech. “The ego of which we speak,’ says Lacan clearly echoing the arguments of The Ego and the Id, ‘is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the imaginary captivations which constitute it from head to toe, in its genesis as in its status, in its function as in its actuality, by another for another’” (ibid p70). Language, specifically speech, is causal in the formation and the understanding of human identity. We develop our conception of our identities on the basis of what is reflected by others through the prism of language, in both what is said and what is unsaid. Desire in Lacan’s sense is linked to language, the subject “becomes human’ coincidently with the child’s ‘birth’ into language.” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p19). What separates human desire from animal desire is the assertion that human desire is not a desire for the object, but a desire for recognition: it is a desire for the assimilation or indeed appropriation of the other’s desire. Here, Lacan’s conception of ‘desire’ is thought of as a uniquely human attribute, born in language, or to be more precise speech, and distinct from biological ‘need’. For Lacan language is given a primacy, which he has based on this “adaption of the Hegelian theory of desire” (Dews, 2007, p72). Lacan hopes to find in language the possibility of making explicit a scientific claim for psychoanalysis.

Lacan’s consideration of linguistics as a modern science entices him to attempt to ground psychoanalysis within the aegis of a ‘linguistic science'. His assertion is, that in the struggle to renew the never exhausted power of symbols in human exchange:
“Psychoanalysis has made a contribution to this struggle, and its task now is to bring its own efforts into line with the trust of modern science so as to assure itself of a legitimate place in it. This all the more possible because the psychoanalyst is a practitioner of the symbolic function,’ and this function lies at the heart of the movement (i.e. Structuralism) that is establishing a new order of the sciences in our day. This new order is based on the principle that the ‘conjectural’ sciences are no less rigorous than the ‘exact’ sciences, for exactitude is to be distinguished from truth” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p80).

Lacan shifts his emphasis towards structuralism. Truth about what it is to be human rather than the exactitude of empirical fact becomes the property of the analyst and the Psy-function in general whose scientific claim entices a vision of truth as a scientific veracity rather than an aesthetic and moral assertion that is related to power. Psychology and indeed sociology are disciplines that are predicated on notions of inclusion and exclusion, acceptability and unacceptability, normality and abnormality, at a pre-theoretical level. To find yourself at the wrong side of any of these dichotomies in the psychological and sociological context will seriously affect your capacity for autonomy.

Lacan believes he has escaped the weaknesses of behavioural psychology and similar affective psychological practices that took root within modern culture - he is particularly critical of psychoanalysis in the American context - by grounding Freud’s account within a conception of how language functions. An example of how Lacan tries to achieve this is when he merges Freud’s account of the ‘good little boy’ with linguistics by shifting from the Freudian biological approach to a structuralist approach. He does this by appropriating the little boy’s mental state and mental ability when the little boy makes the utterances ‘o-o-o-o’ and ‘da’. For Lacan these phonemes ought to be interpreted as a nascent or maybe an unwitting ‘fort’ (gone) and ‘da’ (here) in the child’s game of disappearance and return. These utterances are meant to be indicative of a primary language, in the sense of a beginning that has a universal manifestation, which is a primary language for all humans, a phenomenon of all languages, and is in this sense fundamental. He merges his attributions of ‘gone’ and ‘here’ with Freud’s structure of the Oedipus complex. The child’s expression ‘o-o-o-o’ interpreted as ‘gone’ is for Lacan symbolic of the missing mother in an analogy of the ancient Greek tragedy that underpins all our consciousnesses. The child’s apperception of his own individuality is the causation of a wrench that can never be resolved. For Lacan the
unconscious is permeated by a lack entailed in the absence of the ‘Father figure’, or the No/Name (Non/Nom) which seems to be an abiding yet unconscious need for a resolution to the absence of a totemic founding creator, which is the only figure that can adequately reciprocate the mother’s love and can never be adequately usurped by the child. He argues that “the unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is, not at the disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse”. (Lacan, 1977, p49) This is how Lacan links the yearning for this existential resolution to the social. Here the unconscious which correlates with the Freudian concept of the ‘id’, another reified heuristic, is something that lingers between what is spoken and what is heard, it is the not-said in language that holds the key to this dramaturgical dimension that represents the existential foundation for all humans that only the psychoanalyst can interpret and ameliorate. It is this that offers a type of unwitting evidence that is subliminal in its effect, and it is neither consciously intended nor consciously received. But as Foucault argues, language at this level is devoid of an author function: it is below the level of the proposition and intentionality.

Lacan conflates Levi-Strauss’s primordial law concerning the symbolic function of gift giving in the performance of matrimonial rites as a signification of the prohibition of incest, which is not dissimilar to Durkheim’s grounding of morality in the social functions of totemic practices, with Hegel’s notion of ‘desire’, in order to suggest a primary language which is universal. “[I]t is “primary” because it is the language into which in-fans is introduced when he begins to speak - universal in the sense that it has a character ‘that would be understood in all other languages,’ yet because it structures his subjectivity, it is absolutely particular to the subject” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p84). Lacan requires this universalistic functioning in language to replace the biological and the transcendental, as a means to give a ‘scientific’ credence to psychoanalysis. As psychology is reliant on its applicability to all humans, it cannot in its ‘scientific’ validation be culture specific, Lacan therefore settles on phonemes as the elementary particles of speech which “may be divided into 12 sets of binary pairs ‘out of which each language makes its own selection”, (ibid, p79) (suggesting more than a hint of anthropomorphism). For Lacan the smallest components of language phonemes make up the composition of a meaning, each minute component of language is a signifier, and therefore through the correct analysis “we shall be able to restore to speech its full value of
evocation by a discreet search for their interferences” (Lacan, 1977, p82). But the crucial point that Lacan overlooks and Foucault points out, is that language does not speak, men do. Foucault, in his analysis of General Grammar, shows that language below the level of the proposition is retrospective by definition, and it can only extract significance and meaning from the composite parts of language as an *a posteriori*. Language exists prior to any analysis of it. Contrary to what Lacan wishes to base his scientific validation on, the reduction of language to its smallest components, to phonemes, is not to trace the origin of language, or to point to its most profound foundation. It is simply to apply a retrospective analysis and an artificial composition to language by introducing an additional complexity to what is necessarily simple. “Language is the original form of all reflection, the primary theme of any critique. It is this ambiguous thing, as broad as Knowledge, yet always interior to representation, that *general grammar* takes as its object” (Foucault, 1970, p84). What Lacan is attempting to do is fabricate for language a positivist (scientific) arrangement, that language by its very nature opposes, by trying to capture simultaneity of meanings and representations in language that language itself can never possess. Language is the object of grammar, grammar is not language and nor is linguistics. We must ask ourselves what it is about linguistics, about the reduction of language to its composite parts, that Lacan finds attractive. Its attraction must surely be the attraction of unearthing a mode of interpretation that is based on a belief in its universal applicability, and the power that entails. Lacan hoped to find in language what the General grammar in the Classical period insisted was there. As Foucault states:

"In the Classical period, what was denoted by the term universal language was not the primitive, pure, and unimpaired speech that would be able, if it were rediscovered beyond the punishment of oblivion, to restore the understanding that reigned before Babel. It refers to a tongue that would have the ability to provide every representation, and every element of every representation, with a sign by which it could be marked in a univocal manner; it would also be capable of indicating in what manner the elements in a representation are composed and how they are linked to one another; and since it would possess the necessary instruments with to indicate all the possible relationships between the various segments of representation, this language would also, by that very fact, be able to accommodate itself to all possible orders” (ibid, p84).

What if we were to view psychoanalysis as an ideology that understood itself as having the potential to make psychology a science? Is this not what Durkheim had
hoped for, and Freud the trained physician dreamed of? Lacan tried to bring this about through the creation of a radical discontinuity that would effect "a work of theoretical transformation 'which establishes a science by detaching it from the ideology of its past and by revealing the past as ideological"(Foucault, 1972, p5). Are Lacan’s and Freud's failed attempts at gaining recognition for psychoanalysis as a 'genuine' science of psychology better understood as ideology? It is not based is it not on the notion that behind any apparent beginning there is a secret origin:

"Thus one is led inevitably, through the naivety of chronologies, towards an ever-receding point that is never itself present in any history; this point is merely its own void; and from that point all beginnings can never be more than recommencements or occultation (in one and the same gesture, this and that) To this theme is connected another according to which all manifest discourse is secretly based on an 'already-said'; and that this 'already-said' is not merely a phrase that has already been spoken, or a text that has already been written, but a never-said, an incorporeal discourse, a voice as silent as a breath, a writing that is merely the hallow of its own mark. It is supposed therefore that everything that is formulated in discourse was already articulated in that semi-silence that precedes it, which continues to run obstinately beneath it, but which it covers and silences. The manifest discourse, therefore, is no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said” (ibid, p25).

It appears that what Lacan is really looking for in language is a tabula rasa and in science the power and irrefutable authority upon which psychology could prescribe existence without recourse. But as Lyotard points out “language cannot speak itself.” (Dews, 2007, p144) For example:

“Dan Sperber has argued, [...] ‘when [Lévi-Strauss] identifies in turn social life and communication, communication, language and exchange; exchange and reciprocity, there is hardly any place left for the political within the social domain’. Lévi-Strauss characteristically overestimates the internal logic and coherence of symbolic systems, rather than defining the categories of a collective unconscious, might be traversed by incoherences which betray its political function of speciously universalizing the interests of a specific social group” (ibid, pp128-129).

Whilst Lacan thinks he can find is the source of all possible knowledge of the individuality of subject, what in actual fact he finds is the grounds for an ideology. Arguably, from his account, there emerges an idea that there is a common source to all that is perceived by humans, that all that can be known is represented in language including silence, and this can ultimately provide an encyclopaedia of
everything determinative for the human, all that would then be required is an insight into the fundamental functioning of all language, a language reduced to its smallest fragments which Lacan believes can ultimately reveal for psychoanalysis what is determinative to all mankind. This is the foundation of an ideology and unfortunately it is a notion that persists also in the social sciences. In the 1960s this held a perverse promise, the idea that all that can be known about the individual and the collective could be represented in a symbolism inherent in language. There is that seems at once therapeutic and sinister in the teleology of continuity within structuralism, the idea that somehow social evolution is inherently progressive and it promises the possibility of a reintegration of a universal order in which all things in time and space are connected at some distant and abiding level, and all that is required is a belief in the ultimate completion of what begins as an a priori ordering. Foucault was only too aware of the implications of this type of supposition when he states:

“The sciences are well-made languages, just as languages are sciences lying fallow. All languages must therefore be renewed; in other words, explained and judged according to that analytic order which none of them now follows exactly; and readjusted if necessary so that the chain of knowledge may be visible in all its clarity, without any shadows or lacunae. It is thus part of the very nature of grammar to be prescriptive, not by any means because it is an attempt to impose the norms of a beautiful language obedient to the rules of taste, but because it refers the radical possibility of speech to the ordering system of representation” (Foucault, 1970, p87).

There is a peculiar mobility to language. Linguistics can trace the etymology of a word, it can point to its root, it can reveal the provenance of a dialect or even hint at the origins of a language, but it cannot retrospectively unveil the root of all meaning - language is too democratic and too localized in its functioning for this. Synecdoche, metonym, and catachresis are but some of the influencing phenomena that change the functioning of a live language, phenomena that suggest the origin of language must always reside in the present and indicates that any linear conception of continuity must have its causality in the perspective of the interpreter. Lacan confuses disruptions, discontinuities, idiosyncrasies and the myriad localized origins of a functioning language with evidence of human desire and imperfection. It is precisely this imperfection that his psychology as a science would have to cure.
Foucault considers the proposition to be the necessary component to form a language, to make possible a discourse. Words are not sufficient, which would rule out the scientific validation that rests on phonemes. For Foucault,

“The proposition is to language what representation is to thought, at once its most general and most elementary form, since as soon as it is broke down we no longer encounter the discourse but only its elements, in the form of so much scattered raw material. Below the proposition we do indeed find words, but it is not in them that language is created. It is true that in the beginning man emitted only simple cries, but these did not begin to be language until they contained – a relation that was the order of the proposition” (ibid, p92).

To cry out words as vocal signals does not constitute speech. For speech to come into being what is uttered must contain a propositional value; it is the proposition that establishes language. “In the proposition, all the functions of language are led back to the three elements that alone are indispensible to the formation of a proposition: the subject, the predicate, and the link between them” (ibid, p93). It is the verb, which all propositions at least implicitly entail, that is the threshold for all language, this is the link in the great chain of language, and because “the entire species of verb may be reduced to the single verb that signifies to be,” (ibid, p94) we can see that language is in fact predicated on the individual. It can have no meaning below the acknowledgement of the existence of a being. Its entire raison d’être revolves around the supposition of this unitary and individuated reification of existence, of being. “Without a way of designating being, there would be no language at all; but without language, there would be no verb to be, which is only one part of language. This simple word is the representation of being in language; but equally the representive being of language to affirm what it says, renders it susceptible of truth or error” (ibid, p94). It is the evaluation of the utterance that allows language its traction, its illocutionary force is predicated on a being that can promise, on the utterance of a truth that can be verified or negated. In an analogy on art Foucault compares the verb to be as the invisible canvas upon which language is overlaid.

In Foucault’s 1981-1982 series of lectures titled The Hermeneutics of the Subject Lacan’s project is described as one whose purpose is to develop spirituality directed toward salvation rather a scientific endeavour. Foucault argues that:
“Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the subject by right. Spirituality postulates that the subject as such does not have right of access to the truth. It postulates that for the subject to have a right of access to the truth he must be changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent and up to a certain point, other than himself. The truth is only given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s being into play. For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth. I think this is the simplest but most fundamental formula by which spirituality can be defined. It will follow that from this point of view there can be no truth without a conversion or a transformation of the subject” (Foucault, 2005, p15).

An inherent asceticism lies at the heart of the insistence by Lacan and psychology more broadly on the necessity of an alignment of the analysand with the ‘truth’, and an imperative to recognize the dehiscence caused by the lack of the existential totem as well as a resolution that requires specific practices and techniques centering around a belief.

“Nietzsche construes the will to truth as a desire for disinterested truth expressed in the form of resentment against our instincts they embody. The will to truth is a form of asceticism that emphasises disinterested and objective truth purely for its own sake” (Doyle, 2009, p54).

Ought not science be a golem that requires subsequent direction? A thing created for ‘good’ that requires direction, which possesses no inherent course of its own. If so, we must then ask who it serves, who finds this version of good favourable? Lacan’s purpose was to consolidate a conception of the ‘unconscious’ for psychoanalysis, this is what was to represent the truth for Lacan, and belief was the price required of the analysand for attaining this truth. Foucault states:

“There has been an attempt to conceal the conditions of spirituality specific to these forms of knowledge within a number of social forms. The idea of the effect of class position or of the party, of allegiance to a group or membership of a school, of initiation or of their analyst's training, etc., all refer back to these questions of the condition of the subject’s preparation for access to the truth, but conceived of in social terms, in terms of organization” (Foucault, 2005, p29).

On the basis of symbolism within the structure of language Levi-Strauss conceptualized laws he considered to be primordial and abiding and to be determinative in the patterning of human relationships and therefore fundamental in the formation of human identity. This primordial law was also “the same law that sets the pattern of human language” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p19). So here we have a distinct mode of interpretation that believes it can evaluate the
human condition from past to present with the anticipation of what is beyond. The ‘unconscious’ reflects the symbolic order but it is not accessible to the individual subject. To evoke a sense of tradition and authenticity within the discursive structure of psychoanalysis, Lacan needs to link his conception of the ‘unconscious’ to Freud’s notion of the ‘id’ so the lack at the core of human identity correlates with an abiding hidden persona that the ego can never appease; it is the Other with a capital ‘O’. In the discourse between the analyst and the analysand there are four personas, two Egos and two ids, it is the task of the psychoanalyst to uncover that part of the discourse that is unavailable even to the analysand himself or herself, yet which also has its social element in that it is transindividual, as it is wrapped up in the intersubjectivity of language and symbolic silences, yet is not at the disposal of the subject. It is the bifurcation forged as a result of the child’s recognition of his individuality in the imaginary stage and is shaped by the ego’s relation to the social, and for Lacan it has an unwitting effect on the continuity of his discourse. It is at this point that Lacan fails to escape the ‘magical’ dimension of psychoanalysis, an accusation he himself has directed at psychoanalysis in general. He states, “For nobody is less demanding than a psychoanalyst as to what provides the status of his action, which he himself is not far from regarding as magical” (Lacan, 1977, p33). Even though Lacan has a different conception of the ‘unconscious’ than that proffered by Freud, he needs to place the psychoanalyst outside, or above the limitation of the subject, to attribute a capacity that ordinary self-consciousness otherwise cannot attain. The criticism being made here is based on the notion that, “The effectiveness of the analysts’ response will be in proportion, of course, to his own attainment to the unconscious within himself, but it is the subject’s own message (not the analyst’s) that is received back from him in inverted form” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p83). Without a belief in this magical attainment we must acknowledge that psychology doesn’t scientifically interpret existence; it politically prescribes it “for the least glimmer of truth is conditioned by politics,” (Foucault, 1998, p5) and its suppositions of acceptability are normative and are similar to Durkheim’s thoughts on morality and societal cohesion.

Lacan wishes to maintain a Freudian basis for his conception of psychoanalysis, therefore he evaluates Freud’s account in terms of his own requirements. To achieve this Lacan needs to create a link between cognitive consciousness and biologically induced needs and appetites, and as has been stated he does this by
articulating “an account of the emergence of a *specifically human* form of desire” (Dews, 2007, p63). Lacan’s famous ‘mirror-stage’ is based on Hegel’s conception of self-conscious being dependent on the mutual recognition of consciousness by the other. There is an acute social imperative implied in this conception because if a perpetual zero-sum ontological game is to be avoided, a game which would inevitably culminate in a master-slave relation, mutual reciprocity is required. “For Hegel such recognition involves the abandonment of total autonomy as a possible goal. Full reciprocity is only attained when human individuals cease to cling to the punctuality of self-certainty, and recognize themselves and each other as common participants in the practical unity of a social world, in that ‘I’ which is We, and We which is ‘I’, which Hegel refers to as Geist” (ibid, p66). Freud was eventually to link his conception of the libido and the ego, which he in turn linked to narcissism; the ego was attributed with causal differentiation between the biological, specifically, the neural network, and the self and external reality and the self including the biological. It is Lacan’s merging of Freud’s conception of the ‘ego’, and its instrumental consequences for the formation of narcissism and identity, with the reflective affirmation possible through the functioning of language, coupled with the self-consciousness inherent in Lacan’s conceptualization of the Hegelian notion of desire that lends itself to Lacan’s conception of what he terms the ‘mirror-stage’ which he argues first occurs between the ages of 6 to 18 months, and which is based on the infant’s recognition of his own individuality through a mirror-like reflection in the other. Here this conception will be re-conceptualised and Lacan’s account of this universal bifurcation that fragments the initial unitary existential awareness of the infant is rejected.

There is a serious problem with the tendency to anthropomorphize and hypostatize heuristics, particularly around such conceptions as the ‘id’, ‘ego’, and ‘superego’. As Peter Dews explains, “the newly defined id must be seen as the initial reservoir of libido, Freud suggests that the ego not only chooses objects which resemble itself, but also models itself to a large extent upon its earliest objects” (ibid, p68). To argue that these elaborate and complex influences as understood by the analyst are somehow registered within the infant’s psyche as universally determinate rites of passage into human identity which can be realigned and reconditioned at a much later date if necessary by someone with the requisite insight will become implausible if a non-bifurcated conception of human
identity can be posited. To argue that such a dramatic and conceptually uniform phenomenon occurs without the infant’s comprehension and appreciation of the significance of these events, as if this were possible, is surely to attribute retrospectively, that which at the moment of supposed influence could not possibly have the psychological register proffered by the psychologist. If we can settle on a unitary, non-bifurcated conception of individuality, Lacan’s re-conceptualisation of Freud’s Oedipus, phallus and castration complexes can be considered then as unnecessary elaborations and therefore superfluous to any understanding of human identity.

Lacan states, “It can be said that psychoanalytic action is developed in and through verbal communication, that is, in a dialectical grasp of meaning. It presupposes, therefore, a subject who manifests himself as such to the intention of another” (Lacan, 1977, p9). It is this intention that proves problematic. In short, it unavoidably entails attributing comprehensions, competences, dilemmas, and indeed ontological procrastinations at the level of infant awareness, albeit with supposedly unwitting or unconscious permeation, which seems improbable. What is interesting about Lacan’s use of this mirror-stage concept is the shift from a supposition tied to a transcendental universal determinate, that is, the unknown universal determinative properties of the unconscious as has been proffered in transcendental phenomenology which is thought to be mysteriously located between the biologically known and the empirically recognisable behaviour of the human subject to a universally identifiable symbolic order inherent in language, which Lacan argues can serve as a scientific validation for psychoanalysis. The clear implication here for psychoanalysis is that any justification of a validity claim requires as a necessity an underlying universalistic framework to how human subjects develop a sense of identity. Ironically, the argument presented here is that a less tendentious reformulation of Lacan’s mirror-stage account will bring about precisely the opposite of what Lacan had intended. Through a rethinking of the mirror-stage, psychoanalysis can be revealed as a modern day superstition, a political religion that reveals the psychoanalyst as little more than a reincarnation of the Ancients’ ‘high-priest’. Psychoanalysis relies on a belief in the ability of the psychoanalyst to recognise, understand, and be capable of interpreting the human unconscious; this is the ‘religious/superstitious aspect. The political component is entailed in the capacity to know what the human unconscious ought to look like,
the ability to know when it needs to be realigned and what a proper unconscious ought to be. In fact Lacan, unwittingly reveals a more realistic, that is, immanent comprehension of what a conception of the human unconscious entails in relation to inter-subjectivity. In order to create a universally applicable validation, which in fact would ultimately depend on consensus, Lacan over-elaborates what could have been simple but profound realisations. Therefore, Lacan’s account will not escape disparaging criticisms similar to those he aimed at other schools of psychoanalysis, such as, “in America particularly, Lacan claims, this tradition has been distorted by the cultural milieu, deeply marked as it is by communications theory, behavioural psychology, and the alleged national experience of self-achievement through adaption to the milieu” (Muller and Richardson, 1982, p69).

Lacan also requires a normative basis linked to the social in order to prescribe the psychoanalyst’s intention.

In his analysis of writing, Foucault addresses the problems that can be attributed to the functioning of the symbolic form. He examines its function in terms of:

“How superstitions arise whereby people believe that the sun is a crocodile, or that God is a great eye keeping watch on the world; it is also how esoteric forms of knowledge arise among those (the priests) who pass on the metaphors to their successors from generation to generation; and it is how allegorical discourse (so frequently in the most ancient literature) come into being, as well as the illusion that knowledge consists in understanding resemblances” (Foucault, 1970, p111).

For Lacan to have proven that psychology was a science he would, like Durkheim, have had to name the Father figure, or figure of authority, and he would have had to give a precise and unambiguous description. Foucault states, “The name is the end of discourse. And possibly all classical literature resides in this space, in this striving to reach a name that remains always formidable because it exhausts, and thereby kills the possibility of speech” (ibid, p118). To name the Father would be to define it beyond all disputes, to capture the image, to make it accessible to all who wish to witness it, in order to end all discourse, to eradicate all doubt. In truth the Father figure is not simply the representation of a break with the mother, an entry into language or the symbolic. It is a notion of an impersonal and universal authority that becomes appropriated by the analyst as it authorises the analyst. Is this not ultimately the scientific aspiration of psychology, to ascribe to itself the final word, to become the arbitrator of all language, to possess the ability or better
still, the entitlement to decipher and name what is beyond consciousness for all mankind, to name and inscribe the unthought? Does not desire make this impossible? Is not the very staple of psychoanalysis the very thing that precludes it ever having the stability of a genuinely scientific basis anchored with the unquestioning power of certainty? Is not desire too nebulous, too felt, too connected to the moment and consciousness and too specific to individuality that any attempt to attribute an unknowable causality is equivalent “to that of finding words that will at last name accurately that which has remained dormant in the enveloping fold of words too far removed from it: of this latter kind are those secrets of the soul” (ibid, p118).

The transcendental irrationality, that is, “a transcendental raising of level that is, on the other side, an unveiling of the non-conscious is constitutive of all the sciences of man” (ibid, p364). At the heart of psychoanalysis there is a wishful irrationality which can be witnessed in the statement, “Freud’s work presents us with fear, rivalry, love, anxiety, the whole range of human thought and emotion, operating at an unconscious level, while seeking disguised expression in conscious life in the form of dreams, symptoms, parapraxes” (Dews, 2007, p56). Somehow the psychoanalyst conceptualises a mirror of the entire gamut of conscious existence in its most profound and deterministic expression on the basis of an aspect of being that is incomprehensible and unknowable to the subject, yet the determinate of all consciousness is curiously accessible to the analyst who is in ‘attainment’ to his own unconscious.

"Yet paradoxically, it is Freud’s refusal to recognize the distinction between explanation and understanding which has endowed the discipline which he has founded with its depth and power. For this refusal enabled psychoanalysis to do justice simultaneously to two profoundly rooted, yet apparently irreconcilable, views of human behaviour, to combine a realization that human action is moulded and impelled by biological and social forces, even-and especially-when these forces remain excluded from awareness, with an appreciation that no amount of scientific investigation could invalidate the treatment of human beings as responsible agents, capable of forming purposes and enacting intentions” (ibid, pp57-58).

The individual analysand is devoid of any autonomy. It is an entity which is compelled by social forces yet responsible for concrete actions that deviate from the social norm to an unacceptable degree. For Lacan “the unconscious is that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal
of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse” (Lacan 1977, p49). Psychoanalysis is not reliant on, or obliged to produce, a coherent theory of verification or validation because it is perpetuated entirely on the basis of its independence, political convenience, and proliferation as a practice. For Foucault “there can be no doubt, certainly, that each one of the human sciences was occasioned by a problem, a requirement, an obstacle of a theoretical or practical order: the new norms imposed by industrial society upon individuals were certainly necessary before psychology, slowly, in the course of the nineteenth century, could constitute itself as a science” (Foucault, 1970, p345). In fact, this is the reality that concerned Lacan, which is why he was compelled to challenge the prevailing modus operandi and try to formulate a conception of psychoanalysis with a verifiable scientific identity. For Foucault “the idea of a ‘psychoanalytic anthropology,’ and the idea of a ‘human nature’ reconstituted by ethnology, are no more than pious wishes” (ibid, p379). In his book The Order of Things Foucault argues that today there is an inherent anachronism at the heart of all the human sciences. He states:

“It is the fact that the human sciences, unlike the empirical sciences since the nineteenth century, and unlike modern thought, have been unable to find a way around the primacy of representation; like the whole of the Classical knowledge, they reside within it; but they are no way the heirs to its continuation, for the configuration of knowledge has been modified and they came into being only to the degree to which there appeared, with man, a being who did not exist before the field of the episteme” (ibid, p263).

His understanding of language is attentive to the ways in which beings are ordered and classified. Foucault attributes the initial idea for his book The Order of Things to his reading of a passage in Borges, “this passage quotes a certain Chinese encyclopaedia in which it is written that animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) that from a long way off look like flies” (ibid pxv). What struck Foucault as interesting about such taxonomy, once the laughter and charm had subsided, was the mode of thought behind the possibility of such an impossible grouping. He goes on to invoke the imagery of an umbrella and a sewing machine resting on an operating table to point out that what is common to this seemingly incongruous arrangement is of
course the table. What is common to Borges' Chinese encyclopaedia is the alphabetical order in which the various examples are listed, and in a further example of taxonomy by Eusthenes, of an array of snakes and worms that have all been attributed names beginning with the letter A. What is common to all is the mouth that had to cease its naming for want of saliva. Foucault asks, "Where else could they be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language?" (ibid, pxvii). It is man which is the table upon which language arranges things; he is "the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space" (ibid, pxviii). As a philosopher of systems of thought, Foucault was intrigued by the functioning of language and the role it played in the formation of knowledge, of how language shaped what it is that can be known at any given point in time. More specifically he understood that knowledge entailed comparisons and that "there exists two forms of comparison and only two: the comparison of measurement and that of order" (ibid, p53). Order discovers things from the simplest up to the most complex, and measurement allows us to analyze things in relations of equality and inequality. Once things are analyzed in accordance to relations of equality and inequality, likes are then analyzed according to identity and difference. The point is that things cannot be analyzed and therefore ordered in their isolated nature and as Foucault acknowledges, differences are based on inferences. This generalized form of comparison can only be established "according to its position in the body of our acquired knowledge; the absolute character we recognize in what is simple concerns not the being of things but rather the manner in which they can be known" (ibid, p54). Foucault stresses the point that any order that is given to things, particularly to human identities and categorizations, is formulated on the basis of what is pre-existing in the mind of the evaluator. This is also why he is so stridently opposed to a notion of an *a priori* for human identity or existence, and to the idea that humans can be appraised on the basis of a notion of a 'scientific' recognition of a universally applicable criterion. This is also why he is so opposed to a conception of a transcendental consciousness. For him, this makes little sense, such arguments always require a leap of faith that ask for too much. Foucault is acutely aware that "the fundamental codes of a culture - those governing its language, its schema of perception, its exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be at home" (ibid, pxx).
For example, Foucault rejects the phenomenological approach because it “gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all history – which in short leads to a transcendental consciousness” (ibid, pxiv). The problem Foucault recognizes with the phenomenological approach is that by limiting its understanding to the subject it necessarily seeks an a priori to existence itself. This represents the limitation of this way of conceptualizing existence for humans because it insists on an underlying seedbed of influence that is not recognized by consciousness and by relegating prevailing and pre-existing external influences it becomes misguided and inevitably gives rise to an insistence on an underlying determinative that is universal, inhering in all humans but which is beyond articulation. This type of phenomenological approach to an understanding of the individual ignores the reality that each human subject as an individual is born into a world that already exists. It attributes an unconscious that is transcendent to existence, while allowing for the imposition of an order that is based on the supposition of some universal determinative. It can only do this by turning away from what is really formative for the individual. It makes permissible the ascribing of taxonomy for human individuality on the basis of a claim to a privileged access to something as elusive as a discernable unconscious.

Foucault experienced an uneasy feeling in relation to Borges’ Chinese encyclopaedia. Although he found it hilarious, he became disconcerted, “perhaps because there arose in its wake the suspicion that there is a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous, the linking together of things that are inappropriate” (ibid, pxvii). For example, is the psychoanalyst’s attempt to analyze dreams any different from suggesting that there is a correct and specific way to arrange Borges’ Chinese encyclopaedia or Eusthenes’ snakes and worms, a precise way to make the order correlate with the real? Is there a valid way to establish an order among these things? What is it precisely that authorises the psychoanalyst’s mouth to make the definitive utterance? We must ask, what really is this necessary and a priori system of concatenation that allows the psychologist to arrange his classifications?, because:

“There is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical (superficially, at least) than the process of establishing an order among things; nothing that demands a sharper eye or a surer, better-articulated language; nothing that
more insistently requires that one allow oneself to be carried along by the proliferation of qualities and forms. And yet an eye not consciously prepared might well group together certain similar figures and distinguish between others on the basis of such and such a difference: in fact, there is no similitude and no distinction, even for a wholly untrained perception, that is not the result of a precise operation and of the application of a preliminary criterion” (ibid, ppxix-xx).

What Foucault realized to be a worse kind of disorder than that of the incongruous, was that of the order of utopias. And it is this realization that Foucault found so disconcerting, because he realized that it is utopias that “permit fables and discourse: they run with the grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of fibula; heterotopias (such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stops words in their tracks, contests the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the lyricism of our sentences” (ibid, pxviii). Influenced by Nietzsche’s binary oppositions, what Foucault realized at the very beginning of his first book, and which was to shape and give a unique insight to everything he subsequently produced, was that there is something in the functioning of language itself that extirpates the incongruous, and marginalizes the abnormal. There is a bias, a prejudice inherent in the very fabric of language without which it could not function, yet it facilitates the fabulous, the transcendental, the utopian, which all tend towards the universal. For language to be understood it must refer to what is known; language will always champion the norm, because language is itself normative and all we can hope to do is change what that norm is.

But there is a limitation inherent in the functioning of language, “what distinguishes language from all other signs and enables it to play a decisive role in representation is, therefore, not so much that it is individual or collective, natural or arbitrary, but that it analyzes representation according to a necessarily successive order: the sounds, in fact, can be articulated only one by one; it is bound to arrange it, part by part, in a linear order. Now, such an order is foreign to representation” (ibid p82). What can often become overlooked is the fact that the suppositions we make that are actually a consequence of our unawareness of the limits of language and speech. As Foucault states, “it is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space
where they achieve their splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that deployed by the sequential elements of syntax” (ibid, p9). It is easy to attribute too much to speech, to make the assumption that what has been said is the whole account. “If the mind had the power to express ideas ‘as it perceives them’ it would express them all at the same time [...] it is in this strict sense that language is an analysis of thought: not a simple patterning, but a profound establishment of order in space” (ibid, pp82-83). The act of naming things for example is merely an act of pointing, “To pass surreptitiously from the space where one speaks to the space where one looks” (ibid, p9). One need only think of the degree of generalization and repetition that would be required if description were to dispense with proper names. Language functioning in such an onerous way would shift towards a closer alignment with the visual, yet it could never adequately encompass all that is seen, never mind all that is felt. Language has its limitations; it therefore employs analogy in order to fold back on itself. Analogy is an immensely powerful type of similitude, but analogy is also unstable, unreliable, because the similitudes that analogy treats are not visible - the slightest of resemblance is sufficient for analogy. “Disencumbered thus, it can extend, from a single point, to an endless number of relationships” (ibid, p21). Analogy is so malleable that it can be made to link almost anything in any direction; it is universal in its application, “through it, all figures in the whole universe can be drawn together” (ibid, p22). What it is that all analogy must have in common is man. All analogy must converge and pass through man, just as the operating table is common to the umbrella and the sewing machine. It is man that is common to all analogy.

In his essay ‘Language to Infinity’, Michel Foucault writes about language at its limit, which is also its origin; both the limit and origin of language are to be found in the present not the past. This is where the boundary of language lies. The written word is anchored in time and without speech it becomes incongruous to future contexts. It is repeated speech with its gradual and almost imperceptible modifications that allow language transcend the ontological boundaries of the initial written context. It is this repetition and re-representation that creates a persistent semiotic background which in time attains an ontological status. Its trajectory is not from past to present but from present to past. It is within this context that Foucault argues that it would be more realistic to look at the various positions of subjectivity rather than to seek some hidden a priori, an elusive
universality within language. “Discourse must not be referred to the distant presence of the origin but treated as and when it occurs” (Foucault, 1972, p25).

There is no existential bifurcation; there is an array of enunciative modalities which locate the subject in a variety of manifestations at the same time. Foucault states:

“Instead of referring back to the *synthesis* or the unifying function of a subject, the various enunciative modalities manifest his dispersion. To the various statuses, the various sites, the various positions that he can occupy or be given when making a discourse. To the discontinuity of the planes from which he speaks. And if these planes are linked by a system of relations, this system is not established by the synthetic activity of a consciousness identical with itself, dumb anterior to all speech, but with the specificity of a discursive practice” (ibid, pp54-55).

This way of thinking suggests that it would be more realistic to consider the various positions that a subjectivity must occupy rather than to seek this hidden *a priori* or some elusive notion of universality within language. Foucault states, “The positions of the subject are also defined by the situation that it is possible for him to occupy in relation to the various domains or groups of objects” (ibid, p52).

There is no existential bifurcation in the psychoanalytical sense. There is an interlinking of discourses, there are exchanges of information and statistics, and different objects of discourse. For example in the case of psychoanalysis it is around a medical discourse that merges with other forms of clinical discourse and disciplines which give rise to new objects of discourse and new enunciative modalities, to new types of statements or a repetition of a statement but in reference to new objects of discourse. The subject is not the unifying object but rather he occupies various sites and statuses in accordance with the enunciative modality of the discourse. Foucault states:

“Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. It is a space of exteriority in which a network of distinct sites is deployed. I showed earlier that it was neither by ‘words’ nor ‘things’ that the regulation of objects proper to a discursive formation should be defined; similarly, it must now be recognized that it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to a psychological subjectivity the regulation of its enunciation should be defined” (ibid, p55).
The regulation of discourse is external; it is not to be found in recourse to transcendental subject or to a psychological conception of subjectivity. It becomes increasingly apparent that psychology cannot recognize itself as a science on the basis of linguistics, indeed it should be becoming increasingly obvious that psychoanalysis has no scientific grounding at all, and to be fair to Lacan he also regarded psychoanalysis to be without this foundation which is why he made his speculative inquiry into the possibilities of linguistics as when he states, “if psychoanalysis can become a science (for it is not yet one) and if it is not to disintegrate in its technique (and perhaps this has already happened) we must discover the sense of its experience” (Lacan, 1977, p57).

Through Foucault, it is argued here that it is impossible for psychology to find a scientific grounding in linguistics. Yet the psychoanalytic relationship, and many psychotherapeutic relationships, involves speaking. Language is the medium of both education and indoctrination and whether we think of it as signifying something dysfunctional in human nature, or something predetermined, or whether it is thought of as the origin of a unique perspective relating to the context of its circumstance and existence, we need to be cognizant of a fundamental difference of trajectory in terms of the way it is emphasised in relation to the human situation. Language can be intimate and impersonal and to read into its most distant and impersonal and de-authorised being, what is most intimate for a subjectivity can emphasize a degree of movement, a shift in status in the equilibrium between interlocutors. Whether it is ‘conventional’ spirituality or psychoanalysis, the one who assumes the position of the arbitrator of the truth automatically relegates the other no matter how seemingly benevolent the intention. Positions are taken on one side or the other on a spectrum, with autonomy at one pole and indoctrination at the other. The task now is to find out where education fits into this scheme. And if we refuse Lacan's conception of the unconscious in favour of a conception of ‘the unconscious’ as something that for us can only reside in the other, this ineffable something that Lacan’s mirror reflects is not desire but is that part of being that language can never convey, then we are dealing with a being that requires much more caution and respect with regards to its autonomy. As for the existential bifurcation, there is a much more plausible and satisfactory explanation for the cause of this existential split an explanation that can help define not only what the subject is but also help to define education, and
this is, time. If time is subjectivity and subjectivity is time then this explains the basis for this existential bifurcation, and it also rules out the possibility of psychology as a scientific discipline. It might seem a strange line of inquiry for this thesis to take as it could be asked what has language and our conception of time and perception to do with the distinction between education and indoctrination? The following chapter explains the reason for adopting this position.
Chapter Three

Time and Subjectivity
Chapter Three: Time and Subjectivity

Martin Heidegger thought about being-in-the-world for creatures like us, creatures that at the point of self-awareness realize that they are already in the world. He elaborated on the angst entailed in the realization that ‘being here’ is always ahead of itself, that each creature has already this equiprimordial tendency to take care, and that there is a prevailing mood or Stimmung, this background of attunement and understanding that lends itself to the potentiality for persistence. That is to say, we humans have an innate potentiality linked to our capacity to continue to exist. It is this potentiality of being that affects and even creates the conditions of and for possibility that is primordial for Da-sein. Indoctrination is fundamentally about the curtailment of possibility through the imposition of the intention of another. At this point it is not our concern whether this curtailment is beneficial or not, but rather to juxtapose the curtailment with conditions for possibility which must surely be the ultimate agenda for education. Psychology has for so long exploited an aporia at the core of human perception which is how “time is the affecting of self by self” (MerleauPonty, 2005, p494). This quotation of Martin Heidegger by Merleau-Ponty indicates where this dehiscence at the root of perception is to be found. The argument here is that there is no ‘id’ or ‘ego’ or ‘superego’, there is no Lacanian ‘lack’ submerged within the unconscious except as a heuristic tool that can readily serve the intention of another towards a form of manipulation; the cogito is illusionary and inverted. The argument here is that these hypostatised heuristics are simply a corruption of time and the subject really are.

‘I think, therefore I exist’. Rene Descartes’ famous cogito seems to suggest that human existence entails an inherent bifurcation. The ‘I’ that thinks and the ‘I’ that is acknowledged has been one problematic in philosophy. For Descartes, his cogito allowed him to recognize his own existence by ultimately evading the machinations of the evil genius through recognizing the fundamental autonomy entailed in the act of thinking, only to find his thought divided into a consciousness that is simultaneously what recognizes and what is recognized by itself. As Deleuze argues, in Kantian thinking the ‘I’ and the thing that thinks are separated by time. Influenced by experiences, the ego as the thing that thinks engenders change and it is the ‘I’ that relates the ego to time. This brings about a synthesis between the ego
and time and as a consequence “my existence can never be determined as that of an active and spontaneous being” (Deleuze, 2008, p.viii). With regards to Descartes’ cogito, Kant’s conception indicates the ‘I’ as determined by the ego which in turn is determined by the ‘I’ which gives the ego form through its synthesis with time. “It is like a double diversion of the I and the Ego in time which relates them to each other, stitches them together” (ibid, p.viii). The mind affects itself, through a distinction between the conception of the ego and that of the id as a bifurcation of the subject in relation to time. In this sense we can conceptualize time as an immutable form of interiority and space as the perpetually altering form of exteriority. Kant thought of this interiority as ‘inner sense’. Time is indeed an ‘inner sense’ but not in accordance with the Kantian conception of a privileged or higher category; it is not a pure form. “Time is not first coupled with space, but the ‘space’ that is supposed to be coupled with it is encountered only on the basis of temporality taking care of time” (Heidegger, 1996, p383).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty in contradiction of the common analogy reminds us that time is not like a river; it is not observed flowing into the future but into the past. Time doesn’t come from the past it “arises from my relation to things” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p478). Merleau-Ponty argues that what is past or future for him is already in the world. Past and future exist in the present, “past and future withdraw of their own accord from being and move over into subjectivity in search, not of some real support, but, on the contrary, of a possibility of not-being which accords with their nature” (ibid, p499). Merleau-Ponty, influenced by Heidegger, argues that if we separate the objective empirical world from the finite perspectives of subjectivity we are left with a succession of instances of nows. There would be no continuity, no temporal character and nothing would occur in sequence. Indeed there would be no time, no notion of now and no conception of succession. He therefore states:

“We should, then, gain nothing by transferring into ourselves the time that belongs to things, if we repeated ‘in consciousness’ the mistake of defining it as a succession of instances of now. Yet this is what psychologists do when they try to ‘explain’ consciousness of the past in terms of memories, and consciousness of the future in terms of the projection of these memories ahead of us” (ibid, p479).
It is the body as the seat of consciousness that gives time its continuity. The unconscious for Merleau-Ponty is simply a myth. As Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have shown perception is entirely bound up with time, and as Merleau-Ponty has shown, the body is the seat of perception, there is a ‘tacit cogito’ born out of sensory perception that Descartes doubt elected to ignore. Time is not something that affects subjectivity: it is subjectivity. “Time is neither objectively present in the ‘subject’ nor in the ‘object’, neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’, and it ‘is’ ‘prior’ to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition of the very possibility of this ‘prior’” (Heidegger, 1996, pp384-385).

Education involves giving and taking time. Students, in their formative years have their time appropriated and this thesis will argue, influenced by Foucault, that if the explicit aim of socialization is factored into the education agenda in a significant way, this time can even be said to be expropriated. For mature students time is ‘invested’. In both of these scenarios the utilization and expenditure of the student’s time warrants a justification. Anticipated educational outcomes will have at least an implicit correlation with the amount of time invested in each educational enterprise. The argument presented in this thesis will be that there is an obligation on the part of the educational institution to create the conditions for an enhanced circumstance for the student, and that additional knowledge and abilities are normally understood as a means to affect a certain range of possibilities and strengthen the student’s capacity to recognize and actualise potentiality. Inability and unsuitability may at times close off certain possibilities for a student, but generally education ought to be concerned with the enhancement of the conditions for possibility for each student. If education is thought of as related to an enhancing of the capacity for individual agency then it has relevance for the student’s potential for a more autonomous future, which in turn will have a correlation with the amount of time appropriated and how this time is invested. This chapter aims to show that the way in which the relation to time itself is conceptualized will have a profound effect on how the student is regarded in relation to the institution. If, for example, time is subjectivity and subjectivity is time, that time itself is congruent with each student, and is earmarked for the enhancement of the conditions for possibility through education, then there ought to be concern about the permeation of the educational space by practices that emphasise or impose agendas that have little to do with the
expected *educational* interests of the student. Where political tokenism and proselytizing practices are surreptitiously infused into the education space through therapeutic and socializing techniques, these, it will be argued, both represent an unsolicited encroachment into subjectivity itself and a corruption of the student’s precious investment of time, that is, of subjectivity, and of life. If socializing agendas are not distinguished from genuine education, this may reflect a clandestine commoditization or expropriation of the student’s time in the interest of non-educational agendas. In this way time and therefore subjectivity become appropriated to serve non-educational interests and as such the spectre of indoctrination comes into play. Such practices it will be argued represent both a diminution of autonomy and a transgression of the existential act of giving time that the student offers in the hope of an enhancement of his or her conditions for possibility.

For both Foucault and Durkheim, education functions as an ordering, situating the individual within a social order. For Foucault, education is a disciplinary function that requires resistance from the individual; for Durkheim it is this very disciplinary function that facilitates a higher form of autonomy. The argument here is that genuine education diminishes the disciplinary function in education and has the capacity to facilitate autonomy for the individual without the indoctrinatory internalisation bound up with socialisation.

In his *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, despite his commitment to moral individualism, Durkheim clearly sets about elevating an idea of the collective at the expense of the individual. For Durkheim we free ourselves from physical forces by opposing them with collective forces. We are not more personal as we become more individualised or the more we are tied to the restrictions of nature and our senses. In fact, we are freer the more we free ourselves from our senses. Durkheim states:

““This is because individuation is not the essential characteristic of the personality. A person is not merely a single subject distinguished from all the others. It is especially a being to which is attributed a relative autonomy in relation to the environment with which it is most immediately in contact” (1964, p271).

For Durkheim, autonomy must be thought of in terms of a release from the conditions that would pertain in a state of nature if the individual had to contend against nature as an individual. Consequently collective necessity will dictate a
more abstract form of collective imperative as a society becomes greater and more pluralistic. As Mart-Jan DeJong and Jacques F.A. Braster point out in their ‘Education for social cohesion in a pluralistic society’, for Durkheim “as societies become more modern, more individualized and more culturally diverse, the greater importance of a conscience collective at a more abstract level” (1998, p115). Durkheim indicates such an obligation when he states,

“We speak a language that we did not make; we use instruments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted to each generation that it did not gather itself, etc. It is to society that we owe these varied benefits of civilization, and if we do not ordinarily see the source from which we get them, we at least know that they are not our own work. Now it is these things that give man his own place among things: a man is a man because he is civilized” (1964, 212).

As has been seen in the first chapter, Durkheim makes a functionalist argument for social cohesion that is based on traditional values and he aims to cultivate a socialized morality with a particular emphasis on education as its conduit. He therefore extrapolates from time a conception that is more than a recognition that “man designated himself as the being who measures values, who values and measures, as the ‘calculating animal as such’” (Nietzsche, 1994, 49), because for Durkheim time is indicative of a tacit conformity. Its basis is in collective adherence. Its provenance signals the distant origin of a more primitive collective existence. Time for Durkheim is a correlative to an abiding Social Being. Durkheim challenges the reader to:

“Try to represent what the notion of time would be without the processes by which we divide it, measure it or express it with objective signs, a time which is not a succession of years, months, weeks, days and hours! This is something nearly unthinkable. We cannot conceive of time, except on condition of distinguishing its different moments. Now what is the origin of this differentiation?” (1964, 10).

Time for Durkheim, with its origin in mutual agreement and collective understanding is quintessentially social. It “is an abstract and impersonal frame which surrounds, not only individual existence, but that of all humanity. It is like an endless chart, where all duration is spread out before the mind, and upon which all possible events can be located in relation to fixed and determined guide lines” (ibid, 10). For Durkheim there is no other possibility to how we might conceptualize time; it can only be witnessed in the mutual recognition of
measurements and common incremental arrangements that are attributable to the functioning of communal existence. “The division into days, weeks, months, years, etc., correspond to the periodical recurrence of rites, feasts, and public ceremonies. A calendar expresses the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the same time its function is to assure their regularity” (ibid, 10-11).

Durkheim extrapolates from the differentiation he perceived in the functioning of time something universal, an \textit{a priori} condition of civilization that is the idea of shared time. He traces the origin of this elemental differentiation to the communal ritual embedded in totemism. Fundamental to totemism are categorizations that express ‘sympathetic values’ which “cannot be derived from experience: they are logically prior to it and condition it” (ibid, p13). Here Durkheim is pointing to a sphere of determination that transcends the individual. It pre-exists the individual and it exists beyond the individual. By conceptualizing time in this way Durkheim tries to validate a prevailing social force, a force that “alone can furnish the mind with the moulds which are applicable to the totality of things and which make it possible to think of them. It does not create these moulds artificially; it finds them within itself; it does nothing but become conscious of them” (ibid, p444). For Durkheim it was the values and requirements of the Third Republic that represented this social force, a force that will also allow him to suggest a natural hierarchical categorization. But this notion of an all pervasive \textit{a priori}, and its implication of an eschatological teleology as a movement inscribed in tradition towards the most favourable destiny, also renders Durkheim’s historical analysis open to an accusation of historicism. It is this historicism which allows Durkheim fashion his view that education in particular should reflect what is essentially a natural and moral top down social ordering. He states:

“If men did not agree upon these essential ideas at every moment, if they did not have the same conception of time, space, cause, number, etc., all contact between their minds would be impossible, and with that, all life together. Thus society could not abandon the categories to the free choice of the individual without abandoning itself. If it is to live there is not merely need of a satisfactory moral conformity beyond which it cannot safely go. For this reason it uses all its authority upon its members to forestall such dissidences.”(ibid, p17).

The argument here is that this ‘forestalling of dissidences’ is the primary function of the social sciences today, and their increasing encroachment into the education
space as a ‘broader’ conception of education is really an ersatz ameliorative for social dissidences that have their basis in structural neglect and inequality. It is in this way among others that the social sciences act as an instrument for political security which was, after all, Durkheim’s primary aim. In light of this, Durkheim’s way of conceptualizing time as something transcendent and infinite becomes indicative of a political and social view that diminishes the individual, masking a particularistic, pragmatic, and instrumental utility.

In contrast with Durkheim’s conception of time, Merleau-Ponty recognizes objective time as a recording of the passage of time rather than recognition of what time itself is. For example there is a distinction to be made between the way time inheres in the subject and the way in which institutions, such as the school or the prison, think of time as an instrument of measurement and evaluation of change that is exterior to the subject, even objective. Merleau-Ponty states:

“Time is thought of by us before its parts, and temporal relations make possible the events in time. Correspondingly, therefore, the subject must not be himself situated in it, in order to be able to be present in intention to the past as to the future. Let us no longer say that time is a ‘datum of consciousness’; let us be more precise and say that consciousness deploys or constitutes time. Through the ideal nature of time, it ceases to be imprisoned in the present” (2005, p481).

Merleau-Ponty’s conception of time places its emphasis on subjectivity, both as a consciousness in the world and of a consciousness of being in the world; time and consciousness are inseparable for human beings. Subjectivity and time are bound together in an equiprimordial sense, because “time presupposes a view of time” (ibid, p477). Time is both concomitant with and conditional for consciousness; it opens the horizon of perception and reflection and cannot exist without this self-awareness. It is through this existential phenomenon that time becomes comprehensible for us and it is time which allows us to become aware of ourselves, and of our own thought. Just as our bodies are constitutive for and condition our perception of the vertical and the horizontal and even more acutely our sense of depth - how the near and the far are perceived are always in relation to the body - so too is time an intrinsic phenomenon of the body and consciousness. Merleau-Ponty states that:
"We must define thought in terms of that strange power which it possesses of being ahead of itself, of launching itself and being at home everywhere, in a word, in terms of its autonomy. Unless thought itself had put into things what it subsequently finds in them, it would have no hold upon things, would not think of them, and would be an ‘illusion of thought’" (ibid, 432).

Recognition of our own thought is a secondary event, a reflection, but it is an event that allows us to become aware of our self-awareness. It is in this sense that thought is always already ahead of itself. For Merleau-Ponty it is through our senses that we have our primary contact with the world, “sense experience is that vital communication with the world which makes it present as a familiar setting of our life" (ibid, p61). Although Descartes claimed to have doubted the existence of the sensible world he had to experience it first in order to doubt it, therefore it is not because I think that I am certain of my existence but rather I am already conscious of my existence through the senses. Merleau-Ponty states:

“The cogito is the recognition of this fundamental fact. In the proposition: ‘I think, I am’ the two assertions are to be equated with each other, otherwise there would be no cogito. Nevertheless we must be clear about the meaning of this equivalence: it is not the ‘I am which is pre-eminently contained in the ‘I think’, not my existence which is brought down to the consciousness which I have of it, but conversely the ‘I think’ which is re-integrated into the transcending process of the ‘I am and consciousness into existence” (ibid, p446).

Merleau-Ponty switches Descartes’ cogito to I am, I think. Thought is only one aspect of consciousness, and consciousness is always consciousness of something - through attention and perception the existential context becomes narrowed and defined. In the interest of clarity it might be useful to think of conscious awareness as a precursor to reflective thought because, as Merleau-Ponty points out, if thought were not already ahead of itself “how would you set about looking for that thing, the nature of which is totally unknown to you? Which among the things you do not know, is the one you propose to look for? And if by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know that it is indeed that thing, since you are in ignorance of it?” (ibid, p431).

The body as subjectivity, as a thing that perceives, always maintains a degree of freedom in relation to the world because it is not a thing that exists in-itself, like something inert, but instead it exists as a sensible organism in the world; it is a thing that exists for-itself. This can be thought of as humans’ fundamental capacity
and disposition for autonomy. In relation to the world, ontologically the human is quintessential autonomy; and it is this raw autonomy that society through socialization and a political conception of the human must corral and redefine in order to bring about a ‘higher’ and more conditional conception of autonomy. As Merleau-Ponty states:

“Would I know that I am caught up and situated in the world, if I were truly caught up and situated in it? I should then merely be where I was, as a thing, and since I know where I am and see myself among things, it is because I am consciousness, a strange creature which resides nowhere and can be everywhere present in intention. Everything that exists exists as a thing or as a consciousness, and there is no half-way house” (ibid, pp43-44).

Thought as reflective self-awareness must come to terms with a body and consciousness, already in existence for-itself, acknowledging that reflective thought is a secondary event. It is retrospective and in this sense it is the antecedent of sensible consciousness. It is this phenomenon that is the essence of subjectivity, this fundamental phenomenon of existence that allows us to differentiate between past, present, and future. Therefore it is subjectivity itself that is the fundamental structure of time and it is this fundamental structure of subjectivity that erupts in the manifestation of time. Merleau-Ponty states:

“Time is ‘the affecting of self by self’, what exerts the effect is time as a thrust and as a passing toward a future: what is affected is time as an unfolded series of presents: the effecting agent and the affected recipient are one because the thrust of time is nothing but the transition from one present to another. This ek-stase, this projection of an indivisible power into an outcome which is already present to it, is subjectivity” (ibid, pp494-495).

Influenced by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty argues that if we separate the empirical, objective conception of time from the finite perspective of subjectivity there would be nothing continuous in the apprehension of time and there would be no constancy of recognition all that we would be left with is an intermittent sequence of ‘nows’. Consciousness and therefore subjectivity provides the conduit of continual presence that involves protention toward the future present and retention of the present past. In fact, without the body and consciousness as the vehicle of subjectivity there would be no conception of time, time itself would not exist. In contradistinction to Durkheim’s historicism, it is not the past that encroaches on the present but the present that interprets and retains the past,
which is why we should always ask exactly whose traditions and values are we really compelled to hold? For example, Merleau-Ponty explains:

“...This table bears traces of my past life, for I have carved my initials on it and spilt ink on it. But these traces in themselves do not refer to the past: they are present; and, in so far as I find in them signs of some ‘previous’ event, it is because I derive my sense of the past from elsewhere, because I carry this particular significance within myself. We recognize the past through the prism of the present not the present through the prism of the past” (ibid, p480).

Merleau-Ponty is critical of the psychologist and the sociologist because they assign to the human body, as its reality, the idea of an objective representation. So too one can argue that the determinative and abiding notion of the unconscious, whether it is as an existential lack or the imperative in the intersubjectivity of language, is always an ideal that is formulated against the background of an objective time. There exists this strange notion that the objective world is capable of passing “on to the sense-organs messages which must be registered, then deciphered in such a way as to produce in us the original text” (ibid, p8). They overlook the exclusivity of subjectivity, that the subjective for-itself experience of another can never really be known. Objective, empirical and universalizing determinates are by definition intended to posit a deeper or a higher conception of a self, however, for Merleau-Ponty, “once we have reduced the living body to the condition of an object. If it is once conceded that it may be the seat of third person processes, nothing in behaviour can be reserved for consciousness” (ibid, p141). This is why it is so important to recognize that time is subjectivity. It is aware of itself and it provides itself with a manifestation of itself which is unique to itself. Merleau-Ponty explains:

“It is of the essence of time to be not only actual time, or time which flows, but also time which is aware of itself, for the explosion or dehiscence of the present towards the future is the archetype of the relationship of self to self, and it traces out an interiority or ipseity. Here a light bursts forth, for here we are no longer concerned with a being which reposes within itself, but a being the whole essence of which, like that of light, is to make visible. It is through temporality that there can be, without contradiction, ipseity, significance and reason. That is seen in the commonly held notion of time. We mark out the phases or stages of our life: for example, we consider everything that bears a significant relationship to our concerns at the moment as part of our present, thus recognizing implicitly that time and significance are but one thing” (ibid, p495).
Merleau-Ponty insists that the subject must be identified with temporality. We need to acknowledge that “perception provides me with a ‘field of presence’ in the broad sense, extending in two dimensions: the here-there dimension and the past-present-future dimension. Second elucidates the first” (ibid, p309). For Merleau-Ponty it is simply wrong to think of one conception of the self as an adumbration of another self. The existential bifurcation is simply time recognizing itself in consciousness, time “has meaning for us only because ‘we are it’” (ibid, p500). This is a different way of understanding subjectivity that rejects those notions of an ‘unconscious’ which would harbour a deeper and more ‘genuine’ self. The difficulty with introducing the unconscious in that way is that it can too readily, as we have seen, privilege the intention of another as the one who can dig beneath the subjective experience to locate another place of subjectivity. The constituting and the constituted are inseparable. Consciousness cannot be withheld from either, and consciousness does not allow for withdrawal into pure subjectivity. It entails reflection but this is always necessarily retrospective. Just as constituted time without a constituting agent would be an abstraction without a source, withdrawal from temporality into pure subjectivity, if it were possible “would destroy time, which would be left without date or place” (ibid, p495). Merleau-Ponty points out that simply existing as a consciousness entails time as an abiding reality. He states, “I am not the initiator of the process of temporalization; I did not choose to come into the world, yet once I am born, time flows through me, whatever I do” (ibid, p496). Existentially, we do not have “a little tabula rasa of consciousness to make room for something new” (Nietzsche, 1994, p38).

Durkheim and Merleau-Ponty make opposing arguments, each of which emphasizes a conception of time that will support their theory. To be fair to Durkheim, his account is of its time and therefore warrants a more charitable interpretation. Time is an indicator of how divisions and categorizations are expressed and many of these categorizations are indeed an expression of ‘sympathetic values’. But it must also be recognized in light of Merleau-Ponty's account that Durkheim relegates subjective experience in order to posit a notion of a universal origin that transcends the perspectival and situated embodied consciousness of temporal beings in favour of a positionless ‘Social Being’, and his conception of time is fundamental to this view. But as Merleau-Ponty states; “if I am at all times and everywhere, then I am at no time and nowhere” (2005, p387).
Durkheim’s argument is intended to represent a particular political view which is an attempt to formulate a means of social cohesion that counters the clericalist, monarchist, and Marxist sentiments and ideals of his historical situation. It is in this sense the ‘Social Being’ is representative of what Durkheim would like to have us believe is an abiding transcendental consciousness, a reference point from which the next generation must measure its normativity in order to derive its sense of acceptance, value, and autonomy. Merleau-Ponty in stressing the significance and limit of subjective experience states:

"We have no right to level all experiences down to a single world, all modalities of existence down to a single consciousness. In order to do so, we should need a higher court of appeal to which to submit perceptual and phantasmal consciousness, a self more intimate with myself than the self which thinks up my dream or my perception when I confine myself to dreaming or perceiving, which possesses the true substance of my dream and my perception when I have only the appearance of it" (ibid, p338).

This implicit criticism of psychology can no doubt be equally tailored to suit the social sciences, yet it must also be recognized that a Durkheimian could point out that Merleau-Ponty does neglect “the common field where all minds meet” (Durkheim, 1964, p13). Durkheim’s claim for the social sciences particularly with regard to education obliges him to stress the salience of a universal social force which is inextricable from a conception of an objective notion of time that invokes a sense of the sacred or at least mystical. This is not to say that this conception of time is not his genuine belief, nor is it just pragmatic or instrumental. It is simply to highlight a correlation between the comprehension of time as an impersonal framework and a belief in universal and a priori origins. Just as Lacan required a bifurcation of the ‘me’ and the ‘I’, Durkheim, by proffering a predominant and determinative role for the constituted over the constituting is also obliged to introduce a duality; he must insist that man is bifurcated. Durkheim states:

“There are two beings in him: an individual being which has its foundation in the organism and the circle of whose activities is therefore strictly limited, and a social being which represents the highest reality in the intellectual and moral order that we can know by observation – I mean society” (ibid, p17).

Durkheim inverts the relationship of the constituting to the constituted. This allows him to interpret time in a way which suggests something otherworldly, mystical, linked to the sacred, and this is precisely what his Elementary Forms of
Religious Life argues. It unveils totemism as extant evidence of humanity’s most distant social foundation, as a form of social organization with natural hierarchical structures which has for so long has been clothed in religious garb. Unlike Lacan, Durkheim does name the ‘Father’; he cites the collective conformity and adherence to the universal phenomenon of time as evidence of the existence of what has always underpinned the source of the sacred, that is, a Social Being. But by naming the Father Durkheim leaves his theory open to refutation. As Heidegger explains, “measuring is constituted temporally when a present standard is made present in a present length. The idea of a standard implies unchangingness; this means that it must be objectively present in its constancy at every time for everyone” (Heidegger, 1996, 383). In contrast with Durkheim, Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology, of, Perception underemphasizes the influence of history, tradition, and social values that condition thought and consciousness itself even before the emergence of a self’s existence as subjectivity. Both these thinkers can be thought of as representing a binary opposition around the conceptualization of time. Therefore, “It is all the more necessary that the time “in which” beings are encountered be given a fundamental analysis, since not only history, but natural processes, too, are determined “by time”. However, more elemental than the circumstance that the “time factor” occurs in the sciences of history and nature, is the fact that, before all thematic investigation, Da-sein “reckons with time” and orients itself according to it” (ibid, p371).

“Though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied” (Mill, 2006, pp60-61).

Heidegger helps us to distinguish between an authentic relation to time, the time of one’s finitude, and the time of the ‘They’, which is inauthentic. For Heidegger, time is already given to us unthematically because it is beings like us who, simply by being in the world, temporalise temporality. It is this phenomenon of the temporalization of temporality that allows beings like us to possess an innate dability. For example our horizon for now is the today. He argues that this dability “is “always” available to us without ever having explicitly taken it over, and we make constant use of it, although not always in verbal expression” (Heidegger, 1996, p374). In Being and Time Heidegger avoids the use of the phrase
‘human being’ because it connotes too much. Instead he uses the expression Da-sein to indicate existence, to indicate being-there or being in the world, and to indicate being in existence as beings like us for whom there is a world. "Da-sein is a being which I myself am, its being is in each case mine" (ibid, p108). In this respect, Heidegger goes to quite a bit of trouble to avoid expressing the type of Cartesian bifurcation of subject and object, thought and being, that has dominated Enlightenment and post Enlightenment thinking. Indeed the strength of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology lies in the ways in which the reader is persistently reminded that the ontological and ontic interpretations of existence, of Da-sein, are always no more than an emphasis that "being-in-the-world is a structure that is primordial and constantly whole" (ibid, p169). Neither the ontological nor the ontic conceptions of Da-sein have precedence; they are to be thought of as equiprimordial.

Heidegger attributes the term ‘they’ to an undefined, amorphous conception of other beings like us. It is essentially a non-specific representation of social existence and influence, but contrary to Durkheim, “nor is the they something like a “universal subject” which hovers over a plurality of subjects. One could understand it this way only if the being of “subjects” is understood as something unlike Da-sein, and if these are regarded as factually objectively present cases of an existing genus” (ibid, p120). Heidegger uses the term Mitda-sein specifically to refer to other beings like us, it represents being in the world with other Da-sein, this is a more defined and immanent reference to Da-sein we encounter in the world. "But we must not overlook the fact that we are also using the term Mitda-sein as a designation of the being to which existing others are freed within the world" (ibid, p113). Merleau-Ponty was influenced by Heidegger and the in-itself and for-itself distinction becomes even more relevant here as it is crucial to Heidegger’s argument.

For Heidegger time always has a span. There is a duration that Da-sein allows itself, “this duration is again the time revealed in the self-interpretation of temporality, a time that is thus actually, but unthematically, understood in taking care as a ‘span’ ” (ibid, p376). Da-sein is always already taking care in the world because it is always already ahead of itself. This span, the duration Da-sein allows itself, will change depending on the task at hand, for example, breakfast will have a
shorter span than writing a thesis or climbing a mountain. Heidegger argues that useful things to hand are less noticeable than things that can no longer fulfil their useful function; we are less cognizant of our surrounding environment and the useful things we use when taking care, ontologically understood this concept of care is always already ahead of itself and is therefore prior to any value laden conception of care. It allows itself time without having any specific reckoning, and it is in this way pre-reflective. “Here time dates itself in one’s actual mode of allowing oneself time heedfully in terms of what is actually disclosed in taken care of in the surrounding world and in attuned understanding of what one does ‘all day long’ ” (ibid, p376). Becoming wrapped up in the moment, in a task, has its duration; it has a span that indicates an innate datability, a datability that becomes subsumed beneath the advancement of clock time, of objective time.

Durkheim, like Hegel, elevates time to a higher unity, which detaches time from the experience of subjectivity. This, Foucault will show us, not only serves as a political device for control but also diminishes the experience of the student in relation to the educational institution and its agenda. Agendas that have their interests predicated on a span that transcends the educational endeavour or the student’s educational objective, that can only find their justification in negative, ‘abnormal’ social events, must relegate subjectivity and the educational experience in correlation to the time span that will frame how they conceptualize their enterprise. When the student’s education is intended to play a role and function unrelated to genuine education and when it serves an agenda that is defined outside the educational milieu and within a time frame that is indefinite or at least transcends the educational objective, we must then think of this in terms of a transgression of the educational space. Heidegger offers an alternative explanation that takes us further along in resolving the subjective/empirical distinction in how we perceive time. He states:

“The proof for the “existence of things outside me” is supported by the fact that change and persistence belong equiprimordially to the nature of time. My objective presence, that is, the objective presence given in the inner sense of a manifold of representations, is change objectively present which persists. This, however, cannot be “in us”, “because precisely my existence in time can first be determined by this persisting thing”. With objectively present change “in me” which is also posited empirically, an objectively present thing which persists “outside of me” is also posited. This persisting thing is the condition of the possibility of the objective presence of change
“in me”. The experience of being-in-time of representations equiprimordially posits changing things “in me” and persisting things “outside of me” (ibid, p189).

Heidegger refers to objective time in a variety of ways; he refers to it as vulgar time when he attributes it to the common time of the ‘they’; he refers to it as worldly time when in relation to the unison of clock time; and he refers to inauthentic time when juxtaposing the ‘they’ time with primordial time which for Da-sein is authentic time. This objective, vulgar conception of time is also derived from an inner sense, because Da-sein reckons with time before any thematic conception of it. “The vulgar conception of time owes its provenance to a levelling down of primordial time” (ibid, p372). This reckoning of time is prior to the use of instruments fashioned to measure time; indeed it is this reckoning that make it possible for something like clocks to exist at all. Before clock time which has radically altered how time is commoditised, objective or vulgar time was based on the sunrise, on the regularity of night and day.

Because for the most part Da-sein is entangled in the everydayness of being in the world, that is, wrapped up in the social world of the ‘they’, primordial time, that is, authentic time, becomes covered over and levelled down by this vulgar conception of time. The everydayness of existence in the social world of the ‘they’ has a tranquillizing affect on Da-sein, “entangled being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating” (ibid, p166). For Heidegger there is an averageness entailed in communal existence; in fact, clock time can be considered to be indicative of this ‘common sense’. Heidegger’s notion of tranquillity relates to the avoidance of authentic existence. The decisions and activities Da-sein is involved in when wrapped up in the inauthentic everyday existence of the ‘they’ world are really already made for Da-sein, all Da-sein has to do is what others do and what is required is to simply do what is expected. Heidegger argues that “the concepts of “future”, “past” and “present” initially grew out of the inauthentic understanding of time” (ibid, p300). These conceptions of future, past, and present represent the three ecstasies that form the horizon of temporality for Da-sein. But Heidegger suggests that this ontic interpretation must be grounded in an ontological interpretation, in a Da-sein that interprets itself and in doing so:
"The "now" interprets a making present of beings. In that "now that..." lies the ecstatic nature of the present. The datability of the "now", "then", and "on that former occasion" is the reflex of the ecstatic constitution of temporality, and thus essential for time itself that has been expressed. The structure of the datability of the "now", "then", and "on that former occasion" is evidence for the fact that they stem from temporality and are themselves time. The interpretive expression of "now", "then", and "on that former occasion" is the most primordial way of giving the time (ibid, p375).

Temporality interprets itself in Da-sein and brings about a consciousness of a now, a present that awaits and retains, the temporalization of temporality renders Da-sein ecstatically open to past, present, and future. Therefore both ontic and ontological conceptions of time equiprimordially stem from Da-sein being-in-the-world.

Heidegger argues that "being-in-the-world has the character of being of care" (ibid, p185). What Heidegger means by this, is that Da-sein interpreted at an ontological level is always already ahead of itself and even in a sterile interpretation of existence: "Da-sein exists for the sake of a potentiality-of-being of itself" (ibid, p333). Before self-awareness Da-sein is already taking care in the world, but it is important not to confuse this ontological interpretation of care with the value infused conventional conception of care; in language we can only articulate what is already known, and this dual use of the word care is an example of language at its limit folding back on itself. What Heidegger is emphasising is that Da-sein is already making its way in the world prior to our reflective recognition as self-awareness. Da-sein ontologically understood is equiprimordial with existence as Mitda-sein, which Da-sein also is, therefore initially and for the most part Da-sein has fallen prey to the world of others. In its existence in the world Da-sein is tranquilised, existence is easier and as a result Da-sein’s potentiality for being-for-itself is modified. Whether entangled in the everydayness of the they world or caught up in a moment of authentic individualising and unique awareness, Da-sein always hankers after possibilities; it is primarily futural. Heidegger points out that "as long as it is, Da-sein always has understood itself and will understand itself in terms of possibilities" (ibid, p136). Being-in-the-world and being for-itself Da-sein has always involves definite possibilities because “Da-sein is the possibility of being free for its ownmost potentiality of being” (ibid, p135). When Da-sein becomes average; the ‘they’ has its own way to be, through distantiality, that is,
through the phenomenon of finding a ‘here’ through our relation of the ‘there’ of things and other Da-sein we find our place, our location. But also:

“The they maintains itself factically in the averageness of what is proper, what is allowed, and what is not. This averageness, which prescribes what can and may be ventured, watches over every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly squashed. Overnight, everything primordial is flattened down as something long since known. Everything gained by struggle becomes something to be manipulated. Every mystery loses its power. The care of averageness reveals, in turn, an essential tendency of Da-sein, which we call the levelling down of all possibilities of being” (ibid, p119).

Heidegger’s interpretation of how existence and tradition relate to each other is different from that of Durkheim. Heidegger argues that:

“Da-sein grows into a customary interpretation of itself and grows up in that interpretation. It understands itself in terms of this interpretation at first, and within a certain range constantly. This understanding discloses the possibilities of being and regulates them. Its own past – and that always means that of its “generation” – does not follow after Da-sein but rather always goes ahead of it” (ibid, pp17-18).

Because Da-sein is initially and for the most part Mitda-sein, with others, the traditions of its Mitda-sein, its surrounding environment, always already precedes it and frames the structure of its possibilities and its capacity to recognize potentiality. Contrary to conventional theories of self, which begin with a notion of an individualistic self that gradually adopts their environment and social mores, Heidegger argues the reverse; Da-sein is always already wrapped up in or entangled in the they world and authentic individuality involves an involuntary and secondary recognition. This directly challenges and questions the prospect of regressing to an authentic conception of self by invoking the primary speech of infants, which we saw in psychoanalysis.

Heidegger suggests that authentic existence reveals an underlying mood. This mood makes Da-sein aware of an existential mode of not being at home. It invokes a sense of uncanniness. This “uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness” (ibid, p256). We catch a glimpse of Da-sein in an ontological sense not when we turn towards it but in turning away from it, it is when we flee from it that we catch a glimpse of it, “in turning away from it, it is ‘there disclosed’ ” (ibid, p173). For Heidegger, Angst is
the abiding signification of an authentic existence. This is because primordial time, unlike vulgar time, is finite. In Angst, Da-sein grasps “the primordial totality of being of Da-sein” (ibid, p171). In the authentic moment Da-sein is compelled to acknowledge its existence as spanning from birth to death, a death that can occur at any time, it is therefore always imminent, “being-toward-death is essentially Angst” (ibid, p245). But authentic time does not only entail negative realities, because “Angst reveals in Da-sein its being toward its ownmost potentiality of being, that is, being free for the freedom of choosing and grasping itself” (ibid, p176). Angst individualizes, it reveals to Da-sein that for which it is anxious; in the authentic moment the surrounding ‘they’ world is shut out and the Angst which is revealed to Da-sein is uniquely specific to the individuality and the finiteness of that particular existence. “The fundamental possibilities of Da-sein, which are always my own, show themselves in Angst as they are, undistorted by innerworldly beings to which Da-sein, initially and for the most part, clings” (ibid, p178). Da-sein in fleeing the Angst entailed in authentic existence is irresolute. “Resoluteness means letting oneself be summoned out of one’s lostness in the they” (ibid, 1996, 275). In authentic time Da-sein is caught up in a temporalizing moment that “has time for what the situation requires of it” (ibid, p377). It is a moment that never loses time. In resoluteness it has a span that is the present, and this is the nature of the moment. It is in contrast to existence in the ‘they’ world “as the person who exists inauthentically constantly loses time and never “has” any” (ibid, p252).

Conscience is the silent call that summons the self to the self, and it reveals to Da-sein that it always already exists. “The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self, it is something like an alien voice. What could be more alien to the they, lost in the manifold “world” of its heedfulness, than the self individualized to itself in uncanniness thrown into nothingness” (ibid, 1996, 255). The call of conscience is that of guilt, but not as it is conventionally understood: it summons Da-sein to its unique and authentic possibilities in relation to the finiteness of its primordial time: it reveals to Da-sein its inevitable death as uniquely its own in contrast to the ‘they’ that “never dies because it is unable to die” (ibid, p389). This is the existential region which psychology, religion, and socializing techniques have always sought to use to undermine in order to prescribe individuality. Here as we have seen, subjectivity is targeted through, for instance, notions of the
‘unconscious’, or through notions of a universal conscience or theory of universal origin, or even through the idea of a public conscience. “‘Deceptions” occur in conscience not by oversight of the call (a mis-calling) but only because the call is heard in such a way that, instead of being understood authentically, it is drawn by the they-self into a manipulative conversation with one’s self and distorted in its character of disclosure” (ibid, p253). It is this misconception of what conscience is, as conscience understood at an ontological level and its interpretation as a sense of guilt, which attracts psychologising and socializing techniques, for “what else is this “public conscience” than the voice of the they” (ibid, p257). Nietzsche thought that we must recognize the tension between natural and cultural life as a tension, that the alienation this recognition generates must be experienced before any alteration is possible. The recognition of finite existence is an intrinsic component of meaning, the despair it entails must be experienced if life is to be truly embraced. Heidegger warns against letting others implant their agendas as a message in the form of an existential imperative, because “the call does not say anything, does not give any information about events in the world, has nothing to tell” (ibid, p252). The call of conscience simply lets you know that you already exist and your existence is finite, it is unique, and it is your own.

Heidegger argues that conscience ontologically understood does not involve this value laden message; it cannot be relayed back, and it awaits no reply because it entails no message or question. For Nietzsche, bad conscience is a sickness in the same way that pregnancy is a sickness, it was the domestication of man that brought about bad conscience. Man has historically inherited bad conscience which Nietzsche compares to a civil war against nature. This inheritance has become so habitual that our natural inclination becomes thoroughly intertwined with bad conscience, “for too long man has viewed his natural inclinations with an ‘evil eye’, so that they finally came to be intertwined with ‘bad conscience’ in him” (Nietzsche, 1994, p70). For Heidegger the call of conscience is the occasional emitting of authentic existence, and can only be genuinely understood ontologically. It is therefore wrong to think of this call of conscience in terms of the values that are unavoidable in an ontic interpretation of existence. He states,

“the call does not give us to understand an ideal, universal potentiality-of-being; it discloses it as what is actually individualized in that particular Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1996, 259). Taken interpretively, the ontic will always
precede the ontological, and though Da-sein is initially and for the most part entangled in the ‘they’ world, it is also always already ahead of itself, it is in this way the world for Da-sein is from the outset always its own. Da-sein in existing for-itself is always already taking care prior to reflection, this is what conscience reveals. In falling prey to the world Da-sein turns away from itself, for Da-sein the authentic existence revealed in the call of conscience is uniquely its own, and furthermore in contradiction to Lacan and psychoanalysis “communication is never anything like a conveying of experiences, for example, opinions and wishes, from the inside of one subject to the inside of another” (ibid, p152)

Through Heidegger’s conception of time and subjectivity emerges a creature that requires much more consideration with respect to autonomy than Durkheim’s conception of it would afford. Heidegger’s Da-sein is a creature that is always already making its way in the world, seeking potential and possibility. Durkheim’s moral individual according to Heidegger’s thinking is what is already given because of existence with others, the traditional and communal values that Durkheim holds in such high regard already exist and they are what Da-sein is born in to. There is a very different emphasis here, which has fundamental ramifications for how education and socialisation might be thought about. Education thought of in terms of subjectivity as time and vice versa is about facilitating awareness of the world opening up horizons increasing the entelechy that is inherent in beings-like-us. Therefore the inevitable consequence of education must be the questioning of these communal and traditional values; it must entail a discomfort with internalisation or conceptions of the ideal of education intended to propagate social sentiment. If so whose sentiment does it propagate, is it that of the ‘they’?, unless of course there is an abiding universal social force as Durkheim would have it. Conscience for Da-sein is a cognizance of its own uniqueness, its distinctness in the world. Socialisation is about ensuring a collective identity therefore it diminishes or negates such moments and it is about fencing off how Da-sein can perceive its world and in this way reduce the conditions for possibility that might otherwise be unpredictable. There is a different emphasis of time with socialisation as it must emphasise the ‘they’ time, objective time, and in so doing it places a primacy on the constituted over the constituting. Socialisation by definition gives primacy to the ‘they’ world and covets conscience as its prize. Is this really the role that is proper to education? A further consideration that will need to be addressed is whether the objective constituted conception of time is indicative of something that transcends the
individual subject, that is, as an impersonal framework, and whether and how this really how the social world functions. By emphasising the impersonal over the subject does education facilitate what a ‘society’ needs or what the most predominant want? This question is addressed in the following chapter and in Chapter Six, asking about the plausibility of an impersonal social force or authority and the interests it serves.
Chapter Four

Social Forces
Chapter Four: Social Forces

In Durkheim’s thinking, intersubjectivity invokes a distinction between the sacred and the profane and it functions as the basis of all classification; in totemic symbolism he finds the origin of social organization from which “the idea of kind or class was formed in humanity” (Durkheim, 1964, 144). According to Durkheim’s findings, classification is a correlative of affinity and repulsion which entails an ordering that is inherent in all societies. The most rudimentary form of categorization is attributed to the individual intellect, the power of perceiving resemblances causes an attraction of like to like, and a conception of antitheses is to be found in the perception of opposites: “in fact, a class is not an ideal, but a clearly defined group of things between which internal relationships exist, similar to those of kindred. Now the only groups of this sort known from experience are those of men associating themselves” (ibid, p147). Durkheim attributes to the collective a functioning that transcends the profane; man lives a double existence, without periodic ritual symbolism the ‘contagion’ entailed in the ‘effervescence’ aroused by the collective rites, symbolism and rites upon which traditions are founded and depend, dissipate. Communal sentiment requires a belief and this belief needs to be regularly renewed otherwise its symbolism loses its potency, “the soldier who dies for his flag, dies for his country; but as a matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is the flag that has the first place” (ibid, p220). Like Foucault, Durkheim thinks in terms of force, in something more diffuse than mere physical power. Durkheim points to the various forms of ‘Mana’ for his conception, arguing that such superstitions conceal what we can more realistically understand as social force. For Durkheim this is a force that gives sustenance to our moral natures, “this is the moral conscience, of which, by the way, men have never made even a slightly distinct representation except by the aid of religious symbols” (ibid, p211). Durkheim argues that it is the mind’s capacity to think in universal forms that raises it above the contingent and the individual, as this capacity links the mind to humanity rather than something that could only reside in the monad. Durkheim states:

“Thus both with the individual and in the group, the faculty of idealizing has nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of luxury which man could get along without, but a condition of his very existence. He could not be a social
being, that is to say, he could not be a man, if he had not acquired it” (ibid, 423).

Durkheim has in mind a replacement for the role that religion has played in creating the notion of something eternal, something beyond the profane. Without a belief in something that transcends ritual and ceremony, man will not accept a faith he cannot understand. Durkheim is arguing for a sort of secular faith, therefore:

“To spread itself or merely to maintain itself, it must be justified, that is to say, a theory must be made of it. A theory of this sort must undoubtedly be founded upon the different sciences, from the moment when these exist; first of all, upon the social sciences, for religious faith has its origin in society; then upon psychology for society is a synthesis of human consciousnesses; and finally upon the sciences of nature, for man and society are a part of the universe and can be abstracted from it only artificially” (ibid, p431).

It is clear that Durkheim sees the social sciences and psychology as the modern inheritors of what was the once the sphere of religious influence. The following quote gives an insight into the ultimate objective for these ‘scientific’ disciplines. Durkheim states:

“The real reason for the existence of the cults, even those which are most materialistic in appearance, is not to be sought in the acts which they prescribe, but in the internal and moral regeneration which these acts aid in bringing about. The things which the worshipper really gives to his gods are not the foods which he places upon the altars, nor the blood which he lets flow from his veins: it is his thought” (ibid, 346).

It is this targeting of thought itself that should be foremost in mind when Durkheim argues that it is education that ensures that:

“Social sentiments could never be totally absent. We remain in relations with others; the habits, ideals and tendencies which education has impressed upon us and which ordinarily preside over our relations with others, continue to make their action felt” (ibid, p348).

To display respect and sometimes fear towards the symbolic form of the social grouping is to acknowledge its totem. Its significance for the individual is that “he has the feeling that he is obeying an imperative, that he is fulfilling a duty. For these sacred beings, he has not merely fear, but also respect. Moreover the totem is the source of the moral life of the clan” (ibid, p190). Durkheim desires here the justification of a social ordering, particularly the prevailing social order, in
particular, a legitimation of the ways in which individuals have become categorized to their social milieu, thus demonstrating the ways in which tradition and its ceremonies and rituals are determinative and consolidating. He envisions an education that is primarily oriented towards the ends of the social sciences which always has at its core the maintenance of the prevailing order; social scientists are not employed by the state to be revolutionary. Durkheim attributes to the collective a functioning that naturally determines which members of a society dominate and which members of a society are to be subordinated to them. For Durkheim man could not have conceived of hierarchies if such knowledge had not already pre-existed them:

“Consequently, even if the facts were not enough to prove it, the mere analysis of these ideas would reveal their origin. We have taken from society, and projected them into our conception of the world. It is society that has furnished the outlines which logical thought has filled in” (ibid, p148).

Classification and categorical hierarchy is a natural consequence of social existence therefore the epistemic awareness of each student ought to be tailored to the specific practical and political requirements of existence in his or her social milieu. His or her mode of awareness should be conducive to the social category in which their existences will play out. The possibility of an enhanced categorical existence will entail the adaption to a new political and social milieu. Durkheim considers the social sciences to be the proper mechanism for the propagation of social cohesion due to the abeyance of communal rituals and the onset on modern individualism. Durkheim’s notion of a social being is of its time, but its anthropomorphic qualities can easily be discerned in contemporary statements designed to invoke a conception of society, statements that conjure a notion of a society that thinks, a society that expects and denounces, and that at times even honours. Such enunciations are always intended to invoke a sense of consensus, or to create the impression of a political or social view that transcends the perspectival.

The reiteration of tradition and the values inherent in it can be a means for a generation in power, for the centralising impetus of a political party, protective of their epistemological inherence, is to determine the perspectives of the next generation. It can be a means to curtail the tools of analysis and to ensure a specific chronological interpretation of the prevailing system of power relations. It
suppresses new emergences of meaning that are integral to a will to know and to a new play of forces. It ignores Nietzsche’s reminder that only things outside history can have an unchanging meaning. If overemphasized it radically constrains epistemological and ontological cognizance. It can stifle the emergence and development of new forms of rationality, except as forms of resistance and counter-conduct. Foucault states that:

“It is as if it was particularly difficult, in the history in which men retrace their own ideas and their own knowledge, to formulate a general theory of discontinuity, of series, of limits, unities, specific orders, and differentiated autonomies and dependencies. As if, in that field where we had become used to seeking origins, to pushing back further the line of antecedents, to reconstituting traditions, to following evolutive curves, to projecting teleologies, and to having constant recourse to metaphors of life, we felt a particular repugnance to conceiving of difference, to describing separations and dispersions, to dissociating the reassuring form of the identical” (1972, p12).

Foucault recognizes in the continuation of tradition a conceptual structure with a very precise function, “it makes it possible to think the dispersion of history in the form of the same” (ibid, p21). For Foucault it is “as if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought” (ibid, p12). For tradition to disallow discontinuity it must ignore the creative contribution of resistance and counterforce and instead embark on an endless quest for an endless origin. “Tradition enables us to isolate the new against a background of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to genius, to decisions proper to individuals” (ibid, p21). Tradition overlooks the suppressed and subjugated forms of discourse that are always there beneath the surface. Entailed in Durkheim’s way of conceptualizing time is the notion of an historical consciousness “in this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness” (ibid, p12). Foucault suggests that the will for there to be a continuous history and for the possibility of an ultimately undifferentiated homogeneous autonomy is to:

“Provide a ‘privileged shelter’ for the sovereignty of consciousness. Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject – in the form of historical consciousness – will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a
distance, by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode” (ibid, p12).

Ever mistrustful of universals and their link to historicism, Foucault asks, “How can you write history if you do not accept a priori the existence of things like the state, society, the sovereign, and subjects?” (Foucault, 2010, p3). In his 1977-78 series of lectures titled *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault makes the observation that conduct involves the directing of others in accordance with mechanisms of coercion, conducting conduct is the exercise of power, it is a way of behaving in a more or less open field of possibilities. For Foucault it is government rather than State that can be witnessed in the various forms of social organization throughout the ages. Foucault shows ‘society’ to be a certain historical perspective that emerged in the eighteenth century as a consequence of the power struggles and the conflicting justificatory narratives between the aristocracy and the bourgeois administration around the issue of sovereignty and state. Foucault uses France as the historical context for the emergence of this new discursive formation. He attributes to Boulainvilliers the creation of an alternative historical narrative designed to counter juridical and administrative discourse on the eighteenth century state. Foucault inquires:

“So what is this new subject of history, which is both the subject that speaks in the historical narrative and what the historical narrative is talking about, this new subject that appears when we get away from the state’s juridical or administrative discourse about the State? It is what a historian of the period calls a “society”. A society, but in the sense of an association, group, or body of individuals governed by a statute, a society made up of a certain number of individuals, and which has its own manners, customs, and even its own law. The something that begins to speak in history, that speaks of history, and of which history will speak, is what the vocabulary of the day called a 'nation'” (2004, p134).

Foucault focuses is on governmentality rather than the state, which is merely a consequence of government, and he recognizes the notion of society to be indicative of a new discursive threshold pertaining to the problematic object represented by government. Foucault argues that “governmental reason does not divide subjects between an absolutely reserved dimension of freedom and another dimension of submission which is either contested or imposed” (Foucault, 2010, p11). Force is not some metaphysical substance, abstractions are not outside perspectives nor are they some harmonious balance that suggests an abiding
consensus, and if these abstractions persist it is because they serve some interest or set of interests. “Thus according to Foucault, ‘to govern in this sense is to structure the possible field of actions of others’.” (Davidson, 2007, pxxii). There is no perspectiveless abstraction that mysteriously represents the collective, there are only explicit and disguised interests that always serve a more specific agenda. Conducting others is a form of power; it is a force that acts on the actions of others. Conduct is a relation of force that structures the field of possibility. Education is not outside this field of relations. The question is does this type of relationship amount to indoctrination?

In the modern era governmental reason is evaluated on the basis of a liberal criticism and it is governmentality that has to make the distinction between what to do and what not to do. No longer is government evaluated on the basis of the legitimacy of the sovereign, but instead it is evaluated in terms of success or failure; it is ‘political economy’ that ensures self-limitation of government. For Foucault, the “question of the frugality of government is indeed the question of liberalism” (Foucault, 2010, 29). The market is no longer the site of justice as it was until the eighteenth century; under the gaze of liberalism it becomes the site of verification, “the market must tell the truth (dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to governmental practice” (ibid, p32). A regime of truth pertaining to the market is now connected to governmental practice. The question then becomes, how useful is government and its institutions, “for what is it useful? Within what limits is it useful? When does it stop being useful? When does it become harmful?” (ibid, p40). Arising from this new approach to governmentality is a new way of perceiving the law. In the traditional revolutionary approach the law is “conceived as the expression of a collective will indicating the part of right individuals have agreed to cede, and the part they wish to hold on to. In the other problematic, radical utilitarian approach, the law is conceived as the effect of a transaction that separates the sphere of intervention of public authorities from that of individual independence” (ibid, p41). There are two conceptions of law and of freedom and they are contradictory, Foucault’s interest lies in the logic of strategy that creates a connection between the contradictory and irreconcilable notions of law and freedom.
Foucault points to the penal system to indicate which form of law prevailed, no longer is punishment predicated on the sovereign’s right to life and death, instead “punishment will be rooted only in the play of interests of others, of the family circle, of society, and so on. Is it worthwhile punishing? What interest is there in punishing? What form must punishment take for it to be in society’s interest to punish? Is there an interest in torturing, or is it more worthwhile to re-educate, and if so, how and up to what point? How much will it cost?” (ibid, p46). Utility becomes the evaluative criterion of government and its sphere of influence must represent equilibrium between social utility and economic profit, and between private and collective interests. Furthermore, as a consequence of a globalization of the market place political government must provide itself “with a precise, continuous, clear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation of its power is not given by respect for the freedom of individuals, but simply by the evidence of economic analysis which it knows has to be respected. It is limited by evidence not by the freedom of individuals” (ibid, p62). In this new liberal art of government freedom is managed, liberalism manages and organizes the conditions which it thinks ought to allow for freedom. “Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligation relying on threats, etcetera” (ibid, p64). For example, legislation is needed to ensure that there are no more state monopolies and legislation is needed to ensure a free labour market. Foucault states, “What then, will be the principle of calculation for this cost of manufacturing freedom? The principle of calculation is what is called security” (ibid, p65). The collective and the individual interests have to be protected against one another, “the freedom of the economic processes must not be a danger, either for enterprises or for workers. The freedom of the workers must not become a danger for the enterprise and production” (ibid, p65). Strategies of security need to protect against old age, illness and accidents. Freedom and security, this is the new governmental game. It is this interplay between freedom and security that Foucault argues is the economy of power that is peculiar to liberalism.

To manage a population requires the production of an interest that will appear favourable to the population. “The production of the collective interest through the play of desire is what distinguishes both naturalness of population and the
possible artificiality of the means one adopts to manage it” (Foucault, 2007, p73). Foucault, always attentive to the significance of statements and the context they depend on, draws attention to the significance entailed in the transition from referring to humanity as mankind to referring to it as human species, and it is within this transition “we can say that man appears in the first form of his integration with biology. From one direction, then, population is the human species, and from another it is what will be called public” (ibid, p75). The public is a way of seeing the population “under the aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behaviour, customs, fears, prejudices, and requirements; it is what one gets a hold of through education, campaigns and convictions” (ibid, p75).

Perceived as a human species and as a public “we have a whole field of new realities in the sense that they are pertinent elements for mechanisms of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must act” (ibid, p75). Through a constant interplay between techniques of power “the population could be formed, continue, and remain as the privileged correlate of the modern mechanisms of power” (ibid, p79).

The government of the state subsumes beneath it sovereignty and discipline, “so, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality” (ibid, p109). Through the institutions, forms of knowledge, techniques and calculations of governmentality, society is controlled by the apparatuses of security with the population as its object. Foucault’s interest lies in the technology of power behind this concept of governmentality. This is how a whole network of alliances, communications, and points of support are given concrete expression. “Hence the theme of man, and the “human sciences” that analyze him as a living being, working individual, and speaking subject, should be understood on the basis of the emergence of power and the object of knowledge” (ibid, p79). Concrete expression of this power is also to be witnessed in psychiatric institutions that “intensifies, and gives density to a psychiatric order rooted in the definition of a non-contractual regime for individuals reduced to the status of minors. Finally, we can show how a whole battery of multifarious techniques concerning the education of children, assistance to the poor, and the institution of workers’ tutelage are coordinated through this psychiatric order” (ibid, p117). Foucault suggests that the demise of the Christian method or art of pastoral guidance, the “art of conducting, directing, leading,
guiding, taking in hand, and manipulating men, an art with the function of taking charge of men collectively and throughout their life and at every moment of their existence”, (ibid, pp164-165) is the point of origin, a genealogical point where the Christian pastorate fades and “the point of formation, of crystallization, the embryonic point of governmentality whose entry into politics, at the end of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, marks the threshold of the modern state. The modern state is born, I think, when governmentality became a calculated and reflected practice” (ibid, p165). Though remnants of the pastorate still persist and are most obvious in medicine, “in its modern forms, the pastorate is deployed to a great extent through medical knowledge, institutions, and practices. We can say that medicine has been heirs to the pastorate” (ibid, p199). This has ramifications for education in the form of a medicalization of dispositions and character traits that are introduced into educational discourse by way of psychologising and socializing appropriations of medical terminology as a means of ostensible scientific validation.

Foucault argues that all discursive claims to truth are deployed on the basis of a relationship of force, and all force must be in opposition to something. For this reason discursive claims to truth are decentred. Foucault is interested in the rules of right that produce discourses of truth and therefore produce power through discourse. He states, “Right must, I think, be viewed not in terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but in terms of the procedures of subjugation it implements” (Foucault, 2004, p27). Basically, right is truth and truth is power, which means claims to truth based on ‘science’ become problematic because:

“We have a historical and political discourse – and it is in this sense that it is historically anchored and politically decentered - that lays a claim to truth and legitimate right on the basis of a relationship of force by therefore excluding the speaking subject – the subject who speaks of right and seeks the truth – from juridico-philosophical universality” (ibid, p53).

There is an element of tyranny in Durkheim’s historicism. Foucault’s historical genealogies can be thought of as in opposition to the unifying continuity and universalism Durkheim emphasises. Foucault traces genealogies and looks for discontinuities in order to resurrect subjugated knowledges and histories of buried counterforces that dispel unities and create aporias, those irreducible differences that complete or at least throw light on the underlying play of power
and resistance, histories of force and counterforce, of the conditions of domination and subjugation. “These genealogies are a combination of erudite knowledge and what people know. They would not have been possible – they could not have even been attempted – were it not for one thing: the removal of the tyranny of overall discourses, with their hierarchies and all the privileges enjoyed by theoretical vanguards” (ibid, p8). Therefore, the possibility of alternative histories become indicative of an increase in autonomy, signifying the emergence of alternative forms of reason. Foucault has the psychiatric expert, the psychologist, and the social scientist in mind when he refers to genealogies as ‘antisciences’. Genealogies make known and oppose the power-effects of discourses that make a claim to be regarded as a ‘science’. Foucault asks:

“What type of knowledge are you trying to disqualify when you say that you are a science? What speaking subject, what discursive subject of experience and knowledge are you trying to minorize when you begin to say: ‘I speak this discourse, I am speaking a scientific discourse, and I am a scientist’. What theoretico-political vanguard are you trying to put on the throne in order to detach it from all the massive, circulating, and discontinuous forms that knowledge can take?” (ibid, 10).

Today's ‘they’ world is structured on competition and inequality which is integral to market competition, although in modern capitalism the market cannot be left to pure competition, there must be an active governmentality involved to superimpose market mechanisms, “one must govern for the market, rather than because of the market” (Foucault, 2010, p121). Therefore neo-liberalism is presented with the problem of how to delimit governmental involvement. What influences political action around education and intrigued Foucault is, “what will be the effect on the art of government of this general principle that the market is what ultimately must be produced in government?” (ibid, p121). Laissez-faire is no longer the economic principle, for neo-liberalism it is now a process of constant vigilance and intervention. In this context government now entails saving competition from its own inimical effects. Government must create the conditions for the economy, and through education it must produce a competent workforce that can meet the needs of the market. Government must also compensate for unemployment without intervening directly in the unemployment rate as that sphere is reserved for the economy. For neo-liberalism “full employment is not an objective and it may be that a reserve of unemployment is absolutely necessary for
the economy” (ibid, p139). Even the compensation for unemployment as social policy is tied to the economy. A stronger economy will have a more “generous social welfare as a kind of reward and compensation” (ibid, p142). But this must be based on a principle of inequality:

“In broad terms, for regulations to take there must be those who work and those who don’t, there must be big salaries and small salaries, and also prices must rise and fall. Consequently, a social policy with the objective of a relative equalization, even a relative evening out can only be anti-economic, social policy cannot have equality as its objective” (ibid, p143).

There should be no transfer of resources from the part of the economy that generates savings and investment to the part that doesn’t. It is the expenditure of the highest paid on consumption that should compensate for those who under-consume. The only real social policy is economic growth. “As the neo-liberals have always said, neo-liberal government intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than any other system” (ibid, p145). The economy is the basis of legitimation for a government that “has to intervene on society as such, in its fabric and depth” (ibid, p145). The economic processes become the regulatory principle of society. Society becomes an enterprise society and a judicial society that is framed by the regulatory requirements of the economy.

Foucault makes an interesting statement in his assessment of anti-Machiavellian literature, when he states, “the education of the Prince assures upward continuity of forms of government, and police assures their downward continuity” (Foucault, 2007, p94). Thought of in relation to human potentiality and the conditions for possibility, then mutatis mutandi education has been construed as both a means of widening and narrowing perspectives depending on the emphasis applied to it. The question to be asked is where education stands if “the general economy of power in our economy is becoming a domain of security?” (ibid, p11). Should the objective for education be at the level of population, which would indicate a sociological end for education, or should primacy be given to the individual? The answer to this question has a direct bearing on how education manifests; if education is tailored for sociological outcomes then innovation suffers - John Stuart Mills’ genius will be denied his conditions for possibility. Therefore education with sociological ends and the population as its emphasis and object become specifically designed for the disadvantaged, the poorest in society. There
emerges from this an uneasy sense of apartheid in the functioning of education which is recondite of Durkheim’s notion of a socialized education tailored to the individual’s social milieu. In the current economic and political climate it makes sense for the economic interest of governmental legitimation and arguably the population to educate those who are most advantaged to the highest standards for the global market, and to socialize those for whom it is improbable that they can progress beyond their disadvantaged social milieu. Foucault states, that “within the system of knowledge-power, there is a break between the pertinent level of the population and the level that is not pertinent, or that is simply instrumental. The final objective is the population” (ibid, p42). These are the two levels of governmentality that Foucault discerned in his analysis of bio-power and this duality in thinking can find ostensible justification by contrasting an emphasis between the collective and the individual interests to correlate with whether time is conceptualized as a totalization or as subjectivity. Education for the privileged is focused on the individual and his or her finite capacity for potential whereas those whose social circumstance means that their social milieu curtails potentiality will find that the purpose of their education transcends individual potentiality and has its emphasis on the collective and security. For those most in need of genuine education, the notion of the people becomes subsumed beneath this new collective subject, the population.

Foucault states “that the motto of liberalism is: ‘Live dangerously’” (2010, p66). Liberalism stimulates danger and therefore becomes this constant arbitration between freedom and security. Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is evidence of the combining notions of economic freedom, surveillance, and disciplinary techniques that are bound up in the concept and manifestation of liberalism. Foucault states:

“Bentham presented the famous Panopticon as a procedure for institutions like schools, factories, and prisons which would enable one to supervise the conduct of individuals while increasing the profitability and productivity of their activity. At the end of his life, in his project of the general codification of English legislation, Bentham will propose that the Panopticon should be the formula for the whole of government, saying that the Panopticon is the very formula of liberal government” (ibid, p67).

As consequence of the crisis in capitalism reflected in interventions, such as Roosevelt’s New Deal and Keynesian policies between and after the two world wars, control paradoxically becomes the mainspring of freedom for neo-liberalism.

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Foucault conceptualizes the state as a series of stratifications, “the state is what must exist at the end of the process of the rationalization of the art of government” (Foucault, 2007, p287). He considers the state as neither universal nor autonomous; it is a process of incessant transactions, links between local and centralized authorities, forms of control and decision making centres. “In short, the state has no heart, as we well know, but not just in the sense that it has no feelings, either good or bad, but it has no heart in the sense that it has no interior” (Foucault, 2010, p77). The state is simply multiple governmentalities. Between and after the world wars, the state begins to gradually takeover a number of practices and transactions in relation to finance from which emerge two strands of liberalism - the German ordo-liberalism and the American anarcho-liberalism. The state finds legitimation in relation to one or another of these two strands of liberalism. “The economy produces signs that enable the structures, mechanisms, and justifications of power to function. The free market, the economically free market, binds and manifests political bonds” (ibid, p85). Because socialism has no intrinsic form of governmentality, it can only function as a corrective and a sort of palliative to the dangers inherent in these new modes of governance. The question for neo-liberalism is not what degree of freedom the state ascribes to the economy, but how economic freedom “can have a state-creating function and role, in the sense that it will really make possible the foundation of the state’s legitimacy” (ibid, p95). History has a lesson for those who espouse legitimation on the basis of tradition, ritual, symbolism, and think in terms of a socialization combined with the atomic but institutionalized individualism of capitalism as an homogeneous possibility. This is not so far from Durkheim’s or Habermas’s conception because in reality all they do is “intensify this mass society, this society of standardizing and normalizing consumption for everyone, the idea of the Volkswagen, and so on” (ibid, p114). Foucault points out that this is a very important consideration to take into account in the assessment of the liberal market economy, serving, as it does, as the principle form and model for the state, which is, liberalism “because of its defects, is mistrusted by everyone on both the right and the left, for one reason or another” (ibid, p117). Heterogeneity is healthier than homogeneity.

Foucault analyzes the theory of human capital through the prism of the American anarcho-liberal model but this model can be applied to neo-liberalism in general if thought of in terms of degrees of acuteness. The capital of the worker is the wage
he can generate, it is a set of physical and "psychological factors which make someone able to earn this or that wage, so that, seen from the side of the worker, labor is not a commodity reduced by abstraction to labor power and the time [during] which it is used. Broken down in economic terms, from the workers’ point of view labor comprises a capital, that is to say, it as an ability, a skill; as they say: it is a “machine”. And on the other side it is an income, a wage, or rather, a set of wages; as they say: an earnings stream” (ibid, p224). This machine has a lifespan and the attitude that makes someone suited to generate an income stream cannot be separated from the person. In accordance with this conception “the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself” (ibid, p225). Foucault raises the issues of genetics and racism as possible consequences of social preference in relation to economic and cultural capital. He states:

“And as soon as society poses itself the problem of the improvement of its human capital in general, it is inevitable that the problem of the control, screening and improvement of the human capital of individuals, as a function of unions and consequently reproduction, will become actual, or at any rate, called for” (ibid, p228).

Foucault asks “what does it mean to form human capital, and so to form these kinds of abilities-machines which will produce income, which will be remunerated by income? It means of course, making what are called educational investments” (ibid, p229). Foucault acknowledges that the notion of educational investments are not specific to neo-liberalism, “but the neo-liberals lay stress on the fact that what should be called educational investment is much broader than simple schooling or professional training and that many more elements than these enter into the formation of human capital” (ibid, p229). Parental guidance and attention particularly in relation to the mother is considered of great importance to the formation of human capital. Foucault argues that the decisive determinants are:

“Time spent, care given, as well as the parents’ education – because we know quite precisely that for an equal time spent with their children, more educated parents will form a higher human capital than parents with less education – in short, the set of cultural stimuli received by the child, will contribute to the formation of these elements that can make up a human capital” (ibid, 229).

This allows for the sciences of calculation and quantification, for the measurement of possibilities for potential investment in human capital predicated on
environment alone. "What in the child’s family life will produce capital? What type of stimuli, form of life, and relationship with parents, adults, and others can be crystallized into human capital? (ibid, p230). In the American model, there is a generalization of the individual as an enterprise that extends beyond the economic market exchanges and that has become “a principle of intelligibility and a principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behaviour” (ibid, p243). As has been said, liberal society and government is not egalitarian. It is based on an optimization of systems of difference, but the rules of the game encompasses all individuals, as it is a system where those in minorities and those beyond the reach of normalization are both marginalized yet also included under a panoptical gaze. “So, everything comprising what could be called, if you like, the formative or educational relationship, in the widest sense of the term, between mother and child, can be analyzed in terms of investment, capital costs, and profit – on the capital invested” (ibid, p244). The political imaginings and concrete reality that suggests potentiality in one and not in another can become compounded because of the type of education that is advanced. The following chapter uses the prison to understand the influences that condition the educational experience for those who are most disadvantaged and in need of genuine education. The aim of this chapter on the prison is to define what education is and what it is not.
Chapter Five
The Prison
Chapter Five: The Prison

Government in the eighteenth century discovered that it could no longer think of governance in terms of territory, that is, of the management of a domain and its subjects. There was a realization that “it also has to deal with a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction its regulations as well as possibilities of disturbance. This new reality is called society. From the moment that one is to manipulate a society, one cannot consider it completely penetrable by police. One must take into account what it is. It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristic, its constants and its variables” (Foucault, 1984, p242). For Foucault, politics is not simply a way of maintaining peace. It is the continuation of war by other means, and it is conducted on the basis of maintaining a relationship of force between the dominating and the dominated. At its core is a form of governmentality that is centralized around the political party. At its periphery are those furthest from the power base, the marginalized, those who cannot identify with the dominant identity, and those who must remain excluded. It is clear that western democracies have dispensed with organizing governmentality around the body of the sovereign. Sovereign power with its individualized apex and amorphous base has given way to what Foucault refers to as disciplinary power, that is, a system of power that maintains an unindividuated, interchangeable, and supervised apex, and a base that functions as its most individuated strata. For Foucault, “the individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an ‘ideological’ representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called ‘discipline’ ” (Foucault, 1977, p194).

Foucault makes a distinction between what he refers to as a somatic singularity and the individual. The individual is a creation; it is the product of technologies of power that have laid claim to the right to punish on the basis of a defence of society. Individualization is the principle of this disciplinary code which underpins our modern technology of power and from which the human sciences emerge and psychology blossoms as its new casuistry. Foucault states:
“Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies” (ibid, p217).

Discipline is the panoptic tactic of surveillance that watches without been seen. It determines conduct. It recognizes in each individual a duration that must be individuated in order to be controlled, made efficient, and then combined for optimum productivity, for optimum force. It is a power that is “articulated directly onto time” (ibid, p160). Discipline arranges bodies in space and time. “Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations” (ibid, p146). Discipline as a unitary technique reduces the body as a political force while maximizing its usefulness at the least possible cost. It controls the body through hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment and by way of “their combination in a procedure that is specific to it, the examination” (ibid, p170).

Everything is regulated by the clock; time has a new significance for disciplinary power: “It poses the principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time: exhaustion rather than use; it is a question of extracting, from time, ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more useful forces” (ibid, p154). It demands maximum speed and efficiency. It introduces micro-penalties as regulatory measures, “the normal is established as a principle of coercion in teaching with the introduction of a standardized education” (ibid, p184). There is a hierarchy, a form of domination to individuation; children are more individuated than adults, madmen, delinquents, and patients more than the ‘normal’ or the healthy. Discipline gives birth to new forms of knowledge that have their raison d’être in the practices of individuation and normalization, such as sociology, and the social sciences more generally: for example, in clinical medicine, psychiatry, psychology, child psychology, and educational psychology. Each individual is made a case through the emergence of these clinical sciences, “the examination that places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them”
(ibid, p189). It is through disciplinary mechanisms such as these that disciplinary power becomes refined. Foucault states:

"These sciences, which have so delighted our 'humanity' for over a century, have their technical matrix in the petty, malicious minutiae of the disciplines and their investigations. These investigations are perhaps to psychology, psychiatry, pedagogy, criminology, and so many other strange sciences, what the terrible power of investigation was to the calm knowledge of the animals, the plants or the earth. Another power, another knowledge" (ibid, p226).

In today's disciplinary system, the right of punishment has shifted from the old vengeance of the sovereign to a representation of the common interest, to a defence of society. Punishment no longer takes the form of a ritualistic spectacle of bodily torture; it is no longer a means of expressing a surplus of sovereign power, but rather it has become more calculated and it now is duration that must facilitate the action of punishment. It becomes:

"A prolonged succession of painful privations, sparing mankind the horror of torture, has much more effect on the guilty party than a passing moment of pain... It constantly renews in the eyes of the people that witness it the memory of vengeful laws and revives in all the moment of a salutary terror. Time, operator of punishment" (ibid, p108).

Disciplinary power prescribes a punishment that is more diffuse, aiming to be an actual and salutary instrument to instil the disciplinary code in a general way throughout the social body. This humanization of punitive power provokes a shift in its point of application; the mind is now to be the surface of inscription for power. The body is no longer physically branded, instead there is a whole series of social brandings, such as sex and drug offender registers and police records, all of which are predicated on surveillance and documentation, but even more significantly than this punitive power in the disciplinary system is concerned with the branding of the soul. Foucault regarded his book *Discipline and Punish* to be a genealogy of the modern soul. In it he states:

“Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect; it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains, and corrects; over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized; over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives” (ibid, p29).
For Foucault, the soul is the consequence of the suppression of a general striving in life for the sun and light. The intense individualization that disciplinary power brings to bear on those who are at the base of its power structure entail torments and mortifications that are masked by espousal of a higher morality; it is this that gives the real non-corporeal soul its existence for Foucault. The soul as the effect of the articulation of a specific kind of power carves out a psyche, a consciousness, a personality, a subjectivity; this is Foucault’s individual as distinct from a somatic singularity, and “on it have been built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism” (ibid, p30). Nietzsche’s psychological category of *ressentiment* can be clearly discerned in Foucault’s concept of the soul, but there is a subtle yet important difference in emphasis. Nietzsche attributes to his classification of the slave disposition of ressentiment the creation of values and a morality that culminate in a saying no to life, whereas Foucault’s soul suggests a Heideggerian influence in that it is not so much the effect of saying no to life as the suppression of a yes.

Isaiah Berlin introduced the spectre of a monstrous impersonation in his essay *Two Concepts of Liberty*. Berlin attributes the same meaning to the terms liberty and freedom, which is essentially autonomy in life, conceptualizing two forms of liberty that derive from this same root. Both conceptions are expressions of how freedom as a political concept have led to historically different and oppositional ways of understanding what an autonomous existence would be. They are what Berlin calls negative and positive conceptions of liberty. His negative conception is simply freedom from the interference of others. Negative liberty is transgressed “if I am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may be, enslaved” (Berlin, 2006, pp231-232). There are obvious problems that arise from a realization of this negative form of liberty for communal existence as its full exercise cannot be realized by all and its ultimate attainment by some must be predicated on a somewhat macabre zero-sum game of life. Yet historically this negative concept of freedom has been less problematic than the realization or at least attempted implementation of what Berlin’s positive conception of liberty represents. It is, as Berlin argues, the positive concept of liberty that provokes the emergence of “this monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X would choose if he were
something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all political theories of self-realization" (ibid, p236). Historically, theories of self-mastery and moralistic evaluations based on a notion of a higher-self, which is the basis of Berlin’s positive conception of liberty, have found expression in the form of grotesques such as Hitler and Stalin. This positive concept of liberty finds its source in the Cartesian bifurcation in which a dominant self is summoned, and will identify with a universal yet definitive assumption of reason in the Enlightenment sense; it relies on this ideal of reason as a normalizing rationale in order to suppress a notion of a lower self which according to the higher self and certain social imperatives will manifest as “irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my ‘lower’ nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my ‘empirical’ or ‘heteronomous’ self, swept by every gust of desire and passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its ‘real nature’” (ibid, p235).

Berlin’s concept of positive liberty seems particularly relevant for an analysis of this broader assertion for education, especially within the prison, even though, in many respects the institution of the prison itself seems more reflective of Berlin’s negative conception. For example, Foucault argues that the prison is both disciplinary and despotic, the prison is the fullest manifestation of disciplinary power, but “after the sentence, a power was constituted that was reminiscent of the power exercised in the old system. The power that applied the penalties now threatened to be as arbitrary, as despotic, as the power that once decided them” (Foucault, 1977, p129). In relation to Berlin’s negative conception of liberty, the prison represents the zenith of autonomous realization in a zero-sum power dichotomy between the state and the citizen. Panoptic surveillance and micro-penalties specific to the institutional norms have a modus operandi in which “secrecy is imperative, and so too is autonomy, at least in relation to this technique of punishment: it must have its own functioning, its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it must fix its own norms, decide its own results” (ibid, p129). The prison can be as petty and pedantic and as cowardly (many hands, no hands) as any of Foucault’s pen pushing Ubus¹ and as arbitrary and capricious as any

¹ “The adjective ubu-esque was introduced in 1922 and derives from the play by Alfred Jarry, Ubu roi, Paris, 1896. English translation by Barbara Wright (London: Eyre Methuen, 1966). See the Grand Larousse, vol.7 (Paris: Larousse, 1978): “The word describes someone who, by his grotesque, absurd, or ludicrous nature, recalls the figure of the Ubu”; Lé Grand Robert, 2nd edition,
despotic sovereign Ubu. The Ubu produces statements that “have the curious property of being foreign to all, even the most elementary, rules for the formation of scientific discourse, as well as being foreign to the rules of law and being, in the strict sense, grotesque” (Foucault, 2003, p11). This is the background from which the prison postulates rehabilitation; it harbours this notion that the criminal must be re-educated into social life, but it is also dependent on regulations, punishments and impositions that are not specified in any legal code. It resides “at the point where the law is inverted and passes outside itself, and where the counter-law becomes the effective and institutionalized content of the juridical forms” (Foucault, 1977, p224). Threat is the lifeblood of the prison. Not only do its punitive measures function outside and beyond any law, “it must be the most powerful machinery for imposing a new form on the perverted individual; its mode of action is the constraint of a total education” (ibid, p236). The prison with its apparatuses of coercion and the physical and psychological pressures it exerts on the individual circulate around the implementation of what Foucault refers to as the Psy-function peculiar to the human sciences masquerading as ‘rehabilitation’. Education can only have a sociological end; it can only be infused with psychological significance. This is an education in which the student is merely an object to be worked on and is at best secondary to the imagined outcome. Prison is the moralist’s ‘wet-dream’, and it is precisely for this reason that prison education will always have at its core the mentality that:

“A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas; it is at the stable point of reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link is all the stronger in that we do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be our own work; despair and time eat away the bonds of iron and steel, but they are powerless against the habitual union of ideals, they can only tighten it still more; and on the soft fibres of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires. (Servan, 35)” (ibid, pp102-103).

Evaluating education using Berlin’s notion of a monstrous impersonation offers a way of showing how education can take on a form of indoctrination by assuming a privileged access to the personality of the student. This is unsuitable not only for education itself, but for any type of human interaction. It highlights what really

vol 9 (Paris: Dictionnaires Lé Robert, 1985): “Someone resembling the figure of King Ubu (in his comically and extravagantly cruel, cynical, or cowardly character).” (Foucault, 2003, p28)
amounts to a denial of education as well as a transgression of the most rudimentary form of individual autonomy. What is proposed here is not simply to evaluate such a transgression as defined against Berlin’s elegant concepts of negative and positive liberty, but also to think of it in light of Foucault’s thinking on the play of forces that permeate throughout all human relations. What is proposed is to give more definition to this idea, or to put it more accurately, this ideal of a ‘higher’ self that posits a notion of a ‘real’ self, which is actually a reversal of Heidegger’s ontological interpretation of authentic Da-sein and to show how it arrives at a distinctly Durkheimian idea of what individual autonomy would entail. And this is precisely the danger Berlin’s concept of positive liberty harbours, because:

“The real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual (as the term is normally understood) as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a Church, a State, the great society of the living and the dead and the not yet born. This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’, single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’ achieves its own and therefore their ‘higher’ freedom” (Berlin, 2006, pp235-236).

This thesis attempts to rescue education from the disciplinary forces that are superfluous to it. It attempts to mobilise Foucault’s writings on power and knowledge in order to examine his assertion that as a compensation for the demise of a more direct manipulation of the body under sovereign law, “a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the praises that the law needs: they reassure it that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive action” (Foucault, 1977, p11). The position taken here is in agreement with this, arguing that this is precisely how education has functioned within prisons and it also asserts that this is increasingly how education is being applied to the marginalized in society. However it raises again the question, Is this really education? It is recognized, as Foucault does, that education has functioned as a disciplinary power, yet the argument made here is that there is a conceptual distinction to be made between genuine education and the type of influences the human and social sciences increasingly attach to the aims and practice of education. Just as Foucault argues:
"It is useless, then, to say that the 'human sciences' are false sciences; they are not sciences at all; the configuration that defines their positivity and gives them their roots in the modern episteme at the same time make it impossible for them to be sciences; and it is then asked why they assumed that title, it is sufficient to recall that it pertains to the archaeological definition of their roots that they summon and receive transference of models borrowed from the sciences" (Foucault, 1970, p.366).

Just as the human sciences ought not to be understood as sciences so too ought the human sciences not to be understood as forms of education. It is difficult to know which is more pernicious, the mimetic charade as the scientist or as the educationalist. Either way those who bear the full weight of disciplinary individualization tend to be rendered mute in the face of a synthesis. In order to give voice to subjugated knowledges and silenced voices, a distinction needs to be made between the form of discursivity that is germane to genuine education and the parasitic forms of discursivity that have always formed around it. Because it focuses on subject-matter, knowledge of the world, and what we can know about the world, there is an intrinsic interiority to the practice of genuine education that provokes curiosity, critique, and constitutes a danger to those who would rather not know or would rather that others did not know. Education has always been attractive to forms of discursivity that are themselves without interiority, framing discursive formations that produce knowledges that counter its direction, and that circumvent or limit what education can focus on. Therefore an institution as totalitarian and secretive as the prison should display noticeable signs of unease in its presence. The prison is an environment in which education is situated within a ubiquitous political imagination, an imagining that assures that what ought to be a student is first and foremost and almost entirely perceived as a delinquent or a patient. It is an environment in which both the delinquent and patient are the only forms that can represent rehabilitation, the potential for a return to 'normality'. In such an environment it is the student as student, concerned with acquiring knowledge of the world, that proves to be abnormal and recalcitrant, there is no place for critique or the resistance inherent in thinking within the prison.

In the introduction to her book *The Body Problematic, Political Imagination in Kant and Foucault*, Laura Hengehold gives an account of how “Eleanor Bumpurs, a “270-pound, arthritic sixty-seven-year-old woman” (Hengehold, 2007, p1) was shot dead by New York City police in 1984. Hengehold draws on Kant’s idea of
noumenon as a construct for comprehending the political imaginings of normality and the political and social concerns with appearances that become attributed to the abnormal. The analogy to be drawn from Kant’s notion is clearly that we only have insight into appearances and not things-in-themselves, to believe otherwise would be to suggest fanaticism (Schwärmer). Hengehold raises the Kantian question of how our political “imagination contributes to our sense of reality and our ability to act on it” (ibid, p7). The argument is that there is an aesthetic judgment that precedes empirical or introspective knowledge and this creates morally significant identification and evaluations that intuitively distinguish the normal from the abnormal and are affected by and affect a common way of seeing things. For some this becomes a real problem because though we might occupy the same physical world, we can at the same time occupy very different perceptual spaces, spaces that are too often defined through relations of inequality. Spatial representation will often depend on perspective, and the problem for Eleanor Bumpurs was that her representational space did not correlate with the system of signs and symbols intended by others to define her representational space. Eleanor Bumpurs resisted eviction with a knife; she was first shot in the arm to disarm her and then without warning ‘blown to pieces’ by a shotgun-wielding policeman. Eleanor Bumpurs was a black woman and she was suspected to be mentally ill, “housing officials acknowledged that she sometimes ‘saw Reagan coming through her walls’ ” (ibid, p1). As Foucauldian individuals both Eleanor Bumpurs and the policeman that killed her are the effects of power. Hengehold reflects on what it was that Eleanor Bumpurs’ body invoked in the imagination of others beyond its physical presence. Hengehold argues:

“That in some ontologically significant sense, a part of Mrs Bumpurs existed in other people’s bodies and codes as well as in her own flesh and language. But she was obviously unable to use this plurality to her advantage; she experienced it as a problem, and not in a way to escape or take distance on her poverty” (ibid, pp2-3).

There is a disparity in the way institutions imagine the rich and the poor, the normal and the abnormal; they become subject to different forms of discourse and it is on the basis of this difference that the poor and the abnormal come to represent discursive objects while others don’t. This means that they are also subjected to different forms of surveillance. Indeed the school and the prison exemplify the materiality, positivity, and rarity of transindividual statements that
can marginalize and exclude incompatible forms of discursivity on the basis of normation. “Identification with the subject of any discourse – such as scientific knowledge, law, or religion – alters someone’s being. It also alters the objects of the discourse that now exist for these subjects” (ibid, pp213-214). Those bodies that represent what is outside the sensus communis become excluded from ‘normal’ discourse as foreign identities. Add to this a poor education and they become “an “incommunicable” state of mind to a dominant sensus communis” (ibid, p104). In this way the political imaginings of authorities and institutions as well as ‘normal’, (or should it be normalized?) individuals shape the form of the abnormal aesthetic.

“These doubles – the ones one must be like and the ones one must not be like – indicate the structure of the sensus communis that both brings one together with others and consigns one to privacy and incommunicability” (ibid, p282). Hengehold is struck by these aesthetic judgments, these political imaginings that can bring about the violent death of an elderly woman because her rent was overdue. Hengehold adds, “I am also struck, however, by how often people in similar situations – the disabled, aged, poor, of those with exhausting family and work obligations – from the outer horizon of imagination for those in relatively stable or affluent circumstances” (ibid, p3). Hengehold is concerned with the effects of power, perception, and discourse on those who reside in the liminal space of a social formation, but as Foucault argues power is also positive; it also creates the individuals that straddle power that identify with its current strategic deployment.

There is significance, for example, to the way impersonal categories shape the perception of those contaminated by what Foucault regards as ubu-esque institutional discourses. It is difficult to argue against Foucault when he states that “discourses of truth that provoke laughter and have the institutional power to kill are, after all, in a society like ours, discourses that deserve some attention” (Foucault, 2003 p6). Within the context of the prison and the law vis-a-vis criminality, it is the psychiatric expert and the administrative bureaucratic pen-pushers who articulate and repeat statements that produce discourses that introduce a succession of doubles in their attempt to establish an antecedent below the level of the crime, by insisting that the criminal resembles his crime even before it was committed. They formulate their political imaginings through examinations, discourses that demand intimate information and in turn disqualify
the one that produces the discourse, and as such are one-sided discourses. These practitioners of power through discourse are Foucault's Ubus. They represent a maximization of power within the disciplinary system; they are the effect of a surplus of power that lays claim to truth, but they are also grotesques, clowns, buffoons, that possess such ridiculous authority that they can produce discourses of truth that can make you laugh and can kill you. And it is precisely such discursive practices, such types of statements that are increasingly laying claim to the means and end of education for the marginalized today. Education for the marginalized has always been strewn with pejorative articulations; today such statements assert their validity and inviolability through scientific credence. This is the discourse of the medico-legal expert, the probation officer, the social worker, the psychologist, the scientific expert, the Ubu. The Ubu is a grotesque because only the Ubu possesses the arbitrary power of the sovereign within the disciplinary system. They can produce texts that claim truth on the basis of claims to science, although they are not sciences but rather political imaginings, aesthetic judgments. Foucault states:

“When I say these are grotesque texts I use the word grotesque, if not in an absolutely strict sense. I am calling “grotesque” the fact that, by virtue of their status, a discourse or an individual can have effects of power that their intrinsic qualities should disqualify them from having. The grotesque, or, if you prefer, the “Ubu-esque” is not just a term of abuse or an insulting epithet, and I would not like to use it in that sense” (ibid, p11).

At the conclusion of her book, Hengehold quotes Simone de Beauvoir warning against the myopia of excluding a group or personality trait from the taxonomy of acceptability because “no movement or State can know a priori whose being will fail to benefit from a changed society” (Hengehold, 2007, p298). But with the diminution of the welfare state this is precisely the role the social sciences and psychology come to play in an ever more increasing way by converting the sordid business of punishing into the “fine profession of caring” (ibid, p23). The abnormal individual in expert opinion is an everyday monster and as such this abnormal individual is the individual to be corrected; he or she requires correcting because all other attempts at training him or her within the school and the family have failed. Normalization, the touchstone of psychology and the social sciences functions as a legitimized power for correction and exclusion. Because not all will be required to fulfil the role of delinquent it becomes of little relevance that if
analyzed according to criteria of normativity “the vast majority of the world’s people are pathological” (ibid, p262). As crime becomes increasingly pathologized the psychiatric expert and the judge swap roles. Psychiatric power has always been “the power and science of public hygiene and social protection” (Foucault, 2003, p120) and as a means to justify its potential for predicting danger, psychiatry very quickly becomes interested in the problem of criminality. As a consequence everything that becomes a target for its intervention becomes medicalized though most psychiatry has long given up its aspiration to cure and it is this combination of medicalization and exclusionary force that will come to find representation in “the dangerous rise of therapeutic education” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, pviii). As can be witnessed with the prison there comes a time when the psychiatric function becomes a political demand. It becomes necessary “to fix some group in the role of a “problematic object”, “collective risk”, or racial enemy so that society can be built around his or her prison, asylum, or uncommunicating body” (Hengehold, 2007, p298).

Risk is fundamental to a governmentality that is predicated on danger and security. In such a society it is essential for there to be those that are recognizably on the margins, conspicuously outside normality, and it is advantageous and salutary for them to have less control and derive less benefit from the powers associated with their bodies. Because in societies of security and danger, such as ours, statistical manipulation ensures that risk becomes a category of understanding. This is the role that the social sciences and psychology play in our society; danger needs to be analyzed in specific ways to ensure that risk exists in the first place. “Those who have certain kinds of bodies tend to live, and believe themselves bound by, the fictions created by other groups” (ibid, p11). These fictions become their reality and there is a price to be paid for challenging these fabricated realities. This is particularly true in relation to the law and the institution of the prison. Lack of fluency in the strangely esoteric yet laughable enunciative modalities that assign prisoners a personality and status also verify their standing in a power relation; not only do they become object of a peculiar institutional discourse, “in modern disciplinary societies, responsibility for and perceived dissonance among discourse and practices is given over to ignorance, moral weakness, biological defect, or perverse cussedness of individuals – specifically those individuals who are regarded as being inferior in class or race”
(ibid, p260). They are made to become aware of their bodies as a defect, a disability, an obstacle to normality. The meanings and imaginings that are drawn from them become counterproductive, as Hengehold argues, “The supposedly universal subject of much science and philosophy is the subject whose circumstances require him or her to be least aware of his or her body; the able or healthy person is seldom brought up short by the fact of his or her embodiment” (ibid, p6). The advantage that genuine education offers over the psychologising and socializing therapeutic and medicalized corruptions of education, with their over-emphasis on self-realization, is that genuine education is outward looking, it involves a focus on subject matter that is always exterior, in the world, it is about engagement with and knowledge of the world. Genuine education is empowering in an unapologetically instrumental way, that is, it has recognizable value, it enhances potential, it facilitates critique, and it ensures an aptitude in communication and a communicable aptitude. Too much has been said in favour of a non-instrumental education, as if anything worthwhile could be non-instrumental. Daniel Karpowitz calls it objective rather than subjective education. Either way it is education in which “the power structures and discourse of the classroom and its dynamic are not democratically decentered, as if to place students and professor on a level of imagined equality, it is made up of the texts themselves and the mutual demand of respect for close attention to, and mastery of those texts” (Karpowitz, 2005, p324). It is the subject-matter and the curriculum that form the interiority that distinguishes education from therapy. For too long has the philosophy of education allowed the concept of instrumentality to mask sociological ends; education is a disciplinary power and has a form of examination that is peculiar to it, but this must be distinguished from the excessive examination that serves sociological and political ends, a reality being masked by the demonization of the notion of instrumentality.

The European Council in its 1989 report ‘Education in Prison’ states, “Genuine education must respect the integrity and freedom of choice of the student” (p13). This clearly indicates a regard for the concept of individual autonomy in ‘genuine’ education. The European Council on Education in Prisons also states, “Education in prisons is sometimes seen as a means towards socialization, or resocialization. This can be a valid objective, provided it is not taken to mean imposing behaviour on people” (ibid, p13). This indicates a tension between what is considered to be
appropriate individual autonomy and social necessity; it brings education within the orbit of the political. The 1989 European Council Report on Education is primarily an aspiration and its value really resides in the problems its recommendations highlight rather than any realistic possibility of influencing the prison as institution: for example Ireland and Denmark have been cited as countries where prisoners are not disadvantaged by choosing education over work in prison. Twenty three years later and the Irish prison system have implemented an incentivisation regime that railroads prisoners into what is ostensibly education, but in actuality simply requires a physical occupation of the education space as a gesture of conformity and as bureaucratic tokenism. This is education as conceptualized by administrative social sciences, education hijacked to further careerist agendas. Each prisoner must produce what is essentially a form of institutional livret and have it signed each time he occupies the education space if he wishes to avoid a diminution of what are called privileges. It is tempting to say that they must prove they have done their lessons in order to avoid punishment but this is untrue because education itself is irrelevant to this regime; it is the education space that must be occupied, and actual education is superfluous to the whole enterprise. Because of probationary sanction, education within the prison has always been part of the punitive system and its function is bound up with an aesthetic judgment. What enters the educational space in prison is primarily perceived as a delinquent and through engagement in ‘educational’ discourse is rendered a patient, with rehabilitation and therapy being the motivational force of this space. It would be absurd to enforce education on an adult or worse an adult population unless such an aesthetic judgment facilitated permissibility. The presence of compulsion and threat indicates education with a sociological end and as a disciplinary power it “is a power which functions through networks and the visibility of which is only found in the obedience and submission of those on whom it is silently exercised” (Foucault, 2006, p22).

The 1989 European Council’s Report on Education in Prison is generally thought to be a comprehensive and progressive document. It makes seventeen recommendations, all of which are intended to enhance how prisoners encounter education in the prison. Stephen Duguid in his book Can Prisons Work remarks:
“In discussing the issue of prisoner motivation, the report highlights the attainment of ‘a degree of autonomy for the education sector’ as a crucial factor in persuading prisoners that taking part in education will not require them to ‘capitulate psychologically to the prison system’. In addition to being structurally apart from the prison, teachers must have some leeway or discretion in the way they approach their work” (2000, p122).

The European Council’s report recognizes that “many prisoners are likely to be suspicious of education see it as a device to manipulate them if it is identified too closely with the overall prison system” (European Council Report, 1989, p20). The criticism of the report made here is not based on its assessment of the problems that face prison education but on how the report conceptualizes education; how it defines education is intrinsic to the improbability of the reports actualization. The report claims too much for education, it tries to ameliorate too much under the rubric education and ends up at times in agreement and at times in disagreement with the statement that “the concept of intervention, as a matter of doing something to someone, as making a kind of diagnosis followed by a prescription, gets something fundamentally wrong about education” (Smeyers, Smith, Standish, 2010, pp203-204). The problem is the report tries to appease all interests and agendas and becomes tokenistic, too politically correct; education becomes an edifying nomenclature for practically every prison activity and from this stems its definition of education. It states:

“This report, in accordance with its terms of reference, takes prison education in its wide sense to include library services, vocational education, cultural activities, social education, physical education (PE) and sports, as well as the academic subjects which are included in the narrower concepts of education. The term “educator” and “teacher” are used in the report to indicate staff engaged in facilitating any of the activities just mentioned. Broadly speaking, the term “teacher” refers to those engaged in more conventional, usually classroom-based education, while the committee speaks of “educators” when referring to persons in the provision of adult education in its wider sense” (European Council Report, 1989, p8).

This broad definition of education has its basis in a geographic location. The argument made here is that this is somewhat surreptitious as the report consistently has difficulty grappling with the tension between genuine education and broader conceptions of education based on a distinctly different definition, that is, between genuine education with its primary concern in the realization of the student’s potential in relation to the subject-matter, and a broader conception that is rehabilitative and therapeutic and which by definition must regard the
student as prisoner, as delinquent, as a secondary consideration to exterior interests, as something to be worked on. Foucault states that "society responds to pathological criminality in two ways or offers a homogeneous response with two poles: one expiatory and the other therapeutic. These are the two poles of a continuous network of institutions" (Foucault, 2003, p34). The fundamental problem with the 1989 European Report on Education in Prison really “springs from a deep awareness of the special nature of prison education” (European Council Report, 1989, p11). No doubt all education once contextualized has a special nature but the ‘special’ aspect of prison education is based on political imaginings that are related to the problematic object - the prisoner-delinquent. This ought not to obtain for genuine education as the student ought only to be defined in relation to the subject-matter. The report states that most prisoners have “negative past educational experience, so that, on the basis of equality of opportunity, they are now entitled to allow their educational disadvantage be addressed” (ibid, p10). But by reinterpreting the definition of education to factor in the additional role of crime prevention it sidesteps the ever-present reality that especially in the prison “education is always vulnerable to being assimilated to a medical model” (Smeyers, Smith, Standish, 2010, p203). Instead of seriously addressing the history of failed education for a disadvantaged stratum of society, education comes to be thought of as a cheap alternative to the cost of crime on society; education as a sociological and psychological tool for crime prevention. Education no doubt can have an effect on recidivism and offer alternatives to crime as Duguid points out, but this is an epiphenomenon and ought not be made the raison d’être for education, otherwise it ceases to be genuine. By being given a psychological means and a sociological end it ceases to be education at all, becoming a form of socialization close to indoctrination and thereby loses its value to the student and its epiphenomenal function. Just as Stephen Duguid looks to education as the solution to recidivism so too the European Council’s Report on Education in Prisons tentatively seeks a potential resolution by incorporating a rehabilitative emphasis on the grounds that "education has the capacity to encourage and help those who try to turn away from crime" (European Council Report, 1989, p10). Education does not encourage individuals to turn away from crime. Education, if it is genuine, creates the conditions for possibility that others in society have had, and thus crime is factored out of functional enterprises,
assuming of course that political imaginings, aesthetic judgments, or notions of risk have not closed off all avenues for a life and potentiality outside of crime. This thesis argues that education ought not to be defined by location or any ulterior criterion or end; it is defined by the nature of the discourse that it entails, by the particularity of the statements that accumulate and find repetition around its subject-matter. Its object is the student, and in genuine education the student comes to be defined ultimately on the basis of this interiority, that is the subject-matter that is external to the student, but represents the interior of the genuinely educational enterprise and the only valid criterion of evaluation of the student, the often maligned curriculum. This is the only acceptable form of ordering if education is to remain genuine. Ordering through socialisation techniques and psychological evaluations do not serve an educational function; they harbour an entirely different intention.

An appreciation of the role of the statement is essential to an understanding of Foucault’s thinking in this respect. At the time of writing The Order of Things and Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault was yet to realise that what he was really writing and thinking about was power. This was to become evident in one of his most visceral of articulations Discipline and Punish. In his early work Foucault recognizes the statement as the imprint of language; statements reveal “an anonymous murmur in which positions are laid out for possible subjects: ‘the great relentless disordered drone of discourse’ ” (Deleuze, 1988, p55). The statement signifies language in its being. Every statement is an event but it is also evidence of a play of forces, there is a positivity that is unique to statements, “language in its mode of being, is the statement; as such, it belongs to a description that is neither transcendental nor anthropological” (Foucault, 1972, p113). The statement is situated at the level of the ‘it is said’, unlike the proposition it does not involve a first person but it does have a subject, because “the statement is neither visible nor hidden” (ibid, p109) but is revealed through the regularity of statements that become manifest in relation to an analysis of an object of discourse. The statement is covered over because “language always seems to be inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence. Is it not the locus in which something other than itself appears, does not its own existence seem dissipated in this function?” (ibid, p111). What becomes overlooked is that there is language, language being what remains when stripped of intentionality and potentiality, an
archive. The statement is also unlike the phrase as it does not refer to a subject that has the power to initiate a discourse. All reference to the statement will be in the third person. “A statement belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text, and a proposition to a deductive whole” (ibid, p116).

In assessing the type of discourse that is peculiar to the institutions of education and to the human and social sciences, it is important to understand that there is no such thing as a statement in general. Statements do not have characters of their own, rather they are indicative of the conditions anterior to their existence. Foucault was later to attribute to these conditions of existence, evidence of relations of power. The statement depends on the support of a place and a date, a specific point in time for its existence. The central theme for Foucault is that the statement is unique. It describes an enunciative surface, the condition in which the enunciative function operates, and if these conditions change so too does the statement; he offers the example of the meaning of statements pre and post Copernicus and Darwin. The environment in which the statement can appear is extremely variable and forms part of the statement itself. “The link between the statement and a variable subject in itself constitutes a variable that is intrinsic to the statement” (Deleuze, 1988, p7). The prisoner, the delinquent, the patient, and the student are objects of different discursive formations brought about by the accumulation and the regularity of statements made in relation to them. They reflect the exteriority of language and represent neither Heidegger’s Da-sein nor Foucault’s individual. Statements have their materiality and this plays an important role. The statement can appear to have paradoxical properties but this can be explained by the rules of materiality that all statements must obey, therefore the medium of the statement becomes decisive. Foucault states:

“In our societies (and no doubt in many others) the property of discourse – the sense of the right to speak, ability to understand, licit and immediate access to the corpus of already formulated statements, and the capacity to invest this discourse in decisions, institutions, or practices – is in fact confined (sometimes with the addition of legal sanctions) to a particular group of individuals” (1972, p68).

Statements breed, they multiply, there is no statement that does not presuppose other statements, yet each statement is unique and under the right material conditions it is repeatable. As an enunciative function with voice as its medium, the
statement is unrepeatable. No statement can be made for the first time twice, each change in time and context alters the statement. The statement can only be repeated through the materiality of the text, which means “the rule of materiality that the statements necessarily obey is therefore of the order of the institution rather than the spatio-temporal location: it defines possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits), rather than limited and perishable individualities” (ibid, p103).

Not all statements are discursive, some are visibilities; both the school and the prison are examples of non-discursive statements. As such statements tend to function as a limit to forms of discursivity, the issue here is really how the prison as non-discursive statement will determine what kind of statement is acceptable and who it is that has the right to make it. There is also concern about how the prison school and the type of discursivity that permeate it are defined in relation to the discursive limits shaped by the prison. Discursive formations reflect a body of knowledge which will in turn define a perceptual field. The repetition of statements form families and assume a primacy for the formation of a truth that becomes ascribed to a contention between articulable and visible forms of knowledge and in this way can limit the criteria of acceptability when statements are produced “under positive conditions of a complex group of relations” (ibid, p45). The objects of discourse do not exist in limbo awaiting discovery; the delinquent, the patient, and the student do not lie hidden they have to be created by the positivity of relations of discourse. “These relations are established between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization; and these are not present in the object” (ibid, p45).

Objects such as the delinquent or the student are not created by what Foucault calls primary relations or secondary reflexive relations, such as relations of dependency between the person being taught and the person teaching and vice versa. The object ‘student’ is created outside this relationship by relations that can properly be called discursive, such as those that exist between forms of discursivity, and between institutions, in the interstice between what are otherwise distinct discursive formations. It is here, in what Foucault was to recognize as a power vacuum, in such an interstice, that the psychiatric practices
and the social science disciplines that operate in relation to a Psy-function were to forge relationships with existing authorities and disciplines, and it is these authorities of emergence that link themselves parasitically to discursive formations pertaining to law, medicine, and education. This in turn bring about new types of discursivity and statements that make “possible the formation of a whole new group of various objects” (ibid, p44). This issue was to dominate Foucault’s thinking. It is what he is referring to when he insists that we must “question those divisions or groupings in which we have become so familiar” (ibid, p22). This, it is argued here, is particularly relevant for those who have a concern for genuine education, for those who think that there is a distinctive discursive formation that is proper for education, a discursive formation that is or at least ought to be defined by statements that are acceptable to the education space and the practice of education, statements that become manifest in relation to the object student and are repeated and achieve regularity within the context of the object student and the subject-matter. Therefore education ought not to be defined by location, sentiment, or politics, but by the type of statements that it produces in relation to the student and the educational subject-matter. What Foucault defines as authorities of emergence become increasingly problematic and not only for how education is defined. It also affects how we think as students and educators and even how we are individualized. The objects that are created by these ‘sciences’ can only ever be situated in a field of exteriority, they reside at the limit of discourse, they characterize, they make classifications that are entirely discursive, they bring into existence a series of doubles.

There is a threshold to what can be said within any age, within any epistemic formation, yet each discourse has the power to say something other than what it actually says, nonetheless “on the basis of the grammar and the wealth of vocabulary available at any given period, there are, in total relatively few things said” (ibid, p119). Though it is curiously without contradiction when Gilles Deleuze explains “that everything is always said in every age is perhaps Foucault’s greatest historical principle: behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it is all the more important to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing either behind or beneath it” (1988, p54). Education has always attracted other discursive formations with ulterior interests and agendas. Various religious denominations and countless political initiatives have laid claim to education and used it as a
means to disseminate tendentious values and social mores as well as beliefs. There is a necessary commonality in the level of discourse that finds its place in the interstice between these discursive formations. In order to traverse from one esoteric, that is, specialised formation to another it must be a discourse that functions at a very low level; its base or curtain could be described as being “characterized by the language used by parents or by the morality of children’s books” (Foucault, 2003, p33). These discourses invariably will have their foundation in theories of social danger, salvation, and risk, and when invested with power, such as the status of a science, such a “set of notions functions, then, as a switch point (échangeur), and the weaker it is epistemologically, the better it functions” (ibid, p33). When such elementary categories of morality become attached to notions of perversity such as ‘pride’, ‘stubbornness’, or ‘nastiness’, conditions are created for the childish, laughable, cunning, and deadly discourse of the Ubu. “It is, then, a discourse of fear and moralization, a childish discourse, a discourse whose epistemological organization, completely governed by fear and moralization, can only be derisory, even regarding madness” (ibid, p35).

Conceptualizing education according to a broader understanding than its function requires, opens up a power vacuum into which alien forms of discursivity flow and gradually through invoking a climate of fear and morality, can come to permeate the entire discursive field. It is with this in mind that educators should appraise Foucault when he questions the validity of the types of statements that emerge from such parasitic practices and then ask the questions:

"Who is speaking? Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language (langue)? Who is qualified to do so? Who derives from his own special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true? What is the status of the individuals’ who-alone-have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse” (Foucault, 1972, p50).

Stephen Duguid in reply to the question posed in the title of his book Can Prisons Work: ‘The Prisoner as Object and Subject in Modern Corrections’, states:

“I was an amateur in 1973 when I first entered the maximum security British Columbia Penitentiary, a recently minted historian hired to teach European history to prisoners enrolled in an experimental university-level prison education program. Twenty-five years later I have concluded that my efforts and those of my fellow teachers at that penitentiary were successful
(and thanks to research we can now show just how successful) precisely because we were outsiders, interacting with our prisoner-students in the context of reciprocal teaching and learning, not as counsellors, keepers, or fixers” (2000, pvi). 

Duguid is certainly a strong advocate for education within the prison, though the argument proffered here is that he is too concerned with using education to affect attitudes and values rather than a focus on aptitude. Remarkably Duguid has failed to recognize the reason that all the educational initiatives that he highlights have lost out to contending interests and agendas such as the chagrin of prison officers and security paranoia as well as the re-emergence of the medical model of corrections in the form of cognitive development. He fails to recognize that the predominance of the more hegemonic discursive formations within the prison will always win out because education as a concept and as a practice has too nebulous a definition and therefore is less cognizant of what a transgression will look like or more to the point sound like. It would be very difficult politically to argue against education in the prison. The problem is that too many ulterior and detrimental agendas can take up residence in the educational space and claim their forms of indoctrination to be educational. Duguid makes the fundamental mistake of evaluating educational outcomes against forms of discursivity that are not educational; he therefore makes persistent reference to the wrong object of discourse. Education becomes something nominal because the statements that are brought to light are pertinent to the problematic object the ‘delinquent’, and at times the ‘patient’, though Duguid does try to avoid this, but rarely the ‘student’ in the capacity of student. The term student may be used but the discursive formation in which the student is contextualized is that of the social sciences, psychology, security, and risk.

Duguid infuses the educational space with a discourse proper to what Foucault calls the authorities of emergence by attempting to justify education within the prison on the basis of a reduction in recidivism rates. He in turn conceptualizes recidivism and education against Foucault’s delinquent. Duguid’s impression of the delinquent is conditioned by his reading of Discipline and Punish which he refers to throughout his book. Foucault states:

“ „The prison cannot fail to produce delinquents. It does so by the very type of existence that it imposes on its inmates: whether they are isolated in cells
or whether they are given useless work, for which they will find no employment, it is, in any case, not 'to think of man in society; it is to create an unnatural, useless and dangerous existence'; the prison should educate its inmates, but can a system of education addressed to a man reasonably have as its object to act against the wishes of nature?” (1972, p266).

Duguid makes no reference to Foucault’s earlier work and therefore by accepting the delinquent as he appears fully formed in Discipline and Punish, he remains indifferent to how such a problematic object is created in the first place. This failure means that Duguid’s delinquent is not quite Foucault’s delinquent, because for Foucault the delinquent is not simply a persona that the prisoner must adopt in order to navigate the system that the prison imposes and the branding that the epithet criminal ensures after release. The delinquent is first and foremost the creation of a very particular type of discourse. It is never for Foucault a representation of the true subject, of the incarcerated individual, but a product of discourse itself. The delinquent can and often is created by the childlike ubu-esque discourse that is conducted between the judiciary and the psychiatric expert at trial. It is then re-created throughout the prison sentence and beyond through the type of statements that psychologists and probation officials make, statements from which the subject as prisoner and criminal, like Charcot's darling little hysterics, must obligingly respond to the demand “give me some symptoms, make some symptoms from your life for me, and you will make me a doctor” (Foucault, 2006, p276). The delinquent and the hysteric must mimic in order to conform and in order to validate and verify the scientific status of the psychologist. So too the delinquent must also verify the social scientist’s status as ‘scientist’. And it is here that these strange and childish statements attain their truth and find such regularity that they bear more than a resemblance to a monstrous impersonation.

Duguid states:

“Criminology, like psychiatry, is an archetypal Enlightenment product, an attempt to apply science (it is, after all, a social science) to understand a phenomenon in order to intervene and thereby control or eradicate it – much the same as modern medicine has its origins in struggles against diseases such as smallpox. And just as the medical establishment has used its claims of beneficence to expand the field of operation, so has criminology managed to extend dramatically the field of behaviours designated as deviant and subject to cure” (2000, p10).
Bad behaviour is often attributed to a poor education and there is no doubt a good deal of truth to this assertion, but the question is does indoctrination or even attempts at brainwashing entailed in medical models such as has been recognizable in the American model of correction used between 1945 and 1975, and which is present today in the form of cognitive development employed throughout America and across Europe really act as a compensation for a poor education?, and who is it exactly that it compensates? It must not be assumed that even though many prisoners are poorly educated that they cannot recognize the value of genuine education. The problem is genuine education is quite difficult to recognize in the prison educational space amidst the plethora of therapeutic and socializing initiatives. After all as Hengehold points out it is their awareness of their limited capacity to communicate outside their very narrow social milieu that renders them cognizant of an acute incompatibility. In fact a serious problem for education within the prison is that this space is so infused with therapeutic practices and rhetoric that ‘teachers’ often play dual roles, conducting what are (and this may appear here as polemical, but is nevertheless a faithful representation of the institutional reality) clearly low brow, childlike, half-hearted indoctrination sessions with the requisite interspersion of appraised hand clapping and ostentatious gratitude. Many prisoners see this as a space to be avoided or manipulated as it is itself such a manipulative space. Duguid is critical of the therapeutic approach yet he fails to make a distinction between aims that are proper to education and those that have an emphasis on reform. Duguid’s prisoner-students did experience the intrinsic qualities that education has to offer but he tries to claim too much, or maybe too little, for this. He states:

“It was this conviction that something more than just education was going on in those seminars and endless discussions with the prisoner-students that persuaded me to make their post-prison lives my research project” (ibid, pp18-19).

It is clear that Duguid makes a fundamental error in how he interprets the delinquent. A fundamental premise of his book is the idea that what he calls the defenders of incarceration making prisoners “the object rather than the subject of their discourses” (ibid, pviIII). He maintains that by perceiving the delinquent as subject and not object (which is the basis for his argument for outsiders rather than insiders) there will be some form of reciprocity. Again this is a failure to
recognize the delinquent as double, a fabrication that occupies the various discursive sites assigned to the prisoner: the actual subject is of course present but at all times remains hidden as long as the delinquent is perceived. Duguid regards his approach to reform through education as being:

“Grounded in a more romantic version of Rousseau, this approach retains the modern universalist idea that citizenship is possible even with most troubled of our peers if we appreciate their complexity, treat them with respect, and demand reciprocity – treat them, in other words, as subjects rather than objects” (ibid, p18).

As if it were so simple! Nevertheless this is precisely what Duguid’s approach cannot do. He is making an emotive argument that is based on sentiment, relying on the wish for the inculcation of dispositions. He ignores the real issue which is the process of examination that the social sciences are predicated on and the type of statements that are derived from this type of evaluation. These are not only alien to the primary and secondary reflexive relations between a student and a teacher, they by definition preclude the subject, and what’s more, in Duguid’s approach to education as reform, the delinquent actually becomes the object for prison education.

Duguid acknowledges that his experience as a teacher within the prison system led to his forming of a sort of general theory about his prisoner-students. He states:

“In my case this ‘general theory’ became centred on the work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg in the fields of moral education and developmental psychology, and I mined this pit for several years in seeking an explanation for the behaviours and attitudes of my students both in prison and after release” (ibid, p87).

If seen from the student’s perspective Duguid fails to stick to his more valuable remit as a teacher of history and descends into a classification of personalities and dispositions by gravitating toward Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s human taxonomies. He develops a psychological means and a sociological end. Once this path is taken Duguid’s thinking is on a course aimed at self-affirmation, rather one aimed at the creation of conditions for possibility. Genuine education offers much more than the possibility of avoiding recidivism. Ironically, when Duguid argues for “not training in job skills or conflict resolution, but good old-fashioned education that offers up a vocabulary and a set of critical insights about when and how to use it (ibid, p91), he is making a case for a much narrower definition of education than is argued for
here, because the argument here is that it is neither the location nor the particularity of the subject matter that ought to define education, but the statements it generates. Being subjected to socialization is, I argue, a form of indoctrination, as it foists one particular perception of reality to the exclusion of all others, asserting what is right in relation to how we think about the world and ourselves, and its implementation is predicated on a political and aesthetic judgment. It generates statements that are not in relation to the student but the delinquent, whereas taking a course in sociology requires the practice of education and the statements that are peculiar to the object ‘student’.

The problem with education within the prison is the perception that it leads nowhere. That it creates no realistic conditions for possibility too often correlates with reality. In the prison, education too often simply becomes a means to display conformity, a conformity that fulfils the prescription of the psychologist and the probation officer. Education becomes a token gesture to evaluators who recognize in education an indication of obedience and conformity. In fact, those prisoners who do manage to attain recognisably worthwhile educational goals are often viewed cautiously; ubu-esque statements such as “he was typical of the self-taught, isolated, stubborn, proud, and perversely elitist prisoner” (ibid, p67) are almost to be expected. As Duguid points out “retaining a sense of self in the face of the treatment can be a dangerous business” (ibid, p64). Nevertheless, the value of a university degree continues to attract the attention of more than a few, particularly long term, prisoners because it holds out a value that transcends the prison setting and an intrinsic knowledge base that suggests an enhancement of the conditions for possibility. Unfortunately at the other end of the spectrum, basic skills and even literacy ‘programmes’ have become too closely linked to therapeutic discourse and infantilisation to make their value sufficiently accessible to mindsets that might benefit if it were otherwise.

Foucault states:

“The scientist, who is sheltered, protected, and even regarded as sacred by the entire institution and sword of justice, speaks the language of fear. The infantile language of expert opinion functions precisely to bring about the exchange of effects of power between judicial and medical institutions through the disqualification of the figure in whom these institutions are joined together” (Foucault, 2003, p36).
What comes into existence through the interlinking of discourses, through exchange of information and statistics particularly around ‘medical’ discourse, is a new modality of enunciation that can be called clinical discourse. There may be a disparity of types of clinical discourse, nevertheless, clinical discourse has had an influence on the enunciative modality of other disciplines, however tenuously they are linked to this ‘medical’ discourse. This is particularly true for what can be described as downward education, education for docility, that is, education aimed at ensuring a docile disposition rather than enhancing the conditions for possibility in any meaningful sense for particular social groups, and especially for the delinquent. Education becomes therapeutic; it becomes an education that no longer deserves its name. Clearly this type of medicalized discourse cannot define education in any genuine sense but it bears a remarkable similarity to the broader conception of education, to what has been termed therapeutic education. It is how educational discourse has come to resemble this, with psychology as its means and sociology as its end, and it is increasingly becoming the discourse for the merely “instrumental” and the marginalized. “There emerges “a group of rules proper to discursive practice. These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects” (Foucault, 1972, p49).

The following chapter evaluates through Habermas a justification of the role education might play in such a socialised ordering.
Chapter Six

The Educational Role
Chapter Six: The Educational Role

Jürgen Habermas attempts to formulate the way in which the kinds of orderings, as outlined in the previous chapter, might be justified; his theory of universal pragmatics with its basis in moral consciousness and communicative action culminates in an institutionalised individual which corresponds with Durkheim’s account. Durkheim was a strong influence on Habermas’ thinking, particularly in relation to the role he envisions for education. Habermas’ approach is Durkheimian in that it favours ideas of social meaning and authority extrapolated from intersubjectivity. In Habermas’ case authority can be extrapolated from language whilst for Durkheim’s authority stems from communal ritual. In both cases, the subject is diminished in relation to a notion of an abiding and impersonal social authority. Habermas acknowledges Durkheim’s influence in *Legitimation Crisis* when he states, “The previous course of human history confirms the anthropologically informed view of Durkheim, who has always conceived of society as a moral reality” (1975, p117). In *Communication and the Evolution of Society* Habermas writes:

“By social integration, I understand, with Durkheim, securing the unity of a social life-world through values and norms. If system problems cannot be solved in accord with the dominant form of social integration, if the latter must itself be revolutionized in order to create latitude for new problem solutions, the identity of society is in danger” (1991, p144).

And also in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* Habermas states, “In his impressive analyses, Durkheim warned against the genetic fallacy of reducing the obligatory character of norms to obedience shown by followers confronted with power to command and the power to threaten sanctions” (1992, p73). This is an indication that both thinkers ascribe to a form of authority that transcends what Habermas would call the strategic deployment of power.

The similarities between Habermas and Durkheim are pronounced. Both Durkheim and Habermas envision education as a means to offset potential political crises. Durkheim sees education as the means to attenuate the onset of rampant liberalism and Habermas recognizes in education a means to secure social and cultural systems that can offset the identity and motivational crises that he associates with advanced capitalism. They both advocate securing the social unity
of a life-world through an ‘education’ designated for the internalisation of pre-established values and norms argued for on the basis of an imminent danger to social cohesion. They both see in education the means for orchestrating the obligatory character of norms through a sense of naturalness in obedience. Obedience is seen as an indicator of social normality while all the time a commitment to a notion of inherent autonomy is maintained, an autonomy that correlates with Berlin’s positive conception of liberty. There is in both Durkheim’s and Habermas’ accounts a distancing from the action of power. However, evidence of power functioning in a particularistic and strategic way in all aspects of human relations, as Foucault argues, undermines both their universalising theories and aspirations. Power is always localised in its exercise in all of human interaction. The idea of impersonal authority in both Durkheim’s and Habermas’ theories allows obedience to become an indicator of normality and allows internalisation to become the pathway to autonomy. Durkheim’s concept of Social Being is not dissimilar from Habermas’ statement that:

"Feelings of guilt and obligation point beyond the particular sphere of what concerns individual persons in specific situations. Emotional responses directed against individual persons in specific situations would be devoid of moral character were they not connected with an impersonal kind of indignation over some breach of a generalized norm or behavioural expectation. It is only their claim to general validity that gives an interest, a violation, or a norm the dignity of moral authority" (ibid, pp48-49).

Both Durkheim’s and Habermas’ arguments are essentially about articulating reciprocal and mutually beneficial obedience which transcends coercion and yet both espouse a moral position tied to an anthropocentric comprehension of the human situation. With both Durkheim’s distinction between the sacred and the profane and Habermas’ communicative ethics, “what makes this indignation moral is not the fact that the interaction between two concrete individuals has been disturbed, but rather the violation of an underlying normative expectation that is valid not only for the ego and alter but also for members of a social group or even, in the strict sense for all competent actors” (ibid, p48). The complementarity between their thinking becomes most apparent with Habermas’ argument for the role that education must play. Habermas is introduced here as a more contemporary articulation of the Durkheimian position as his work offers a more modern and detailed representation of current concerns with political, social and
educational interaction while maintaining a Durkheimian message for the role education must play in society. Habermas is also, of course, an acknowledged critic of Foucault.

What is distinctive in Habermas' thinking is that he believes he can formulate a theoretical framework that is outside power. Habermas believes that a distinction can be made between the strategic economic, political, and material reality of productive forces and the communicative sphere of the social and cultural systems. He states;

"I distinguish between communicative and strategic action. Whereas in strategic action one actor seeks to influence the behavior of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor desires, in communicative action one actor seeks rationality to motivate another by relying on the illocutionary binding/bonding effect (Bindungseffekt) of the offer contained in his speech act" (ibid, p58).

Habermas’ intention is to articulate a theory that can offset the identity and motivational crises that diminish what he considers to be the nature-like evolution of traditional values and identities, crises which are a consequence of the ever increasing expansion of public sector administrative measures that are designed to negate the ever increasing legitimization crises that a system of governance such as advanced capitalism cannot fail to create. Habermas’ argument is that when members of a society experience structural alterations created by systems theoretic administrative steering mechanisms, which are themselves critical for the negation of the various legitimization crises that occur, these societies can feel that their social identities are threatened. What occurs is an incompatibility between the continuation of the legitimate existence of the state and the continuance of long established cultural identities and values, thus Habermas speaks of legitimization crisis. He states:

"The less the cultural system is capable of producing adequate motivations for politics, the educational system, and the occupational system, the more must scarce meaning be replaced by consumable values" (1975, p93).

For Habermas advanced capitalism becomes ever more reliant on material inducements to placate identity and motivational based legitimization crises, therefore advanced capitalism is a system of governance that expects and manages recurrent systems crises. Habermas argues that this must at some point culminate
in a critical disjunction between traditional values and the functional requirements of steering mechanisms. Cultural identities come under ever greater threat as the administrative steering mechanism attempts to fabricate politically and administratively produced social values and identities. Initiatives that are primarily intended to compensate for deficiencies and limitations in the systems theoretic steering mechanism encroach on cultural identities. Habermas argues that because advanced liberalism has become a system of governance that expects and manages recurrent systems crises, this critical disjunction will eventually culminate in alienation or anomie. There will be discordance between traditional values with their embeddedness in cultural identities and the administratively induced social values with their links to the political system, due to the political and administrative systems’ eventual failure to compensate for the limitations of the economic system in meeting the ever increasing demands for material compensation. In short, deficiencies in the systems theoretic steering system are countered by an infusion of artificially promulgated social values that are designed to introduce a degree of administrative control and political loyalty.

To offset legitimation crises and smooth the way for a systems theoretic steering mechanism it becomes incumbent on the political system in its governmental capacity and party considerations to be cognizant that “the political system requires an input of mass loyalty that is as diffuse as possible.” (ibid, p46) But this is not as straightforward as it might seem because in advanced capitalist societies, the economic system, which is the last word with regard to legitimation, is contingent on a global market, which means that “a progressive adaption of inner nature to society rather narrows the scope of contingency of the system” (ibid, p14). And this is where the education system fits into Habermas’ scheme, playing a remarkably similar role to that of Durkheim. The solution is to have a tiered educational system, which is the reality of what actually happens, and it is a system with those at the bottom of the social spectrum being subjected to a more intense socialisation of their subjective lives or inner nature. This is what Durkheim was really suggesting, and it is what happens as a consequence of Habermas’ theory, even if he would argue, like Durkheim, that any hierarchy would be due to natural and inherent abilities and qualities rather than any intentional educational or social influences: Habermas’ theory is intended to be egalitarian.
The education system is integral to Habermas’ approach to legitimation. Habermas like Durkheim envisions ‘education’ as the social linchpin, both the centrifugal and centripetal pulse for a new and more harmonious type of society, an education and a society that derives its purpose from and through the social sciences, where each individual to varying degrees, will find their place through psychological evaluation and classification, an education in which cognitive psychology becomes the salient means and justification for educational classification, with of course the social sciences determining its end. Habermas states;

"It is the personality system that is the bearer of the ontogenetic learning process; and in a certain way, only social subjects can learn. But social systems, by drawing on the learning capacities of social subjects, can form new structures in order to solve steering problems that threaten their continued existence. To this extent the evolutionary learning process of societies is dependent on the competences of the individuals that belong to them. The latter acquire their competences not as isolated monads but by growing into the symbolic structures of their lifeworlds” (1991, p154).

Habermas turns to Lawrence Kohlberg’s six stage theory of moral development as the most promising evaluative tool for measuring ‘educational’ progress in its new psychologising and socialising function. The implementation of such a human taxonomy is both significant and relevant as it “is still a mainstay of teacher training courses across the western world” (Smeyers, Smith, Standish, 2010, p204). Kohlberg’s stage 3 is stipulated as the conventional stage with stages 1 and 2 as pre-conventional stages. Each stage is linked with an age group as a sort of rule of thumb or indicative guideline. These stages of moral development are recognised by the developmental psychologist as being part of the necessary ‘learning’ process of internalisation of moral values and social norms. Internalisation is crucial at these earlier stages of cognitive development because “only at the postconventional stage is the social world uncoupled from the stream of cultural givens. This shift makes the autonomous justification of morality an unavoidable problem. The very perspectives that make consensus possible are now at issue” (Habermas, 1992, p162).

For Habermas, normative validity is analogous to a truth claim and to be able to recognise and evaluate such normative truth claims, the student requires the requisite moral cognition therefore socialisation becomes a necessity. Socialisation becomes a necessary component of an autonomous existence. Habermas states,
“Often lacking are crucial institutions that would facilitate discursive decision making. Often lacking are crucial socialization processes, so that the dispositions and abilities necessary for taking part in moral argumentation cannot be learned” (ibid, p209). Thus without irony Habermas argues that socialisation is a necessary process for attaining Kohlberg’s postconventional stage 6 which “requires the recognition that the moral sphere is autonomous” (ibid, p36). Each of Kohlberg’s stages of cognitive development is intended to denote a position within a hierarchy of moral cognizance from which one, in this case the student, would not choose to revert to once a higher level has been achieved. This is Habermas’ justificatory argument for an attainment of each stage in the procedural nature of this socialised ‘education’ that the political system requires. Habermas states, “Kohlberg conceives the transition from one stage to the next as learning” (ibid, p125). Habermas points out that both Kohlberg and Piaget would consider the learning process entailed in cognitive development as an achievement. The argument proffered by this thesis is that to allow oneself to be indoctrinated or to be reduced to outward compliance does not signify an achievement for anyone except the psychologist. Kohlberg’s postconventional stage 6 is a qualification that excludes or at least relegates any thinker that might contest its theoretical presuppositions. Kohlberg’s stage 6 stipulates:

“This stage takes the perspective of a moral point of view from which social arrangements derive or on which they are grounded. The perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the basic moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not means” (ibid, p129).

At first glance this stipulation might seem relatively innocuous but philosophically, and particularly in relation to cognitive psychology, the terms ‘rational individual’ and ‘nature of morality’ are loaded. In the context of Habermas’ thinking, with its claims of universality, these notions become defined and definition entails differentiation ergo inclusion and exclusion. Kohlberg has based his six stages of moral cognition on what he maintains reflects corresponding sociomoral perspectives; Habermas claims for them a validation that is based on an explicitly non-scientific suggestion that they “seem intuitively correct.” (ibid, p129) Habermas like Durkheim argues that there exists a general framework of attitudes that “we are given with the fact of human society.” (ibid, p50) Habermas’ politico-moral theory rests on there being a recognizable qualification that can condition
the forum for argumentation in relation to the validation of norms, and Habermas attempts to articulate such an argument without referring to power, which the Nietzschean and Foucauldian would see as a fundamental flaw. Creating or signifying a norm, particularly a universal norm, introduces a measure against which all humanity can be evaluated, a clear example of the knowledge/power nexus described so extensively by Foucault. Kohlberg’s postconventional stage 6 serves Habermas’ purpose because it requires a cognizance of a general will, “a will that has been divested of its imperative quality and has taken on a moral quality” (ibid, p74). This is an argument for a will that is a priori a will with a history but without a genealogy.

Habermas like Foucault recognizes that all argument presumes the potential for agreement and that the illocutionary force of speech itself is the fundamental presupposition of all argumentation. This fundamental aspect of the speech act leads Habermas to make a claim for a universal moral foundation that is outside or above power, however, for Foucault, such ideas are evidence of the functioning of power, as those who herald the sacred universal norm do so because they themselves have been conditioned by power. Habermas believes that he can escape the particularistic issue of interpretation, validation, and application of universal norms on the premise that “problems of application are viewed from a third person perspective” (ibid, p104). For Foucault rather than ignore the reality that all human relations are power relations, it would be much more realistic and beneficial that first person perspectives enter argumentation more aware of the play of forces that have contributed to their formation rather than believing that an aptitude exists that allows certain individuals to stand above the fray whilst, at the same time, apparently remaining capable of having an opinion and taking decisive actions.

There are a number of tensions in Habermas’ theory of communicative ethics, none more than his advocacy of a consensus based morality that is founded on the basis of presuppositions that are adopted implicitly and intuitively yet at the same time warrant an ‘education’ that is procedural and a student body that is evaluated on the basis of compliance with psychologically inculcated and sociologically internalised behavioural dispositions, attitudes, and beliefs. For Habermas, the justification for such an indoctrinating ‘education’ lies in the potential it offers for
the attainment of autonomy as is characterized in Kohlberg’s stage 6 of cognitive development whereby rules become superfluous because the requisite degree of moral development will have been sufficiently internalized as to represent for the ‘student’ rules that “he himself has set up against himself” (ibid, p155). Habermas’ theory relies on universalistic qualities that “can be traced back to the fundamental norms of rational speech” (Habermas, 1975, p95). Yet its cognition is quite exclusive due to the view that “moral action is action guided by moral insight. This strict conception of morality can evolve only at the postconventional stage” (Habermas, 1992, p162). This leaves the problem of where everyone else fits into this moral scheme. On the one hand, there is the principle of Universalism, which is, “for a norm to be valid, the consequences and the side effects of its general observation for the satisfaction of each person’s particular interests must be acceptable to all” (ibid, p197). While on the other hand, he states, “creatures that are individuated only through socialization are vulnerable and morally in need of considerateness” (ibid, p199). This not only suggests a didactic relationship between the ‘teacher’ and the ‘student’ but, because it contextualises the individual in relation to their form of life and the way that life adapts to an impersonal authority rather than relating to specifically educational subject-matter, it paves the way for a paternal and condescending attitude toward people generally, since most never surpass Kohlberg’s conventional stage. Indeed, Habermas seems to be arguing for an oligarchic arrangement that can be validated on the basis of a tacit notion of consensus.

This also raises the question of the psychologist’s role in education since recognition of an attainment of the postconventional or any other stage is determined on the basis of an expression of agreement with the statements, if not the belief system, of the psychologist, assuming of course that one ought discount any notion of a third person perspective in Selman’s sense, as both Foucault and Nietzsche would argue. Habermas quotes Thomas McCarthy’s observation, saying, “The suggestion I would like to advance is that Kohlberg's account places the higher-stage moral subject, at least in point of competence, at the same reflective or discursive level as the moral psychologist” (ibid, p173). For example, what would the implications be for students, particularly adults, if those that are categorised as being at the conventional stage or less are considered, regardless of their application to the subject-matter at hand, to possess a sociocognitive
inventory which remains too embedded in a lifeworld and therefore only capable of reinforcing its own certainties? The implication is that such creatures are not capable of critical thought, or at least their criticisms cannot be valid and ought to be construed as character flaws. Habermas introduces with Kohlberg a cut-off point a limit to human potentiality on the basis of assumptions that are moralistic, and the claims to authority of the psychologist. For example, "Piaget views the underlying functioning of intelligence as unknown to the individual at the lower stages of cognition" (McCarthy cited in ibid, p174). If it can be assumed that the word ‘conventional’ retains its connotative links to ‘the usual’, ‘the normal’, and ‘the majority’, it appears that neither Kohlberg nor Habermas believe that most people progress beyond Kohlberg’s conventional stage 3, even though Kohlberg’s stages are linked to age groups, which is a point of such significant contention with Kohlberg’s human taxonomy that radical alterations to the postconventional stages have been introduced that highlight the tendentious nature of such taxonomies. What is particularly disturbing about these taxonomies, using Kohlberg once more as an example, is the casual way these assumptions can be used to minorize adults. To suggest an adult ought to be categorized and documented as cognitively below the age of majority because their values do not correlate with the beliefs of the evaluator, ought to demand a very serious scrutiny of the evaluator and an even more rigorous and sceptical assessment of any claim to ‘scientific status’ of Kohlberg’s stage 3, which states:

“This stage takes the perspective of the individual in relationship to other individuals. A person at this stage is aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations, which take primacy over individual interests. The person relates points of view through the “concrete Golden Rule,” putting oneself in the others person’s shoes. He or she does not consider generalized “system” perspective” (ibid, p128).

Habermas pays little attention to the reality that to qualify one group also means to disqualify another. He states, “insofar as norms do not regulate generalizable interests, they are based on force” (1975, p111). Here Berlin’s monstrous impersonation again raises its head for if those whose voices are diminished on the basis of the psychologist’s categorisation perceive their interest to be other than that agreed upon by those parties qualified for moral discourse, then not only are the validated norms imposed upon them by force, they also entail a monstrous impersonation: it is to suggest that if it were otherwise this is what you would
want, therefore this is really your interest. This takes on a more sinister connotation if, as Foucault has consistently argued, that psychology isn’t really a science, since none of the assumptions that Habermas, Kohlberg, or psychology make can be verified, and at most there is descriptive, anecdotal or statistical ‘evidence’. In fact, Kohlberg has had to introduce a transitional stage 4½ to attempt to accommodate adolescence which has remained problematic. Kohlberg has also had retrospective problems with all the postconventional stages “given that it has not yet been possible to prove experimentally the existence of a hypothetical stage 6 of moral judgment, the question arises whether and in what sense, if at all, we can speak of natural stages at the level of postconventional morality” (Habermas, 1992, p171). Kohlberg’s six stage conception of human morality is itself derived from the limitations that undermined Piaget’s four stage conception of cognitive development. Habermas acknowledges that studies in the United States, Israel and Turkey have forced Kohlberg to delete his stage 6 because there is no evidence for its existence but also “if there is no empirical evidence to suggest that we are dealing with more than one postconventional stage, Kohlberg’s description of stage 5 also becomes problematic” (ibid, p173).

Habermas is seeking homogeneity and consensus and this is the fundamental flaw and danger in his argument. He states, “The unity of the person requires the unity-enhancing perspective of a life-world that guarantees order and has both cognitive and moral-practical significance” (1975, p118). This thesis has already argued through Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger that if we understand time is subjectivity, this itself creates a division that splits the subject. For the Psy-function, homogeneity can only make sense if a conception of the self or the Other is deemed erroneous, and a unity enhancing perspective of a lifeworld can only retain a cognitive and moral-practical cohesion and significance if it is imposed. Despite Habermas’ quest for a normative force devoid of power, his ordering reflects Foucault’s account of the capillary nature of power. In Habermas’ account this is arbitrated by the psychologist, and education is intended to be a reflection of an ordering that is re-imposed from above. The assertion is that “as he passes into the postconventional stage of interaction the adult rises above the naïveté of everyday life practice” (Habermas, 1992, p160), but who determines whether this passage has taken place?
Given that it is those postconventional stages of morality that are cognizant of norms concerned with those higher level principles which have universalistic application which have proven problematic for Kohlberg and Habermas, what does this all mean for the student whose interaction with the cognitive psychologist or his or her proxy may be contentious? Habermas states, “Agreement cannot be imposed or brought about by manipulating one’s partner in interaction, for something that *patently* owes its existence to external pressure cannot even be *considered* an agreement” (ibid, p134). However the problem is that the student (or teacher for that matter) who contests the psychologist cannot by definition be considered a partner as such contestation clearly demonstrates that they have not obtained the requisite cognitive aptitude to engage in third person perspective argumentation. Admittedly, Habermas is cautious about dismissing the value sceptic in such an offhand way and tentatively suggests that they may have to be considered on a par with the psychologist, that is, capable of discourse at the same level. However the argument presented here questions this because according to Kohlberg’s taxonomy for the value sceptic the “morality (*Moralitat*) and the ethics (*Sittlichkeit*) of an unquestioned life have not yet parted ways; morality has not yet become autonomous morality” (ibid, p164). For the psychologist, autonomy and conformity are congruent. One suggestion is that such a contestation arises because like a child, the student or indeed teacher, does not see past the concrete authority figure as they still reside at the conventional stage of cognitive development not having yet reworked “the imperative arbitrary will of a dominant figure of this kind into the authority of a suprapersonal will detached from this specific person” (ibid, p153). Habermas states “all I want to do is propose an analytical distinction between two paths of development, one for normatively regulated action and the other for strategic action” (ibid, p151) and he believes that by resorting to psychology and by distilling perspectives through education that he can circumvent the perception of power as a factor in human relations while still maintaining the conventional structure of dominators and dominated. This is precisely why his theory must ultimately rely on power, in the refusal to permit criticism of fundamental presuppositions alongside the delusion that claims to expertise can be devoid of power. This leads to the risk of hierarchical and centralised power since those who claim a decision making capacity in relation to the validation of norms are also those deemed capable of ideal role taking in
discourse as sanctioned by the psychologist through ‘education’. “Insofar as they essentially share the perspective of the moral psychologist who interviews them, their moral judgment no longer have the form of utterances that are naively generated with the help of an intuitive understanding of rules” (ibid, p174).

But, maybe the student has been influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault, or Deleuze and considers psychology and its therapeutic offshoots to be a form of authorised and authoritarian morality, just another bogus belief system, a surreptitious prescription for existence, a specious claim to power or status, just another refinement in an expanding disciplinary system of control. Maybe the student or teacher is one of those value sceptics who “have infiltrated everyday consciousness by way of the educational system” (ibid, p98). The point of Habermas’ universal pragmatics is that to refuse his theory of morality, a theory that is derived from communicative action, is also to tacitly give consent. Habermas extrapolates from the normative functioning of language, automatic inclusion within a universal morality. If you say no, this is based on the illocutionary force of language, as discourse itself involves the acknowledgment of one’s inclusion, as all speech is predicated on the supposition of a possible agreement. Furthermore:

“Every cognitivist morality will confront the actor with questions both of the situation-specific application and the motivational anchoring of moral insights. And these two problems can be solved only when moral judgment is supplemented by something else: hermeneutic effort and the internalization of authority” (Ibid, p179).

Habermas founded his theory of universal pragmatics, moral consciousness, and communicative action on the claim that all discourse has at its core this fundamental potentiality for agreement. This is a view that Foucault also shared as it is an aspect of language that is integral to the normative nature of language as highlighted in Chapter Two. What is objectionable in Habermas’ theory is the idea that it is therefore permissible to situate an individual, in this case the student, within a grid of moral capacity and acceptability, without acknowledging the functioning of the strategies of power which place him or her there. Habermas questions the scientific credentials of psychology, but recognises that it is has a fundamentally moral function and is therefore suitable for his purposes. But if the functioning of such authority within the education system is premised upon an idea of authority that forms its validity and modus operandi around assumptions,
claims and statistics, setting itself up as an arbitrator of human normality and morality, creating a trail of documentation, a trail of ubu-esque statements designed to situate and rank the student as both patient and delinquent within a socio-moral hierarchy, then surely the power that creates such an ordering must be made transparent and open to criticism. In contradistinction to this view, Habermas regards what he calls ‘defence mechanisms’ to be working as barriers to communication because they only recognise the strategic aspect of action, that is, power in its immanent functioning. In his view such creatures fail to transcend their unconscious desires and reach a higher understanding. Therefore such an actor “is objectively violating the shared presuppositions of action oriented towards reaching understanding” (ibid, p188). What Habermas refers to as ‘defence’ is what his value sceptic could argue to be simply a criticism, a challenge, and perhaps a contradiction of the psychologist. It might be to question the psychologist’s beliefs, to disagree with his or her moral judgment, yet for Habermas, this is to be self-deceptive, “the effect of the defence can be interpreted as an intrapsychic disturbance of communication” (ibid, p188). Habermas states:

“This much is true: any universalistic morality is dependent upon a form of life that meets it halfway. There has to be a modicum of congruence between morality and the practices of socialization and education. The latter must promote the requisite internalization of superego controls and the abstractness of ego identities. In addition, there must be a modicum of fit between morality and socio-political institutions. Not just any institution will do. Morality thrives only in an environment in which postconventional ideas about law and morality have already been institutionalized to a certain extent” (ibid, pp207-208).

Habermas argues that cultural systems are particularly resistant to administrative control because “the procurement of legitimation is self-defeating as soon as the mode of procurement is seen through” (Habermas, 1975, p70). Because there is a growing need for legitimation of the political system in advanced capitalism, too much encroachment on the cultural system can prompt a motivational crisis, although such a crisis can also stem from the inability of the economic system to placate each of the subsystems (classes) with an increasing demand for material goods which offsets the diminution of cultural traditions and values. Habermas states, “I speak of a motivational crisis when the socio-cultural system changes in such a way that its output becomes dysfunctional for the state and for the system of social labor” (ibid, p75). The administrative system needs to be able to motivate
the various subsystems to cooperate, a problem that is peculiar to advanced capitalism as there is a reintroduction of class differentiation or class compromise by the state through the administrative system under advanced capitalism, something that occurred organically in the previous liberal system. Habermas points out that crisis tendencies shift from the economic system to the administrative system. In advanced capitalism “class compromise has been made the foundation of reproduction” (ibid, p58). There is a politicisation of certain occupations and a socialisation of those who represent foreign bodies to the economic system, such as housewives, the ill, the unemployed, and the criminalised. It is a system in which the administrative system “enters into compromise-oriented negotiations with the sectors of society on which it depends” (ibid, p63). Habermas points out the importance of the cultural system for the economy and society:

“For the social integration of a society is dependent on the output of this system – directly on the motivation it supplies to the political system in the form of legitimation and indirectly on the motivations to perform it supplies to the educational and occupational systems. Since the socio-cultural system does not, in contrast to the economic system, organize its own input, there can be no socio-culturally produced input crises. Crises that arise at this point are always output crises” (ibid, p48).

Government facilitates and raises productivity through the qualification of human labour, of human capital, and the education system is indispensable in this regard. For Habermas, teachers represent reflexive labour which has an indirect effect on the production of surplus value. Habermas states, “Reflexive labor is not productive in the sense of direct production of surplus value. But it is also not unproductive; for then it would have no net effect on the production of surplus value” (ibid, p56). Habermas points out that in such a system, it is elites that make authoritative decisions and for such arrangements to persist, the ordinary person must be limited in his cognizance of and influence on the decision making mechanisms of the political and administrative apparati. Habermas’ communicative ethics is devised to be a solution to a public morality that cannot be universal as long as international relations are subject to the concrete morality of the more powerful. Habermas points to the reality of the current system when he states:
"The educational processes lead to motivational structures that are class specific, that is, to the repressive authority of conscience and an individualistic achievement orientation among the bourgeoisie, and to external superego structures and a conventional work morality in the lower class" (ibid, p77).

In advanced capitalism there is an ever increasing need for administration therefore the public sector expands and the politically derived administrative controls shift the boundaries of the political system in relation to the cultural system. The political system by way of expanding administrative steering mechanisms encroaches on traditional areas of normation. Habermas states:

"In this situation, cultural affairs that were taken for granted, and that were previously boundary conditions for the political system, fall into the administrative planning area. Thus traditions withheld from the public problematic, and all the more from practical discourses, are thematized. An example of such direct administrative processing of cultural tradition is educational planning, especially curriculum planning" (ibid, p71).

The education system becomes tailored to the systems theoretic steering mechanisms and it is in this way that education comes to have an overtly sociological end. Such administrative encroachment into the cultural sphere can become counterproductive. This has relevance for legitimation because “cultural traditions have their own, vulnerable, conditions of reproduction. They remain “living” as long as they take shape in an unplanned, nature-like manner, or are shaped with hermeneutic consciousness” (ibid, p70). In fact, the structural conflict between the cultural and administrative systems can itself lead to crises of output and a loss of political loyalty. Habermas argues that:

"At every level, administrative planning produces unintended unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken the justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of their nature-like course of development. Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of validity claims can succeed only through discourse. The stirring up of cultural affairs that are taken for granted thus furthers the politicization of areas of life previously assigned to the private sphere.” (ibid, p72).

It can be seen that these are broadly the same type of socio-political developments that concerned Durkheim. For those who recognise, as Foucault did, that all human relations are also power relations, it will seem ironic if not contradictory for Habermas to postulate a potential solution that is based on an administratively initiated and psychologised internalisation of norms through an educational...
structure that is procedural. This is even more remarkable since Habermas argues that the state cannot simply take over the cultural system because “there is no administrative production of meaning.” (ibid, p70) In advanced capitalism subsystems, such as traditional working class cultural structures, are being irreparably eroded because of globalising economic demands and these cannot be artificially recreated, “these traditions cannot be renewed on the basis of bourgeois society alone” (ibid, p77). No amount of administrative and political intrusion into personal lives, no amount of censorship of social discourse, and no psychologising of childrearing can recreate traditional values or manufacture a new meaning infused social culture; once a cultural tradition is lost it cannot be recreated.

Habermas sees in discourse ethics the potential for changing the political landscape, and his focus is on the elimination of systems theoretic steering problems through the internalisation of norms, norms that have been justified through formal validation. The individual will be attributed a moral competence that is tacitly linked to intelligence which in turn correlates to wherever the individual is placed within the psychologist’s taxonomy, be that local normative structures at the conventional or pre-conventional stages or universal structures as defined by postconventional cognitive development according to Kohlberg’s classifications. Habermas argues that through a psychologised and socialised education, disparate subsystems can be encouraged to perceive themselves as a homogeneous social entity. Legitimation crises are to be a thing of the past because the individual whether that individual is one capable of recognising meta-norms or simply believes their lesser status to be a function of a natural ordering devoid of the functioning of power, authority will come to be perceived as impersonal and innate. Discourse ethics is Habermas’ method of papering over the cracks, his way of avoiding the reality that power is evident and unavoidable in all human relations. Wistfully tied to a conception of historical materialism Habermas states:

“If one follows (in the dimensions of universalization and internalization) the developmental logic of global systems of social norms (thus leaving the domain of historical example), resolution of this conflict is conceivable only if the dichotomy between in-group and out-group morality disappears, the opposition between morally and legally regulated areas is relativized, and the validity of all norms is tied to discursive will formation. This does not exclude the necessity for compelling norms, since no one can know (today) the degree to which aggressiveness can be curtailed and the voluntary
recognition of discursive principles attained. Only at that stage, at present a mere construct, would morality become strictly universal” (ibid, p87).

Habermas’ theory which is predicated on a notion of universal morality is “an extravagant idea whose practical consequences may even be dangerous.” (Habermas, 1992, p104) Although he offers safeguards such as the stipulation that “the application of rules require a practical prudence that is prior to the practical reason that discourse ethics explicates,” (ibid, p104), this potentially provides another role for the psychologist within the education system. Habermas tentatively responds to the value sceptic’s concerns by objecting to the role of power entailed in the prudential role of the psychologist, countering their claims by stating “this objection cannot be disputed as long as problems of application are viewed from a third-person perspective” (ibid, p104). Behind the internalisation that assures an ‘intuitive’ and ‘innate’ universal reason, behind the concrete social conditions where “the generalized social expectation of reciprocity linked behavioral expectation give rise to norms, and the generalized self-application of norms give rise to principles by which other norms can be normatively assessed, (ibid, p169) behind the facade that Habermas suggests circumvents power, what Habermas is actually arguing for is a hidden mode of differentiation, a mode of inclusion and exclusion that is beyond reproach, beyond question. He is effectively arguing for a hierarchy that is predicated on psychological classification tailored to sociological outcomes, an ordering which is rationalised by the psychologist on behalf of the political class and inculcated throughout a populace through ‘education’.

At the time of writing Habermas considered his theory speculative; today Habermas’ conception remains either utopian or dystopian depending on the perspective one adopts, nevertheless the role he envisioned for the Psy-function has gained an increasing influence and familiarity across the educational system, particularly for the marginalised. Habermas’ argument for approval based on psychological determination can shed light on the role fulfilled by the Psy-function within the educational space today. Habermas’ link between the administrative steering problems and a controlled ‘cultural’ system as a means to ending the cycle of legitimation crises can help us to understand why psychological approaches serve a complementary role in relation to the political system, and why there is a particular fixation on the working class, particularly boys. If ‘education’ can
inculcate in the student a notion of an authority, which complements the espoused beliefs and values of the psychologist (which themselves coincidently always correlate with the prevailing politico-moral sentiment) then to suggest that this is a process of learning that culminates in the student coming to believe that such internalisation is an act of will that itself suggests an autonomous self means that Berlin’s monstrous impersonation will have become generalised. Education becomes a preparation for the acceptance of truth claims that are passed down from a loftier layer of institutional reasoning, reasoning that according to Kohlberg’s criteria most people and almost all students are ill equipped to understand. For Habermas “the evolution of morality, like the evolution of science, is dependent on truth” (Habermas, 1975, p88). Habermas thinks in terms of the cognitive framework in which beliefs are held. He states, “As for myself, I hold the view that normative rightness must be regarded as a claim to validity that is analogous to a truth claim. This notion is captured by the term ‘cognitivist ethics’ “ (1992, p197). Such a psychologising and socialising ethos for education begin to take on a more ominous tone but it reflects the role the Psy-function is assuming in all aspects of life and particularly in education when he states:

“We need to examine not only the beliefs men hold, but the way they hold them – the complexity, richness, and structure of their views of the world. Politically and socially, it may be more important that members of a given subculture possess a relativistic view of truth than that they are conservatives or liberals” (1975, pp90-91).

What is worrying about the above statement is not that it’s not a good idea to have a relativistic view of truth but the implication that beliefs and views of the world ought to be examined in order to be altered, prescribed. This is what Habermas’ entire thinking culminates in, the prescription of the mental and moral framework of existence for most of humanity. Habermas formulates a theory in which the psychologist has the determining role in relation to education. In contrast, for Kathryn Ecclestone and Dennis Hayes there is nothing theoretical about the role psychology, in particular psychotherapy, has come to play in education. In their book *The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education* they quote D. Lowenthal the director for the Research Centre for Therapeutic Education at Roehampton University, when he states:
"If we are to stand a chance of our children and ourselves leading good lives, it may be vital for psychotherapists amongst others to examine how we can influence education in general... Perhaps, therefore, those of us who are psychotherapists need to look at psychotherapy as an educational practice [...]" (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, p21).

Ecclestone and Hayes make the argument that therapeutic education introduces a language of vulnerability into education which overwhelms positive feelings and responses in students. They state:

"We argue that such interventions and their associated assumptions infantilise children, making them suggestible to fears, problems or 'uncomfortable feelings' that they may or may not face and they normalize the bad experiences of a minority of children as universal difficulties that 'we all have'" (ibid, 2009, p44).

The therapeutic turn in education does not appear from nowhere, as “there is a relation between the thing that is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an “answer” to a concrete situation which is real” (Foucault, 2001, p172). There is a relation between cultural and political instability, or at least the perception of cultural and political instability, and the crusade for the implementation of policies to “encourage schools to identify early signs of difficulties in order to prevent problems emerging and to enable all children to admit to problems” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, p18). The capillary effect which allows the Psy-function to supersede familial authority introduces a therapeutic language that infiltrates and exacerbates a climate of cultural and social despondency which becomes substantiated through media prompts that are based on political utility and convenience. This involves a fixation on the individual which is an effect of the disciplinary functioning of politico-economic system, and a belief that change automatically brings about the erosion of values, especially those values thought to be universal, culminating in interventions in the education system as a means to contain and control the unpredictable and therefore risky nature of thinking. Such a problematization is not in its most fundamental thematic peculiar to any specific era, it is timeless. Even for Plato “the primary danger of liberty and free speech in a democracy is what results when everyone has his own manner of life, his own style of life” (Foucault, 2001, p84). And it is here at this juncture that the Psy-function fits into the modern education system. It is nothing more ambitious than an attempt to encourage a homogeneous and politically compatible form to dispositions,
attitudes, and values through the internalisation of normative truths. In this way it attempts to harness the unpredictable nature of thinking through the policing of the speech act. ‘Education’ is and probably always has been utilised as the most viable apparatus for the inculcation of political ideologies and the silencing and diminution of discordant voices.

Ecclestone and Hayes argue that therapeutic education both lowers educational standards and inhibits social aspirations. Public or group displays of vulnerability where ‘students’ are pressured into revealing all aspects of their non-educational private lives lead to students lowering their expectations of themselves and others. A climate of vulnerability prevails when even “teachers are encouraged to present their own difficulties, express feelings about particular events and ask children to offer help to them” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, p28). Ecclestone and Hayes argue that there is an element of danger in compelling people to reveal a diminished and emotionally vulnerable image of themselves which in therapeutic ‘education’ is encouraged by ritualistic forms of state sanctioned emotional ‘support’ and assessment. Therapeutic education propagates a more fragile sense of self; it turns children, adolescents, and even adults into self-preoccupied and anxious individuals, it promotes emotional vulnerability, and it is a language of introversion and discontent that is intended to suggest that normal childhood is toxic and in need of therapy, making it a self promoting vocabulary that makes risk an abiding feature of the education space. The emphasis on risk demands there be an extension of counselling and the Psy-function generally, and it makes greater intrusion into the personal and private areas of the lives of students more permissible. Ecclestone and Hayes state, “not only does therapeutic education lead schools to take on an extended and intrusive role in children’s socialization, but the emotional well-being industry peddles a strong, negative message of emotional determinism” (ibid, p45). For Ecclestone and Hayes, education or genuine education in their sense is being diminished or even replaced with a pernicious form of social engineering which prompts them to question what vision of the human being is being assessed, evaluated, and advocated by this psychologising and socialising corruption of the education space.

"Instead, we argue that if a ‘subject’ is to be educational, it must be based on the intellectual disciplines rather than a fashionable idea, a pressing professional concern or political interference. Indeed, the insertion of
political imperatives into education amounts to social engineering of the most pernicious sort” (ibid, p162).

Political initiatives and administrative steering concerns coupled with the self interest of this new manifestation of the salvation industry mean that “invalid and unreliable assessments lead to labels and judgments about the ability of families, particularly working class families, to deal with children’s emotions” (ibid, p44). Ecclestone and Hayes argue that the labelling of students with any of over 800 psychological syndromes and the expanding multitude of categories within the vast proliferating array of human classifications introduce a pathological vocabulary into education, so that when students showing natural human traits such as shyness or fear of speaking in public, they are are medicalized and pathologized. Students are attributed mental disorders as class, the consequences of disadvantage, or even distinctive cultural traits have come to be evaluated in a language of endemic pathology; emotionally illiterate parents’ begat emotionally illiterate children giving credence to notions of emotional elites and an emotional underclass. Ecclestone and Hayes do raise an awareness of the inimical nature of therapeutic education which is that “therapeutic education immerses young people in an introspective, instrumental curriculum of the self, and turns schools into vehicles for the latest political and popular fad to engineer the right sort of citizen” (ibid, p64). But they fail in their attempt to make a convincing counterargument because their definition of education is too narrow. It is based on pre-established liberal disciplines rather than the discourse involved; any subject-matter can be educational but it is the type of discursivity it entails that determines whether it is genuinely educational or not.

Ecclestone and Hayes focus on Britain under Tony Blair’s New Labour government where “every day without a new education headline was regarded as a day wasted” (ibid, p132). They argue that education has been the site of a political response to the emotional state of the nation. Tellingly, it is not without significance that Blair attempted to persuade Isaiah Berlin to change his definition of positive liberty while Berlin was on his deathbed. Key to the Psy-function and therapeutic education is the perception of benevolence and voluntarism. At the time of Blair’s New Labour working class boys were singled out for particular attention and therapeutic education was seen as a means to change perceptions. Again the political emphasis is dramatic, “for example, in a consultation document,
Boys Will be Boys, produced in 1996, the government argued that ‘the very future of our society depends on reconnecting young men and boys – particularly in the most economically and socially deprived areas – with a sense of belonging and identity which will provide both hope and self reliance” (ibid, p38). In keeping with New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ ideology, welfare is not an economic concept but a psychic one. Ecclestone and Hayes argue that “the emergence of ‘emotional well-being’ into the political and professional thinking moves mental health work from a marginal activity into mainstream education and welfare services” (ibid, p17).

The idea that such measures could offset the anomie caused by loss of manufacturing industries due to globalisation and the influx of cheap labour through immigration and the concomitant alienation of immigrants due to heartfelt and real resentment is laughable, but statements such as these had a ready audience and for many represented a realistic solution such was the pervasiveness of the language of therapy. Ecclestone and Hayes focus on the damage that therapeutic education does both to individual and collective aspirations and how an over-preoccupation with the self can impair one’s conditions for possibility. Here it must also be noted how the therapeutic turn has been used under Blair’s government as a means to avoid the real concrete economic and structural problems that needed to be tackled. Ecclestone and Hayes focus on a very particular time and place which is why they attribute the therapeutic turn in education to a cultural preoccupation with the language of therapy which invited a political response with equally slippery underlying concepts, theories and vocabulary from a political entity such as Blair’s government which became renowned for political spin. While it is the case that Blair’s New Labour found a readymade audience in the British public of the time and a natural marriage in the ‘salvation industry’ which proved to be mutually beneficial for the therapeutic industry and politicians. But as Foucault shows the encroachment of psychiatric power in the form of the Psy-function, including therapeutic practices into education, has a much deeper genealogy.

In his introduction to Foucault’s 1973-74 series of lectures published under the title Psychiatric Power, Arnold I. Davidson captures the Foucauldian appreciation of power when he states:
“Rather than thinking of power as the exercise of unbridled violence, one should think of it as the “physical exercise of an unbalanced force” (in the sense of an unequal, non-symmetrical force), but a force that acts within “a rational, calculated, and controlled game of the exercise of power.” Instead of conceptualizing psychiatric power in terms of institutions, with their regularities and rules, one has to understand psychiatric practice in terms of “imbalances of power” with the tactical uses of “networks, currents, relays, points of support, differences of potential” that characterizes a form of power” (Davidson in Foucault, 2006, pxv).

For Foucault, medical authority functions as a power long before it functions as knowledge, the institution does not exist prior to relationships of power: it is the expression of such relationships. For the psychiatric function to claim its place within the disciplinary apparatus, it must show its utility in relation to the subjugation of the somatic singularity and it must make its contribution in the creation of the disciplinary individual known. Psychiatric power appears at the site of a confrontation, a battle between reason and unreason, between normality and abnormality and its treatment from the very beginning has been a moral one. It claims for itself at first the truth in relation to madness and eventually the truth in relation to abnormality. It produces a discourse that claims the status of a science which guarantees its truth. Foucault states:

“In crude terms, psychiatric power says: The question of truth will never be posed between madness and me for the very simple reason that I, psychiatry, am already a science. And if, as science, I have the right to question what I say, if it is true that I make mistakes, it is in any case up to me, and me alone, as science to decide if what I say is true or to correct the mistake. I am the possessor, if not of truth in its content, at least all criteria of truth” (2006, p134).

Kohlberg’s and Piaget’s classifications are evidence of such truth claims that are specifically intended to claim for psychiatric power a preponderant influence within the education space, and as with the asylum its function is essentially a moral one. Its purpose is to situate the student’s body and mind in accordance with its coincidence or deviation from such ‘scientific’ truths. Though this may entail a contradictory array of ‘scientific’ truths, the statements produced by the patient-student must fall in line with whatever form of psychiatric power happens to be in place at the time. In this way, the individual becomes the effect of this moralising and normative disciplinary power. There is always some degree of behaviourism in even the most seemingly benign form of therapeutic function; psychiatric power can only function if it entails a form of implicit threat in much the same way as
morality does. “When she couldn’t think of anything, the teacher said she go home and come back the next day with something to go in the worry box” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, p31). The optimal effect of this often disguised behaviourism is internalisation and it is within the education space that psychiatric power increasingly pursues its ambitions and objectives as “it looks forward to the future, towards the moment when it will keep going by itself and only a virtual supervision will be required, when discipline, consequently, will have become habit” (Foucault, 2006, p47).

Foucault states that “disciplinary power has an inherent tendency to intervene at the same level as what is happening, at the point when the virtual is becoming real; disciplinary power always tends to intervene beforehand, before the act if possible, and by an infra judicial interplay of supervision, rewards, punishments, and pressure” (ibid, p51). The therapeutic encroachment into education is the almost inevitable effect of a continuous pressure to intervene in ever increasing way into the personal lives of individuals; disciplinary power was always going to reach a point where potential would become its fixation. Such a refinement of the disciplinary apparatus finds its optimal efficacy in ‘education’ as it is the ideal location to ascribe labels as a justification for intervention. The therapeutic function relies on fear and security, “the dream of the class society is that everyone ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning” (Ecclestone, Hayes, 2009, p77). In its very nature the therapeutic function perpetuates hysteria around the issues of culture and youth suggesting danger and risk that can only be managed through the policing of the proliferation of statements that might suggest resistance or social discord. The Psy-function becomes inextricably linked to those with most reason to resist or those whose lives already signify a form of resistance, that is, the impoverished and the marginalised, and its task becomes one of curtailing unpredictability and and exercising control through the behaviourism that is silently exercised in the continuous grading and ranking which has its basis in obedience, agreement, conformity, submission, and gratitude.

Historically the weight of psychiatric power has been brought to bear on those whom conventional disciplines such as the school and the family cannot contain; it is brought to bear on those who escape conventional classification, on those on the
margins of society, on those who disciplinary power cannot assimilate into its ordering through the normal channels, and its power is brought to bear on the abnormal. The proliferation of therapeutic practices into social consciousness and the education space in a more general way suggests distrust, fear, trepidations in the appraisal of childhood, youth, marginalised adults, and even the workforce, and it can also be pointedly class specific. Such refinement of the disciplinary apparatus indicates the creation of a new type of individuality, “the overall effect of therapeutic education in primary and secondary schools is to dismantle subject disciplines and to use them as vehicles for the latest manifestation of social engineering” (ibid, p145). The individual in Foucault’s sense is not something that pre-exists relationships of power; in fact it is relations of power which precede individuality. Foucault states:

“It is because the body has been “subjectified”, that is to say, that the subject-function has been fixed on it, because it has been psychologised and normalized, it is because of all this something like an individual appears, about which one can speak, hold discourses, and attempt to found sciences” (2006, p56).

The body can be subjectified in this way because everyday life is constantly under a panoptic gaze that is designed to determine conduct. Through the ‘therapeutic’ manifestation of the Psy-function, unashamed intrusions such as infra-legal and asymmetrical learning contracts can accompany ‘scientific’ practices shaping the innermost lives of students. Learning to learn becomes an activity that eschews recognised educational aims and goals. It opens up the educational remit by focusing on the life of the ‘student’ with the aim of psychologically managing the ‘educational’ experience by putting in its place a process of evaluating and charting change in the learner; it “emphasizes the person in whom the changes occur or is expected to occur” (Knowles, Holton, Swanson, 2005, p16). By focusing on the person ‘learning to learn’ it perceives that there is an opportunity to preside over any superfluous discursivity beyond the discourse proper to the business of education. It recognises that because education is conducted between human beings there is a space, or a power vacuum of non-disciplinary discourse, into which the therapeutic turn can stake its claim. It is the nature of disciplinary power to leave nothing to chance to leave as little space as possible for unsupervised interaction, it constantly strives to extend its panoptic gaze and this is where therapeutic education claims its opportunity. Such malleability means that in time
the Psy-function can gradually appropriate most discourses within the education space and when validated on the basis of political expediency it becomes a means to expropriate the language of education itself. It is a disciplinary power that is by definition hegemonic. It justifies such power through the medicalization or through the criminalisation of the potentiality of the student. It transforms learning from a feature and consequence of the educational enterprise into a psychological appraisal of the student's statements. These, in turn, are used as a filter for assessment. Education increasingly requires outward conformity, but most importantly of all this disciplinary power functions as a validation of the therapeutic function. Individuals in Foucault's sense are the creation of power and are increasingly being regarded as the property of power. It makes no sense according to Foucault to speak of original rights of the individual because the individual is the creation of mechanisms of power such as psychiatric power which functions below the level of the law and it is here below the level of what is permissible and impermissible that psychiatric power can claim its entitlement to deconstruct and reconstruct individuality.

Historically, the sciences of man have their origin in the facilitation of tactical problems related to “the need to distribute the forces of work in terms of the needs of the economy that was developing” (Foucault, 2006, p73). In the modern era the family serves as the sole and crucial anchoring of an otherwise disciplinary functioning of power. The family is the zero point where the different disciplinary systems hitch up with each other. “What the King’s body was in societies of mechanisms of sovereignty, the family is in societies of disciplinary systems” (ibid, p82). In the modern era, the civil code limits and intensifies the family unit which is tailored to a more effective functioning of the economic system, modern life suggests smaller family units ideally with a patriarchal apex. It is the failure of such units that have created a raison d’être for the Psy-function particularly outside the asylum. Foucault states:

“In short, the function of everything we call social assistance, all the social work which appears at the start of the nineteenth century, and which will acquire the importance we know it to have, is to constitute a kind of disciplinary tissue which will be able to stand in for the family, to both reconstitute the family and enable one to do without it” (ibid, p84).
Psychiatric discourse positions itself as indispensable to the disciplinary system by posing as a surrogate family and the more it propagates perceptions of risk and danger "the tighter the disciplinary system, the more numerous the abnormalities and irregularities" (ibid, p110). The broadening of the Psy-function, "that is to say, the psychiatric, psychopathological, psycho-sociological, psycho-criminological, and psychoanalytical function" (ibid, p85) to include ever more practices of assessment and diagnosis introduces forms of discourse that are intended to permeate all disciplinary forms of individualisation, normalisation, and subjection. Foucault states:

"This is how psycho-pedagogy appears within school discipline, the psychology of work within the workshop discipline, criminology within prison discipline, and psychopathology within psychiatric and asylum discipline. The Psy-function is, then, the agency of control of all the disciplinary institutions and apparatuses, and, at the same time and without contradiction, it holds forth with the discourse of the family. At every moment, as psycho-pedagogy, as psychology of work, as criminology, as psychopathology, and so forth, what it refers to, the truth it constitutes and forms, and which marks out its system of reference, is always the family. Its constant system of reference is the family, familial sovereignty, and it is so to the same extent as it is the theoretical authority of every disciplinary apparatus" (ibid, p86).

The extension of the Psy-function through therapeutic education is essentially a usurpation of the sovereign element of familial authority to accommodate administrative steering concerns. Foucault argues that the truth is that which the Psy-function constitutes and forms is always the family. It replicates the functional heterogeneity between the two types of power, between the essential sovereign nucleus of the family unit and the disciplinary mechanisms of governmentality and, when used as a general form of coercion and indoctrination, the role that therapeutic education assumes becomes a means of accommodating administrative and political initiatives because Psychiatric discourse is the true discourse of the family “this is why you can see that a truth formed on the basis of the family cannot be deployed as a critique of the institution, or of school, psychiatric, or other forms of discipline” (ibid, p87).

For psychiatric power to disseminate its function outside the asylum, it was necessary to select an intermediary. Foucault argues, “I think this intermediary is easily found and is basically the psychiatrization of abnormal children, and more
precisely the psychiatrization of idiots.” (ibid, p190) From very early on in its history pedagogy held a natural attraction for psychiatric power. It says give me your most difficult cases, those you struggle to teach, those who refuse to conform and we will avoid the asylum. The myriad forms of psychiatric power may indeed claim unique insights, offering different emphases and areas of expertise, claiming to be distinctive enough to avoid amalgamation with other manifestations of the Psy-function, but what is really relevant for the educational space is that they all play the same game in slightly different ways, in that they all entail one interlocutor being evaluated on the basis of what he or she states, what he or she believes to be true about themselves and the world, and they involve being assessed in relation to what another interlocutor holds to be the truth about that person and the world. As Foucault states, “it seems to me that, in the end, the diffusion of psychiatric power takes place by way of this development of the concept of the normal” (ibid, p202).

By intervening in the family, the child becomes the primary target for psychiatric intervention. No longer will it be a matter of inquiring about madness and the madman's childhood; madness no longer has to wait for the age of majority, but can now reveal itself in childhood. By mimicking the language and procedures of medicine, psychiatry constitutes itself as a medical and clinical science and in this way creates its own truths about childhood. No doubt with the advent of neuroscience certain psychiatric functions take on a genuine medical function but this does not hold for psychiatric and psychologising functions that base their analysis on an evaluation of the life of the patient articulated entirely as a form of moral and political authority. For example, Foucault makes an interesting observation of the difference between the pedagogical function and the psychiatric function when he states:

“You see that there is a difference between the teacher or demonstrator, the person who possesses the truth, the teacher or scientist, manipulate judgment, the proposition, and thought, the doctor will manipulate reality in a way that error becomes true” (ibid, p131).

Here Foucault is referring to the way in which psychiatric power has a history of manipulating reality in order to compel a problematic perception to coincide with a less ‘erroneous’ one, that is, psychiatric power not only claims the truth in relation to the family, but it also claims to be the agent and sole arbitrator of reality
itself, a reality that correlates with a specific yet universal recognition of reason. This is the power that has escaped the asylum and this power is increasingly being introduced into the education space in a variety of manifestations. If for only this reason alone its claims to a scientific status must be questioned, particularly as it becomes more influential within the education system; the therapeutic function cannot simply be accepted without question when it claims a ‘scientific’ status. Any being who claims to be the possessor of all criteria for truth must not be accepted at face value.

Much can be made of the distinction between various forms of psychiatric power as each will lay claim to its own unique truth. It is a mistake to try single out some from others, to say this one is closer to science or truth than this other one. Instead it should be asked, what if this is not a science? What does it mean if the psychoanalyst, the psychologist, the psychiatric expert, the therapist and the counsellor have no real scientific credentials? What sense do they make and at what level is discourse being conducted, if the experts and those who claim authority are stripped of that authoritative voice and shown to be simply making statements with no special claim to truth or reality? Foucault states:

“We may say that psychoanalysis can be interpreted as psychiatry’s first great retreat, as the moment when the question of truth of what is expressed in the symptoms, or, in any case, the game of truth and lie in the symptom was forcibly imposed on psychiatric power; the problem being whether psychoanalysis has not responded to the first defeat by setting up a first line of defence” (ibid, p138).

Foucault attributes the emergence of psychoanalysis less to Freud, Charcot’s disciple, than to the hysterics who exposed Charcot as a fraud. For Foucault, psychoanalysis was the reaction to Charcot’s disgrace and indicated the limit of psychiatric power at the time. Psychoanalysis with its fixation on childhood and the family allowed psychiatric power to transcend the asylum. Idiocy for example is not a disease therefore it opens up a different concern for the psychologising function: the notion of development. Psychiatric power claims the ‘retard’ and the ‘idiot’ as its own. Foucault states, “Development is therefore a kind of norm with reference to which one is situated, much more than a potentiality that is possessed in itself” (ibid, p208). Development is both peculiar to the individual and at the same time common to everyone. The idiot is not ill but he is not average. The idiot
is not ill, but he is not normal, he is abnormal. Therapy for the idiot involved imposing education on them and this education for the idiot was what they called moral treatment. What relationship does such an initiative have with the forms of therapeutic education being introduces into schools today, particularly for the lower classes and ‘delinquents’? Risk assessment was integral to the psychologising of the idiot just as it is to the student as potential patient and delinquent today. Foucault quotes from a report of the time: “in order to get care for him we have to write false reports, to make the situation look worse than it is and depict the idiot or mental defective as someone who is dangerous” (ibid, p220). Today we can witness the triumph of psychiatric power, the Psy-function was able to claim everything abnormal for itself and through its own expansion into different spheres, and it can label life itself as a reality that can only be safely witnessed through a therapeutic prism. Foucault states:

“Through these practical problems raised by the idiot child you see psychiatry becoming something infinitely more general and dangerous than the power that controls and corrects madness; it is becoming a power over the abnormal, the power to control, and correct what is abnormal” (ibid, p221).

Earlier developments, such as the autobiographical account, which Foucault suggests emerged at around between 1825 and 1840 in psychiatric practice and criminology, allowed the madman's erroneous understanding of reality to be evaluated against the doctor's (narrative) reality, a reality with which the patient was required avow and identify as an indication of being brought back to his rational senses, as an indication of being cured. Even today this remains the strategic basis of the therapeutic function which has transcended its origin within the asylum. For Foucault psychiatric power does not rely on a fundamental body of knowledge, which does not mean that it is without knowledge, but rather that this is a knowledge created and designed only to allow it to confer upon itself the status of a science. Without its scientific status, it is without credibility and becomes a disparate array of sometimes absurd and often infantilising moral sanctions. Foucault states:

“I think what is thought to be necessary in the good running of the asylum, what makes it necessary that the asylum is given a medical stamp, is the effect of the supplementary power given, not by the content of a knowledge. In other words, it is through the tokens of his possession of a knowledge,
and only through the actions of these tokens, whatever the actual content of this that medical power, as necessarily medical power, functions within the asylum” (ibid, p184).

And so it is with therapeutic education, it has a knowledge, a simple knowledge, a ‘moral’ knowledge which allows it to conduct the discourse of the psychiatric expert, and the power invested in it with the legitimacy it needs to function within the education system. Just as the psychoanalyst and psychologist realised that childhood and the family could give the disciplinary power, the sovereign power required allowing it to avoid the accusations that psychiatry faced with regards to manufacturing its own symptoms as a means of verifying its own truths, so too the rise of therapeutic education creates a lucrative market for the espousal of a politically expedient range of expensive interventions that have increasingly come to represent the normative reality that the ‘student’ must adopt. Foucault states:

“The school has to call in the psychologist when the power exercised at school ceases to be a real power, and becomes a both mythical and fragile power, the reality of which must consequently be intensified. It is under this double condition that one needs the educational psychologist who reveals the different abilities of individuals on the basis of which they will be placed at a certain level in a field of knowledge, as if it was a real field, as if it was a field which had in itself its power of constraint, since one has to remain where one is in this field of knowledge defined by the institution. In this way knowledge presents itself as reality within which the individual is placed. And, at the end of the educational psychologist’s treatment, the individual actually is the bearer of a double reality: the reality of his abilities on the one hand, and the reality of the contents of knowledge he is capable of acquiring on the other. It is at the point of articulation of these two “realities” defined by the educational psychologist that the individual appears as an individual. We could undertake the same kind of analysis of prisons, the factory, and so forth” (ibid, p190).

The Psy-function becomes the touchstone for the confirmation and assurance of conformity within the education space. The role it assumes as the nexus between the various discursive formations that inhabit the education space allow it to become the arbiter of what is appropriate and acceptable. It can also become the conduit in which capricious public irritations with social and political systems come to find their expression within the education space. In this way it becomes the expeditor initiatives by political parties and interest groups that can shape the nature of the educational experience for both the educator and student alike. This was what Durkheim and Habermas were attempting to do by trying to arrange an educational system to facilitate their conception of what society ought to be rather
than seeing it as an institutional arrangement that facilitates the student's potential in relation to the world as it is. Ultimately, this entails a curtailment of the way the student’s capacity for thinking, rather than an exploration of the extent of his or her potentiality.
Chapter Seven

Indoctrination
Chapter Seven: Indoctrination

This chapter sets out to define indoctrination. By defining indoctrination it will show what a transgression of the education space looks like. In this thesis two positions were set out which offered different ways of thinking about society and the individual. Durkheim's conception offered autonomy but at the price of internalisation. Foucault cannot offer autonomy because for him we are all caught in power relations, instead what he offers is resistance. Through Lacan the plausibility of the scientific status of psychoanalysis in particular and the Psy-function in general was questioned. It was argued that there cannot be such scientific validation that is grounded in linguistics, as language is not a science. Time was offered as a more plausible explanation for the existential bifurcation that so many of the Psy-functions derive their authority from. How time is conceptualised is also highlighted as the indicator of how education as institution relates to the student, arguing that the tendency to overvalue the notion of an impersonal framework and authority correlates with the aims of socialisation rather than the purposes of education. The prison was used to argue that there is a distinction between the discursive formations of socialisation and education, and that the socialisation agenda cannot have as its object the student. It was then argued that education is defined by the discourse it entails. Habermas’ argument for a socialisation role for education was explored as this offered a more detailed analysis of the Durkheimian position. It was argued that power is a feature of the human experience, and that no level or type of discourse can escape it, and that power, especially when it occupies the education space, ought to be transparent. There was a more detailed analysis of the role that the Psy-function plays within the education space where it was argued that the therapeutic function can have an inimical effect particularly when used in a more generalised and procedural way. The following chapter intends to show that not only is socialisation not education, but also that socialisation is a form of indoctrination that represents a transgression of the education space in the most profound sense.

Foucault says “I am interested in what Habermas is doing. I know that he does not agree with what I say – I am a little more in agreement with him” (Foucault cited in Kelly, 1994, p1). Habermas says of Foucault, “of the circle of those in my generation engaged in philosophical diagnoses of the times, Foucault has the most
lasting effect on the zeitgeist, not least of all thanks to the earnestness with which 
he preserves in productive contradictions” (Habermas, 1994, p154). The 
divergence between Habermas and Foucault centres on the issue of power. 
Habermas considers Foucault’s critical analyses of power to be the basis of an 
alternative normative assertion and, for Habermas, Foucault fails to recognize this 
and therefore creates productive or performative contradictions. Habermas insists 
that there is a higher sphere of normativity upon which more localised norms are 
based and that these normative principles can be validated as universal norms 
upon which a justification of legitimised power can rest, so that all that is required 
to justify such regulative action is the recognition of the means of validation of 
these universal normative principles. Habermas criticises Foucault for welcoming 
power into the contemporary philosophical landscape, a move he maintains 
“inflicts environmental damage for which he can be held philosophically 
accountable” (Kelly, 1994, p1). And this is precisely what Habermas attempts to 
do, bring Foucault to account, albeit posthumously. Essentially Habermas’ 
argument is that if Foucault wants to make a critique of the Enlightenment derived 
notion of reason, then he must offer an alternative theory. Indeed Habermas 
interprets Foucault’s writings on power to be such a theory, therefore for 
Habermas Foucault also appeals to a normative paradigm albeit without giving it 
recognition. As Kelly states, “Habermas argues that Foucault’s paradigm of critique 
is self-refuting because of his theory of power: if critique itself is a form of power, 
then it cannot be used to criticize power or if it is used undermines itself” (ibid, 
p5). But Foucault does not presume to stand outside power; he bases his critical 
position on the idea of different more localised forms of rationality, on an 
awareness of knowledges that have become subjugated, knowledges which he 
recognises as forms of power, failed powers, which are nonetheless expressions of 
power. Foucault reintroduces this idea of ‘subjugated knowledges’ as a means to 
critique axiomatic presuppositions, and as a means to show the problematic 
entailed in truth, that is, in order to show how power is infused throughout its 
genealogy with claims to universality. As has been argued, Foucault is interested in 
dispensing with universalistic thinking which always has its basis in the 
subjugation of local powers and their concomitant knowledges. Foucault’s 
histories depict the processes of such subjugation and bring to light the 
heterogeneity that always underlies discourses of truth and those values that claim
universality. Therefore Habermas could not be further from the intention or consequence of Foucault’s thinking when he states, “Foucault pursues genealogical historiography with the serious intent of getting a science underway that is superior to the mismanaged human sciences” (Habermas, 1994, p91).

Foucault claims to have no interest in creating a theory of power instead he unearths a form of critique that, Richard Bernstein argues, rejects being “wedded to a set of distinctions and binary oppositions, for example, normative/empirical, liberation/domination, universal/relative, rational/irrational, that Foucault subverts. Foucault himself suggests that this is so, and this is precisely what many of Foucault’s defenders have claimed” (Bernstein, 1994, p221). Foucault selects and takes up specific positions, local in this sense, and gives them a renewed voice. He adopts what Bernstein describes as a position of arbitrary partisanship which, for Habermas, represents an alternative normative stance. Foucault never claims to step outside power. How could he? But he also has never attempted to formulate a normative theory, or never could attempt this without performing one of the contradictions of which Habermas accuses him. Instead he shows that the regulative structures that are norms also have a genealogy, and this revolves around power. Bernstein states that “Foucault’s critics argue that his concept of critique is confused and/or incoherent. Yet Foucault and many of his defenders appear to claim that Foucault has developed a new type of critical stance that does not implicitly or explicitly appeal to any basis, ground, or normative foundations” (ibid, p213). There is no theory of power just the functioning of power which Foucault highlights in its heterogeneity. In fact what Foucault is particularly interested in is how power perpetually re-inscribes relations of inequality through institutions. He shows how “power is exercised, and that it only exists in action” (Foucault, 1994, p28). Power is not something that can be held in abeyance, stored, held back for when it is required. Power only exists in expression, it only exists in action and resistance, and there must be resistance for power to exist. It is the inability to express such resistance which gives rise to Foucault’s conception of the soul. Power is a force brought to bear on another force which is why neither Habermas nor Durkheim can position their theories outside power. In the field of human relations power is omnipresent and truth is evidence of its most edifying and shameful achievement. What Foucault points out, and what is so unpalatable for Habermas’ discursive ethics, is that “there can be no possible exercise of power
without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on
the basis of this association” (ibid, p31). This after all is the purpose of a validation
of norms is it not? That is, the establishment of truths. Because of his untimely
death and Habermas’ continuance of a posthumous debate it is Foucault’s thinking
that appears to take a defensive posture but really it is Habermas’ position which is
untenable.

Habermas hangs his theory of communicative action and discourse ethics on the
notion that it is possible to arrange a sphere of discursive practice and norm
validation that can be so unquestionably legitimate that it can avoid accusations of
indoctrination and totalitarianism because the inconvenient issue of power will no
longer be a factor.

“The function of the formal-world concepts... is to prevent the stock of what
is common from dissolving in the stream of subjectivities repeatedly
reflected in one another. They make it possible to adopt in common the
perspective of a third person or nonparticipant” (Habermas cited in

The assertion here is that there is no power vacuum in the field of human relations,
nor can there be, yet even the insistence on a realm of discourse outside the play of
power is an expression of power. The encouragement of belief in its existence
through the education system is a formalisation of a certain expression of power.
What happens is that in the field of human relations, knowledges are produced
which become stratified, they become strategically arranged and laid down as
truths by formalising some illegalities which arguably leads to a form of
indoctrination of children in the guise of internalisation. What Durkheim and
Habermas ultimately suggest is an inevitable consequence of their role for
education. Through the exclusion, marginalisation and silencing of alternative
voices and knowledges there comes into existence an insistence on one universal
manifestation of true reason, which is the ultimate representation of power’s
expression. For Foucault, to understand the functioning of such power, it is
necessary to give expression to its concomitant resistance, Foucault states, “For
me, no given form of rationality is actually reason” (Foucault 1994, p125). Foucault
refuses to succumb to what he refers to as the blackmail of the Enlightenment yet
it is precisely this that Habermas and the idea of a universal form of rationality
represent. Foucault states:
"Yes, yes. I think that the blackmail which has very often been at work in every critique of reason or every critical inquiry into the history of rationality (either you accept rationality or you fall prey to the irrationality) operates as though a rational history of all the ramifications and all the bifurcations, a contingent history of reason were impossible" (ibid, p118).

There are many contingent histories of reason, however for those who want to see in the Enlightenment a grand narrative grounded in the notion of a progressive human nature, Foucault will not offer an alternative grand theory. Instead he points out that for human beings “There is no hidden essence to be discovered; there is no hidden depth revealing what we truly are; there is only the task of producing or inventing ourselves. This is what Foucault calls ‘ethics’ in his late writings” (Bernstein, 1994, p215). Foucault’s philosophical intention throughout all his works is to make people question their most cherished convictions and beliefs, and his critique is at all times a critique of the present. For Foucault resistance involves a continuous need to take care of the self, to invent one’s own individuality. As Bernstein states, “Care is needed here because “normative” is a term of art that suggest to many some sort of permanent ahistorical universal standards of evaluation. And it is clear that Foucault rejects any such standards” (Ibid, p218). Foucault makes no appeal to a totality or to a future achievement and as Bernstein points out he ruthlessly excludes teleology. So the message Foucault takes from the Enlightenment is that he recognises in it the first historical period that named itself and created a critique of itself and whose evaluation and critique of itself was situated in the present. For those who wish to persist with definitive and universal notions of reason, Foucault states, “let us leave in their piety those who want to keep the Aufklärung living and intact. Such piety is of course the most touching of treasons” (Foucault, 1994, p147).

Foucault does not, even unwittingly, as Habermas would have it attempt to create a theory of power or to concoct a new alternative science to the human sciences. He states that “a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (ibid, p24). Habermas makes an argument for a form of social arrangement that is predicated on institutional constructs that currently do not exist. Habermas’ acknowledgement of the current role of socialisation for
education is problematic because Habermas himself does not consider the human sciences to be actual sciences. He states:

"The human sciences are and remain pseudosciences because they do not see through the compulsion to a problematic doubling of the self-relating subject: they are not in a position to acknowledge the structurally generated will to self-knowledge and self-reification – and thus they are also unable to free themselves from the power that drives them. Foucault depicted this in *Madness and Civilization* in connection with the example of psychiatric positivism" (1994, p73).

So both Habermas and Foucault recognise in the human sciences practices that create both discursive and non-discursive conditions for statements that shape their evaluations, yet they have no real scientific foundation. This prompts the question, what does this mean in terms of the influence that they have increasingly come to exert in the field of education? It means that the normative agendas that they represent in the education space is of a much more political, politicised and often self-serving nature, in particular in respect of trying to legitimate the profession and its claim to power, knowledge and authority, than they would like to admit. It means that either they represent one side of a power relation and conduct a discourse that represents the dominant viewpoint or as in the case of Blair’s New Labour, they simply represented a political reaction to the latest capricious social sentiment. The role of the social sciences and psychology categorised here as the Psy-function have an influence in education that Habermas could only justify by postulating an imagined justification based on a separate layer of normative validation, which in reality can never really exist in the neutral manifestation in which Habermas envisaged. Therefore, currently they represent a decentred form of systems theoretic steering mechanism which, because of the nature of the neo-liberal or advanced capitalist political system, must ultimately find its justification in the placation of political, economic, and most importantly party interests and agendas. This can be easily recognised in how the education system almost inevitably has to change and adapt each time a new political regime assumes power. Because there is no hidden essence or depth that can reveal who we really are; in other words because there is no universal human nature which the human sciences can unearth, the issue becomes how can education in a field of power/knowledge relations that are decentered be distinguished from indoctrination? In order to answer this question it will be necessary to define
indoctrination and compare it to the earlier definition of education as discourse specific to the subject-matter and conceptualised within a timeframe that has the student within the limitation of their engagement with education as the primary concern, as what Aislinn O’ Donnell has described as “the educational conversation” (O’ Donnell, 2013, p268). This should depict what a transgression of the education space would ultimately involve.

In his book *Foucault*, Gilles Deleuze explains Foucault’s earlier work in light of his later realisation that it was power that he was talking about all along, therefore it is important to assess Foucault’s thinking about thinking through the prism of Deleuze. Deleuze explains the role of the diagram in Foucault’s thinking. The diagram is a map or an abstract machine that is coextensive with the entire social field. It is a highly unstable play of forces, a field of relations that is both blind and mute though it makes others see and speak. It is intersocial and constantly evolving, an informal microphysics of power that “never functions in order to represent a persisting world but it produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth” (Deleuze, 1988 p35). The diagram signifies the myriad non-unifying relations of force that traverse the entire social field, and it is the multitude of events that have not been attributed statements, that have not been formalised. Diffuse, it is indicative of the present and near present, a perpetual immanence that changes and shapes history.

Power produces knowledge. Power “produces reality before it represses. Equally it produces truth before it ideologizes, abstracts or masks” (ibid, p29). Within the context of the diagram institutions have two roles, “they organize, in effect, the grand visibilities, the field of visibility, the grand narratives, the regime of the enoncés” (Bove in Deleuze, 1988, pxxx). Relations between forces merge to create concrete assemblages, integrations that to begin with are local become homogenised and global. Education is one example of a finalised function of the coming together of such power relations. Another is the prison. But as Deleuze explains,

“Ultimately this realization and integration is differentiation: not because the cause being realized would be a sovereign Unit, but on the contrary because the diagrammatic multiplicity can be realized and the differential of forces integrated only by taking diverging paths, splitting into dualisms, and
following lines of differentiation without which everything would remain in the dispersion of an unrealized cause” (1988, pp37-38).

This fundamental differentiation is very important in Foucault’s thinking, particularly in relation to his conception of knowledge and subjectivity. In Foucault’s thinking a gap opens up that Foucault refers to as a non-place. This is “as Foucault puts it – where the informal diagram is swallowed up and becomes embodied instead in two different directions that are necessarily divergent and irreducible” (ibid, p38). It is through this arrangement and differentiation of the play of forces which are constitutive of the diagram “that we see the great dualities: between the different classes, or the governing and the governed, or the public and the private. But, more than this, it is here that two forms of realization diverge or become differentiated: a form of expression and a form of content, a discourse and a non-discursive form, the form of the visible and the form of the articulable” (ibid, p38).

Broadly, Foucault’s epistemological emphasis is derived from this fundamental duality, from how power’s strategic deployment formalises the relationship between articulated statements and visibilities (non-discursive statements) and gives form to knowledge, and the implications these arrangements have for what can be known. It is within this context that Foucault argues that thought itself is an event: it is never a concept. The conditions for statements have been highlighted in Chapter Five. What needs to be recognised at this point is that “the conditions pertaining to visibility are not the way in which a subject sees: the subject who sees is himself a place within a visibility (as in the place of the King in classical representation, or the place of any observer in a prison system)” (ibid, p57). Visibilities are non-discursive statements and as such are removed from the author function; they are flashes of luminosity that pertain to a historical episteme, so “everything that has just been said about the statement must also be said about visibility. For if, in their turn, visibilities are never hidden, they are none the less not immediately seen or visible. They are invisible so long as we consider only objects, things or perceptible qualities, and not the conditions which open them up” (ibid, p57). Both the articulable and visibilities are forms of knowledge that are irreducible to each other, they always remain separate, like Magritte’s pipe which can exist both as a statement and a visibility though the statement ‘pipe’; the pipe
as visibility and as statement always remain distinct forms of knowledge because the word as statement is never really reducible to the visual form. Deleuze states:

"All knowledge runs from a visible element to an articulable one, and vice versa; yet there is no such thing as a common totalizing form, not even a conformity or bi-univocal correspondence. There is only a relation of forces which acts transversally and finds in the duality of forms the condition for its own realization" (ibid, p39).

For Foucault each historical *episteme* can be distinguished by the statements, both discursive and non-discursive, that it generates, as well as by the statements that it is no longer possible for it to make. This break at which certain things can no longer be said or made visible represents the threshold of an epistemological era. The knowledge that has been laid down, the statements that accrue, and the forms made visible by each age are what Foucault refers to as strata. Deleuze states:

“Knowledge is not a science and cannot be separated from the various thresholds in which it is caught up, including even the experience of perception, the values of imagination, the prevailing ideas or commonly held beliefs. Knowledge is the unity of the stratum which is distributed throughout the different thresholds, the stratum itself existing only as the stacking-up of these thresholds beneath different orientations, of which science is only one. There are only practices, or positivities, which are constitutive of knowledge: the discursive practices of statements, or the non-discursive practices of visibilities” (ibid, p51).

In everyday life in the modern *episteme*, institutions strategically use and distribute power by investing it in some and not in others through the awarding of status and the reproduction of statements from which knowledge is determined and formalised. It is through institutions as sites of application of power that the human sciences act on human identity, increasingly through moralising and disciplinary techniques that are procedural and intended to condition how individuals are made subjects and how subjects are to be individuated, that is, arranged through processes of evaluation and examination. For Deleuze, “Foucault's fundamental idea is that of a dimension of subjectivity derived from power and knowledge without being dependent on them” (ibid, p101). Individuals are positioned on a grid, arranged according to degrees of domination and submission and through the strategic use of power identities are formed and worked on, and the self that is shaped by both power and knowledge involves negative and positive effects. Yet for Foucault “there will always be a relation to
oneself which resists codes and powers; the relation to oneself is even one of the origins of these points of resistance [..]” (ibid, p103). Key to understanding what Foucault is driving at is the role he attributes to seeing and saying as distinguishable from the articulable and visibilities. These are not different ways of saying the same thing. Broadly, it is helpful to think of one as being related to the strata that is to the forms of knowledge that any historical era can apprehend as its intersubjective composition, while seeing and saying should be thought of in relation to forms of thought concerned more intimately with subjectivity.

For Foucault thinking is a dice-throw and there is nothing behind knowledge, “everything is knowledge, and this is the reason why there is no ‘savage experience’: there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge. But knowledge is irreducibly double since it involves speaking and seeing, language and light, which is the reason why there is no intentionality” (ibid, p109). Deleuze credits Foucault with completing this understanding of how the self automates a self; Foucault, influenced by the thinking of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger shifts the way in which the self is conceived in philosophy from a phenomenological to an epistemological approach. In fact Deleuze states that “there is a final rediscovery of Heidegger by Foucault” (ibid, p107). Always distrustful of phenomenology, Foucault recognises in Heidegger’s thinking a shift from the phenomenological to the ontological sphere. Deleuze argues that “everything takes place as though Foucault were reproaching Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for going too quickly” (ibid, p112). Intentionality is fine if philosophical analysis functions at the level of the proposition or the phrase but it can have no role to play at the level of the statement because “all intentionality collapses in the gap that opens up between these two monads, or in the ‘non-relation’ between seeing and speaking” (ibid, p109). Intentionality can only put into the object of apperception an already finalised form as the irreducible duality between the forms of knowledge and forms of thought will have already been attributed an accepted form by the time intentionality becomes significant, that is, before intentionality, power will have already done its work. In his appraisal of the similarities and the differences between Foucault’s and Heidegger’s thinking, Deleuze states, “we can evaluate them only by taking as our point of departure Foucault’s break with phenomenology in the ‘vulgar’ sense of the term: with intentionality. The idea that consciousness is directed towards the thing and gains significance in the world is
precisely what Foucault refuses to believe” (ibid, p108). For Foucault, knowledge is the decisive factor and knowledge must come from the outside, there is nothing beneath knowledge but there is an outside of knowledge, the diagram. Time is subjectivity itself but the form that subjectivity takes is not conjured by the soon to be individual from within, or projected though consciousness and intentionality onto the world. It must come from the outside in the dual forms of knowledge and the finalised form given by the formalisation of the diagram that constitute knowledge for each episteme. And it is against this background that thinking assumes its aleatory role. This is why Foucault thinks of subjectivity in terms of the fold rather than that of intentionality. “Memory is the real name of the relation to oneself, or the effect of self by self.” (ibid, p107).

The fold is subjectivity. It is the self, an abstract figurative representation of the self which highlights the self’s relation to the play of forces that are the outside. The self affects the self through instigating and constituting a memory of the self which is perpetually forgotten and reconstituted. Deleuze explains:

“But time as subject, or rather subjectivation, is called memory. Not that brief memory that comes afterwards and is the opposite of forgetting, but the ‘absolute memory’ which doubles the present and the outside and is one with forgetting, since it is itself endlessly forgotten and reconstituted: its fold, in fact, merges with the unfolding, because the latter remains present with the former as the thing that is folding. Only forgetting (the unfolding) recovers what is folded in memory (and in the fold itself)” (ibid, p107).

There is a noticeable similarity here with Heidegger’s ideas of irresoluteness and resoluteness as the self that forgets the fold unfolds and merges with the outside, and folds once again remembering its constancy and retaining within its interiority, the outside which conditions and influences its subjectivity. Deleuze explains:

“Time becomes a subject because it is the folding of the outside and, as such, forces every present into forgetting, but preserves the whole of the past within memory: forgetting is the impossibility of return, and memory is the necessity of renewal. For a long time Foucault thought of the outside as being an ultimate spatiality that was deeper than time; but in his late works he offers the possibility once more of putting time on the outside conditioned by the fold” (ibid, p108).

The fold as self is where two irreducible forms of knowledge and thought compete and in this double capture a knowledge-being is constituted. In the gap between
forms of knowledge and thought where informal forces reside, a battle rages between the articulable and the visible and between what is seen and what is said. This is a battle for supremacy for the formation of truths, and in this battle the statement that has primacy. More often than not, it is the articulable and the verbal statement that shapes the truth in relation to what is visible and seen. Power determines the outcome of such battles as the statement predominantly finds its repetition and formalisation in the functioning of institutions. For the Knowledge-Being “this is the source of the battle for its possible existence. This is the strategic domain of power, as opposed to the stratic domain of knowledge. From epistemology to strategy” (ibid, p112). Thus emerges a “second figure of being, the ‘Possest,’ Power-Being, as opposed to Knowledge-Being” (ibid, p112). For Foucault, knowledge, power, and self are irreducible to each other “yet constantly imply one another” (ibid, p114). Knowledge and power imply a self, power and self imply knowledge, and self and knowledge imply power, and all three imply thought. As Deleuze states:

“In truth, one thing haunts Foucault – thought. The question: ‘What does thinking signify? What do we call thinking?’ is the arrow first fired by Heidegger and then again by Foucault. He writes a history, but a history of thought as such. To think means to experiment and to problematize. Knowledge, power and the self are the triple root of a problematization of thought” (ibid, 116).

Thinking is what occurs in the interstice between seeing and saying. Thinking also places a limit on each of these separate forms of thought and knowledge. The outside of knowledge is “a turbulent stormy zone where particular points and the relations of forces between these points are tossed about. Strata merely collected and solidified the visual dust and sonic echo of the battle raging above them” (ibid, p 121). It is here in this gap where the informal forces of the outside do battle that thinking occurs and competes with truth. The visible is a place without a story and the voice is a story without a place, “truth is defined neither by conformity or common form, nor by the correspondence between two forms” (ibid, p64). It is power that defines truth, the power to influence what is said over what is seen and vice versa. “Truth offers itself to knowledge only through a series of problematizations’ and these problematizations are created only on the basis of ‘practices’, practices of seeing and speaking” (ibid, p64). In the modern episteme, the struggle for an autonomous subjectivity, in as much as it can be autonomous, is
a resistance to the constraints of individualisation and the shackles of being attributed a fixed identity once and for all. The individual can become a pawn which is "coded or recoded within a ‘moral’ knowledge, and above all becomes the stake in a power struggle" (ibid, p103). The self's relation to the self can become another power relation or proxy battle in another’s epistemology or in another’s formalisation of what might otherwise be diagrammatic. The fold unfolds and each time it folds again, it encounters the outside on the inside, “to think is to fold, to double the outside with a coextensive inside” (ibid, p118). In thinking there is a resistance and there is a degree of differentiation each time the fold brings the outside into the inside, it gives form to a new subjectivity. Thinking is the present and it is aleatory, “thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able to finally ‘think otherwise’ (the future)” (ibid, p119).

The issue here is how can education as a practice that teaches or reveals knowledge, that is, that teaches or reveals what has accrued in each stratum, the conditions and influences that have given rise to knowledges about the world can avoid reducing that aleatory dimension that in Foucault’s view defines what it is to think, and therefore to some degree resist the formalised knowledges and formalising institutions of the outside. The argument forwarded here is that the distinction between education and indoctrination is revealed in the curtailment of the aleatory nature of thinking and the entelechy entailed in Heidegger’s account of being; this is what represents a transgression of the function of the education space. This is because psychologising and socialisation not only adulterate the student role by transforming it into that of the patient or delinquent, they also in their more strident disciplinary functions attempt to inculcate ‘truths’, that is, finalised forms that are intended to minimise or eliminate the incongruence between seeing and saying. There is an implicit assumption relating to the arrangement of statements, both discursive and non-discursive, that prescribe a prevailing and narrow moral, social, and political order. They prescribe truths that are intended to negate the aleatory and contentious qualities that will manifest if thinking is not circumscribed. This also confines the conditions for possibility both for the subject and collective life and it has ramifications for the formation of subjectivity, as this political reality always involves a more intense series of prescriptions for those who are at the base of the social order. Is this not what is
meant by a socialised education arranged to accommodate and frame existence within a social milieu? Is this not what is entailed in Durkheim’s and Habermas’ institutionalised individual? Of course the most ardent and passionate psychologist or social scientist can never be sure that they have limited thought and thinking to prescribed ideas because the methods of measurement that place the ‘student’ within an ordering is determined almost entirely on the basis of what is said. With this correlates an aesthetic judgment, that is, what is seen and the way in which it relates to social norms and ‘scientific’ truths. And all this leads to another of Foucault’s key concepts, the ancient Greek notion of *parrhesia*. It is through an analysis of the concept of *parrhesia* that a transgression can finally be revealed.

Foucault has always been interested in the functioning of truths, in the production of knowledge/power, and in the manifestation of power/knowledge in a finalised form. For Foucault truth is not thought of as a definitive account of what is, instead truth is indicative of a problematic. For Foucault, to fully understand truth requires recognition of its inherent heterogeneity. Whether, as for the Cynics, for whom truth entailed recognition of another autarkic form of existence, or, as with Christianity where truth resides in an entirely different world, there is always a notion of an ‘other’ connected with the question of truth, “an other life for an other world” (Foucault, 2011, p287). This is also the case for socialisation and therapeutic practices; the ideas of socialisation and therapeutic education must by definition assume the existence of a different dysfunctional and erroneous truth, as socialisation involves a contestation of truths. This problematic concerned with the issue of truth is one in which the Psy-function asserts itself as the predominant power. It is this problematic relationship to truth that allows for a concept such as parrhesia to have its significance, not just for the Greeks and early Christianity but, as is always the case with Foucault’s histories, its relevance pertains to the present. More specifically, in this thesis, this concept is used as an analytical tool to distinguish between genuine education and socialisation in its prescriptive form, that is, between education and indoctrination. Truth presupposes an ‘other’. This other may be in the contestation between the seen and the said, or between different forms of thought and knowledge, or in the institutional arrangements that formalise truths, employing strategic action to give a finalised form and to resolve the contestation between forms of knowledge and the aleatory nature of thinking. With truth, dominance is represented through the strategic functioning of
power at the expense of the subjugated forms of knowledge that are rendered mute. Power is the action which traverses institutional structures and which prejudices thinking; for both, truth is the prize. Dominance claims truth as its property, resistance claims truth as its champion, both constitute a problematic. A future historian might look back on such contestation, such a struggle, as evidence of the truth of our time.

In education today it appears that truth has increasingly become the property of the human sciences. As the therapeutic function is coupled with a psychological conception of learning, it becomes more pervasive. Traditional and cultural values are diminished, partly due to administrative intrusion, and educational institutions wash their hands of their educational function and herald the Psy-function as arbitrator and pre-emptive evaluator of contentious socio-political issues that require at least an ostensibly ‘neutral’ yet authoritative voice, that is, the ersatz voice of the sovereign family. There has been a proliferation of therapeutic approaches to education; mental health agencies increasingly point to the education space as a seedbed of conditions, syndromes, and disorders. Education is seen by some as a means to encourage tolerance and understanding of mental illness through this therapeutic approach to education in general. Resistances to psychologising and therapeutic encroachments into the education space are viewed as symptomatic of repression, or as an indication that someone is ‘in denial’. It doesn’t matter what they are in denial of because ‘denial’ itself has become a medical affliction. In modern society the diminishment of cultural and social systems, more often than not, lead to perceptions that suggest incapacity or failure within the education system. The term education becomes both a contribution to and the amelioration for crime, for substance abuse, for precocious sex, pre-marital pregnancy, lack of sporting prowess, economic decline, and almost any other form of discourse that becomes salient in relation to social and moral discordance. ‘Luckily’, there is an astonishing array of experts with qualifications in Social Sciences who can intervene – Foucault has described well the dangers of such claims to expertise. Education proper and educational institutions try to navigate these competing claims and discourses, but increasingly the timidity (and self-interest) of those involved in education as well as the wider public has contributed to the subjugation of genuine educational discourse which now appears closer to what Foucault would call a subjugated knowledge, ridiculed for
its educational aspirations. So what are the consequences for the student and for the prospect of genuine education in the face of such a plethora of new and continuously changing truths and discourses?

Foucault traces the use of the word parrhesia back to Euripides. Broadly, it means free speech, but it refers more specifically to a very particular form of free speech which is that of truth telling. Foucault’s interest resides in the role of the truth teller, rather than in some definitive conception of truth. To be a parrhesiast, the truth-teller must not only tell the truth but the truth must be told under certain conditions, conditions that entail a risk for the parrhesiast. The parrhesiast must reveal the truth that they know either in relation to themselves, in relation to someone else, or in relation to the world in which they reside. If parrhesia is considered in light of Foucault’s account of the aleatory nature of thinking, the truth the parrhesiast reveals must coincide with what they believe to be true and also what can be verified as truth. For the parrhesiast to exercise parrhesia the truth they reveal must be different to the truth which has been accepted as truth by the dominant power. It must be different to the truth upon which authority rests, and in revealing this truth the parrhesiast exposes himself or herself to harm or even death, for the use of parrhesia must entail a risk to the parrhesiast.

Status has a role to play in the power arrangements that allow for parrhesia. For example, the King or the tyrant cannot use parrhesia because they risk nothing, and so too “the parrhesiast is not the professor or teacher; the expert who speaks of tekhné in the name of tradition” (ibid, p25). Handing down knowledge and skills to the next generation does not involve parrhesia. This practice does not require the teacher to tell the truth about themselves, neither does a genuinely educational function or discourse, that is, educational conversation does not involve the student revealing something of his own life that would entail a risk. Parrhesia does not pertain to the subject-matter of genuine education, it is superfluous to the tekhné, and parrhesia has no relevance to a discursive formation that can be properly understood as genuinely educational. Genuine education does not invite the parrhesiastic role from the teacher or the student even though there is an imbalance in power in the functioning of education, there is a status that is based on knowledge of the subject-matter that is integral this relationship.
With socialisation, it is not a case of parrhesia being superfluous; instead it is a matter of parrhesia being denied. With the socialisation and therapeutic functions both of which seek to bring about the same end, a greater degree of conformity, the student as actual or potential delinquent or patient is, on the one hand, required or pressured to tell the truth as it coincides with his or her thinking. But this is an invitation that cannot be considered a parrhesiastic contract whereby risk is put in abeyance. It is an invitation that invariably provokes a negative consequence if the truth revealed does not coincide with the prevailing normative structure or the interlocutor’s beliefs. So in this way parrhesia is denied. The student as delinquent or patient will be categorised, classified, documented and ranked as being deficient in some sense. Their statements will be considered a reflection of their lives and assessed critically against the normative evaluation of the therapist or social scientist. Because no possibility of a truth that counters or resists the prescribed truths of the social scientist will be countenanced, there is no possibility for the conditions to exist for what Foucault refers to as the parrhesiastic game. Despite all double-speak of the psychologist or therapist, the therapeutic-socialisation function is inseparable from the examination, an examination that qualifies or disqualifies, not on the basis of an objective subject-matter but on the basis of the life of the student-patient of the student-delinquent. The parrhesiastic function is disqualified by the socialisation and psychologising functions because parrhesiastic truth will and by definition must always be unfavourably judged and categorised; it will always entail a negative outcome for the truth-teller. Foucault states:

“For in parrhēsia the danger always comes from the fact that the said truth is capable of hurting or angering the interlocutor. Parrhēsia is thus always a “game” between the one who speaks the truth and the interlocutor” (Foucault, 2001, p17).

Despite therapeutic rhetorics of equality and mutual learning experiences between therapist and patient, all the risk is with the patient because “the function of parrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but has the function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or of the speaker himself” (ibid, p17). The relationship between the psychologist, therapist, or counsellor and the student-patient or delinquent is always hierarchical because one situates the other within a disciplinary grid on the basis of what is said. But there is also another condition of
parrhesia that the Psy-function cannot accommodate, which is that for parrhesia to be deployed, the student as delinquent or patient must not be forced to speak, they must retain the right to silence (although for Lacan this would not curtail evaluation if that is what is chosen), as when “someone is compelled to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a parrhesiastic utterance” (ibid, p19). There is a relation between parrhesia and freedom, as, although the parrhesiast occupies a lower status than his interlocutor, he must nevertheless be free to choose whether to use parrhesia or not, he or she must also possess the right to use parrhesia. Socialisation and psychological analysis will always entail a degree of compulsion and coercion which is why they make conspicuous gestures of voluntarism that tend to be specious within certain institutional arrangements.

Criticism in the parrhesiastic sense is a very risky business for anyone who opposes psychiatric power. Whether the patient or delinquent voice is from within the asylum, the prison, or the school, the employment of parrhesia without a parrhesiastic contract will prompt inimical consequences which often masquerade as further ‘therapy’. Cure is evidenced by degrees of agreement. An obvious example might be the psychoanalytical claim that criticism is merely transference, or a criticism of the educational therapist is an indication of denial or low self-esteem, that is a further indication of a flawed personality trait. To show how a denial of parrhesia is connected to relegation in status, Foucault highlights Euripides’ play The Phoenician Women. Here he shows how a denial of parrhesia is akin to be reduced to the status of a slave. He states, “If you do not have the right of free speech, you are unable to exercise any kind of power, and thus you are in the same situation as a slave. Further: if such citizens cannot use parrhesia, they cannot oppose a ruler’s power” (ibid, p29). This is the position in which psychiatric power has always held the madman, and it is fundamental to the authority that the Psy-function exercises in therapeutic education. In Euripides’ play, Jocasta, the mother of Polyneices, asks about the suffering he had to endure during exile, Polyneices replies, that “the worst is this: the right to free speech does not exist” (ibid, p29). To be deprived of the capacity to offer criticism is to be denied a critical role in society, as it is to “endure the idiocy of those who rule” (ibid, p29). The Psy-function in education introduces a skewed form of discursivity into the education space. It is the introduction of the disciplinary function in a way that encroaches on
the most personal and private spheres of existence with the aim of inserting a truth and with the aim of arranging a conscience, such that statements can be policed and so that the unpredictability of the event that is called thinking is curtailed. Its political efficacy resides in the reduction of resistance to the silent realm of the subject’s soul. This is a disciplinary power that denies and forecloses criticism. It cannot allow a criticism that undermines its ‘scientific’ authority. It is a disciplinary power that assumes a sovereign function “and without the right of criticism, the power exercised by a sovereign is without limitation. Such power without limitation is characterized by Jocasta as “joining fools in their foolishness.” For power without limitation is directly related to madness” (ibid, p19). Psychiatric power is the coupling of internalisation with the denial of parrhesia and this is the face of indoctrination that can be found in therapeutic education.

If it can be agreed that education is the attainment of knowledge about the world, that is, what the various strata have come to signify and how such significance has come about. If it can be agreed that this aleatory, unpredictable aspect of thinking opens up conditions for possibility, whether through innovation and invention, as the fundamental element of research and searching that allows humans to transcend what is already known. If it can be agreed that resistance and the potentiality entailed in thinking suggests the most rudimentary and ultimately inalienable form of autonomy of the subject, a resistance which opens the way to a questioning of pre-established truths, and a questioning of formerly unchallenged beliefs that will be the benefit of both the subject and the collective, then it becomes apparent how very important this concept of parrhesia becomes in helping to distinguish education from indoctrination. If advancement, progress, and opening up of the conditions for possibility are inextricable from the purpose of education, then it is difficult to see how education could not encourage the aleatory component of thinking, and alternatively, it is difficult to see how indoctrination with its emphasis on the internalisation of prescribed truths could be considered anything other than the curtailment of this aleatory function, that is, as anything other than an attempt to create an impression that seeing and saying naturally merge into universal truths. Indoctrination is the internalisation of truths designed to negate the unpredictability of thinking. But indoctrination has its limitations, it cannot ever be certain that it has adequately policed thinking. All it can evaluate are utterances and statements. It can suppress free speech, it can
police the propagation of unsanctioned truths with a view to ultimately suppress the act of thinking, and it can in this way diminish the inherent risk in the unpredictability of the thinking event. The fundamental premise of this thesis is that this is precisely what psychology and the social sciences do in, and represent for, the educational space. The therapeutic colonisation of ‘education’ is in fact fundamentally anti-educational.
Conclusion
Conclusion

“We did not know when I was ten of eleven years old whether we would become German or remain French. When I was sixteen or seventeen, I knew only one thing: school life was an environment protected from exterior menaces, from politics” (Foucault cited in Hengehold, 2007, p11).

This thesis has argued that though education is a discipline, it involves a discourse that is distinct from politics and the other disciplinary mechanisms that have their methodology in a political ordering. Unfortunately, today Foucault’s school experience seems rather idyllic. The school and its raison d’être education have become a political football by introducing too many influences and discourses into the education space which serve agendas that need to be questioned. The aim of this thesis was to show what a transgression of the education space involves. The argument forwarded here is that though the curriculum will and probably must be an issue of political contention, it is important that the environment in which education is conducted be protected from external menaces and agendas, from politics and social engineering, and, most importantly, from discourses that diminish the educational experience not only for the student but also for the teacher. It is important that the educational space remains an environment that is dedicated to the practice of education, that is, education in its genuine sense. Education in its genuine sense, in its untainted discourse, holds a beneficial promise that other forms of discourse with non-educational objectives which offer different objects of discourse than those the student will find compelling. It can be advantageous for disciplinary functions to masquerade as a form of ‘education’. Socialisation and psychologising techniques and agendas find a raison d’être within the field of education but only by intensifying the disciplinary gaze upon those that are most marginalised, those whose bodies have come to represent abnormality. This is a consequence of the way in which education has come to be construed as ‘therapeutic’, understood here in its socialisation and psychologising sense to mean a normalising form of political coercion. Therefore, in order to highlight what a transgression of the education space is it was necessary to define both education and indoctrination as distinctive practices.
Through Durkheim it has been argued that there are ways of thinking about the subject in relation to the collective that serve as pre-conditions for an appropriation of the educational function. Indeed, both Durkheim and Habermas believe education's primary purpose is sociological and serves a political interest. Education is thought of as a means to secure political stability, to secure an ordering and to condition change. The belief in an impersonal, abiding, and ideally universal authority becomes a feature of the diminution of the subject both in relation to the collective, and the student in relation to the educational institution, coming to fashion the objectives of education. This conception of an authority figure is indispensable to both the social sciences and the psychiatric function. For the social sciences, the belief in the abiding authority will be external. With Durkheim, it is a conception of a quasi-mystical social force, more commonly it is the inculcation of a sense of society that is referred to. For Habermas this authority can be derived from the functioning of agreement in language. For the psychiatric and psychologising function, this abiding authority will be derived from the idea of an existential a priori embedded in a conception of the unconscious. It will be internal in this sense. In fact, the location of their source of authority is the most fundamental distinction to be made between the social sciences and psychology.

Both the sociological and psychologising disciplines appropriate this notion of an impersonal, abiding and universal authority and employ it in the service of specific, pragmatic, instrumental, and political interests. It has been employed by Durkheim, Lacan, and Habermas in a way that suggests that its authority is beyond reproach, both unquestioned and unquestionable yet beyond the ken of those on whom it is exercised. Through a critique of Lacan, the scientific basis of such an authority and the unquestioned credentials of such disciplines are brought into question.

Time has several functions in this thesis. Time is offered as a more plausible explanation for the Cartesian bifurcation from which psychoanalysis in particular derives its expertise and scientific authority. Time is also employed as an alternative analytical approach to evaluating the nature of the relationship between the subject and the collective. It has been argued that theories that postulate a primacy for an impersonal social framework involve a contradiction which values the constituted as a precondition of the constituting. In the educational environment placing a primacy on a concept that has been predicated
on the ideas of intersubjective commonality or social force invites discursive formations that will evaluate the life of the ‘student’ in relation to political initiatives and requirements. These are presented as normative social requirements so that education is not understood in relation to the student’s time in engagement with the educational subject-matter. In this way the student’s time as student is devalued, it is made impersonal, and it is appropriated to serve purposes that are non-educational. This has led to a focus on objects of discourse, other than the ‘student’, namely the ‘patient’ and the ‘delinquent’, leading the language of education to be medicalized and pathologized. ‘Education’ thus becomes concerned with the policing of potentiality rather than an enhancement of the conditions for possibility and the aleatory nature of thinking.

Through Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, it has been argued that time is subjectivity, and subjectivity is time. This suggests time is a much more precious factor than its common, objective, and vulgar conceptions of it would suggest. Time is not simply a conceptual artefact to be commoditised or siphoned away for ulterior purposes. In the educational space the expropriation of time requires justification on educational grounds, not political ones. Through Heidegger it has been argued that time as a feature of the ‘they’ world can come to subsume the subject. Time and how it is thought of is significant in distinguishing genuine education from socialisation, and its relevance to conscience and potentiality helps reveal indoctrinating functions. Genuine education is specific to the duration in which the subject is student. Socialisation and indoctrination will always relate to a timeframe that transcends the role of the student. Most importantly, a failure to recognise time in its authentic form as subjectivity allows for a conception of conscience that can become expropriated through socialisation and psychologising functions. This is particularly relevant with regard to those whose bodies allow for political imaginings and aesthetic judgments that differ from the ‘norm’.

Through Foucault it is argued that power is exercised in all human relations and that there is always an imbalance in these relations of power which weighs most heavily on those who cannot be easily incorporated within the disciplinary grid. Foucault showed how education is a disciplinary apparatus, and this no doubt is how education functions in a society. This thesis has argued that education although is indeed a disciplinary function, it is also a practice to which many other
disciplinary functions have become attached. However, when practiced in its genuine sense, education is a particular form of discourse that is sufficiently distinct in its relationship with the subject as student as to be an entirely separate discursive formation to that of socialisation, which ought never to be confused with education. Durkheim, Habermas and Foucault showed how education can be the site of a struggle for social and political dominance. Through an analysis of education within the prison it was argued that those who are most in need of genuine education are denied it, because education, defined in this thesis as a form of discourse the object of which is the student falls prey to more hegemonic discursive formations which have different objects of discourse, such as the delinquent, the criminal or the patient. Socialisation packaged as education is tantamount to a denial of education.

Autonomy has been a constant theme throughout this thesis. There is a correlation between a diminution of the subject, in relation to a denial of his or her status as student, and indoctrination. It was argued that internalisation is a prerequisite of both Durkheim’s and Habermas’ conceptions of autonomy. This measure, when coupled with a denial of the functioning of power in its strategic manifestation, will lead to what Berlin has described as a monstrous impersonation. However, for Foucault there is no autonomy. Not only are all human relations power relations, all knowledge (savoir) is predicated on power - power is a determinative of knowledge and knowledge (connaissance) creates power: we are all caught up in a disciplinary grid. Even if there is no autonomy, there is resistance. Power only exists when it is exercised on another force. Resistance is a form of power, and without power there can be no knowledge. Education requires resistance, because to think is to resist. Conversely, socialisation involves the policing of statements and is closely related to indoctrination which is an attempt to curtail thinking and inculcate truths through internalisation. Parrhesia, as it was for the ancient Greeks, is the distinction between those in whom power becomes invested and those who have only the power of their abnormal bodies. The subject will always resist, but he or she can be muted. If there is a site for autonomy, then education is its battleground. It is the struggle to adequately give expression to thinking. Therefore education in its genuine function, even as a subjugated discourse, must always facilitate and celebrate this most autonomous of endeavours.
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