A Complicated Birth: the Northern Ireland Ministry of Education, 1921-1925.

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Candidate's Declaration

This thesis is entirely my own work, based on research in primary and secondary sources.

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Abstract

The primary purpose of this thesis is to establish the extent to which the development of the nascent Ministry of Education (M.O.E.) in Northern Ireland (N.I.) was defined by its relationship with the Roman Catholic (R.C.) Church, the Protestant Churches, and the Irish Free State (I.F.S.) Government, 1921-1925. This work's research will argue that the refusal of the Catholic and Protestant Churches to accept the non-denominational 1923 Education Act (also known as the Londonderry Act) is critical to understanding the genesis of the state's education policy and the perpetuation of segregated education. This thesis will in turn assess how the ministry's relationship with these groups helped to shape northern society. The ministry's profound influence on N.I.'s process of state building and the consequences of its fraught, and often acerbic, relationship with the Free State Government will also undergo rigorous analysis.

Due to the complicated and problematic history, of education in Ireland, this study will begin with an overview of its early history to point to the important trends and developments that were repeated in N.I. after 1920. How the Free State Government's orchestrated heel dragging on the transfer of services (staff and documents) strained cross-border relations and diminished the M.O.E.'s capacity to administrate effectively will be examined. An investigation of the I.F.S.'s illicit payment of Catholic teachers in N.I. from February to August 1922, designed to undermine the M.O.E., will demonstrate how already fractious relations would worsen. This will also allow for an examination of how the Dublin Department of Education's (D.O.E.) Gaelicisation of education influenced education policy and state building in both jurisdictions. The extended consequences for teachers, the perennial casualties throughout this period, and the future of teacher training on the island of Ireland, will be examined.

Chapter 4 will assess the rationale behind, and the consequences of, the R.C. Church's refusal to cooperate with the new ministry, and the Lynn Committee, which was tasked with proposing future structures for education in N.I. This will also provide context for its position in post-partition Ireland. Analysis of the Unionist government's introduction of Promissory Oaths for teachers, and rules forbidding the exhibition of religious emblems in schools, will provide an understanding of the tensions that existed between the R.C. Church and the state. How the implementation of these policies exacerbated the extant belligerence of R.C. managed schools will be investigated, thus contributing to wider understanding of the Catholic authorities' claims that they would not be treated fairly in the northern state.

The Protestant churches' relationships with the ministry were more complex, given that they were loyal to the state and the Crown and therefore sought to fight their collective battle from within the system. This thesis will examine the rationale for the clerics' vigorous agitation to have the 1923 act amended to allow for segregated education. This study will argue that the Lynn Committee created their recommendations knowing that they would be rejected by Lord Londonderry. This was part of a long-term strategy to facilitate their later objections to the recommendations' omission from the bill. Their rationale for a more regular and forceful use of the Orange Order to exert their considerable power to pressurise the government on their behalf will also be considered. The intricate workings of the triumvirate, consisting of the Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and the U.U.P., will be carefully examined to determine how they were interdependent on each other, while also being central to all negotiations, and their outcomes. Finally, this will show how the battle to amend the act saw the political demise of Lord Londonderry, and with it, the lost potential that non-denominational education had to offer for future generations.

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Abbreviations

C.L.G.B.	County Grand Lodge of Belfast
C.E.S.	Church Education Society (Set up by the C of I)
C.O.F.L.A.	Cardinal O'Fiach Library and Archive
C. of I.	Church of Ireland
D.O.E.	Department of Education
I.R.A.	Irish Republican Army
I.N.T.O.	Irish National Teachers' Organisation
M.O.E.	Ministry of Education
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.E.O.	National Education Office Dublin
N.A.I.	National Archives of Ireland, Dublin
N.I.	Northern Ireland
P.R.	Proportional Representation
P.R.O.N.I.	Public Record Office of Northern Ireland
R.C.	Roman Catholic
U.C.D.A.	University College Dublin Archives
U.E.C.	United Education Committee of the Protestant Churches
U.U.P.	Ulster Unionist Party

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Introduction

> I am aware only too acutely that this book will have to be rewritten − by another – in thirty to fifty years when the government of Northern Ireland finally allows access to its education files for the first half of this [twentieth] century.[1]

The statement, from Donald Akenson's tour de force, *Education and enmity: The control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920–50* is, in many regards, the catalyst for this study. It will heed Akenson's call for a much-needed reappraisal of the development of early primary education policy in N.I.[2] The place of education amongst the controversies surrounding the partition of Ireland has, often, gone unrecognised. By examining primary education, this study will consider how the development of the nascent Ministry of Education (M.O.E.) in N.I. was defined and restricted by its troubled relationships with the Irish Free State (I.F.S.) government, the Roman Catholic (R.C.) Church, and the three main Protestant churches; the Church of Ireland, (C. of I.) the Presbyterian and the Methodist Church, between 1921 and 1925.[3] Primary education has been chosen as it was central to a three-way conflict, and was the only level of education legally required by all children. A thorough investigation of the relationships between the state and the churches will establish the extent to which they hindered the development of the ministry and impacted on the implementation of its minister's policies during its first four years of existence. A key figure was Lord Londonderry, appointed as the first minister for education at the first sitting of the N.I. parliament on 7 June 1921. He introduced the 1923 Education Act, commonly known as the Londonderry Act, passing into law on 2 June of that year. It was intended to implement a non-denominational system of education in the new state. Despite there being limited, albeit important, work published on educational developments in N.I., this is the first study focused solely on the development of the M.O.E. for this period.[4]

The politics of education on the island of Ireland has been addressed in two seminal works: Donal Akenson, *Education and enmity* and Sean Farren, *The politics of Irish education,*

[1] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973), pp 9-10.
[2] Ibid.
[3] The terms M.O.E. and ministry will be used in the case of Northern Ireland. The term D.O.E and department will be used in the case of the I.F.S.
[4] S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-1965* (Belfast, 1995); Akenson, *Education and enmity*.

1920–65.[5] Farren points out that before his 1995 publication, Akenson's *Education and enmity* and *A mirror to Kathleen's face* were the only works to examine educational developments on both sides of the border in post-partition Ireland.[6] Farren's work sets out to 'evaluate the educational policies and developments' on bon both sides of the border, with only the first four chapters covering the period under review in this study.[7] These works did not intend to examine the daily workings of the ministry, meaning that relatively little attention was paid to their finer details. Further, this work will provide a detailed examination of the development of the M.O.E. in a cross-border context. The relationship between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. has not, thus far, received any detailed scholarly attention. Close examination of correspondence between Belfast and Dublin, and internal memoranda, will highlight the origins of the acrimonious relationship and the role of prominent individuals. These communications, held in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (P.R.O.N.I.) and the National Archives of Ireland (N.A.I.), expose the challenges of state-building and the difficulties surrounding the transfer of staff and services. [8]

The problematic relationship between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E will be examined first, followed by an examination of the R.C. Church, and lastly the Protestant churches. As the events generally followed sequentially, with a few exceptions due to the overlapping nature of events such as teacher training, a chronological approach has been employed. Sequential clarity is central to this work's objectives, for two reasons. Firstly, the thesis will analyse the M.O.E.'s relationship with the D.O.E. and Provisional Government, and secondly, the M.O.E.'s relationship with the R.C. Church and Protestant churches through a detailed examination of archival correspondence and memoranda.[9] Once the natural chronology of the material was established, it allowed for a fuller examination of policy development, and internal and external reactions to those policies. There is no equivalent study to date which has employed this method. It was chosen to provide a clear continuity of events while tracking the significant

[5] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*.
[6] D. Akenson, *A Mirror to Kathleen's face* (Abington, 1975).
[7] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. xii.
[8] Ministry of Education memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19); Ministry of Education memos on Provisional Government paying Catholic teachers in N.I.,16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19; ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[9] Some of the archival resources used: Cabinet Secretariat Northern Ireland (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB); Department of Education Northern Ireland (P.R.O.N.I.: ED); Cardinal Patrick O'Donnell Papers, Cardinal O'Fiach Memorial Library Armagh (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10); Department of Finance, Early Series 1922-4 (N.A.I.: Dáil Éireann Papers, FIN/1); Papers of the 7th Marquess of Londonderry and his wife Edith Helen (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099).

changes in the political landscape, moods and opinions. Errors or misinterpretations in other work (as will be noted later) have come from failing to examine the chronology properly.

When the Provisional Government met 20 January 1920, Michael Collins pledged that it 'would, so far as its resources permitted, finance [Catholic] schools in the Six Counties'.[10] A comprehensive examination of communications between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E., including internal D.O.E. memoranda, allows for a better understanding of the I.F.S.'s change of policy on its illegal payments to what the M.O.E. pejoratively termed 'recalcitrant teachers'.[11] Elucidating Robert Lynn's dramatic political reversal from attacking Londonderry and his bill, to becoming his strongest ally and defender, is facilitated by the detailed investigation of the relevant correspondence and House of Commons debates.[12] In September 1921, Londonderry appointed Lynn – a member of the U.U.P., M.P. for West Belfast, Orangeman and editor of the fervently unionist newspaper, *Northern Whig* – chairman of a committee tasked with proposing future structures for education in N.I.[13] This thesis thus provides the most detailed account to date of Londonderry's ignominious defeat in 1925. In Londonderry's absence, James Craig capitulated to the threats of the United Education Committee of Protestant Churches (U.E.C.) and the Orange Order, and amended the 1923 act. This thesis also provides the first substantial examination of events that took place in May 1925, a key period overlooked by Farren or Akenson.[14] The events of May 1925 illustrate the increasing pressures on Londonderry, with the U.E.C. increasing their use of the Orange Order to apply pressure to the government and individual M.P.'s. The clerics became even more vociferous from their pulpits in their condemnation of the M.O.E. and individual members of the government in their congregations.[15]

The interaction between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. created acrimonious cross-border relations for future decades. The R.C. Church's reasons for deciding not to cooperate with the

[10] Record of Provisional Government meeting 30 Jan. 1922 (NAI: TSCH/1/1/1). (See also McNeill Papers, LA1/F/275 where he says that this was ratified at a meeting of the Provisional Government, 17 Feb.1922).
[11] MOE memos on Provisional Government paying Catholic teachers in N.I., 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19; ED/32/B/1/2/123); O'Brien to Collins 14 June 1922 (NAI, FIN1/280). See also memo from Ministry of Finance to Ministry of Education outlining the dates of payment for 'recalcitrant teachers' 23 Nov. 1923 (PRONI: ED13/1/399).
[12] Lynn to Londonderry, 19 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1); *The parliamentary debates, official* report, first series, vol. 1: *Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1922*, col. 125 (*Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i).
[13] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 49.
[14] U.E.C to Londonderry, 11 May1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8); Meeting between ministry, U.E.C and CGLB, 14 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[15] McQuibban to Londonderry, 22 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8); Andrews to Craig, complaining that he had to listen to 'two lengthy harangues' from the pulpit, 17 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).

ministry set the tone for their relationship. The treatment of the R.C. Church's non-participation in the literature has been limited and missed some key points. This study will discuss the detrimental effects of non-cooperation, but it will also examine some of the reasons which contributed to their decision-making process. Outlining the Church's reasons for their actions is not condoning them, but creating an understanding of why they were enacted. The Protestant churches' confrontations with the government to have the Londonderry Act amended, will also be examined in detail. The act espoused non-denominational education for children in primary education in the new state. The evidence provided by this study will demonstrate how the R.C. and Protestant churches fought, with different approaches, to perpetuate denominationalism which resulted in a lost potential for future generations to narrow the sectarian gap. This study will demonstrate that education was one of the, if not *the*, focal point for the new state, and the I.F.S, to assert its authority while establishing their national, cultural and religious identity. N.I. harnessed education, especially in its interactions with the I.F.S., as a robust expression of its new identity. This articulated, north and south, how the Belfast government considered education as one of the main pillars to state building. It became a main theatre in which the ministry's difficult birth would be forged. The plight of teachers and trainee teachers, often forgotten victims of the conflicts and controversies, will be assessed. This will illustrate the human suffering experienced because of the ministry's volatile relationships. This matter, which has yet to receive detailed analysis, will be investigated in detail throughout the thesis.

Literature Review

Examining the turbulent infancy of the M.O.E must not be approached without an appreciation of the evolution of education in Ireland since Chief Secretary for Ireland Edward Stanley's letter to the Duke of Leinster which led to the establishment of the national system of primary schools in 1831.[16] Chapter 1 provides this background, drawing on extensive literature on nineteenth century education in Ireland. T. Walsh provides a detailed account of the political and religious complexities that shaped educational developments throughout the nineteenth century.[17] P.F. O'Donovan's *Stanley's Letter* provides an informed political background to Stanley's proposal. It creates an appreciation of Stanley's reasons for changing the archaic

[16] T. Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in Walsh, B. (ed), Essays in the history of Irish education (London, 2016); p. 8; T. O'Doherty and T. O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools, 1900-1922: the 'new education' turn* (Dublin, 2021), p. 2; J. Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum', p. 100; P.F. O'Donovan, Stanley's Letter: *The National School System and Inspectors in Ireland, 1831-1922* (Dublin, 2009), p. 7; B. Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland 1900 – 1944* (Ontario, 1983), p.5; J. Coolahan and P. F. O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate 1831-2008* (Dublin, 2009), p. 16.
[17] Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000'.

status quo which fundamentally reshaped the history of education in Ireland. Coolahan and O'Donovan's work on the national school inspectorate delivers a unique background, from an inspectorate perspective, into the development of education during the nineteenth century while adding to the discussion on the politicking that influenced the introduction of Stanley's proposals.[18]

Donald Akenson's exceptional canon of work, especially on the M.O.E, proved to be invaluable to the thesis.[19] In *Small Differences,* Akenson delivers a solidly factual account of how the Protestant churches removed themselves from the system in favour of the Church Education Society (C.E.S.), 1839-1869. This background is essential to Chapter 5 as it contextualises the Protestant churches' support for local authority involvement in the early twentieth century. J. Magee and P.F. O'Donovan document how a section of Protestant clerics in Counties Antrim, Down and Tyrone reacted to Stanley's non-denominationalism by burning schools and intimidating teachers.[20] His observations help to create a more complete sense of the Protestant clerics' visceral reaction to desegregation.

B. Titley examines how the R.C. Church jealously guarded its control of education in the first two decades of the twentieth century.[21] While this is a Catholic-centric study, it does deliver a broader portrait of events. It establishes the finer details of the R.C. Church's approach to this formative phase, which would affect its position post-partition. Titley discusses the R.C. hierarchy's outrage at the perceived threat of democratising/secularising of education by the imperial administration.[22] T. O'Doherty and T. O'Donoghue's work *Radical reform in Irish schools, 1900-1922,* supports Titley's observations. In examining the 'radical change' in education instigated by the Resident Commissioner of Education William Starkie, their study reveals the outrage and insecurity that it generated within the R.C. Church.[23] Devoted to the educational changes in the two decades preceding partition, it nevertheless provides a sense of the political and religious tensions that resulted from them. Titley broadens the discussion through measuring the clerics' reaction to the McPherson bill, 1919-1920. The proposed

[18] Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate.*
[19] D. Akenson, *Small differences: Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants 1815-1922, an international perspective* (Dublin, 1991); D. Akenson, *The Irish education experiment: the national system of education in the nineteenth century* (London, 1970); Akenson, *Education and enmity*.
[20] J. Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum: popular education in Ulster from 1831 to the 1990s' in E. Phoenix (ed.), *A century of northern life: the Irish News and 100 years of Ulster history 1890s-1990s* (Belfast, 1995), p. 100; O'Donovan, *Stanley's Letter,* p. 28.
[21] B. Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* pp 16-24.
[22] Ibid.
[23] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools, 1900-1922.*

introduction of local authority involvement in education was anathema to the R.C. bishops. Importantly for this thesis, these events served as the final practice run for the impending hostilities with the Londonderry Act. Mary Harris' offers a balanced, yet concise analysis of the R.C. Church's reaction to its place in the new sate and its interactions with the M.O.E.[24]

N. McNeilly offers an overview of the inherent deficiencies of the nineteenth century school system, including no contribution from local authorities, and teachers living on contributions or 'gratuities'.[25] He documents how education had been 'eternally plagued by religious and political controversy throughout the [nineteenth] century'. McNeilly straddles both centuries when stating how the new M.O.E. had inherited a dysfunctional system and had to work 'against the cries of pessimists and denigrators, because it had to destroy much of what had been built in order to achieve the new'.[26] He successfully conveys the struggle experienced by the M.O.E to gain acceptance and 'whittle away at strongly defended attitudes, while at the same time it had to persuade the community to spend more and more of its resources on education'.[27] Like Akenson, McNeilly was writing in the 1970s when much of the archival material used for this thesis was closed.

Archives

The scope of this study encompasses cross-border relations between the embryonic M.O.E. and D.O.E. It will therefore be the first to conduct an extensive examination of how inter-ministerial/governmental relations affected the development of the M.O.E. The M.O.E. corresponded regularly with the D.O.E., the R.C. and Protestant churches, the Orange Order and trainee teachers. This correspondence, including internal M.O.E. and D.O.E. memos, will form the bulk of the primary material for this aspect of the thesis. They are useful in illustrating each educational body's subjective perceptions of proceedings.[28] Internal D.O.E. correspondence between Fionán Lynch, Minister for Education, and Michael Collins and William O'Brien, secretary to the Irish Treasury in 1922, reveal that there was disharmony over Collins' handling of educational matters in N.I.[29] A comprehensive examination of this

[24] M. Harris, *The Catholic Church and the foundation of the Northern Irish State* (Cork, 1993).
[25] N. McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work (1923-73)* (Belfast, 1974), p. 2.
[26] Ibid., p. 5.
[27] Ibid.
[28] M.O.E. memo regarding co-operation between Northern and Southern Ireland 16 Mar. 1922, p. 1, (ED/32/B/1/2/32); M.O.E. memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19); O'Brien to Lynch 1922-23, 1 May 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/253).
[29] Lynch to Collins, 8 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287); O'Brien to Collins 14 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/280).

correspondence provides a fuller appreciation of the motivations of key figures in the development of education policy in the early months of 1922, adding to the originality of this study. A substantial proportion of the archival material consulted here is not new to scholarship, but this is the first study to concentrate on the M.O. E. as an institution and means viewing it from a different position. This also meant drawing on much that may have been passed over by other scholars. While some of the major events, such as the I.F.S. illegally paying Catholic teachers in N.I., have been acknowledged, they have yet to be analysed in detail. This thesis provides a unique 'behind the scenes' account of how clashes and controversies occurred, festered, and shaped the development of the M.O.E.

The Minister's Private Office files and the Secretary's Private Office Registered files held in P.R.O.N.I. contain cross-border communications between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E., and internal M.O.E. memos. These divulge a valuable reservoir of historical context, contributing further knowledge about the difficulties experienced by the ministry during its infancy. Akenson, Farren and others focused primarily on the major educational events, and their consequences, without examining the finer details of their causes, or those involved. Consequently, much of this archival material did not receive, or require, the same detailed scrutiny needed by this study. Akenson acknowledges that M.O.E. records in P.R.O.N.I. were 'inaccessible to historians' during his research for *Education and enmity*.[30] Farren used only Cabinet Papers (CAB 4, 9) and M.O.E. documents (Ed 13, 32) which were relevant to his study which was concentrated more on 'educational policies and developments'.[31] The history of the M.O.E. has yet to be fully documented, which is why this thesis' original approach of focusing primarily on the details of correspondence opens a rich source of untapped historical detail. They reveal the important role played by key, often overlooked, individuals such as Lewis McQuibban, Permanent Secretary to the ministry. Londonderry's prolonged absences due to business commitments in England, meant that responsibility for communicating with the main parties often rested with the very capable McQuibban.[32] Importantly, the communications emphasise how the absences left subordinates, especially McQuibban, to deal with the D.O.E.'s co-ordinated heel-dragging during the transfer of services. They document the instigation and evolution of defining moments such as the D.O.E. unilaterally switching dates for the Easter exams, which would have long term detrimental effects for trainee teachers who decided to

[30] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 275.
[31] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. xii.
[32] McQuibban to Londonderry, 20 Dec. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52). See Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 41.

travel south for training. These files expose how such episodes were mainly instigated by the I.F.S., while providing critical evidence on how they were received by, and dealt with, by the M.O.E.

The files disclose the plight of trainee teachers as victims of the M.O.E.'s and the D.O.E.'s soured relations. Catholic trainee teachers corresponded with the M.O.E. accusing the D.O.E. of forcing trainees, just before their exams, to sign a pre-dated contract requiring them to work in the I.F.S. for five years or pay the training fees.[33] They were pursued by the D.O.E. for repayment when they returned north to take up teaching positions. The correspondence reveals how the trainees felt abandoned by the M.O.E. after they had been contacted by the D.O.E.[34] In this case, some teachers were left without pay for several months, demonstrating how teachers were the perennial victims throughout the period. During the turbulent transfer of services, correspondence from the Secretary's and Minister's Private Office files (P.R.O.N.I.) reveal that McQuibban took the lead for both when communicating with the D.O.E.[35] His communications reveal the unease and uncertainty felt by the department with the pending transfer of services. The Teacher Training files supplement this section of the study by offering clarity on the plight of trainee teachers on both sides of the border in post-partition Ireland.[36] A series of letters from students in the I.F.S. to the D.O.E. enquiring about their eligibility to attend the north's training college, and if they could teach in the I.F.S. afterwards, outlines the uncertainty facing the pending trainees.[37] The letters facilitate examining the precarious predicament encountered by future teachers, on both sides of the border. This is the first time that these correspondences have been examined in the history of education in Ireland. They afford a unique appreciation of the impact that the political wrangling had on aspirational educationalists.

The acute difficulties arising from the D.O.E. unilaterally changing the date of the Easter exams for entrance to teacher training colleges are uncovered in McQuibban's correspondence with his southern counterpart and with Londonderry.[38] The issue was serious

[33] Teachers to Ministry of Education, 1 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[34] Ibid.
[35] McQuibban to Dilworth, the Secretary, N.E.O., Marlborough Street, Dublin, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52; ED/32A/1/5).
[36] Ministry of Education to B. Duffy, 12 Jan.1923. (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4); Mary Smyth to northern Ministry of Education, 3 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[37] Teachers to Ministry of Education, 1 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[38] McQuibban to Dilworth, the Secretary, N.E.O., Marlborough Street, Dublin, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52; ED/32A/1/5).

enough to be addressed in parliamentary debates.[39] On 17 May 1922, Parliamentary Secretary Robert McKeown informed the House of the turmoil and upset caused by the change of dates 'so that the pupils could have the last month of the session to devote to the study of the Irish language, literature and literary history'.[40] Later memoranda from the M.O.E. General Correspondence file provide additional detail on the bureaucratic and logistical difficulties experienced by the M.O.E. resulting from the D.O.E.'s belligerence during the transfer of services.[41] In return, as Martin Maguire has outlined, the southern government claimed that the Belfast government was poaching its top civil servants.[42] This had commenced in July 1921, which suggests that tension existed long before 1 February 1922, the date set for the transfer of services.

The structure and approach of the thesis offers a wider context to the intricacies of state building and some of the practical ramifications imposed by partition. The D.O.E.'s decision to promote the Irish language, history, and culture through education, clearly indicated how central it was to the I.F.S.'s process of state building.[43] While acknowledging that not all Catholics identified as Irish or nationalist, and vice-versa, this change in education was significant in creating a clearer delineation in the two predominant co-existing cultures, religions, and nationalities on the island. The D.O.E.'s Gaelicisation of education, and its future intransigence over teacher training, forced the M.O.E. and the Belfast government to reappraise its position.[44] One of the more obvious practical ramifications of this was the uncertainty created for trainee teachers on both sides of the border.[45]

This uncertainty became a reality for educational staff during the transfer of services. School inspectors who were working in the north, but not yet officially transferred, became collateral damage in the squabbling between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. Both states were delivering a message of strength to each other.[46] This is a new interpretation of education's influence on both governments' approaches to state building. It addresses the repercussions

[39] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i* col. 525.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ministry of Education memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 1, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[42] M. Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland, 1912-38* (Manchester, 2008).
[43] M.E.O. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, pp 10-11, (PRONI.: CAB/6/ 19); MacNeill essay, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163).
[44] Londonderry to Collins on Easter exams, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[45] Meeting between Harbison and McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[46] List of fifty-two officers who volunteered their services to Northern Government, early 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).

that generated such hardship for those caught in the political crossfire. The approach also uncovers the political complexities generated during the transfer of services. The resultant political turmoil created from the Londonderry Act, is explored with a fresh approach through examining the communications between the main parties. The correspondence furnishes this study with a new appreciation of the M.O.E.'s complex and volatile relationship with the triumvirate of the Protestant clerics, the Orange Order, and many M.P.'s from the U.U.P.[47] The internal political unrest in the state will be analysed in the context that it was created as direct result of partition, which deeply affected the development of the M.O.E.

Chapter 2 draws on the Department of Finance Early Series and the Department of the Taoiseach files, N.A.I. to explicate the southern ministry's illegal payment of Catholic teachers in the north. To date, these files have not been examined in an all-Ireland educational context in the field of education and never in the history of the M.O.E. The files are pivotal to illustrating why the Provisional Government adopted an adversarial approach to the M.O.E. and its government. Investigating the Finance files unveils internal concerns expressed by some southern bureaucrats, such as William O'Brien, secretary to the Irish Treasury, over the illegal payment of £18,000 per month to Catholic teachers in N.I.[48] Minutes from Provisional Government meetings in 1922 document that this financial burden had contributed heavily to its waning commitment to continue with the payments.[49] When investigating the impact of an external force on the 'victim', what motivates the protagonist is often overlooked. Examining N.A.I. files provide a valuable balance to the thesis as they offer an insight into the rationale for the southern department's/government's unwillingness to cooperate fully with its northern counterpart. This is best exemplified in Michael Collins' interactions with Londonderry in April 1922, when he denied all knowledge of the illegal payments.[50] Documentation from the Minister's Private Office collection clearly demonstrates that although Londonderry had concrete evidence of Collins' complicity in the payments, Collins still denied all knowledge.[51]

An eighteen-page document from the Londonderry Papers is an invaluable source, providing a distinct overview of the frustrations experienced by the M.O.E. during the

[47] McQuibban to Londonderry, 22 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[48] O'Brien to F. Lynch, Minister for Education, 7 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287); Lynch to Collins, 8 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287); O'Brien to Collins 14 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/280).
[49] Meetings of Provisional Government, 9 June and 4 Nov. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/2/1; TSCH //1/1/3/1).
[50] W. J. Dilworth to L. McQuibban, 7 Apr.1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[51] Londonderry to Michael Collins, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52); Michael Collins to Londonderry, 10 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[51] Londonderry to Michael Collins, 12 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).

difficulties with the transfer of educational services.[52] This document exposes the growing frustration and anger within the M.O.E. because of the D.O.E.'s deliberate obstructionism designed to cause maximum disruption during the process. The papers also reveal that although his absence was well recorded, Londonderry still maintained a passion, albeit at a remove, for his role; an aspect of his time as minister that has not been acknowledged sufficiently elsewhere. Neil Fleming's use of these papers in *The Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, power and politics in Britain and Ireland* (London, 2005), does not cover in any detail this facet of Londonderry's tenure as minister. House of Commons debates reflected how the D.O.E.'s choreographed delay with the transfer of services had permeated northern political life. The general sense of antipathy in the House towards the D.O.E.'s antagonism was evident when the M.O.E.'s Parliamentary Secretary Robert McKeown and prodigal Robert Lynn castigated the D.O.E. for unilaterally rearranging the Easter exams. McKeown vented that they 'had acted more like a handful of schoolboys, very immature schoolboys at that, than men'.[53] The Londonderry Papers flesh out the ministry's sense of injustice at the southern department's belligerence throughout the transfer of services. The papers reveal that by May 1922 the ministry had become so exasperated that it was going to contact the Colonial Office to complain about the D.O.E. 'in regard to the question of Officials, Documents or Records being withheld in Dublin government'.[54] The Ministry of Finance files disclose the anger felt by the Head of the Northern Civil Service, Ernest Clark, who referred to the southern department's 'dog in the manger attitude of the transferring ministries'.[55]

Londonderry's letter to Robert McKeown, 11 September 1922, divulges his misgivings about N.I. politics, expressing that he had 'always been criticised in Ulster and I always will be, because I am sometimes just half a length in front of local ideas and this makes me suspect'.[56] On closer inspection this also divulges that he felt very much as an outsider, never feeling comfortable amongst his colleagues. Londonderry did not, because of his forthrightness, always endear himself to his party members. He confessed to McKeown, a man steeped in the tradition of Ulster Protestant unionism, that 'Belfast has always disappointed me a little'.[57] This was only three months into his term as minister of the M.O.E. It exposes

[52] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government 10 May 1922, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[53] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i* col. 525.
[54] Cabinet Secretary to all Ministers 5 May. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: Londonderry Papers D3099/5/1).
[55] Sir Ernest Clark, Head of Northern Civil Service to Prime Minister Sir James Craig, 22 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/A/1/1).
[56] Londonderry to McKeown, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/7/77).
[57] Ibid.

Londonderry's inability curtail his opinions in an environment where it was extremely likely they would be repeated amongst his peers, the vast majority of whom were brethren in the Orange Order. Records from his meeting with the Protestant churches in early 1923, which was their first recorded response to the bill, provide an insight into how Londonderry navigated his way through this difficult period.[58]

In Chapter 6, the Londonderry Papers are key to dispelling the established orthodoxy which characterises Londonderry as deceptive when persuading the Protestant clerics to accept the wording to amend Sections 26 and 66, dealing with religious instruction and the appointment of teachers, in the first draft of his bill.[59] The accusation is predicated on the spurious allegation that the clergy had been beguiled by the ambiguity of Londonderry's semantics in the negotiations prior to amendments in early May 1923.[60] The chronology of communications clearly shows that on 26 April, three weeks before the Protestant churches accepted the amendment, Lord Londonderry had written to Bishop Grierson clearly outlining that religious instruction had to be delivered outside of school hours.[61] The letter explained that 'moral instruction', which he promised to make obligatory by amendment, must be non-denominational and not include reading from the Bible. Instead, it would, he said, 'contain lessons in Christian morality and Christian principles, which are the basis of good citizenship'.[62] Crucially, the timeline to this episode explicates that Bishop Grierson had this vital information before the collective of bishops had agreed to the amendment. Between 8 and 10 May, Rev. Bingham (Presbyterian), Archbishop Charles Frederick D'Arcy (C. O. I), Bishop Grierson (C. O. I.), and Rev. Smyth (Methodist) had written to Londonderry to thank him for the proposed amendments.[63] This thesis will be the first to use the Londonderry papers to defend Londonderry against the allegation of deceitfulness.

The Londonderry Papers and the Ministry of Education 'D' files document U.E.C.'s more frequent employment of the powerful Orange Order in 1925 to pressurise the ministry to

[58] Conclusions from Board of Education Board of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, n/d but it is early 1923 as it was first response to the introduction of the bill (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9). See this file also for individual cases outlining the same grievances, as put forward by the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian C.O.I.
[59] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 49 and Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 69.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Londonderry to Bishop Grierson 26 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[62] Ibid.
[63] Rev. Bingham to Londonderry, 8 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9); Archbishop D'Arcy to Londonderry, 9 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9); Bishop Grierson to Londonderry, 8 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9); Rev. W.H. Smyth to Londonderry 10 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

amend the 1923 act.[64] While this has been addressed in a general sense in the literature, this is the first study to examine in detail how the Order interacted with the U.E.C., the ministry and M.P.'s. The influence the Order wielded over the Protestant public, and government ministers would eventually see them tip the balance in favour of the U.E.C. These files are central to understanding the complex relationships that existed in the triumvirate of the Protestant churches, the Orange Order and the U.U.P. Their overarching influence in the running of the state was evidenced when Londonderry received a correspondence from a member of his staff informing him a member of the Grand Lodge had telephoned Charles Blackmore, Secretary to the Cabinet, to tell him that if there was a 'Cabinet to be held in the immediate future' to rearrange for the Monday morning for their convenience.[65] Another example can be found when John Andrews, Minister of Finance, wrote to Craig on 17 June voicing his concerns that a number of backbenchers would, on the instructions of the Orange Order and the Protestant clergy, not support the government when Parliament next met.[66] He was worried that unless action was taken before 12 July, the Orange Order and the churches were working in tandem to make the government's position even more problematic.[67] This highlights one difficulty among many experienced during the complicated birth of Londonderry's ministry.

This work is the first to inspect the Eoin MacNeill Papers, University College Dublin Archives (U.C.D.A.) regarding the M.O.E. MacNeill's papers elucidate the emphasis placed on education by the I.F.S. government, with the added incentive of impeding the progression of the M.O.E. These papers, which were not availed of by notable historians such as Farren and Akenson, will contribute to addressing the lacuna in the extant historiography. MacNeill's essay, discussed in Chapter 3, discloses the Provisional Government's intention to Gaelicise education as he felt that 'the kernel of the situation will be education'.[68] The situation in question was the I.F.S. recreating a national and cultural identity, through education, as a core principle in the process of state building. This would prove to be a contentious matter placing education at the centre of both governments conflicting cultural identities, and their respective visions for state building. MacNeill, a northern Catholic, a historian of early and medieval Ireland and founder of the Gaelic League, would eventually become Minister for Education on

[64] Orange Order to Craig and Londonderry June 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/1); UEC and Orange Order to McQuibban 24 Apr. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[65] Ministry of Education staff to Londonderry 17 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[66] Andrews to Craig, 17 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[67] Ibid.
[68] Eoin MacNeill essay on policy of non-recognition of the northern government, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: LA1/J/163).

31 August. He expressed an exuberance for the strategy of paying the 'recalcitrant teachers' as it would destabilise and undermine the Belfast M.O.E. MacNeill's papers also track the decline in enthusiasm for the strategy of paying the recalcitrant teachers. By mid-August 1922, just before he became minister for the department, MacNeill issued a memo openly espousing the cessation of payments to the teachers.[69] This development away from payment of northern teachers signalled an emerging paradigm shift within influential sections of the southern government towards education in the north. As MacNeill considered education central to asserting national identity in both jurisdictions, the increasing reluctance towards paying recalcitrant teachers also implied a declining interest in N.I.

The General and Policy 'G' series files reflect the variety of issues which the M.O.E. had to deal with, including the payment of recalcitrant teachers.[70] The documents, which have generally gone unused in related studies are therefore critical to exposing, for the first time, that not all teachers were willing participants in the clandestine and illegal scheme of paying northern teachers.[71] The files also disclose how the President of the I.N.T.O., John Harbison, in an unofficial capacity, tried to broker a deal with the M.O.E. to include the Irish language in the curriculum as part of a settlement deal.[72] The files contain information which allows for a new approach to topics such as payment of school fees, instruction in the Irish language, curriculum matters including religious instruction in schools, and disputes between schools and the Ministry of Education.[73] They also detail how teachers who would fall victim, yet again, to the aggressive politicking between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E.[74] The correspondence between the trainee teachers and the M.O.E. documents the realities of the human 'collateral damage' incurred by the trainees. They also reveal that the northern ministry would actively pursue them for pension payments missed while receiving payments from the south.[75]

Material on the introduction of the partisan Promissory Oaths and Religious Emblems Acts, 1923 are contained in the 'G' series. The punitive nature of these acts is encapsulated in school inspector Kirkpatrick's report on the displaying of emblems in a school in a R.C. school

[69] Memo from Eoin MacNeill on payment of teachers, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).
[70] John Harbison, President I.N.T.O. to Secretary McQuibban, 20 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[71] Report from school inspector Welply to McQuibban, 18 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[72] Meeting between Harbison and McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[73] Documents relating to payments to teacher's pension fund in N.I., Oct. 1922 to Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/13/1/176; ED/13/1/399; ED/13/1/149); Ministry of Finance letter on pensions (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/13/1/199).
[74] Meeting between Harbison (I.N.T.O.) and McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[75] Documents relating to payments to teacher's pension fund in N.I., Oct. 1922 to Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/13/1/176; ED/13/1/399; ED/13/1/149).

in county Down.[76] The report outlines how the teachers, and in this case the children, were adversely affected by the M.O.E.'s Protestant/unionist leanings. Drilling down into the correspondence demonstrates how the prohibitive acts endorsed by the M.O.E created problems on the ground in R.C. schools. The files also contain the minutes of the meetings of the Lynn Committee. A thorough investigation of the minutes has led this thesis to conclude that the recommendations were designed for failure as part of the Protestant clergy's long-term plan. This is the first time that this case has been argued in relation to the Lynn recommendations. This challenges the standard, and only, interpretation of the events regarding the Lynn committee, and opens the subject for further review and research in the future. All these factors contribute to the originality of this work.

The Cabinet Secretariate Files contain minutes of Cabinet decisions (known as Conclusions). Each file relates to a meeting containing an agenda, supporting memoranda and associated correspondence. They disclose how major decisions were debated and approved at Cabinet level. In Chapter 5, the files uncover Londonderry's manoeuvrings during the passage of the first bill, to have his administrative structures accepted in Cabinet.[77] Although employed by Akenson and Farren, in a general sense, this study differs by dissecting the dialogues to divulge how the decisions were arrived at. Londonderry successfully defended his position when two Ministers expressed their concerns that his proposed new local education authorities would become 'ad hoc bodies' that would be expensive to maintain.[78] The exchange demonstrates Londonderry's determination and commitment to see his bill passed as close to its original text as possible.[79]

The Ministry of Home Affairs files provide the claims and counter claims of both parties during the outcries of injustice at the alleged harassment of Cardinal Logue by the Special Constabulary.[80] While this incident has been noted in the literature, it has not received a comprehensive examination. This study will provide a balanced account of the historiography, drawing on the complaints of all sides. This is a necessary exercise as the harassment of Logue is integral to understanding the prevailing sectarian tensions in which the M.O.E. operated. These incidents, involving the Cardinal's car being stopped and searched,

[76] Minister's Assistant Secretary to S. Kirkpatrick, Oct. 1925; Extract from Kirkpatrick's report, 21 Aug. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).
[77] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 15 Dec. 1922 and 11 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/66/21; CAB/4/61).
[78] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 15 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/66/21).
[79] Londonderry to Lord Lieutenant, 4 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/17).
[80] The Catholic Federation Salford to W. Churchill, 28 July 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: HA/5/982).

were deemed so serious that Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, was contacted.[81] As highlighted in Chapter 4, this noteworthy development emphasises the disquieting prospect of sectarianism from police and government, which Catholics had to contend with. This material allows for a more developed understanding of the tensions that existed between the R.C. authorities/hierarchy and the state. A letter from Lionel Curtis of the Colonial Office to W.B. Spender, Secretary of the Cabinet in N.I., revealed the contempt in certain circles in Westminster for Irish Catholics, which, it would appear, were indistinguishable to them.[82]

Local papers, which are generally divided along political/religious lines, provide important perspectives from both sides of the political divide. The *Irish News*, which is still to this day viewed mostly as being representative of nationalist/Catholic opinion, is not available online. Its archives can be accessed in the Belfast Central Library. Unfortunately, its closure due to COVID coincided with the time that the trip to view the archives had been arranged. The *Catholic Herald* and the *Freeman's Journal*, available online, have instead been examined here for Catholic/nationalist opinion on contemporary issues including the Londonderry Act and the Unionist government. In the case of the Cardinal's issues, the *Catholic Herald* reported a series of incidents where the Cardinal's car was 'searched by Craig's "Specials" for the fourth time'.[83] The *Northern Whig*, along with the *Belfast Newsletter*, represented the voice of Protestants/unionists. The *Northern Whig* viewed the Cardinal's story through the unionist prism when reporting that when questioned by Nationalist MP Joseph Devlin on the matter, Churchill stated that no one should 'object to a little inconvenience' when trying to stamp out murder.[84] The *Newsletter* understated the situation when reporting that 'effective steps were being taken to prevent any further act discourtesy to his Eminence' when the matter was raised in the House of Lords.[85]

Conversely, the two pro-unionist papers also reflected 'the grievances of its [the government's] perceived supporters, who were far from united behind or contented with their Unionist government, except on the question of partition'.[86] In September 1922, Londonderry wrote to McKeown complaining that the *Whig* and *Newsletter* were 'not unwilling to injure

[81] Ibid.
[82] L. Curtis to W.B. Spender, 22 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: HA/5/982; CAB/6/48).
[83] *Catholic Herald*, 29 July 1922.
[84] *Northern Whig*, 21 June 1922.
[85] *Belfast Newsletter*, 29 June 1922.
[86] *P.* Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39* (Dublin, 1973), p. 2.

me, they take no steps to verify anything; in fact unless they can find fault, they seldom report me at all'.[87] The unionist press was not afraid to call the government out on matters such as education to keep them in check. This in turn illustrates the complex challenges faced by Londonderry and his ministry. Akenson opined that Londonderry had to 'navigate between two dangerous shoals' the UK legal authorities (regarding Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act which prohibited making a law to establish or endow any religion) on the one side, and the Protestant denomination's accusations of creating Godless institutions on the other.[88] Londonderry's complaint about the unionist press, attacks on his bill in the Senate and the House of Commons, attacks from The U.E.C., the Orange Order and the R.C. authorities, clearly demonstrates the plurality of his detractors was considerably more than Akenson had accounted for.[89] He had enemies within, and without, and had to navigate the treacherous riptides created by each of these undercurrents.

The Ministry of Education 'D' files divulge that on 19 February 1923, Lynn threatened to carry his protest 'to every corner of Northern Ireland' because Londonderry had not adopted his committee's recommendations.[90] As noted in Chapter 5, this threat, which evidence suggests was private, was not taken lightly and was seen as a 'declaration of war against the government'.[91] Investigating the parliamentary debates in the Senate and the House of Commons illustrates how Londonderry dealt with his detractors from within the U.U.P. On 27 February, Londonderry's Senate speech introducing the new education bill was tailored to quell the growing disquiet amongst the Protestant clergy and Lynn.[92] Surprisingly, and, more shockingly perhaps given his threat the previous month to protest, Lynn had a sudden epiphany when leaping to Londonderry's defence in the commons on 14 March.[93] This clearly demonstrates how this study documents the changes that occurred which assisted in moulding M.O.E. in its formative years. The parliamentary debates demonstrate how, during the bill's passage through the commons, Londonderry came under attack from members of the U.U.P., most vociferously from Dr Hugh Morrisey, MP for Queen's University, and William Coote,

[87] Londonderry to McKeown, 9 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/7/67).
[88] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 66; Section 5 Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/19),
[89] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), I,* col. *355.*
[89] *Ibid.*
[90] Lynn to Londonderry, 19 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[91] The letter was not signed by the author. Londonderry had sent a copy of Lynn's letter, 19 Feb., to the author. (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[92] *Hansard N.I. (Senate)*, i, col. 13.
[93] Ibid., col. 127

MP for Fermanagh and Tyrone.[94] On 25 October 1923, Coote derided the bill as having come from the Middle Ages.[95] Dr Morrison attacked the integrity of the act inferring that it would not be out of place in communist Russia.[96] He also questioned Lynn's political integrity for his about-turn on his support for Londonderry and the bill, which contravened his recommendations. These vignettes expose the difficulties Londonderry experienced from his own party, which he would have to overcome if his bill was to be succeed.

Rev. William Corkey's *Episode in the History of Protestant Ulster, 1923-1947*, privately published in the 1950s, provides an appreciation of the fundamentalist principles that drove the U.E.C.'s uncompromising campaign to have the 1923 act amended. Corkey's intensely partisan work is balanced by the sincere, if misplaced, honesty of an author convinced of having fought the righteous fight. He has been characterised generally as an aggressive demagogue who was 'loquacious, devious and extraordinarily belligerent'.[97] As unpalatable as some of his demagoguery and tactics were, he was, as the dominant voice in the U.E.C., central to having the 1923 act amended. His monograph allows for an important external perspective on the ministry's stumbling first steps, and the obstacles to its maturation. It must be acknowledged that the history of the ministry's growth is also found in the works of people like Corkey. He did not sanitise his recollections or his part in the events as he had a fundamental Christian belief, as seen in the first twenty pages of his monograph, that he was doing the work of his God by continuing the fight of his forebearers for the inclusion of the scriptures in education.[98] This adds to the value of his work because of its sincerity and honesty, but caution must be exercised due to Corkey's extreme myopic approach. Corkey's views are heavily biased, and therefore disinclined to provide any appreciable balance in his representations of the M.O.E. If taken in this context, the book's true value is in revealing the motivations of the U.E.C., and the intensity and fervour with which it pursued its aims. This study draws on comprehensive archival research and provides multiple perspectives on the development of the M.O.E., the controversial Londonderry Act, and the process of state-building more widely.

[94] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i, col. 917.
[95] Ibid., col. 1604.
[96] Ibid., 1630.
[97] M. Wilson, *Presbyterians, Ulster unionism and the establishment of Northern Ireland 1905-47*, (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 20), p. 270; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 75.
[98] W. Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster* (Belfast, n.d.), p 31.

Contribution to Scholarship

This is the first study dedicated solely to the early evolution of the M.O.E. While much has been written about the Londonderry Act, this research of the inner workings of the ministry delves into the circumstances and personalities that contributed to, and influenced, its design. A detailed analysis of the ministry's cross-border relationship with the southern government/department is a fresh undertaking in the study of the development of the M.O.E. A comprehensive assessment of the correspondence between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. provides a new focus for evaluating how education contributed significantly to the deterioration of the extant fragile cross-border relations. It also suggests new possibilities for further studies into appreciating the significant influence of education in this much neglected aspect of the period. By arguing that education, through the manipulation of the Irish language and teacher training, became a key stone to state building for both governments, the study creates the potential for further scholarly consideration and development. The significant influence that Irish language and teacher training had on the two nascent governments' approach to state building has largely gone unexamined.

Appraising the development of the M.O.E.'s problematic dealings with the D.O.E. during the transfer of services offers a new perspective for examining the origins of the deterioration of cross-border intergovernmental relations. Detailed communications between the M.O.E., the R.C. and Protestant churches, and the D.O.E., will illustrate how the teachers became the constant casualties resulting from all disputes. While this has been acknowledged in most works on the topic, it has not received detailed analysis. The teachers' letters, and those writing on their behalf, to the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. depict the vivid reality of their lived experiences, which, heretofore, have not been acknowledged. This study will challenge the common belief amongst many historians, including Akenson, which suggests that the M.O.E.'s reason for making its own arrangements for teacher training was because of the D.O.E. bringing the Easter exams forward by a month. This work will demonstrate that the dates from the available evidence do not support this perception.

Correspondence between the ministry and the R.C. Church provides an innovative interpretation of how the R.C. authorities arrived at their policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation with the M.O.E./state. The generally accepted orthodoxy that the R.C. Church's

refusal to join the Lynn committee was catastrophically wrong is overly simplistic.[99] By examining the contributory factors and subsequent events that informed the church's choice not to participate in the committee, this study will provide a more nuanced understanding of the complexities involved in the process. This thesis will argue that the R.C. Church's decision meant that it only lost the possibility of what would have been, at best, a negligible influence in the decision-making process. This study will not argue that the decision was correct or otherwise, but it will offer a considered appraisal of the R.C. Church's rationale for doing so. This approach will provide an impetus for re-evaluating the argument thus enabling a contemporary approach to the debate. This micro approach develops a sense of how these events were experienced by those involved, an approach which has yet to receive extensive scholarly attention.

A thorough investigation of relevant correspondence provides a unique illustration of the ministry's tumultuous and complex internal relationships with the trifecta consisting of the Protestant churches, the Orange Order, and U.U.P. While the consequences of these relationships have been recognised in the historiography, the events that triggered them have not been fully examined. The correspondence between the parties provides, for the first time, a detailed account of the contributory factors that precipitated the consequences.[100] This thesis is the first to argue that the Lynn Committee engineered Sections 26 and 66 of their recommendations for failure. This important development will contribute to the historiography and, it is hoped, will encourage further research into the M.O.E. and the impact of the Lynn Committee. Its originality creates a new prism through which the subject can be examined, assisting in creating a new perspective for further studies into the field.

The traditional understanding that Londonderry, as claimed by the Protestant clergy, was perfidious in convincing them to accept the first draft of the act will be challenged.[101] This important development reverses the established perception of the roles played by the main protagonists. The events of May 1925, which were pivotal to James Craig capitulating to the Protestant clerics' and the Orange Order's demands to amend the 1923 act in Londonderry's absence, are underrepresented.[102] Reviewing the communications between the parties allows

[99] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 52 and Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 249.
[100] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; N. Puirséil, *Kindling the flame: 150 years of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation* (Dublin, 2017).
[101] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 49; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 69.
[102] N. Fleming, The Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland (London, 2005); Farren, *The politics of Irish education;* Akenson, *Education and enmity*; McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years;* W.

for a more comprehensive representation of the events. This will fully contextualise how the sequence of events unfolded, allowing for a more balanced representation of the incident, and Lord Londonderry's part in it. Taken collectively, these new approaches will provide new insights while also posing new questions which will hopefully inspire new and further research into the undoubted influence of the M.O.E on the state.

Chapter Structure

Chapter 1 sets the scene for the debates that followed 1921 by examining the evolution of formal education policy from 1831.[103] The respective churches' experiences of education throughout the nineteenth century mirrored how they would react to, and interact with, the M.O.E in the twentieth century.[104] Without this background, an appreciation of some important nuance could be lost. The same is true for providing a contextual backdrop to the two emerging new states on the island. Much has been written about partition, but there is a gap in the scholarship detailing the sizable impact of partition on the creation of the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. This chapter also signposts another central theme of this work: the historical lessons missed by Londonderry and his ministry. This thesis will argue that, had these lessons been learned, it is probable that the passage of the Londonderry Act could have been negotiated more successfully, thus affording more protection to the primary victims of the controversy, the children, and the teachers.

1 February 1922 was the date set for the division and transfer of services from the D.O.E. to the M.O.E.[105] Chapters 2 and 3 address how the D.O.E.'s belligerent delaying and obstructionist approach to the transfer of staff and services contributed to a deterioration in cross-border relations. The tactic was designed to, and was successful in, undermining the authority of the M.O.E. and the Belfast government. It was orchestrated to affect maximum disruption to the M.O.E.'s operational efficiency. This coincided with the decision by Michael

J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988) and Buckland, *The factory of grievances.*

[103] J. Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum', p. 100; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter, The National School System and Inspectors in Ireland, 1831-1922* **(**Dublin, 2009**),** p. 7; Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16.

[104] McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years*, p. 2. See also: Akenson, *Education and enmity*; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000'; W. J., McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988).

[105] Circular to managers of schools, local committees, teachers etc., Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).

Collins to illegally pay Catholic teachers in the north.[106] This concerted endeavour to destabilise the N.I. government was considered serious enough to be raised on several occasions in the House of Commons.[107] However, this episode has mostly received terse acknowledgement by historians such as Farren, Akenson and Puirséil.[108] This work will provide a detailed examination of the relationships between the leading influential personalities of the M.O.E. and the D.O.E., and its implications for cross-border relations. Opposition to the payments in the I.F.S. will also be examined. It is within these struggles that Chapter 2 and 3 illuminate the two governments' conflicting ideals on culture and national identity and how they were manifested in their respective approaches to education.

An examination of the divergent attitudes to the Irish language and teacher training will illustrate how both governments considered education central to their process of state building. The emphasis placed on education by the M.O.E. and D.O.E. to develop a sense of national identity would worsen their existing acrimonious relationship. This led to assessing how teachers, especially trainee teachers, became direct victims of the hostilities between the educational bodies. Further analysis of the teachers' plight illustrates that not all teachers were willing participants in accepting the illegal payments from the I.F.S., but that they would suffer the adverse repercussions this would have for their pensions. This was compounded by the D.O.E. unilaterally rearranging exams dates for teacher training that had been set pre-partition. This would affect teacher training on the island for decades to come. Training would also become a contentious internal matter for the northern ministry. This is an important distinction to make at this point as Chapter 3 will assess how the Catholic authorities handled it when dealing with the Unionist government, within an internal N.I. context. Due to the complex nature of N.I.'s politics, there will be some unavoidable, but necessary, overlapping of the two issues.

There is unanimity amongst historians that 'when the Ulster Unionist party took control of the newly-formed state in 1920, they inherited an education system that was both segregated

[106] Ministry of Education memos on Provisional Government paying Catholic teachers in N.I., 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19; ED/32/B/1/2/123); Londonderry to Michael Collins on Easter exams, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[107] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i* cols. *555-56.*
[107] *Ibid.*
[108] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; p. 45 (two lines); Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 44; N. Puirséil, *Kindling the flame;* p. 204-5.

and backward'.[109] Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will assess how the new government attempted to improve 'the serious mechanical difficulties', and the impediments that it encountered in doing so.[110] One of the principal impediments to implementing change, on which there is also consensus, was that from 'the early 1920s, Lord Londonderry, first minister for education, had sought to introduce an improved, non-denominational, system of education for all children, but this was strongly opposed by the Protestant and Catholic churches'.[111]

Chapter 4 will address how the R.C. Church decided to react, from its recent minority position within the new state, to Londonderry's attempted democratisation of education. The reasons for, and the consequences of, the R.C. Church's actions will be assessed. The R.C. Church would have, as would the Protestants, interpreted the act as an attempt to secularise education. Catholic clerics decided upon implementing a policy of non-recognition of, and non-cooperation with, the state. The R.C. Church signalled its intent when Cardinal Logue refused Londonderry's request to send representatives to sit on the Lynn Committee.[112] An examination of the ministry's introduction of the repressive Promissory Oaths for teachers, and rules forbidding the exhibition of religious emblems in schools, will contribute to understanding the rationale behind the R.C. cleric's decision to employ the strategy of non-compliance with the M.O.E.[113] School inspectors' reports will reveal how these oppressive measures were dealt by Catholic schools.[114] Teacher training, in this case, was an internal conflict between the ministry and the R.C. Church. The rancour concluded when R.C. authorities ultimately decided to remove its trainee teachers from Stranmillis, the north's new training college, and send them to Strawberry Hill, Middlesex.[115] As Lord Londonderry was central to the proposed reforms, the chapter will provide an insight into his complex character.

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[109] J. O'Brien, *Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 1920-1939: myth or reality?* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010), p. 21. For further references on this consensus see, Buckland, *Factory of grievances;* Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; D. Harkness, *Northern Ireland since 1920* (Dublin, 1983), John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, *Explaining Northern Ireland* (Oxford, 2009); S. Campbell, A formative decade, Birrell and Murie, *Policy and government in Northern Ireland*; B. Walker, *A political history of the two Irelands: from partition to peace* (Eastbourne, 2012); Elliot, *Hearthlands: a memoir of the White City housing estate Belfast* (Belfast, 2017*)*; McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years*.

[110] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* pp 12-13.

[111] Walker, *A political history of the two Irelands,* p. 71.

[112] Cardinal Logue to Londonderry, 2 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/12).

[113] Secretary of Finance to McQuibban, 20 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).

[114] Document from the N.I. Government's Department of Community Relations titled 'Oath or Declaration of Allegiance', May 1972 (P.R.O.N.I.: DCR/1/128); Minister's Assistant Secretary to S. Kirkpatrick, (school inspector) Oct. 1925; Extract from Kirkpatrick's report, 21 Aug. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).

[115] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* pp 122-3; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 52. See also Principal Strawberry Hill to Bishop O'Donnell, 5 Mar. 1925 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).

Chapters 5 and 6 examine how Londonderry's rejection of Lynn's recommendations on religious instruction and appointment of teachers became central to the ministry's fractious relationship with the triumvirate. Chapter 5 will argue that the committee intentionally structured its recommendations knowing that Londonderry would reject them. When the two contentious recommendations were not included in the act, the clerics skilfully characterised them as pre-existing rights that had been stripped from them, as opposed to the reality that they were merely rejected recommendations. Chapter 6 will discuss how the clerics decided to intensify their protests after feeling that they had been deceived by Londonderry into accepting the act as passed into law in June 1923.[116] The traditional belief that Londonderry had deliberately done so will be challenged. Providing a detailed timeline of correspondence between the clerics and Londonderry in May 1923 will conclusively prove that this was not the case.[117] The significant developments that occurred in May 1923, which provide the essential context for the fall of Londonderry in June, have, until now, generally been ignored in the historiography.

[116] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 15 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/61).
[117] Department of education memo, 7 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I; CAB/9/D/1/2); Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 68; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 65.

Chapter 1: Divided Beginnings

Primary education in Ireland has, since 'the decision to establish a national system of education in Ireland in 1831' been controversial and divisive.[1] From 1831 onwards, as primary education was the only education available to all but a few, it became the focus for educational controversies between the R.C. and Protestant churches. This situation became more pronounced after the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, officially divided the country. This led to the sitting of the first northern government on 7 June 1921, and the creation of its M.O.E. Its first minister was Lord Londonderry. Post partition, the M.O.E. soon discovered that dealing with the D.O.E. would become extremely problematic.

The complex challenges faced by the M.O.E. in its relationships with the Protestant and the R.C. churches and the D.O.E. in post-partition Ireland must be understood in the context of developments in education during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Beginning this study in the early nineteenth century provides the necessary background to understand the Unionist government's inheritance of what Akenson described as 'an educational machine which had serious mechanical difficulties'.[2] This also means considering the accuracy of claims such as McNeilly's that pre-partition, education was 'eternally plagued by religious and political controversy'.[3] Examining this period in Irish education will establish this thesis' contention that Londonderry's failure to learn numerous lessons from the past adversely affected the implementation of his 1923 Education Act. This assertion will, as the thesis progresses, become more evident as the M.O.E.'s relationships with the churches and Provisional deteriorated.

Appraising the R.C. and Protestant churches' developments in education throughout the nineteenth century will provide the requisite framework for understanding the future M.O.E.'s challenges in trying to supplant a pre-existing denominationally segregated system with a non-denominational one. This also sheds light on the profound objections to religious segregation shared by the R.C. and Protestant churches. It also provides the platform for

[1] T. Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in Brendan Walsh (ed.), *Essays in the history of Irish education* (London, 2016), p. 8. This work will set 1921 as the date for the establishment of N.I. as its government was elected this year and sat for the first time 7 June.
[2] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington,1973), p.12.
[3] N. McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work (1923-73)* (Belfast, 1974), p. 2. See also: Akenson, *Education and enmity,* S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-1965 (*Belfast, 1995*),* Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000'; W. J., McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988).

assessing how and why they employed differing strategies to battle the M.O.E.'s introduction of desegregation. While the Protestant churches decided to attack the government and affect change from within the system, the R.C. Church opted for a policy of non-recognition of, and non-participation with, the Belfast government.

1.1 Protestant Beginnings

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, nation states in Western Europe and the United States were beginning to support the concept of establishing structures for the implementation of universal elementary schooling, with much of it in the charge of the Christian churches.[4] With the thinking of the English political classes restricted by the prevailing principle of *laissez-faire*, they were reticent about direct government involvement in the provision of education.[5] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue point out that 'In contrast, it was a number of highly influential Irish Members of Parliament who persuaded the government of the United Kingdom that Ireland should have a non-denominational State-funded school system'.[6] Coolahan and O'Donovan submit that, from the early 1820s, it was the Catholic authorities who pressurised the government 'to adopt a new method of state support for primary education, other than subventing the Kildare Place Society'.[7] Also known as the Society for the Promotion of the Education of the Poor in Ireland, the Kildare Place Society was established in 1811 as a non-denominational society; however, its rules stated that the Bible would be read in schools.[8] The society was also the main beneficiary of the substantial annual grants provided by parliament 'to assist education among the lower classes'.[9] Corcoran states that the society's aim was to 'de-Catholicise' education. This drew condemnation from Daniel O'Connell and prompted the R.C. authorities to pressurise the government.[10] This is an early example of how both sets of churches, through pursuing separate agendas, unintentionally combined to alter the history of education in Ireland. Chapters 4, 5, and 6, dealing with the M.O.E.'s relationship with the R.C. and Protestant churches, will show how, almost one hundred years later, the concept of non-

[4] T. O'Doherty and T. O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools, 1900-1922: the 'new education' turn* (Dublin, 2021)
[5] Ibid., p. 1.
[6] Ibid., p. 1.
[7] J. Coolahan and P. F. O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate 1831-2008* (Dublin, 2009), p. 16.
[8] T. Corcoran, 'The "Kildare Place" Education Society' in *The Irish Monthly*, Vol. 59, No.702 (Dec. 1931), pp. 746-752.
[9] P. F. O'Donovan, *Stanley's Letter: The National School System and Inspectors in Ireland, 1831-1922* (Dublin, 2009), p. 12.
[10] Ibid., p. 751.

denominational education evoked similar reactions. This was also an early example of a lesson that Londonderry should have heeded.

Consequently, on 9 September 1831, Lord Stanley, the Chief Secretary of Ireland, announced Ireland's national school system in the parliament at Westminster.[11] This would be the first attempt at democratising education in Ireland; the churches viewed it as secularising. Providing a brief outline of his proposed plan, Stanley 'explained that no longer would grants be paid to educational societies that were not accountable to government'.[12] Stanley stated that funds would now be appropriated to those for whose benefit it had been intended.[13] This directive sealed the fate of the Kildare Place Society. The '£32,000 hitherto paid annually from public funds' to the society 'would henceforth be placed at the disposal of the Lord Lieutenant' for the creation of the new educational system.'[14] The announcement received a mixed reception among the Irish members of parliament but, crucially, it was welcomed favourably by Daniel O'Connell.[15] In October, Stanley wrote to the Duke of Leinster, a member of the privy council, setting out the key principles for the national system of education in Ireland.[16] This 'became the foundation document for the new Irish national school system'.[17] The Commissioners of National Education of Ireland met on 1 December.[18] They appointed members to the National Board of Education whose job it was 'to set down the required conditions for affiliated schools to be recognised, and schools were managed by patrons in the community'.[19] The board 'would have absolute control of funds voted by parliament'.[20] The money was 'to be spent to grant aid the erection of schools, to pay inspectors to visit and report on schools, to pay gratuities to teachers, to train teachers, and to produce textbooks of moral

[11] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 7; Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16.
[12] Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 7.
[13] Ibid., p. 7.
[14] J. Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum: popular education in Ulster from 1831 to the 1990s' in E. Phoenix (ed.), A century of northern life: the Irish News and 100 years of Ulster history 1890s-1990s (Belfast, 1995), p. 100; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 12.
[15] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter*, p. 8.
[16] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools*, p. 2; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter*, p. 8; Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16*;* B. Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland 1900 – 1944* (Ontario, 1983), p. 5.
[17] Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16; O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools, p.* 1; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* pp 8-9.
[18] Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16; O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools***,** p. 2; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* pp 9-10.
[19] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools*, p. 2.
[20] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 10.

and literacy education'.[21] The board would also appoint inspectors, a development that was unwelcomed by both the R.C. and Protestant churches.

One of the core principles of the proposal was

> to afford *combined literary and moral, and separate* religious *instruction* [author's emphasis], to children of all persuasions, as far as possible, in the same school, upon the fundamental principle, that no attempt shall be made to interfere with the peculiar religious tenets of any description of Christian pupils.[22]

The emphasised passage is important to note as Londonderry used the exact same phraseology in his act, which would cause the protracted hostilities with the Protestant clergy. Stanley's system 'was to offer an elementary education to Catholics and Protestants together in the same schools to instill mutual tolerance and respect'.[23] From the outset, as argued by T. O'Donoghue and J. Harford, it was 'the Protestant churches [who] opposed the new system, arguing that the separation of religious instruction from the rest of the curriculum was un-acceptable'.[24] This contributed greatly to the situation where 'the majority of the Protestant schools remained outside the national system and within the Church Education Society (C.E.S.) from 1839 to 1869' meaning 'that the majority of schools were managed by and vested in the Catholic Church'.[25] The non-denominational nature of the new system caused consternation amongst the three main Protestant churches as children would be taught religion separately, and outside of school hours. This was problematic for the churches as they considered education as an extension of their pastoral care. Consequently, the clergy deemed non-denominationalism as state interference which diluted their influence in the sphere of education. Ulster witnessed the most severe reaction where a campaign was instigated in Presbyterian areas in Counties Antrim and Down, in which schools were burned and teachers intimidated.[26] O'Donovan points out that these acts were also carried out in Tyrone.[27] The protest reached the Synod of Ulster who

[21] Ibid., 10.
[22] Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000', pp 9-10 and 58th Report of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland for 1891, H.C. 1892, [C.-6788-1], Appendix B, Rules and Regulations of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland, 2.
[23] T. O'Donoghue, and J. Harford, 'A Comparative History of Church-State Relations in Irish Education' in *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 55, No. 3 (August 2011), p. 321.
[24] Ibid., p. 321.
[25] Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000', p. 10.
[26] Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum', p. 100.
[27] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter*, p. 28.

'lobbied strongly for modifications in the rules to enable them to obtain public money for their schools'.[28] It is somewhat incredulous, given the reaction of the Protestant clerics, that Londonderry would introduce the same clause in his act. The R.C. Church viewed the clause similarly, but with more restraint. The landscape of funding for schools had irrevocably altered because 'unlike donations, state grants came with conditions attached'.[29]

The Anglican Church had its own network of secondary schools. It also had Trinity College, Dublin, making primary schools its main concern. Akenson offers a more sympathetic reading of the situation, pointing out that the C.E.S. was founded, in part, to cater for the 'hundreds of thousands of Irish-Protestant children … who would not be rising up the social ladder to attend secondary school, much less Trinity'.[30] The motivations for establishing the C.E.S. in 1838 were 'complex, but one was to avoid Protestant children being placed in the difficult role of being a small minority in largely Catholic national schools'.[31] The initiative, backed mostly by the Anglican Church and 'a collection of lay nobility and gentry', was initially a success, and by 1848 had 'over 120,000 pupils on its rolls'.[32] This was an expensive undertaking for the C. of I. and 'after undergoing rigorous reforms directed by the United Kingdom parliament, the Church of Ireland no longer had the money to support adequately elementary education'.[33] This precipitated the church's own decline 'and by 1870 (when church disestablishment occurred), was down to 52,000 pupils and heading to oblivion'.[34]

Now outside of the system, self-funding Protestant schools would respond favorably to local authority involvement in their schools, and the financial rewards from rates. Local authority involvement would also become a contentious issue for the R.C. Church. Stanley's national school system provided an allocated time for local clergy to give separate religious instruction to the children of their own respective denominations. This meant that teachers could not perform this duty during normal school hours or as part of the curriculum. Section 26 of the Londonderry Act, the most contentious for the Protestant churches, would contain the same restrictions. There is a defining symmetry here, having missed similar glaring portents with the R.C. authorities. As this thesis makes clear, these gross miscalculations would

[28] Ibid., p. 30; Magee, 'From national schools to national curriculum', p. 100.
[29] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter*, 27.
[30] D. Akenson, *Small differences: Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants 1815-1922, an international perspective* (Dublin, 1991), p. 117.
[31] Ibid., p. 117.
[32] Ibid., p. 117.
[33] Ibid., p. 117.
[34] Ibid., p. 117.

ultimately expose Londonderry's lack of understanding of the history of education on the island and of Ulster Protestantism. As a consequence, this would set him on a collision course with the Protestant clerics and the Orange Order, a treacherous slope down which he would disappear from N.I.'s political landscape.

By the turn of the century, Unionist politicians and clergy supported proposed government reforms to involve local government and local rate support to assist in the management of schools. Protestant churches were, it would appear, initially reticent in welcoming local authority control. It was not, according to Farren, until the Protestant churches faced extreme financial hardship in maintaining separate schools, that they became amenable to public authority involvement. [35] Historians Farren, Akenson, Seamus Ó Buachalla and Thomas J. McElligott recounted how Belfast schools, particularly Protestant schools, had become dilapidated during the first two decades of the twentieth century and, in some cases, unfit for use.[36] McNally's documenting of the exponential growth in the population of the city in the latter half of the nineteenth century, from 87,000 in 1851 to 349,000 in 1901, provides a clearer indication of the strain that the system had experienced.[37] Momentum for reform was quickly gathering pace, especially within Protestant churches in Belfast. This is hardly surprising, as Farren points out that:

> reports had also claimed that between 15-20,000 children of school-going age were unable to find a place in school, while existing schools were overcrowded to the extent of 9-10,000 pupils. Schools of all denominations in Belfast were affected by the crisis but it was one which particularly affected the many different and often small Protestant congregations, each of which was trying to provide its own local school …. But the result was poor standards of hygiene, inadequate or no equipment, poor teacher morale and low educational standards.[38]

This financial distress forced the Protestant churches to lobby for reform. In spring 1919, a private member's bill, the Primary Education (Belfast) bill, sponsored by Unionist members,

[35] Farren, *The politics of Irish education, p. 26*.
[36] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; S. Ó Buachalla, *Education Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland (*Dublin, 1988); T. J. McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-1921* (Dublin, 1981).
[37]McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years, p.* 4.
[38] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 25.

was tabled in the House of Commons seeking to establish a Belfast Educational Authority. This came with the proviso of 'guarantees on religious instruction and on the right of their representatives to enter the schools to provide such instruction'.[39] The resolutely unionist *Northern Whig* reported on the contribution of its editor, Robert Lynn, to the debate on the bill's second reading in the House of Commons on 9 May 1919.[40] Lynn's contribution is important to record at this stage, given his future role as chairman of the Lynn committee. Indicators of how he would approach the chairmanship became apparent when he reproached the Catholic bishops for wanting public money while maintaining total autonomy, without any public control.[41] This could be interpreted as a contributory factor for Cardinal Logue's rejection of Londonderry's invitation to send representatives to join the committee. Lynn was keen to assure all that 'this was not an attempt by Ulster Unionists to establish a godless education' as it would 'constitute the breeding ground of Bolsheviks and its attendant evils'.[42] Religion would become a central element of the Protestant clergy's opposition to the Londonderry Act. The collective paranoia throughout Europe concerning Bolshevism, which had become 'synonymous with the elusive threats and underhand enemies that menaced European post-war societies' ensured unanimity and little fear of rebuttal.[43]

This brief cameo provides a preview of how Lynn would steer his committee. The experience presents an insight into some of the difficulties that Londonderry would experience throughout the passage of his education bill. This was a clear indicator that the future Unionist government would pursue a policy of local authority involvement in financing primary education in N.I. The policy would be roundly denounced as unacceptable by the Catholic authorities. After all the rancour, the Belfast Bill was withdrawn to accommodate the government's own bill, the McPherson Bill.[44] Even though the Protestant schools were experiencing overwhelming financial hardship, their fundamental demands on religion were non-negotiable. This became the principle upon which Londonderry's political future in northern politics would perish.

1.2 Catholic Beginnings

[39] Ibid., p. 27.
[40] *Northern Whig*, 10 May 1919.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] R. Gerwarth and J Horne, *War and peace: paramilitary violence in Europe after the Great war* (New York, 2013), p. 51.
[44] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 28. The bill will be examined in more detail further on.

The Catholic Relief Act, 1829, was a defining marker in the development of Catholic rights.[45] Thomas Bartlett summarises that, following hard on the heels of the act, campaigning commenced 'for an end to tithes, for repeal of the union, for political and educational reform – ultimately home rule…while the phenomenon of the 'political priest' of the 1920s proved enduring'.[46] In forming a symbiotic alliance with the colonial power, and its position of dominance over a devout laity, meant that the Catholic Church had 'positioned itself as integral to the new national system, strategically acting as a partner to the state in the setting up of schools'.[47] This ensured that their schools became, as Ó Buachalla put it, 'parochially organised, denominationally segregated and clerically managed'.[48] The reaction to the new system resulted in the growth of single denominational school managers.[49] The 'militant stance adopted by the Irish bishops' meant that the power of individual managers rested largely in the recruitment and dismissal of teachers.[50] This coincided with Stanley's suggested structure for the national system of education. As Lord Londonderry would in 1923, Stanley advocated a desegregated system of elementary education. But by 1870 the new system had 'developed into an almost totally religious-managed organisation due largely to the sustained agitation undertaken by the Catholic Church, the Church of Ireland, and the Presbyterian Church'.[51] The C. of I.'s creation of the C.E.S., as mentioned earlier, saw the Protestant churches become more detached from the system than the R.C. Church. Chapters 5 and 6 will elaborate further on the far-reaching consequences of the Protestant churches' self-imposed exile from Stanley's system. The Catholic authorities, in their opposition to the Londonderry Act, would seek to defend the established de facto segregation system.

By the end of the century, and following into the next, 'the churches etched away at the mixed denominational principle of the national system, and in reality, most schools were vested in diocesan trustees, had the local bishop as their patron, were clerically managed and the managers, teachers and pupils were of the same faith'.[52] By the turn of the century, the

[45] Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*, p. 16.
[46] T. Bartlett, *The fall and rise of the Irish Nation: the Catholic question 1690*–1830 (Worcester, 1992), p. 343; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 4.
[47] Ibid., p. 11.
[48] Ó Buachalla, *Education Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland*, p. 28.
[49] Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000', p. 10.
[50] O'Donoghue and Harford, 'A Comparative History of Church-State Relations in Irish Education', p. 321.
[51] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools,* p. 8. See also, Coolahan and O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate*; Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000'; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter*; D. Akenson, *The Irish education experiment: the national system of education in the nineteenth century* (London, 1970).
[52] Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000', p. 10.

government had, on several occasions, considered reforms to accommodate the involvement of local government and accessing local rate support to assist in developing the management of schools. It is worth examining some of the aforementioned objections as they provide a point of reference for the R.C. authorities' later objections to the M.O.E. and the reforms contained in the Londonderry Act.

In February 1899, Dr William Starkie was appointed as the fifth, and last, resident commissioner for education for Ireland. In a speech, addressing the 'British Association in Belfast in September 1902, Starkie gave a wide-ranging and candid critique of the system'.[53] He drew on inspectors' reports to make a correlation between the managerial system and local interest in education. O'Donovan points out that this was reflected in 'the lack of proper maintenance of national school buildings and lack of heating, cleaning and general comfort and hygiene in schools, relating these to issues of funding, control and interest in local facilities for education'.[54] This caused a furore within the churches, who were extremely protective of their autonomy in their schools. What rankled the R.C. Church most was Starkey's 'proposal that primary and secondary education be coordinated and provided with reliable finances through rate aid and local control'.[55] The Chief Secretary for Ireland, George Wyndham, maintained an interest in reforming education and, in an important development, appointed a young English inspector, F.H. Dale, to investigate to what extent the Irish system compared with its English counterpart.[56] O'Donovan states that 'Dale's report highlighted serious deficiencies in regard to school premises, equipment, staffing, attendance, infant education, and the quality of instruction generally'.[57] O'Donovan also argues that the report highlighted how poor administration over previous decades had contributed to a recent serious underperformance in national education.[58] The *Freeman's Journal* reported that Dale had recommended establishing an education department and local education authorities empowered to strike rates to remedy these defects.[59] Believing this recommendation to be the

[53] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 269.
[54] Ibid. and Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 18.
[55] O'Doherty and O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools***,** pp 30-40; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 17.
[56] Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 18; O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 270.
[57] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 271; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 17.
[58] Ibid., p. 270.
[59] *Freeman's Journal*, 8 March 1904; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 18; Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 24.

most likely to be endorsed by government, 'clerical denunciations were therefore quick to follow'.[60]

While admitting that the system was rotten, on 18 April 1904, Redmond and the parliamentary party argued against the recommendation to establish an 'education department', alleging that it would be 'a "Castle" department, and therefore not be responsible to the Irish people'.[61] Unsurprisingly, he declared that a speedy resolution could be worked under Home Rule. Wyndham acknowledged that Ireland was too poor to support primary education through local rates but suggested that it might be achievable with technical and intermediate education.[62] This was the first official statement of the government's intent to reform Irish education. As Tetley phrased it: 'the cat was at last out of the proverbial bag'.[63]

Irrespective of their remit, the R.C. hierarchy viewed it as an attempt to introduce local authority interference in their schools. They approached the visit of the two English inspectors as a battle for the control of all Catholic education in Ireland. The Catholic bishops met in Maynooth on 22 June 1904, where they declared that the reform was a diversionary tactic to distract form the real motive of attacking clerical power in schools.[64] From this, they issued a statement opposing the changes, to be read at all churches. It proclaimed that the proposed changes should be resisted as they would be extremely intolerable to the Irish people and the bishops, on religious, political and educational grounds.[65] This was a more contemporary lesson which Londonderry failed yet again to learn from. Dale was dispatched to Ireland again, this time with T.A. Stephens, to investigate the intermediate system.[66] Their 1905 report endorsed the reforms that the government were seeking to impose.[67] They reiterated their position that rate support and local authority involvement in the provision and management of schools was essential, if education was to be adequately funded and developed.[68] Farren points out that, yet again, 'the basis for such reforms had also gained considerable support within the teaching profession itself'.[69]

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[60] Ibid., p. 18.
[61] Ibid., p. 19.
[62] Ibid., p. 19.
[63] Ibid. P. 19.
[64] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 25; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 20.
[65] Ibid., p. 25; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland,* p. 20.
[66] O'Donovan**,** *Stanley's Letter,* p. 272.
[67] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 24.
[68] Ibid., p. 24.
[69] Ibid., p. 24.

Despite its association with the Irish national cause, the Liberal Party's 1906 general election victory made the Irish hierarchy uneasy. Their discomfort was caused by the party's non-conformism and its opposition to state support for religious schools and support for state control of education.[70] The Catholic Church viewed it as a direct threat to the denominational structure of education; a threat they were prepared to resist. Puirséil describes how Bishop O'Dwyer of Limerick had 'called on Irish voters in Britain not to vote for a party whose policies would "cause the faith of thousands upon thousands of poor Catholic children"' to be "lost in Protestant and infidel schools"'.[71] The threat was compounded when Augustine Birrell, the new president of the Board of Education, was transferred to Ireland after his Education Bill for England 'ultimately fell in the Lords which had a Conservative majority'.[72] The bill was 'designed to cut funding to denominational schools' and therefore 'his arrival in Ireland was greeted with suspicion amongst the Catholic hierarchy, who feared that he might attempt something similar in his new role as chief secretary'.[73] There was an increasing sense of insecurity within the R.C. Church in relation to its level of autonomous authority within its national schools.

When the Irish Council bill, 1907, proposed 'a form of devolution which included administrative and consultative powers over education, opposition was expressed again'.[74] Another unionist sponsored proposal in Belfast in 1909, 'to increase financing for school maintenance and heating, through a form of rate support … was viewed as a potential threat to the managerial system'.[75] These, and the previously cited government proposals, were accepted by the Protestant churches and rejected by the Catholic bishops who argued that 'an educational levy on the rates would lead to a form of double taxation'.[76] Even though Catholic schools were also suffering, the bishops opposed all attempts at remedying them and were prepared to die on the sword of the 'double taxation' argument. These were noteworthy portents that Lord Londonderry, and especially his ministry, as some had lived through the proposals, should have been cognisant of. This episode from the early twentieth century provides an introduction into the complex and divided nature of education in Ireland. It provides a brief insight into how the

[70] N. Puirséil, *Kindling the flame: 150 years of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation* (Dublin, 2017), p. 39.
[71] D. H. Miller, *Church, State and Nation in Ireland, 1898-1921* (Pittsburgh,1973), p. 145; Puirséil, *Kindling the flame,* p. 39.
[72] Puirséil, *Kindling the flame,* p. 40.
[73] Ibid., p. 40; P. Maum, *The long gestation: Irish Nationalist life 1891-1918* (Dublin, 1999), p. 82.
[74] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 25.
[75] Ibid., p. 25.
[76] Ibid., p. 25.

churches viewed any outside interference with deep mistrust and suspicion, and how they would also robustly resist any attempts to integrate education.

1.3 The McPherson Bill

The rejection of the McPherson Bill 1919-1920, which also promoted the principles of funding schools via rates collected by local authority, would act as the final practice run for the pending hostilities in reaction to the Londonderry Act. The McPherson Bill, only a year before the first draft bill for the Londonderry Act, was beset with difficulties that Londonderry appeared incapable of learning from. The bill was named after James MacPherson, a Scottish Presbyterian, who became Ireland's new chief secretary in January 1919.[77] McPherson believed that 'one of Scottish education's greatest achievements … was that it had "overcome the pitfall of religion" so that no denomination held grievances'.[78] He wished to emulate this achievement in Ireland. As the bill contained many similarities to Londonderry's Act, its rejection is worth examining in detail as it 'envisaged the most drastic reform ever attempted of Irish education'.[79] Perhaps the British Government's hopes for the bill had been falsely buoyed by misinterpreting the unionist enthusiasm for the Belfast Bill, as being representative of all interested parties. The miscalculation could, in part, have been down to the fact that 'the climate in political circles was favourable to reform and the McPherson Bill did incorporate a consensus of educational views as distinct from views which derived as much from religious conviction as from educational expertise'.[80] It should be remembered that as an 'outsider' Londonderry would make the same mistake, despite the warning signs, of underestimating how deeply covetous the R.C. and Protestant Irish churches were of their authority. It would act as the final, unheeded, warning for the hostilities that would beset the Londonderry Act.

The bill proposed that 'Authorities for local administrative purposes would be created for every county and borough'.[81] The education committees would consist of one third local council members, one third appointed by the department and the rest being 'managers of primary schools and headmasters of secondary and technical schools'.[82] The committees were empowered to strike a local rate for education but 'would not interfere with the managerial

[77] Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland*, p. 59.
[78] Ibid., p. 60.
[79] Ibid., p. 60.
[80] McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-192,* p. 132.
[81] Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland*, p. 60.
[82] Ibid., p. 60.

system in primary or secondary schools, nor have any role in teacher appointments in them'.[83] Clause 3 of the bill was crucial as it 'specifically guaranteed the continuation of denominational teaching in schools'.[84] Without impinging on the denominational schooling, it attempted to democratise education. In return for the taxpayers' contribution, local authorities were given 'a voice in the control of the system in which his [the ratepayer] children were educated'.[85] The ratepayers would have representation on the department's new advisory board and would 'elect fifty per cent of the members of the committees which would play an important role in the administration of education at the local level'.[86] Not as robust as the Londonderry Act would be in certain areas, it was greeted warmly by the U.U.P. and forcefully rejected by the R.C. Church.

As with previous attempts at educational reform, the Catholic bishops resisted; only this time, it was with uncompromising neo-nationalist language which Dudley Edwards suggested was to appeal to 'Faith and Fatherland':

> Education … should be a native plant of native culture … It should be grown from within not an importation from without … So it was in Ireland when our schools were famous; so it has not been in Ireland since England took upon herself to say what kind of schooling, if any, we should have.[87]

Two of the main signatories of the declaration were Cardinal Michael Logue and Bishop Joseph MacRory, Bishop of Down and Connor, both of whom would become leading figures in the R.C. Church's fractious interactions with the new N.I. government. After a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Catholic hierarchy on 9 December 1919, they announced that the bill was being processed 'at the instigation of *an intolerant minority* [author's emphasis] in one angle of the country, who demand that others should be taxed with them to do what … their poorer neighbours … had done voluntarily'.[88] The emphasised phrase is hugely significant, if not ironically prophetic, as it would be the R.C. Church who, after partition, would accuse the

[83] Ibid., p.60
[84] Ibid., p. 60.
[85] Ibid., p. 61.
[86] Ibid., p. 61.
[87] R. W., Dudley Edwards. 'Government of Ireland and Education, 1919-1920' in *Archivium Hibernicum,* Vol. 37 (1982), p. 26. For further reading see McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-1921*. Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; O'Donoghue and Harford, 'A Comparative History of Church-State Relations in Irish Education'; Akenson, *Education and enmity*.
[88] Edwards, 'Government of Ireland and Education, 1919-1920', p. 26. For further reading see also McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-1921*; Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland*, pp. 62-4.

Unionist government of victimising them as the minority religion. By appealing to faith, the emotive rhetoric created a distraction from the real issue, the potential of local authority influence diluting its control over Catholic education. The congregations' heightened sense of nationalism, imbued by the prevailing political climate, ensured that the clergy's patriotic demagoguing would have been positively received. The sentiment was repeated, with similar nationalistic fervour, in the British parliament when Joseph Devlin, Nationalist M.P. for the Falls in Belfast, claimed that 'no English parliament had the right to deal with the question of education in Ireland'.[89]

The depth of feeling within the R.C. Church at the perceived erosion of its power needs to be established. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, their fears were akin to those of the Protestant clergy in relation to the Londonderry Act. Cardinal Logue's letter to the bishops, 27 February 1920, labeled it a 'pernicious' bill which must be opposed to save 'the eternal interests of the children of Ireland'.[90] The cardinal insisted that

> [p]arents are bound to make sure, by every means in their power, that their children are brought up and educated as faithful Catholics, in a Catholic atmosphere, and under the care and direction of their pastors, whose strict right and leading duty it is to watch over, direct and safeguard the religious education of the lambs of their flock.[91]

He declared that they 'have not yet, thank God, arrived at the stage dreamt of by extreme socialists, when the children of the people shall become the mere chattels of the state, the Bill in question seems to tend notably in that direction'.[92] The threat of a socialist (or 'Bolshevik') run system was also employed by the Protestant churches. Protestant clergy employed similar language to insist that Protestant children should be taught in Protestant schools by Protestant teachers, under their stewardship. Logue issued a nationwide edict that the fathers of families in each Parish should be invited to remain after the devotions on Passion Sunday and afforded an opportunity 'to register their protest to a measure which trenches on their parental rights'.[93]

[89] McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-1921,* p. 31.
[90] Cardinal Logue to bishops, 27 February 1920; Bishop O'Donnell Papers (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/6).
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.

On 22 January 1920, the *Evening Telegraph* reported that at a 'special meeting of the Central Council of the Catholic Clerical School Managers was held yesterday at the Gresham Hotel, Dublin'.[94] Part of the committee's statement referred to 'the unlimited taxing power conferred by the Bill. Seeing that Ireland already contributes some 40 millions to the Imperial Exchequer, we regard as unwarranted and unjust the further burden which the bill would cast upon our local rates'.[95] The *Irish Independent* reported that when the cardinal and bishops assembled at Maynooth, they denounced the bill as 'Clerical Decontrol', 'Intolerable Abuse of Power' and 'Back to Hedge School Possibilities'.[96] The predominant concerns that would preoccupy the R.C. Church regarding the Londonderry Act were contained within this backlash to the McPherson Bill. A letter to the editor of the *Evening Standard* from the Secretary General of the I.N.T.O. quoted Fr. Corcoran's contention that the most essential issue for the R.C. Church was 'full Catholic control of the choice of teachers, retention of teachers, and removal of teachers'.[97] In the case of the appointment of teachers, the act, as referenced above, 'would not interfere with the managerial system in primary and secondary schools, nor have any role in teacher appointments within them'.[98] Bishop O'Donnell's letter, 4 March 1920, instructed priests to announce from the pulpit, at the behest of Cardinal Logue, how the 'noxious' and 'baneful measure' was an 'insidious attack on everything that, as Catholics and Irishmen, we hold dear'.[99]

The R.C. authority's antipathy towards the measure was reflected in the bishops' continued denunciation of it, as reported in *the Irish Independent* on 28 January 1919.[100] The predominant concerns that the R.C. Church would have regarding the Londonderry Act were, essentially, contained within this backlash to the McPherson Bill. These were, again, a mirror image of more of the central issues contained within the Londonderry Act, that the Protestant churches would also protest so zealously against. This highlights the fact that the two sets of churches would fundamentally object to the Londonderry Act on similar grounds; the difference being that in the case of the Londonderry Act, the Protestant churches would fight

[94] *Evening Telegraph*, 22 Jan. 1920.
[95] Ibid.
[96] *Irish Independent*, 28 Jan. 1920.
[97] *Evening Standard*, 27 Jan. 1920.
[98] Titley, *Church, State, and control of schooling in Ireland*, p. 60.
[99] Bishop O'Donnell to priests of Down and Connor Diocese, 4 March 1920; Bishop O'Donnell Papers (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/6).
[100] *Irish Independent*, 28 Jan. 1920.

the system from within. The miscalculation made by the R.C. Church's decision on non-compliance can be assessed in this context.

After the bill's progress was delayed from June to November, it was resuscitated by the now irate U.U.P. members. Sir Edward Carson enquired of the prime minister 'when the promised Education Bill would be introduced', while Lynn 'alleged that the delay was inflicting a grave injustice on 20,000 children in Belfast'.[101] It was clear from the Ulster Unionist's impatience that they were eager to have the bill implemented. They believed it had the potential to provide the necessary funds and structure needed to salvage an education system on the verge of extinction. The McPherson Bill proved to be the last attempt to democratise education in Ireland before partition. Buckland succinctly appraises the pre-partition educational milieu when expressing that 'in practice, control of all but a few schools was vested in the parish clergy, who functioned as school managers, so that schools were *de facto* denominational institutions'.[102] The events illustrate that Londonderry missed a glaring opportunity to learn valuable lessons from very recent history. He would display a distinct lack of understanding of the protracted divisions within education, divisions that would be exaggerated by attempting to introduce a non-denominational system of education.

1.4 New States: Divided Loyalties and Ideologies

N.I. came into being during the War of Independence and while riots were raging in Belfast. The first general election, held on 24 May 1921, saw all forty of the U.U.P.'s candidates elected to the fifty-two seat parliament.[103] The executive model employed by the new government comprised of seven departments: The Department of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Education; the latter of which is the focus of this work.[104] Prime Minister Sir James Craig appointed Lord Londonderry as Minister for the M.O.E. at the first sitting of the parliament on 7 June.[105] The Irish War of Independence continued until a truce was agreed on 11 July. The Anglo-Irish treaty was signed on 6 December 1921, and then ratified by the Dáil allowing for the formation of a Provisional

[101] Edwards, 'Government of Ireland and Education, 1919-1920', p. 23.
[102] *P.* Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39* (Dublin, 1973), p. 248.
[103] T. Hennessy, *A history of Northern Ireland 1920-1996* (Dublin, 1997), p. 18.
[104] Ibid., p. 18.
[105] Londonderry will be central to most of the proceedings throughout the thesis. His character will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Government in Dublin. Under the terms of Section 69 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 1 February 1922 was set as the official date for the transfer of educational services from the D.O.E. to the M.O.E.[106]

By the time of N.I.'s first election in May 1921, the island was in a state of flux that would eventually determine its political and geographical landscape to the present day. On 21 January 1919, an independent Irish Republic had been unilaterally declared when Dáil Éireann sat for the first time with just twenty seven members in attendance, as most of the elected MP's were imprisoned in England.[107] On the same day, members of the Third Tipperary Brigade of the Irish Volunteers shot and killed two Royal Irish Constabulary officers, James McDonnell and Patrick O'Connell at Soloheadbeg in County Tipperary; these are often considered the first shots fired in the War of Independence.[108] The two events signalled that republicanism in Ireland had declared war, militarily and politically, on Britain, with the clear intent of removing its influence from the island. The new Provisional Government, and the influential Conradh na Gaeilge (Gaelic League), strongly promoted the Irish language and culture meaning that 'the educational reforms introduced focused almost exclusively on transforming the schools into key agents for the revival of Irish and Gaelic culture generally'.[109]

The rationale for the Gaelicisation of the post-partition education in the I.F.S. was rooted in Patrick Pearse's philosophy on education. E. Brian Titley's *Church, State, and the Control of Schooling in Ireland 1900–1944* provides a perceptive background with the suggestion that

> the extreme nationalist movement had produced one major writer on educational themes – Patrick Pearse, who was executed for his role in the 1916 rebellion – and it was not unreasonable to assume that the ideas of this martyr for the cause would figure prominently in the educational deliberations of his political and ideological successors.[110]

[106] Circular to managers of schools, local committees, teachers etc., Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[107] C. Townshend, *The Republic: fighting for independence, 1918*-1923 (Dublin, 2014), p. xiii.
[108] P. McMahon, *British spies and Irish rebels: British intelligence and Ireland, 1916-1945* (Suffolk, 2008), p. 25.
[109] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 52.
[110] Titley, *Church, State, and the Control of Schooling in Ireland*, p. 73.

Pearse's pamphlet on education, *The Murder Machine*, depicted the system as 'the most grotesque and horrible of the English inventions for the debasement of Ireland'.[111] This provides an insight into where the educational emphasis, post-partition, would focus. Pearse believed that the language provided an identity to the nation and the individual, while forming the platform for the political and intellectual independence of Ireland. This educational philosophy, predicated on social and revolutionary pedagogy, was also the beginning of the weaponising of the language and culture. It was a legacy with an unquestionable lineage that would be adapted by the Provisional Government for its own nation building. The consequences of its added implementation as a political weapon against its future neighbouring government, and in particular the M.O.E., will be the main focus of interest for this work. As Minister for Education, Eoin MacNeill, would become one of the strongest advocates of its implementation.

Providing an insight into the mind-set of nationalist Ireland, Martin Maguire recounted that as far back as 1911 Arthur Griffith 'detailed how, once stripped of nepotistic and corrupt recruiting practices, a national civil service would have a profound impact on Irish education and would offer an attractive alternative to the British and imperial services of young men'.[112] Once full responsibility for education had been handed over to the Provisional Government in 1922, Pádraig Ó Brolcháin was appointed chief executive officer for education. In February 1922, he addressed the members of the National Board of Education telling them that

> [i]n the administration of Irish education it is the intention of the new government to work with all its might for the strengthening of national fibre by giving the language, history, music and tradition of Ireland their natural place in the life of Irish schools.[113]

The zeal for this revival, which was as much about not being British as it was about encouraging a revival of an Irish national identity, would have been anathema to the new Protestant Belfast government. The far-reaching consequences of the Provisional Government's change of the date for the Easter exams and the introduction of the Irish language into the curriculum for teacher training colleges will be analysed in Chapters 2 and 3. This will provide an insight into

[111] Ibid., p. 73.
[112] M. Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland, 1912-38* (Manchester, 2008), p. 96; *Sinn Féin Weekly*, 11 Feb. 1911.
[113] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 110; *Report of the Commissioners of Intermediate Education*, 192-3.

how the Unionist Government viewed the language and those who used it in N.I.; an issue that has resurfaced in recent years. At the time of writing, Acht na Gaeilge (Irish Language Act) remains a contentious issue in N.I.

The post-partition six-county N.I., with a 66% Protestant majority who identified as British, viewed these events with grave concern as it threatened their place, and British identity, within the United Kingdom. Ulster Protestants viewed themselves culturally and nationally apart from their Catholic/Irish counterparts on the island. They broadly attributed their lineage, heritage and culture to the Scottish Protestant Planters of the early seventeenth century. They made what they considered to be the ultimate blood sacrifice at the Battle of the Somme, which is annually commemorated and held as 'an affirmation of loyalty to the British link and of Ulster's Protestant heritage'.[114] James Craig articulated the ethos of the new state when he declared that he was 'an Orangeman first and a member of this parliament second'.[115] He followed this up during a House of Commons debate in April 1934 with the infamous, and much misquoted, declaration that '[t]he hon. Member must remember that in the past they boasted of a Catholic State. They still boast of Southern Ireland being a Catholic State. All I boast is that we have a Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State'.[116] Aside from the likelihood that it was made in response to a remark made, in a similar vein, by Éamon de Valera, the intrinsic values of the state were reflected through its Prime Minister's utterances. Their language was English, they were British; the Irish language was unwelcomed and met with suspicion and antagonism. But the reality was that there was a significant 34 per cent Catholic minority who identified as Irish, and with whom they would have to share N.I. The impact of this must also be considered when assessing the Provisional Government's approach to cross-border cooperation.

The Catholic minority's perception that they had been corralled against their will into a Protestant six county Ulster, must also be considered.[117] This further complication would

[114] G. Walker, *A history of the Ulster Unionist Party: protest, pragmatism and* pessimism (Manchester, 2004), p. 40.
[115] Hennessey, *A history of Northern Ireland,* p. 64; McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years;* p. 37; M. Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State* (London, 1980), p. 92.
[116] Buckland, *The factory of grievances,* p. 72; *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series, vol. 1: Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1922, col. 525 (Hansard N.I. (Commons)*; J. O'Brien, *Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 1920-1939: myth or reality?* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010), p. 38. See also Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange state*; B. O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2: control, the second Protestant Ascendancy and the Irish State (Oxford, 2019),* p. 5; Hennessey, *A history of Northern Ireland*, p. 63.
[117] Buckland, *The factory of grievances,* p. 2; Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange state*, p. 24.

have a significant bearing on future intergovernmental relationships. It would also affect the M.O.E.'s relationship with the Catholic population and the Catholic clergy. Exposing the fragility of pre-partition conflicting, and mutually destructive, ideologies meant that they could not peacefully co-exist on the island. With the first election in May 1921, N.I. set about establishing itself as a separate British entity on the island. This was a clear, strong message to Britain, and the Irish insurgents, that Ulster would remain British, within the United Kingdom. On the other side of the border, at a meeting of the Provisional Government on 30 January 1922, Bishop MacRory voiced his concern that if 'a policy of non-recognition was adopted, the people in the north would feel alone'.[118] Michael Collins responded by telling the Bishop that 'non-recognition of the Northern Parliament was essential otherwise they would have nothing to bargain with Sir James Craig'.[119] This confirms that there was going to be a deliberate policy of non-co-operation employed by the Provisional Government.

The missed lessons from the previous ninety years would prove too costly for Lord Londonderry. Between them, the Protestant and R.C. Churches had been, and would continue to be, intransigent on the elementary and fixed principles of religious segregation, Bible study during school hours, autonomy, no rates or local authority interference, and a retention of the clerical managerial system. Lord Londonderry, for all his lack of intuition, fore- and hindsight, was sincere in his desire to usher in a radical, in the Irish context, non-denominational system of education. The obstacles constructed by the R.C. and Protestant churches would eventually deny him this and he would be ushered out of Ulster politics. The M.O.E.'s acrid relationship with the D.O.E. was not conducive to an effective administration of education in the troubled incipient state. Under Michael Collins the I.F.S., were determined to obstruct and undermine the northern ministry by not recognising its authority. It was under these most trying and complicated conditions that the M.O.E. was conceived and brought into existence. It would be an extremely testing and problematic infancy, that would see its leader's exit from northern politics. With him departed the only opportunity for integrated education for the next seventy years.

[118] Provisional Government meeting, 30 Jan. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/1).
[119] Ibid.

Chapter 2: Transfer of Services: Promises and Evasions and Establishing Identities [1]

Post-partition Ireland witnessed the emergence of two new states, N.I. and the I.F.S. On the 7 June 1921, Prime Minister James Craig appointed Lord Londonderry as Minister for Education. Under the terms of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 1 February was the designated date for the transfer of educational services from the D.O.E. to the M.O.E.[2] The chapter will examine how the deterioration of relations between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. had a domino effect on intergovernmental relations, between the Government of N.I. and the Provisional Government, throughout the first months of 1922. This made the transfer of services a fractious experience, especially for the M.O.E. The first concern that came to the attention of the M.O.E. centred on the arrangements for candidates sitting the Easter exams for teacher training.[3] (A topic that would, as will be seen in Chapter 3, have far-reaching consequences for the future of teacher training on the island of Ireland). Secondly, the accuracy of the northern government's claims that the Provisional Government/D.O.E. was delaying the transfer of personnel and documents will be assessed.[4]

This chapter deliberately focuses on cross-border influences on the M.O.E., as this is underrepresented in the extensive historiography of early twentieth century N.I. Much scholarly work has been published on domestic issues that influenced education in N.I., but scholarship has usually neglected the complexities of the impact that cross-border relations had on the M.O.E.[5] While two seminal works on the subject, D. Akenson's *Education and enmity* and Sean Farren's *The politics of Irish education* offer broad references on the effects of major events such as teacher training, they do not provide a detailed background into the causes of them.[6] While each acknowledged that intergovernmental difficulties existed, neither explored the intricate details of the circumstances, motives and main characters involved. This work will demonstrate how the increasingly problematic relationship between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E.

[1] Sir Ernest Clark, Head of Northern Civil Service, to Prime Minister Sir James Craig, 22 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/A/1/1).
[2] Circular to managers of schools, local committees, teachers etc., Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[3] Londonderry to Collins on Easter exams, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[4] Eighteen and fourteen-page documents compiled by the M.O.E. on issues of transfer of personnel and documents, 10 May 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/A/1/1; D3099/5/1).
[5] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington,1973); S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1960-65* (Belfast, 1995); *P.* Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39* (*Dublin, 1973*); N. McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work (1923-73)* (*Belfast, 1974*); J. O'Brien, *Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 1920-1939: myth or reality?* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010); T. Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in B. Walsh (ed.), *Essays in the history of Irish education* (London, 2016).
[6] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*.

negatively impacted on the former's ability to function. This chapter will approach the matter of teacher training in a cross-border context.

2.1 Fragile Expectations: Dec. 1921 – Feb. 1922

Internal M.O.E. communications indicated that concerns regarding the anticipated levels of cross-border cooperation were tempered with a sense of hope and optimism. On 20 December 1921, permanent secretary Lewis McQuibban forwarded drafts of schemes for proposed cross-border 'joint action' to Lord Londonderry for his approval.[7] Two of the four proposed schemes, numbers one and three, were key indicators of the M.O.E.'s concerns around the pending transfer of services after 1 February. Scheme one was 'for joint action with the intermediate Education Board in regard to the examinations, etc. in 1922' while scheme three proposed 'joint action with the National Board of Education'.[8] While McQuibban believed that pre-partition Boards would have accepted the schemes, his concern was that 'when the transfer of services takes place at the beginning of next month, and the Dublin Ministries are themselves re-organised …we may possible [sic] have to face a difficult situation should the reconstituted Ministries in the South decide to have no dealings with the North'.[9] McQuibban reveals the uncertainty felt by the M.O.E. regarding the pending transfer of services, while also signposting the ministry's concerns over the upcoming exams.

By 6 January 1922 McQuibban's apprehensions appear to have eased. He wrote to Londonderry telling him that he did not 'think that it is likely that any difficulty will arise' with the Provisional Government repudiating the schemes.[10] The reason for the change of disposition is unclear, but it would certainly prove to be misguided. Given the parochial nature of such a small island, the U.U.P. must have been aware of the resurgence of Gaelic culture, especially as it had been gathering momentum since 1919. Prime Minister Craig was aware that Michael Collins' strong feelings on partition were the catalyst for his strategy of making the N.I. parliament unworkable. In January 1922, the M.O.E. wrote to the 'Managers of Local Committees etc.' to inform them that in order to minimise disturbance to educational administration 'the Minister proposes to enter into agreements under Section 63 of the Government of Ireland Act, with the Educational Ministry in Southern Ireland for joint administrative action … in regard to ... the qualifications, examination and training of

[7] McQuibban to Londonderry, 20 Dec. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid
[10] McQuibban to Londonderry, 6 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).

teachers'.[11] There was nothing in the memo to suggest that the M.O.E. anticipated any difficulties attaining cooperation. Yet, on 15 February, McQuibban wrote to his Dublin counterpart, W.J. Dilworth, regarding 'the forthcoming Easter Examinations of … Candidates for admission to the Training Colleges'.[12] He stated that they desired 'entering into a mutual agreement' to accommodate those students resident in N.I.[13] He stressed that the question papers had 'already been prepared' prior to 1 February which gave them an equal entitlement to make use of the 'work that has already been done by the joint staff'.[14] He also suggested a joint examination board made up of four from Dublin and two from the M.O.E. with the understanding that the standard marking and regulations, 'as set forth in the Programme of Examination … in April 1921' would remain unchanged unless by mutual consent.[15] He concluded by proposing a shared cost 'of 31.4 per cent by N.I. and 68.6 by your Ministry' and that the papers, subject to agreement, be forwarded in good time to his M.O.E.[16] The document appears to be an earnest attempt to move forward, during this period of transition, with a pragmatic approach predicated on a perceived mutual dependency.

The scant possibility that it was sent speculatively to gauge how responsive the Provisional Government would be towards such advances can be dismissed due to the level of detail that went into the proposals. The Provisional Government could have viewed this as Unionist insensitivity to the prevailing political situation, which could have been a cause of resentment and anger, and was certainly not conducive to encouraging its cooperation. The Belfast government/M.O.E., often viewed as pragmatic, especially under James Craig, could be regarded as simply getting on with the necessary business at hand.[17] It fitted with the northern government's character that it would have busied itself with the essential task of consolidating its new position on the island. But it was a deeply fragile and insecure government trying to reinforce its own legitimacy. Even though it was stringently British, it was conditionally loyal to Britain, and did not trust its government. As shall be seen, anomalies such as this were among the Unionist government's more disconcerting traits when attempting to define and understand it. It still wished to retain its place within the empire during an era

[11] M.O.E. to Managers of Local Committees etc., Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[12] McQuibban to Dilworth, Secretary N.E.O., Marlborough Street, Dublin, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52; ED/32A/1/5).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] For further reading see G. Walker, *A history of the Ulster Unionist Party: protest, pragmatism and* pessimism (Manchester, 2004).

when empires were disintegrating. The Unionist government was in the precarious position of being the first devolved government within the British Empire. Although unionists were satisfied to have secured the built-in six county majority, there also existed a cognitive dissonance within unionism that the division of the island represented a dilution of the union, and empire. It viewed the I.F.S. Government as the enemy within, and the British Government as the potential external enemy. This is another example of the anomalous culture within northern unionism. The culmination of these circumstances resulted in the Belfast government cultivating an insular disposition that was manifested in a siege mentality; one, it could be argued, that persists to the present day. Education was now being governed by two conflicting political, national, and cultural entities.

The request to form a joint examination board was received with a portentous silence. McQuibban wrote to his counterpart again on 23 February reminding him that he had not replied to his previous letter on what were matters 'of a very urgent nature'.[18] More worryingly for the M.O.E. was that McQuibban drew Dilworth's 'attention to the fact that a number of other communications have been addressed to your office from this Ministry during the past few weeks to which no replies have been received'.[19] McQuibban wrote to the D.O.E. on 1 February 1922 listing the names of 'outdoor Officers, Inspectors and Organisers of the National Board of Education' who he proposed 'with the concurrence of the Commissioners of National Education and the Provisional Government to take into the service of this Ministry as from to-day [sic]'.[20] (An outdoor officer was a school inspector; this position would become problematic during the transfer process). Writing again on 23 February, he emphasised the necessity for 'cooperation between the two Ministries' to ensure 'the smooth working of the educational systems of both Southern and N.I.; and it is the desire of this Ministry to facilitate such cooperation as much as possible'.[21]

2.2 The Blame Game: Feb. – Mar. 1922

The correspondence between the two ministries highlights the M.O.E.'s increasing frustration with the D.O.E. There was a growing realisation with McQuibban that the D.O.E. had commenced its strategy of non-compliance. Most historians, including Akenson, have suggested that the reason for the M.O.E.'s decision to make their own arrangements for teacher

[18] McQuibban to Dilworth 23 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/12/52; ED/31/A/1/5).
[19] Ibid.
[20] McQuibban to Dilworth,1 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[21] Ibid.

training was because of the D.O.E. bringing the Easter exams forward by a month. The dates from the available evidence do not support this. McQuibban wrote to Dilworth on 6 March, informing him that the M.O.E., *as a consequence of the D.O.E.'s refusal to cooperate*, proposed 'to make our own arrangements for holding their examinations for candidates resident in Northern Ireland'.[22] As shall be seen further on, the first time the M.O.E. mentions the D.O.E. changing the dates of the Easter exams was not until 16 March, by which time the government had already commenced plans to establish Stranmillis, its own teacher training college. Dilworth wrote to McQuibban on 27 February informing him that that his minister had directed him 'to express regret that he is unable to accept your suggestion that the marking of the candidates' papers and the assessing of the results by of these Examinations to be entrusted by Joint Examining Board'.[23] He concluded that they planned to continue that year 'as formerly' and that 'arrangements for these Examinations were being made accordingly'.[24] It is clear that the D.O.E. had not yet indicated any intention to reschedule the Easter exams 'a month earlier than usual so that the pupils could devote the last month of the session of study to the study of the Irish language and literature'.[25] Relationships were now taut, and the gulf was widening, but this was not, as yet, because of the change in teacher training colleges' curriculum.

On 16 March, Londonderry generated a very robust eleven-page memo listing the difficulties the ministry was encountering with the 'transfer of Staff and Records and with certain matters affecting general administration'.[26] Before addressing the difficulties, it stated that they were not

> attributable in any degree to any action taken by Commissioners of National Education…before these bodies came under the control of the Provisional Government. But since that time events have shown that it is the deliberate policy of the new Government in Dublin to obstruct as far as possible the administration of Education in Northern Ireland.[27]

[22] McQuibban to Dilworth, 6 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[23] Dilworth to McQuibban, 27 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/12/52).
[24] Ibid.
[25] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 120-2.
[26] M.O.E. memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 1, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[27] Ibid., p. 1.

The M.O.E.'s increasing frustration with the D.O.E. marked a sharp decline in their relationship.

Londonderry first addressed how the functions of the Civil Service Committee were suspended at the request of the Provisional Government 'while in the act of dealing with the allocation of officers of the Education Ministry in Dublin to the Northern Ireland'.[28] The function of the Civil Service Committee in this case was

> [f]or the purpose of partition the 1920 Act created two categories of Irish civil servant. Those civil servants who 'on the appointed day were concerned solely with the administration of public services' in Southern or Northern Ireland became officers of that government. For all other civil servants, the Civil Service Committee established by the Act…would determine their allocation north or south.[29]

Londonderry emphasised the M.O.E.'s shock at the abruptness of the committee's suspension, meaning it was 'unable even to intimate to the officers of this Ministry the fact of their assignment to the Northern Government'.[30] The fact that 'by 1917 the Civil Service Committee … had become implicitly nationalist' might have expedited the process.[31] The committee had managed to inform some staff and 'after repeated reminders … sanction was given for the indoor officials concerned'.[32] The Provisional Government was castigated for not sanctioning the release of the outdoor officials even though 'these officers were engaged exclusively on duties within Northern Ireland and were all desirous of being allocated to that area'.[33]

On 21 January 1922 McQuibban wrote to Andrew Bonaparte Wyse in the D.O.E. expressing exasperation that the committee's operations had been suspended, corroborating Londonderry's account.[34] Bonaparte Wyse, a southern Catholic, would subsequently volunteer to transfer to the M.O.E., eventually becoming, in 1927, the only Catholic to hold the position

[28] Ibid., p. 2.
[29] M. Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland, 1912-38* (Manchester, 2008), p. 106.
[30] M.O.E. memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 2, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[31] Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland*, p. 41.
[32] M.O.E. memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 2, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[33] Ibid., p. 2.
[34] McQuibban to Wyse, 21 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).

of permanent secretary in the northern civil service at that time.[35] McQuibban's correspondence anticipated difficulties the committee's suspension could have caused when pointing out 'that no formal intimation can now be made by them to the members of staff whom they assigned on Monday last to the Northern Government'.[36] The letter's next line encapsulated the potential consequences for the M.O.E.

> [I]f the transfer is to be carried through on the 1st February this intimation will have to come from some quarter. [Original underlining] It is hardly a matter that can be dealt with by the National Board and the Ministry without some such formal intimation of the findings of the committee.[37]

This demonstrated that the Civil Service Committee's suspension had ham-strung the transfer process as neither educational body had the authority to sanction transfers as the '1920 Act stated quite unambiguously that the allocation of staff north and south was exclusively the function of the Civil Service Committee'.[38] The letter asked for them to be sent 'technically on loan, till the formality of transfer is completed'.[39] It argued that the inspectors' case was different '(a) because most of them are already on the spot and (b) because the junior inspectors have not been dealt with by the Civil Service Committee'.[40] This issue simmered for the rest of the year and was symptomatic of the widening gulf between the M.O.E., the D.O.E., and the two governments. Londonderry noted that the M.O.E. had contacted the National Education Office (N.E.O.) in Dublin on several occasions to rectify the matter and suggested that inspectors who had been working in their jurisdiction, could be kept there on loan; all had been ignored.[41]

2.3 Poachers: July 1921 – Apr. 1922

Martin Maguire's work provides an important background to the newly formed civil services in both states. He delivers a genesis for the events that unfolded between the two jurisdictions' civil services during the transfer of services. This background provides an appreciation of how

[35] Office of Commissioners of National Education list showing Wyse as a volunteer, early 1922. His name was also on a list titled 'officers allocated by civil service committee' early 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176). See O. Rafferty, *Catholicism in Ulster1606-1983: an interpretative history* (London, 1994), p. 210.
[36] McQuibban to Wyse, 21 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[37] Ibid.
[38] Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland*, p. 111.
[39] McQuibban to Wyse, 21 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[40] Ibid
[41] M.O.E. memo on difficulties concerning transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 2, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).

the dynamic between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. had evolved by February 1922. This contextualises the correspondence between the two educational bodies, and the blame game that ensued from that. Maguire outlines that tensions between the two civil services had started to escalate after the Truce on 11 July 1921. Prior to this, James Craig and the head of the N.I. civil service, Sir Ernest Clark, strained relationships when they pushed 'ahead with staffing the Belfast ministries in advance of the elections and the creation of the Civil Service Committee'.[42] The Dublin administrators viewed this as an attempt to undermine them, a slight they would not forget. Dublin reminded the north that assignment of the civil services could not happen 'until both the northern and the southern governments had been elected'.[43] Pre-partition, it was decided that 'staff would be discretely sounded out as to their preference for future service, north or south'.[44] On partition, this would, in theory, make it easier for the Civil Service Committee to allocate the transfers. Belfast then accused Dublin of ridding itself of 'duds' and keeping its best experienced personnel.[45] Dublin was aggrieved that the north was offering considerably higher salaries as an inducement 'to attract the right men', a practice which they viewed as divisive and unfair.[46]

After the Belfast parliament was established, the 'mysterious migration northwards of certain officials' was condemned as 'wire-pulling' by the Provisional Government.[47] The Irish Civil Service Association drew a blank when they met with Pollock, the Northern Minister for Finance, to demand the cessation of cherry-picking from the south, and that transfers only occur through the Civil Service Committee. With the Belfast government now established and 'the truce adding to the uncertainty of the Dublin government, a scramble for posts was going on behind the scenes'.[48] These events would not to be forgotten when the M.O.E. would attempt to handpick its own inspectors during the transfer of services. The northern government had then to deal with complaints from the Orange Order and the Ulster Ex-Service Association about the employment of Catholics in the Civil Service. These organisations carried such influence that the complaints were 'treated with the utmost seriousness'.[49] Maguire suggests that it was the northern government, post-truce, who was most interested in the delay of transfers. He proposed this was because Craig was 'desperately anxious for the transfer of

[42] Maguire, *The civil service and the revolution in Ireland*, p.109
[43] Ibid., p. 109.
[44] Ibid., p. 109.
[45] Ibid., p. 110.
[46] Ibid., p. 110.
[47] Ibid., p. 111.
[48] Ibid., p. 112.
[49] Ibid., p. 112

functions' more so than staff, and 'was confident that between local recruits and selected transfers from Dublin he had in fact a functioning civil service'.[50] Sinn Féin was in no rush either to form a government between the truce and whatever settlement could be reached. Consequently, the establishment of a civil service became 'a slow bicycle race' and 'the winner, it was felt, would be whoever was last in'.[51] This episode illustrates that the prickly cross-border relationship was under construction before the transfer of services.

McQuibban's letter to Dilworth on 1 February, from the Minister's Private Office Series, corroborates the list of complaints in Londonderry's eleven-page memo from the 16 March. McQuibban requested a 'definite settlement of a situation which was calculated to cause anxiety to the officers and inconvenience to public services'.[52] Londonderry's memo omitted that McQuibban's letter to Dilworth on 15 February reminded Dilworth that travelling and subsistence payments had not been paid by the Provisional Government 'and that steps are now being taken by this Ministry to pay these expenses'.[53] The letter advised Dilworth that the Provisional Government were informed that inspectors were 'instructed to forward all their weekly journals, reports and correspondence to the ministry'.[54] On 27 February, the Provisional Government eventually responded that:

> […] until formally transferred these officers will be expected to act as heretofore in regard to the sending of reports, journals and official correspondence to this office (i.e. the office in Dublin) and that any action, such as that proposed…would amount to failure on their part to continue to carry out their ordinary official duties.[55]

The situation deteriorated, becoming petty and vindictive with outdoor officers the main victims. The D.O.E. was taking full advantage of the fact that the precursor was Dublin based, enabling it to exert its authority by insisting that the officers' correspondence should go to them rather than Belfast. The Provisional Government's response on 27 February contained an implicit threat of dismissal. On 9 March McQuibban wrote to Dilworth, reminding him this

[50] Ibid., p. 113.
[51] Ibid., p. 113
[52] McQuibban to Dilworth, 1 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A//1/5).
[53] McQuibban to Dilworth, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[54] Ibid., p. 3.
[55] Ibid., pp 2-3.

time that the M.O.E. had paid the inspectors' salaries and expenses for the month.[56] McQuibban concluded that there was no justification for not releasing the staff and that 'only one conclusion is possible, vis: that the action of the Dublin authorities is directly intended to hinder the working of the ministry in Northern Ireland'.[57] Dilworth responded on 11 March telling McQuibban that there was 'no information in this Ministry in regard to the assignment of any outdoor officers of this Ministry to the Northern Government'.[58] This must have infuriated the M.O.E. as they knew this to be untrue, as the Civil Service Committee would most likely have furnished them with the names.

On 22 April, McQuibban wrote to nine of the ten officers, excluding one called Colonel W.R. Murphy, and informed them that although they were not 'allocated by the Civil Service Committee, this Government assumes full responsibility for you…as if you were an Officer allocated to its service under the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920'.[59] This was an invidious position for the officers to find themselves in. The reason for Colonel Murphy's omission will be dealt with further on in the document drawn up for 10 May, but it was the catalyst for the present correspondence on 22 April.[60] With both jurisdictions claiming and exerting their authority over them, the outdoor officers were in a no-win situation. The letter (as referenced above) that McQuibban had sent to Wyse on 21 January had named the ten outdoor officers.[61] On further inspection, a document from the Office of Commissioners of National Education revealed that all of the ten men named in McQuibban's letter had actually volunteered to transfer.[62] The document contained a list of fifty two officers who volunteered their services for the northern government; thirty two outdoor staff and 20 indoor staff.[63] The fact that their requests could have been accommodated, but were not, supports the argument that that the Provisional Government was pursuing an obstructionist agenda. Had the political will been there, it was a ready-made solution. The situation was exacerbated by the M.O.E.'s bullishness to counter-impose its will on the D.O.E. The outdoor officers were the live

[56] McQuibban to Dilworth, on payment of salaries and expenses to inspectors, 9 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[57] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 4, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[58] Dilworth to McQuibban, 11 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED//32/A/1/5).
[59] McQuibban to outdoor officers, 22 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[60] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[61] McQuibban to Bonaparte Wyse, 21 Jan. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[62] List of fifty-two officers who volunteered their services to northern government, early 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[63] Ibid.

casualties caught in the no-man's-land created from the battle between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. They were living with job insecurity as they were unsure to whom they should report, and afraid that if they reported to the 'wrong' authority, they could face dismissal. It would also appear that the Provisional Government and D.O.E. considered these staff as collateral damage to achieve their objective of neutering the M.O.E. into administrative impotence. The debacle, as unfortunate as it was for the outdoor officers, exposed how the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. were now entrenched in intractable positions.

Before he broached the topic of Easter examinations, Londonderry's eleven page memo from 16 March was concise and direct when stating that 'there is no disposition on the part of the Provisional Government to co-operate with this Ministry'.[64] He continued with the direct accusation that 'there appears to be a policy deliberately directed to making it as difficult as possible for the Ministry to carry out its function'.[65] Londonderry's uncharacteristically forceful language revealed the growing anger within the M.O.E. On the issue of the Easter exams, the memo covered the series of intergovernmental correspondence as described above. Londonderry identified that the actions of the D.O.E. were calculated to inconvenience the administration and 'to cause great embarrassment to the candidates…who will be uncertain whether to elect to attend the examinations held by the Ministry or those (if any) set up by the Provisional Government'.[66] Londonderry was keen to emphasise how crucial his next point was for future teacher training in N.I. when declaring that:

> [a]s all the recognised teachers' Training Colleges (with the exception of one) are situated in Dublin or the South, candidates for admission to these colleges who are resident in Northern Ireland may find themselves excluded from training owing to the action of the Provisional Government.[67]

This conveyed the M.O.E.'s concerns over the future supply of teachers and its anger at the D.O.E. for undermining of its authority and status.

2.4 Easter Exams and Teacher Training: Mar. – May 1922

[64]M.O.E. memo on difficulties concerning transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 5, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[65] Ibid., p. 5.
[66] Ibid., p. 6.
[67] Ibid., p. 6.

Selection for teacher training in Ireland in mid to late nineteenth century was very much ad hoc. Several routes could be taken to become a teacher: 'monitorships, pupil-teachership or by competitive entry to one of the training colleges'.[68] It was not compulsory to be qualified to become a teacher. Twenty-six interdenominational District Model Schools were introduced between 1843 and 1867 'to promote the united education of Protestants and Roman Catholics in common Schools; to exhibit the best examples of National Schools; and give preparatory training to young teachers'.[69] Margaret Ó hÓgartaigh noted an inconsistency in the level of training throughout these schools, indicating that training was not yet properly regulated.[70] The Catholic Church objected to the ecumenical and mixed gender ethos of the schools, and banned Catholics from attending them as 'it exercised no control over their management or activities'.[71] The introduction of the Queen's scholarship in 1885, which later became the King's scholarship, and eventually the Easter exams, saw the expansion of opportunity to qualify for teacher training college. Ó hÓgartaigh focuses attention on the fact that 'the local power of the school manager (usually a clergyman) in the selection of teachers should not be underestimated'.[72] By the 1900s, training was considered integral to the professionalisation of teaching. The number of teachers who had attended training had risen from only fifty-five per cent in 1902 to eighty per cent by 1919-20.[73] The deficiency of training, was so bad that it was not until 1905, that 'according to the Rules and Regulations of the Commissioners of National Education … it was no longer possible to be an uncertified principal'.[74]

By the time of partition, the standard method of entering the teaching profession was through the teacher training colleges, making the Easter exams an integral component to education on the island. As Ireland was partitioned, the seven training colleges operating on the island were: Marlborough Street training college, Dublin (a non-denominational institution with a high proportion of Presbyterian students); the Church of Ireland training college, Kildare Place, Dublin (Anglican); and the following Roman Catholic training colleges: St. Patrick's,

[68] M. Ó hÓgartaigh, ''The servants of the Nation': Quiet revolutions in education' in *Seanchas Ardmhacha: Journal of the Armagh Diocesan Historical Society*, 2013, vol. 24, no. 2 (2013), pp 208-9.
[69] Walsh, *National education system*, p. 17; 2*nd Report of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland for 1835,* 18. Also see D. Akenson., *The Irish education experiment: the national system of education in the nineteenth century* (London, 1970), p. 148.
[70] Ó hÓgartaigh, 'The servants of the Nation' p. 209.
[71] Walsh, *National education system*, p. 17.
[72] Ibid. 203.
[73] Walsh, 'The national system of education'; 86th *Report of the Commissioners of National Education in Ireland for 1919 – 1920*, [Cmd. 1476], 28. See also Akenson, Education and enmity, p. 119; Ó hÓgartaigh, 'The servants of the Nation'.
[74] Ibid. 205.

[Drumcondra] Dublin; De La Salle, Waterford (both for men students); and Our Lady of Mercy Blackrock; Mary Immaculate, Limerick; and St. Mary's, Belfast (the latter three for women).[75] St. Mary's, which trained only female Catholic teachers, was the only college situated in N.I. As the college was not willing to work with, or recognise, the northern government, it meant that Protestant women, along with Catholic and Protestant men, post-partition, had to travel south. Consequently, it was in the best interests of the Belfast government to seek a continuation of the extant training system. If this could not be agreed with the D.O.E., the M.O.E. had only two options to pursue: either send candidates across to Britain or establish its own training college. Building their own college would be a drain on finances, staff and other resources needed to run the ministry efficiently. Both options, as will be seen in further chapters, would be extremely problematic for the M.O.E., and future male Catholic trainees.

Londonderry's 16 March memo was the first document encountered by this research which referenced the Provisional Government's intention 'to devote the final month of the session to special study in the Irish Language, Literature and Literary History, which they propounded would be welcomed by the students generally'.[76] This evidence challenges the assumption, as referenced above, that it was the rescheduling of the Easter exams that convinced the M.O.E. to establish Stranmillis. This document suggests that instead, the M.O.E. had already commenced plans for Stranmillis because it was being ignored by the D.O.E. The M.O.E.'s concern was not knowing if the final month of special study would be obligatory. If not, then they needed to know 'what options would be allowed to students who do not desire to take the intensive course in Irish'.[77] The memo stated that because St. Mary's was the only training college in the north, it had 'become necessary to proceed with independent arrangements … to commence no later than the beginning of the session in September next'.[78] St. Mary's, as mentioned previously, 'made no attempt to establish any formal links with the M.O.E. following the latter's establishment in 1921'.[79] McQuibban 'met the Executive head of the Dublin Education Office' on 7 February stating that the M.O.E. was willing to 'enter into

[75] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 120.
[76] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 6, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[77] Ibid., p. 7.
[78] Ibid., p.7.
[79] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 50.

joint arrangements for carrying on the existing training system, but such proposals have so far been entirely ignored … is plain evidence to their obstructive tendencies'.[80]

Londonderry's memo outlined how, by public notice, the Provisional Government had 'modified the Time-Tables of the National Schools so as to make the teaching of Irish compulsory to the extent of not less than one hour each day'.[81] The M.O.E.'s primary concern was that it had also 'been extensively circulated by advertisement in the Northern area with the object, no doubt, of its being applied in that area by managers and teachers willing to adopt it'.[82] The Belfast government saw this as an act of aggression and defiance that was designed to undermine and 'embarrass' it.[83] While it was undoubtedly a gesture of defiance, it also reflected the problematic nature of how the island had been partitioned. The unionists eventually embraced the border and busied themselves securing their state with its built-in majority. The Catholics/Nationalists, on both sides of the border, viewed the border as a permanent monument to partition that had to be removed. The Irish language was applied as a weapon of defiance and identity to challenge the legitimacy of the northern state.

The significant impact of these events was reflected in the fact that Parliamentary Secretary, Robert McKeown addressed them in the House of Commons on 17 May.[84] He informed the house that the D.O.E. had 'without any reference to the Government of Northern Ireland brought the Easter exams forward by a month'.[85] In retaliation, McKeown said that even though funding had been allocated for 'the post of Organiser of Irish Language in Northern Ireland … it is not the intention of the Ministry to fill it at present'.[86] This was the retaliatory culture that was developing during the infancy of the two states. The Irish language had now become intricately woven into the teacher training controversy. On the D.O.E.'s somewhat fanciful claim that 'the Irish language would be welcome by most students throughout the country', McKeown stressed that 'to put it mildly, that may be considered a misrepresentation of the facts'.[87] McKeown also commented on the fact that 'the Provisional Government wished to give undue prominence to the Irish Language in intermediate

[80] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 7, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[81] Ibid., p. 8
[82] Ibid., p. 8.
[83] Ibid., p. 8.
[84] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series, vol. 1: Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1922, col. 525 (Hansard N.I. (Commons), i).*
[85] Ibid., col. 2525
[86] Ibid., col. 525.
[87] Ibid., cols 525-526.

examinations. This could not be tolerated by our Administration, and I am glad to say that…we will be able to hold our own independent examinations in Northern Ireland during the coming month'.[88] The Irish language, through education, had become a defining element for the two governments in asserting their national identities. The northern government's rejection of the language made as powerful a statement as the I.F.S.'s promotion of it. Robert Lynn spoke next providing a snapshot of the increasing resentment within the northern government. After referring to the 'puerile difficulties' caused by the Provisional Government, he added that they 'had acted more like a handful of schoolboys, very immature schoolboys at that, than men'.[89] The Belfast government was feeling the effects of the disruptive politicking of the Provisional Government/D.O.E. This vignette underscores the intensity of the U.U.P.'s fear and loathing towards the Irish language and what it represented. It was a threat to their identity, and it was being used as such by the Provisional government in what it considered to be the most influential area of society: education. Education was the strategically chosen arena in which this political war would be fought.

Of interest also was McKeown's statement that 'the total estimated grant for the whole of Ireland is £104,000…£32,000 would be our share'.[90] The veiled inference here was that this money had not been received by them. A communication from William O'Brien, secretary to the Irish Treasury, to Fionán Lynch, the I.F.S. Minister for Education on 1 May 1922, would suggest otherwise.[91] In assuming that 'the Teacher Training Service for all Ireland will be administered by the Educational Authorities for Southern Ireland' he 'enquire[d] what arrangements have been made for obtaining repayment from the Northern Government of their share of the expenditure'.[92] He added that 'in one or two other agency services being carried out by Irish Ministries for the Northern Government recoupment is to be claimed monthly'.[93] This would suggest that some departments within the Provisional Government had been working successfully, on some level, with the Belfast government. This revealed the importance the Provisional Government placed on education in the process of restructuring of the I.F.S.'s identity. Eoin MacNeill's early 1922 essay based on a policy of non-compliance in the north stated that 'it is my belief that the kernel of the situation will be education'.[94] This

[88] Ibid., col. 527.
[89] Ibid., col. 528.
[90] Ibid., col. 525.
[91] O'Brien to Lynch 1922-23, 1 May 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/253).
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] MacNeill essay, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163).

fully articulated the state's position that education was central to its vision for state building. The conflicting evidence is challenging when attempting to gauge the authenticity of the M.O.E.'s assertions about the Provisional Government; but the evidence does strongly suggest that, when it came to its dealings with the M.O.E., the Provisional Government/D.O.E. had embraced an obstructionist approach. It would, in its defence, argue that it was merely attempting to represent, as best it could, its citizens who were unjustifiably locked into the new entity of N.I. How long this nationalist fervour would last will be seen.

2.5 Irish Language and State Building: Mar. 1922

As mentioned, Londonderry's 16 March memo accused the D.O.E. of being deliberately obstructive to the M.O.E.'s administration.[95] In a resolute tone, Londonderry continued that '[i]f such is the policy of the Provisional Government it will not succeed. It can have one effect only, and that will be to widen, beyond the hope of repair, the breach that already exists between the North and the South'.[96] Concluding, Londonderry recognised the right of the Provisional Government to administer as it saw fit in their jurisdiction, but he 'did not think that they have fully weighed the ultimate results of what that policy may be in relation to Northern Ireland'.[97] This scenario illustrates the cultural signposting of both new governments in their respective processes of state building. While the Irish language facilitated the Provisional Government's agenda for pursuing a renewed Gaelic/Irish identity, it was anathema to the pro-British northern unionists. The Unionist Government was as intransigent in not recognising the language as the Provisional Government was in promoting it. The M.O.E. had the added unease of how, in its view, the Provisional Government conducted its business; especially as six of the seven teacher training colleges fell within its ambit. By threatening the M.O.E.'s future supply of teachers, the Provisional Government were also challenging its authority and limiting its efficiency.

On 24 March 1922, McQuibban contacted the principals of the six southern teacher training colleges with a four-page letter.[98] This could be interpreted either as a proactive initiative by the unionist ministry or an act of provocation towards the Provisional Government. The letter addressed how the D.O.E.'s rejection of the M.O.E.'s offer of cooperation negatively

[95] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, pp 10-11, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[96] Ibid., p. 11.
[97] Ibid., p. 11.
[98] McQuibban to principals of all six teacher training colleges in Ireland, 24 March 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).

impacted its 'future supply of trained teachers for schools under this Ministry'.[99] McQuibban proposed that the M.O.E. set the exams for their candidates 'on the understanding that the successful candidates are admitted to the Colleges under the hitherto accepted regulations'.[100] He stressed that:

> [s]hould this arrangement not be feasible and candidates from Northern Ireland be obliged to attend examinations for admission to be held by any other authority, it is very improbable that the Ministry would be in a position to accept financial obligations in respect of the training of such persons, or be prepared to recognise them as qualified to teach in National Schools in Northern Ireland on the termination of their training course.[101]

This was not conciliatory language designed to build relationships. It displayed a deep misunderstanding of the ethos of the colleges and the symbiotic relationship between those who ran them, and the new Provisional Government. This symbiotic relationship would not be forgotten by the Unionist government when the Catholic authorities would eventually need to engage with them regarding education and teacher training.

McQuibban concluded stating that he wanted the colleges to accept 'candidates from Northern Ireland on the recommendation of the Ministry' who they would pay for.[102] He continued, somewhat incredulously, to ask if they would accept students 'in the absence of co-operation with the Dublin authorities'.[103] He continued:

> [i]n the case that this commends itself to you, it will be necessary that the training be carried on under regulations as to the curricula, length of sessions etc., approved by the Ministry, and the Ministry's officials have authority to supervise the work and hold the annual examinations of the students for whom this Ministry, took responsibility.[104]

It is difficult to fathom why the M.O.E. expected colleges in the southern jurisdiction to accede to their requests, without consulting with the D.O.E., especially since St. Mary's in the north

[99] Ibid., p. 1.
[100] Ibid., p. 2.
[101] Ibid., p. 2.
[102] Ibid., p. 3.
[103] Ibid., p. 3.
[104] Ibid., p. 3.

was Catholic run and would not work with the M.O.E. Essentially, McQuibban was asking that southern teacher training colleges take on northern students, who have taken M.O.E. exams, and that the M.O.E. will pay for them, but the training must follow M.O.E. guidelines rather the D.O.E. or college guidelines. And that if they do not agree to do this, the M.O.E. will not pay for them or recognise their qualification. He also wants them to do this whether or not the D.O.E. sanctions it.

This was a very significant statement/ultimatum, in the developing claim and counter claim culture over who instigated the teacher training controversy. The M.O.E. was either naive, arrogant or being deliberately antagonistic towards the southern authorities by threatening not to hire teachers who sat the entrance exam in the south before completing their training there. It was, ultimately, also impractical to suggest running two separate curricula for each year within the one college. Attempting to intimidate the colleges with the threat of withholding finances was fatuous and counterproductive. The teacher training colleges were under the control of the Provisional Government and four of them by the Catholic authorities, and as such, would not be easily swayed by the M.O.E.'s menacing approaches. The threat not to recognise the qualifications was a more significant one, especially for the teachers who were once again caught in the crosshairs of the hostilities.

2.6 The Gloves Are Off: Assurances and Elusions: Apr. – May 1922

Londonderry's letter to Michael Collins on 7 April 1922 disclosed a more aggressive and sinister development in the D.O.E. plans to undermine the M.O.E. Dispensing with obligatory formalities, Londonderry opened by informing Collins that 'we have conclusive evidence in this Ministry that the education authority of the Provisional Government is proposing to conduct the Easter Examinations of Monitors, Pupil Teachers, candidates for training, etc. at centres inside the Northern area–viz:- Armagh, Belfast and Londonderry'.[105] Events at a meeting between Craig and Collins at the end of March may have contributed to Londonderry's irritability. Londonderry had a clandestine meeting at the conference after which both were gushing in their respect for each other. Subsequently however, a claim arose from the meeting that Lady Londonderry and Collins were having an affair.[106] Londonderry reminded Collins of the unrequited advances from his ministry to effect a cross-border resolution to the Easter

[105] Londonderry to Collins, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[106] N. Fleming, *The Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland* (London, 2005), p. 96

exams before concluding that 'I presume that all this is being done in pursuance of some definite policy on the part of the Provisional Government, but I desire to invite your attention to actions so little calculated to conduce to co-operation between the two Governments'.[107] Setting the exams in the north was an act of aggression signalling to the Belfast authorities that their territory was not acceptable to, or recognised by, the Provisional Government. Yet, files from the Ministry of the Taoiseach documented that Collins, at a government meeting on 30 January, had made it clear that he was not in pursuit of war when he told Bishop MacRory that 'a peace policy had been started and should get a fair chance'.[108] It is difficult to perceive that the Belfast government was unaware of the Provisional Government's obvious aspirations to scupper the effectiveness of its M.O.E. It would only serve to strengthen the resolve of the Unionist government to govern their territory as they saw fit. It would also entrench them further into an already developing siege mentality, which would not bode well for northern Catholics.

Three days later, on 10 April, Collins replied to Londonderry assenting that co-operation between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. could be agreed upon. He suggested that the best way forward would be to organise 'a conference between yourself and such others as you may desire, and Mr. Lynch and Mr. Hayes on the other side'.[109] He blamed Londonderry for the Easter exams controversy, claiming that co-operation 'was made impossible by the express attitude of yourself … towards the Irish language'.[110] Collins was most probably referring to Londonderry's remarks on 9 December 1921, in the House of Commons, where he announced that 'I will not for one moment allow the use of so-called Irish language in the Intermediate Examinations for Northern Ireland'.[111] Londonderry added that because of the change, examinations in N.I. would be cancelled. Farren points out that this was in response to the change in regulations of the Intermediate Board's examinations for 1922.[112] The issue was that 'the regulations for these examinations, which that year were still set and administered from the board's offices in Dublin were changed to permit candidates to answer questions in Irish in subjects other than Irish itself'.[113]

[107] Ibid.
[108] Provisional Government meeting, 30 Jan. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1).
[109] Collins to Londonderry, 10 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/52).
[110] Ibid.
[111] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i,* col. *5211.*
[112] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 43
[113] Ibid.

Collins's letter suggested that 'the air in this respect might be cleared' by the proposed conference that he had suggested at the beginning of his letter.[114] Collins was backing Londonderry into a corner as he held all the cards when it came to teacher training colleges. Collins was exerting pressure to get the language recognised in the north. Knowing how much Londonderry needed the training colleges, there was a strong possibility that Collins was testing how far he could push him. There was also the likelihood that Collins was using the language to prod Londonderry and exert authority within the northern state. Collins was also aware that the Easter exams were to take place the following week and a meeting could not have been organised in time to provide a satisfactory outcome for the M.O.E. This was very much open to being viewed as an empty gesture by Collins and was most probably interpreted as such by Lord Londonderry and his ministry. Addressing Londonderry's accusation that Easter exams were set to occur within the northern jurisdiction, Collins simply said that the D.O.E. was unaware of it but would make enquiries into the matter.[115]

Going on the available evidence, this would appear, at best, to be a disingenuous disclaimer. Chapter 3 will demonstrate that the evidence clearly contradicts Collins claims that he had no knowledge of, and that his government was not involved in, the covert payment of Catholic teachers in the north during this time. This diluted Collins' credibility as an honest broker in the process. The evidence from other correspondence between Londonderry and Collins during the same month confirms that Lord Londonderry had become aware of covert payments to teachers in N.I. (so-called 'recalcitrant teachers': see Chapter 3). This must have engendered a political environment of deep mistrust. On Wednesday, 12 April, Londonderry replied to Collins, welcoming his 'serious desire for co-operation in educational matters'.[116] He did, however, draw Collins' attention to the fact that 'the Easter Exams begin Tuesday next', six days from the day of writing the reply.[117] He explained to Collins that it was 'now too late for us to come to any joint agreement in respect of the examinations for this year'.[118] He called Collins out on the issue of exams being held in N.I. when he reiterated that his information was 'that the Southern examinations are being held in certain vested schools in the Northern area. I have heard of two such centres, viz., the Convent National School, Omagh and St. Eugene's Convent National School Derry City, and there may be others'.[119] This

[114] Collins to Londonderry, 10 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/52).
[115] Ibid.
[116] Londonderry to Collins 12 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.

contentious topic will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3. It is interesting that Londonderry was conscious not to exacerbate the situation, while also placating Collins, by calling it Derry as opposed to the traditional unionist version of Londonderry. It is a distinction that is deeply divisive to the present day, as generally it is recognised as a signifier of ones' allegiances to nationality, culture, and religion.

On 15 April, a M.O.E. minute sheet titled 'Non-reply to communications addressed to N.E.O. Dublin' recorded that the D.O.E. had ignored the Belfast ministry's attempts 'to ascertain the antecedents of teachers' who had transferred to the north.[120] Belfast had sent forms to Dublin seeking information such as: the teachers' date of birth, where they had trained and results obtained, record of their efficiency and character, and their salary (scale).[121] This had the desired consequence of curbing the M.O.E.'s effectiveness. The minute sheet disclosed that the ministry had logistical problems as they could not accurately process the salaries of transferred teachers. It also meant that 'in quite a number of cases' they 'communicated with the teachers direct', which took up time and resources.[122] This resulted in the ministry having 'to act upon inferences in some cases and difficulties will consequently arise when the question of allowing credit for services given in the Free State comes up for purposes of increment of salary, etc.'.[123] This detail suggests that the non-reply to the forms had the potential to disrupt the financial workings of the M.O.E. It probably drained much needed financial resources as it was inferred that the gap in knowledge might have been seen by some teachers as an opportunity to improve their pay scale.

The D.O.E.'s disinclination to form a good, or tolerable, working relationship with the M.O.E. negatively impacted the latter's ability to function at full capacity. The Head of the Northern Civil Service, Ernest Clark articulated the resentment this created when he wrote to James Craig complaining about the D.O.E.'s '*dog in the manger attitude* of the transferring ministries' [author's emphasis] regarding 'our difficulties in getting documents transferred from Dublin'.[124] He asked Craig to mention this difficulty when he was 'seeing prominent people' as they 'have had promises (and evasions)' but had not delivered the documents that

[120] M.O.E. minute sheet recording how Provisional Government ignored request for information on transferred teachers, 15 April 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[121] Four-page form sent to the N.E.O. from Belfast, April 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[122] M.O.E. minute sheet recording how Provisional Government ignored request for information on transferred teachers 15 April 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[123] Ibid.
[124] Clark to Craig, 22 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/A/1/1).

he itemised in the correspondence.[125] His disdain for the Provisional Government continued when referring to it as 'That Government': 'if it really wishes to assist, [it] had only to issue the simplest instructions, and to see that they were carried out'.[126] Craig grasped the gravity of the correspondence. On 25 April Craig wrote to the Minister for Finance, Hugh Pollock, to inform him that the 'Letter from Clark of the 22nd instant will form the basis of my discussions with Winston Churchill on Friday when I have arranged to see him specially *regarding matters of outstanding importance* [author's emphasis]'.[127] The first three months of the transfer process exposed some of the inevitable difficulties that partition had caused on the island.

By May there were signs that the Belfast government had resolved to be proactive. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Wilfred Spender, contacted all ministers informing them that the prime minister wanted to send a letter to the Colonial Office detailing the difficulties the M.O.E. was experiencing 'in regard to the question of Officials, Documents or Records being withheld in Dublin government'.[128] They were requested to furnish him, by 10 May, with a list of any obstruction in the transfer of officials, documents, records, and in the transfer of duties to N.I. He also wanted to know of 'any appointments made by the Provisional Government … without consultation of the ministers of Northern Ireland'.[129] On 10 May an eighteen page 'statement dealing with the presentation of the Government of Northern Ireland regarding the transfer of Educational Services' had been drawn up.[130] It is too detailed to consider it in its totality here, but the document was structured into four main sections. The key points of interest from each section will be examined to track the progression of escalating levels of anger and frustration that the M.O.E. was experiencing.

Section (a) of the document addressed the D.O.E.'s uncooperative delaying over 'officials due for transfer to Northern Ireland and not yet transferred'.[131] It blamed the Provisional Government for the abrupt suspension of the functions of the Civil Service Committee, which had affected the transfer of a number of outdoor staff who were 'stationed

[125] Ibid.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Craig to Pollock, 25 April 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/A/1/1).
[128] Cabinet Secretary Spender to all ministers 5 May. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: Londonderry Papers D3099/5/1; CAB/9/A/1/1). This work will use the Londonderry Papers file, as it was more detailed.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922, p. 1, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1; ED/32/B/1/2/52). Pages 16 and 17 of the document are taken from ED/32/B/1/2/52 as the original document was incomplete. Although this was a later document the content for these two pages was the same.
[131] Ibid., p. 1.

and actually working in the Northern area'.[132] The D.O.E. had sanctioned the release of the indoor officials but was uncooperative with the release of the outdoor officers. The document listed the M.O.E.'s unanswered correspondence with the D.O.E. requesting the release of outdoor staff. The M.O.E. asserted that there did 'not seem to be the slightest justification for the refusal of the Provisional Government to release these officials'.[133] It cited the example of two outdoor officers who arrived in Belfast on 1 of April and 'stated that they had been directed by the Free State education authorities to place themselves at the disposal of Mr. Welply, Divisional Inspector, Belfast'.[134] Having found employment for the two, the document expressed M.O.E.'s dismay at the discourtesy of 'no communication regarding them has been received from the Provisional Government, and Messrs Lavelle and Thompson's transfer to Northern Ireland has been effected [sic] in what seems to be a peculiar and grossly irregular way'.[135]

Finally, Section (a) documented the case of Colonel Murphy. He was the absent name from McQuibban's letter (referenced above) to the outdoor officers on 22 April.[136] His experience is worth recounting as it communicates the M.O.E.'s view of the D.O.E. as obstructive and untrustworthy. Murphy was one of the junior inspectors who was working in N.I. on 1 February, the appointed date for the transfer of services. He had applied to transfer to the M.O.E. but 'he was one of the Junior Inspectors whose cases were not dealt with by the Civil Service Committees'.[137] He had also continued to work in the jurisdiction after the 1 February with 'his salary, travelling allowances etc. being paid by the [Belfast] ministry'.[138] On 23 March, the D.O.E. 'without any previous consultation or reference to the ministry [M.O.E.] … sent a formal notification' that Murphy had been relocated back to Dublin.[139] The document alleged that Murphy left 'without making any communication to the office in Belfast'.[140]

The document revealed the M.O.E.'s dismay with the D.O.E.'s discourtesy towards it. McQuibban wrote to them on 22 April informing them that the M.O.E. would 'be glad to arrive

[132] Ibid., p. 3.
[133] Ibid., p. 5
[134] Ibid., p. 5.
[135] Ibid., p. 5.
[136] McQuibban to outdoor officers, 22 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/176).
[137] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922, pp 5-6, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[138] Ibid., p. 6.
[139] Ibid., p. 6.
[140] Ibid., p. 6

at a final settlement' on the transfer of officers.[141] Perhaps there was a hint of the cherry-picking that the Provisional Government had previously accused them of. The letter forcefully conveyed the M.O.E.'s position, stating that it no longer had any claim on the services of Colonel Murphy. Referring to a letter he had sent to the D.O.E. on 1 February, McQuibban reiterated that the M.O.E. did not 'desire to claim the services of any member of your staff, either indoor or outdoor, whose case has not been dealt with by the Civil Service Committee other than those referred to'.[142] This event seemed to have a galvanising influence on the ministry. The prevailing antagonism between the two sets of civil services since mid-1921 did not help matters. The Provisional Government would have argued that Murphy had not been transferred and, as such, being in their employ, was obligated to follow their instructions. The overview is that the Provisional Government did not appear willing to observe the standard protocol of replying to the M.O.E.'s correspondence. It appeared not to afford the M.O.E. the common courtesy of informing them of their intentions to relocate staff from their jurisdiction to their own. It should be noted that the Unionist government could not have been so naive or ill-informed, that they were unaware of the D.O.E.'s/Provisional Government's policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation.

Section (b) dealt with the difficulties encountered by the M.O.E. with the 'Transfer of documents and Records [sic]'.[143] It listed records and documents that were still being held in Dublin. Most of the records related to teachers' qualifications and antecedence etc., as referenced above, in the form sent to the Dublin ministry.[144] Other records not received concerned teachers 'serving in Northern Ireland who have not yet received their Training Diplomas' and matters regarding their salaries.[145] The next section, Section (c), the most detailed, covered 'Acts of Obstruction'.[146] It opened with the M.O.E.'s most robust declaration thus far, on its dealings with the Provisional Government:

> [i]n regard to matters of general administration there is no disposition on the part of the Provisional Government to co-operate with the Ministry. On the contrary, there appears to be a policy deliberately directed to

[141] Ibid., p. 6.
[142] Ibid., p. 8.
[143] Ibid., p. 11.
[144] For further detail see footnote 124, M.O.E. minute sheet recording how Provisional Government ignored request for information of transferred teachers, 15 April 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).
[145] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922, p. 11, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[146] Ibid., p. 12.

> making it as difficult as possible for the Ministry to carry out its functions.[147]

It referenced the Easter exams, reiterating that 'holding separate examinations for a common purpose in the two divisions of the country seemed obviously undesirable on all grounds, financial, educational and administrative'.[148] It lamented that, as referenced earlier, its offer of a joint examining committee for the grading of papers was rejected.[149] The M.O.E. stated that the Provisional Government's decision 'ignored the authority of the Ministry and its responsibility for the administration of the educational system in the area under its control'.[150] This section concluded by asserting that because all the teacher training colleges (excluding St. Mary's in Belfast) were in the I.F.S., prospective students from 'Northern Ireland may find themselves excluded from training owing to the action of the Provisional Government'.[151]

The following sub-section of this section addressed the controversial matter of training colleges. It alleged that the 'Provisional Government decided, without reference to the M.O.E. … to hold the Easter exams earlier than usual and to devote the final month of the session to special study in the Irish Language, Literature and Literary History'.[152] A M.O.E. memo from 16 March (as referenced above) expressed concerns as to whether this would be compulsory for northern students.[153] The ministry was 'still without information as to whether the arrangement is obligatory'.[154] The document made the strong claim that the 'attempt to modify the arrangements were entirely in the interest of the Southern student' and that it was 'grossly unfair to the population of the Northern area'.[155] This sub-section concluded by recounting that McQuibban's proposal to the 'Executive head of the Dublin Education Office …to enter into joint arrangements for carrying on the existing training system…have so far been entirely ignored by the Provisional Government'.[156] It continued that 'in modifying the existing College Time Table of examination without reference to the Ministry is plain evidence of their

[147] Ibid., p. 12.
[148] Ibid., p. 12.
[149] For further detail see footnote 26, McQuibban Dilworth, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/12/52; ED/32A/1/5).
[150] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922, p. 12, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[151] Ibid., p. 13.
[152] Ibid., p. 14.
[153] For further information see above footnote, M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 6, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[154] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government 10 May 1922, p.14, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[155] Ibid., p. 14.
[156] Ibid., p. 14.

obstructiveness'.[157] The point must be made that again, the M.O.E appears a little naive in expecting the full co-operation of the D.O.E. given the prevailing political climate and that the Belfast riots were still occurring. It is surprising that it had taken until May to get to this stage of understanding. The evidence would strongly suggest that the D.O.E.'s strategy was not, nor indeed intended to be, implemented with any degree of guile or subtlety.

The Irish language was the next issue the document raised. That it warranted more detail than training colleges confirms its priority level with the Belfast government. It voiced the M.O.E.'s disquiet that the D.O.E. was not only giving 'undue preference' to the language in the I.F.S, but more worryingly, it was 'being pushed…in Northern Ireland'.[158] The document restated the concern that this was designed to give preference to teachers who would teach in the I.F.S. as 'intending teachers who will be prepared to take up the study of Irish irrespective of whether the future work of the teachers is unlikely to be in the Northern area or otherwise'.[159] It could be argued that they could have let the northern trainees attend the southern colleges and not use the language northern curriculum when they returned to N.I. This was about more than a curriculum. This was about identity, and the Unionist government refused to expose their trainees to the culture and language of their nearest neighbour, who they also regarded as an enemy. It was also about a battle of wills. The Belfast government was now fully aware of the south's belligerence and was asserting what it saw as its right to access the colleges on its terms. The Dublin government/D.O.E., for its part, was equally asserting its prerogative to govern its jurisdiction on its terms.

The document readdressed the D.O.E. making Irish compulsory by public notice. The concern for the M.O.E. lay in their accusation that 'the Public Notice has been extensively circulated by advertisement in the Northern area with the object, no doubt, of its being applied in that area by managers and teachers willing to adopt it'.[160] It concluded that it was difficult to evaluate the embarrassment that this could have caused the M.O.E., but it had 'evidence of the desire of the Provisional Government to carry matters with a high hand for the purpose of furthering its projects in the area outside its control'.[161] This was a more worrying development for the M.O.E. and the government, as the D.O.E. was imposing its authority in a jurisdiction

[157] Ibid., p. 14.
[158] Ibid., p. 15.
[159] Ibid., p. 15.
[160] Ibid., p. 15.
[161] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government, 10 May 1922, p. 16, (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/32/B/1/2/52).

over which it had no legal right or authority to do so. To compound this, the document cited 'another instance of action on the part of the Provisional Government directed towards securing control of educational policy throughout Ireland'.[162] This, as referenced above, accused the D.O.E. of contemplating 'the possibility of holding their Examinations [sic] in certain schools in Northern Ireland'.[163] This was a more considered appraisal of the situation, as the original accusation from Londonderry stated that he had 'conclusive evidence' that the Provisional Government was proposing to conduct the Easter Examinations in 'Armagh, Belfast and Londonderry'.[164] It is noteworthy that in this instance, he resorted to the traditional unionist name of Londonderry; he understood his audience. The controversy surrounding the Easter exams does, nonetheless, convey the intensity of escalating tensions. The M.O.E. was reaching the end of their diplomatic tether at this stage. The section concluded with a three-page detailed accusation that the Provisional Government were paying some Catholic teachers in N.I.[165] This serious accusation will be examined in Chapter 3. The document concluded with a very brief subsection on 'Appointments of officers without consultation'.[166] It mentioned three officers, one of whom was Colonel Murphy, referenced earlier in this chapter.

This was not the first time the M.O.E. had addressed these issues. Londonderry had collated almost identical information in his memo two months earlier on 16 March.[167] In its introduction and conclusion he did not constrain himself with his customary adherence to diplomacy.[168] He provided a discerning indictment of the Provisional Government when acknowledging 'the willing co-operation of the various authorities that had charge of educational affairs before the advent of the Provisional Government'.[169] He removed any doubt or ambiguity that the Provisional Government was the singular source of his ministry's difficulties by restating that the present difficulties:

> […] were not attributable in any degree to any action taken by Commissioners of National Education, the Intermediate Board or the Ministry of Agriculture and Technical Instruction before these bodies

[162] Ibid., p. 16.
[163] Ibid., p. 17.
[164] Londonderry to Collins ,7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[165] Statement on difficulties with the transfer of educational services from the Provisional Government 10 May 1922, pp 17-18, (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/1).
[166] Ibid., p. 20.
[167] M.O.E. memo regarding co-operation between Northern and Southern Ireland 16 Mar. 1922, p. 1, (ED/32/B/1/2/32).
[168] Ibid., p. 1.
[169] Ibid., p. 1.

> came under the control of the Provisional Government. [Original underlining] But since that time events have shown that it is the deliberate policy of the new Government in Dublin to obstruct as far as possible the administration of Education [sic] in Northern Ireland.[170]

This was the strongest acknowledgement to date that the M.O.E. blamed the Provisional Government for attempting to sabotage the administration of education in N.I.

In his conclusion, Londonderry stated some of the difficulties that his ministry was experiencing as a direct impact of the D.O.E.'s obstructionist strategy. He commenced by insisting that the difficulties were not insuperable and that steps were being taken to meet them. Londonderry was most probably referring to the formation of the 'Committee for the Training of Teachers for Northern Ireland' which had already been formed and would be publicly announced three days later on 19 May.[171] The committee was formed for the 'purpose of making arrangements for the preliminary education, training and certification of teachers for various grades of schools in Northern Ireland'.[172] (This will be examined in Chapter 3) The ministry's extra workload, caused by the D.O.E.'s unwillingness to cooperate, was reflected in Londonderry's complaint that implementing these steps was 'effected [sic] by an incomplete staff working at high pressure'.[173] There is an emerging picture of a ministry, and minister, that was under incremental pressure in terms of time, staff and resources, for which they were naming and shaming the Provisional Government/D.O.E. Londonderry continued that the issues 'considered singly, are perhaps not of the gravest importance, but, taken together, they represent what appears to be a deliberate policy of delay and obstruction having as its object the *making the administration of educational affairs in Northern Ireland as difficult as possible or altogether impossible* [author's emphasis]'.[174] He then emphasised, as quoted above, that 'it will not succeed' and that it could 'have one effect only, and that will be to widen, beyond repair, the breach that already exists between the North and the South'.[175]

[170] Ibid., p. 1.
[171] Booklet detailing the appoint of a committee to structure a new teacher training system in N.I., 19 May 1922, p. 1, (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/31/1/1).
[172] Ibid., p. 1.
[173] M.O.E. memo regarding co-operation between Northern and Southern Ireland 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10, (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[174] Ibid., p. 10.
[175] Ibid. pp 10-11.

Londonderry concluded that if there was 'joint and harmonious action between North and South' to produce good results, the field of education was the most likely in 'bringing Irish people together'.[176] These situations make it more difficult to determine Londonderry's motivations and goals. His personality will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 but suffice to say that it is difficult to ascertain if he was sincere, naive or simply leaving the door slightly ajar for the Provisional Government to hear his conciliatory overtures. If it was the latter, then he was tone deaf to the mood music emanating from the I.F.S. His final line of the memo, said that he thought that the Provisional Government, in implementing its own educational policy, had not 'fully weighed what the ultimate results of that policy may be in relation to Northern Ireland'.[177] Londonderry's final sentence demonstrated that it was not only the D.O.E.'s obstructionist policy that arrested the development of the efficient operating of the M.O.E.; it was also their education policy. This was a double-edged sword that Londonderry would have to shield his ministry from. He would, as evidenced in his commitment to create their own teacher training programme, have to establish the north's own distinct policy. The issues of the records and documents would dissipate with time, but the Irish language is still as contentious with unionists/Protestants to the present day. The present disagreement peaked when 'Mr McGuinness's resignation in January not only brought down the power sharing administration but led to an Assembly election in March 2017'.[178] This action was taken largely in response to the Democratic Unionist Party blocking the Irish language bill after having agreed to support it.[179] The legacy of partition is still writ large across, and impacting upon, the political and cultural landscape of the island of Ireland. The initial cross-border interactions between the educational departments contributed significantly to this landscape, as they became central to establishing both jurisdictions national, cultural, and political identities.

[176] Ibid., p. 11.
[177] Ibid., p. 11.
[178] *The Irish Times*, 12 Feb. 2018.
[179] The other issue that influenced the decision was the scandal of the botched Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme, which could result in the squandering of hundreds of millions of pounds. Sinn Féin maintained that Arlene Foster, who oversaw the North's Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, should resign because of it.

Chapter 3: Recalcitrant Teachers: Payments, Accusations and Denials

Beset with difficulties arising from the transfer of documents and personnel, the relationship between the M.O.E. and D.O.E. had deteriorated significantly in the early months of 1922. Amid claim and counter claim of wrongdoing, the tenor between the two governments, the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. was, as early as March, becoming strained and confrontational. The M.O.E. was not yet fully aware that the Provisional Government was covertly, and illegally, paying Catholic teachers as part of its policy of non-recognition of the new N.I. government and state. Documents from the Cabinet Secretariat Series and the M.O.E. in P.R.O.N.I. establish that the M.O.E. had become aware that the number of salary claims not submitted by Catholic schools had risen from eight in January, to one hundred and seventy by 13 March, swelling to two hundred and sixty-eight by April.[1] The M.O.E. would brand those seen as accepting payments from the Provisional Government with the pejorative tag of 'recalcitrant teachers'.

This chapter will examine how the D.O.E.'s illegal payment of Catholic teachers, from February to October 1922, further exacerbated already escalating tensions between both governments and educational departments. While Akenson, Farren and Puirséil all acknowledge the strategy in general terms, it has yet to receive the detailed attention it deserves in the historiography of education in N.I.[2] The extent to which this ploy inhibited the efficiency, and undermined the authority of the M.O.E., as was its intention, will be examined. Papers from the Department of the Taoiseach and Ministry of Finance series in the N.A.I. convey the Provisional Government's rationale. The papers also reveal how the D.O.E. implemented the strategy and how, by practicing imaginative accountancy, the I.F.S. Department of Finance endeavoured to conceal their payments to the recalcitrant teachers. The plight of the teachers, not all of whom were necessarily willing participants, will also be considered.

3.1 Illicit Payments, Non-Recognition and Subterfuge: Jan. – Mar. 1922

Bishop Joseph MacRory, Bishop of Down and Connor, addressed a meeting of the Provisional Government on 30 January 1922, two days before the scheduled transfer of services. The heading under which the minutes were recorded, 'North East Ulster Policy', reflected the tone

[1] M.O.E. memos on Provisional Government paying Catholic teachers in N.I., 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19; ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[2] D., Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973), p. 45 (two lines); S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-1965 (*Belfast, 1995), p. 44; N. Puirséil, *Kindling the flame: 150 years of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation* (Dublin, 2017), p. 204-5.

of the collective sentiment of non-recognition of the new I.F.S. Bishop MacRory covered issues ranging from his concerns that the Belfast boycott might be removed to asking 'Mr Collins to make representations to Sir James Craig' that the major firms in Belfast 'should take back [Catholic] employees'.[3] On the topic of education, 'Dr MacRory mentioned that the Northern Government had given him no indication of their Educational Policy, but that the salaries of teachers were being paid by them from 10th Feb'.[4] Before proceeding, the first half of the Bishop's statement that charged the northern government with not furnishing them with details of their educational policy needs to be challenged. The bishop was aware of Londonderry's plans to form a committee, as it was reported in the *Freemans Journal*, 29 August, under the banner 'The Education Menace'.[5] Londonderry was reported as 'wanting to secularise the schools' and that Catholic rate payers would object to having 'to pay for non-Catholic schools, in addition to their own, which they had built and maintained with their own money'.[6] If the bishop had not known the full extent of the policy, it was due to his church's refusal to participate or cooperate. If he did know, which is very possible, this would have made his assertion somewhat disingenuous. On 29 August 1921 Lord Londonderry wrote to Cardinal Logue explaining that 'he had decided to set up a Committee to enquire into the educational matters in the North of Ireland' and asked 'if your Eminence would be good enough to give me the names of four Catholic representatives whom I should ask to serve on the Committee'.[7] This will be examined more thoroughly in the following chapter, but suffice to say that the Cardinal was abrupt in his refusal to forward any names or have anything whatsoever to do with what would become the Lynn Committee. Londonderry deemed the cardinal's response important enough to call a cabinet meeting to discuss it. Had the cardinal accepted Londonderry's invitation, the merits of which will be discussed in Chapter 3, the R.C. authorities would have been better versed in the educational policies of the northern government.

The record shows that Bishop MacRory followed his remarks on the education policy by stating that 'this raised the question of non-recognition of the Northern Government'.[8] Fionán Lynch, then Minister for Education, responded by telling the bishop that he 'undertook

[3] Meeting of the Provisional Government 30 Jan. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/1).
[4] Ibid.
[5] *Freemans Journal*, 29 Aug. 1922.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 29 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/6; D3099/3/7/61).
[8] Meeting of the Provisional Government, 30 Jan. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/1).

to enquire into the exact position as regards payment of teachers salaries'.[9] This is the first inference from the records that the Provisional Government had considered the payment of teachers in N.I. Bishop MacRory continued, somewhat ambivalently, that he 'felt that if the policy of non-recognition was adopted, the people in the North would have to fight alone'.[10] There was an incongruity to this logic, as he simultaneously advocated the illegal payment of Catholic teachers and the non-participation of Nationalist/Catholic M.P.'s by not to taking their seats in the northern parliament. The northern government, it would appear, were not the only ones given to bouts of cognitive dissonance. Michael Collins spoke next to inform the bishop, as noted previously, that 'non-recognition of the Northern Parliament was essential otherwise they would have nothing to bargain with Sir James Craig'.[11] Collins confirmed that:

> [h]e was prepared to say that the Provisional Government would, so far as its resources permitted, finance schools in the Six Counties where the teachers and the managers do not recognise the northern Government. He would also support local bodies taking a similar action.[12]

The payment of teachers who were prepared to participate in the Provisional Government's policy of non-recognition of the N.I. Government/M.O.E. had been officially sanctioned. This work will reveal that some had some had done so unwillingly while it happened to others without their knowledge or consent. At the next meeting of the Provisional Government on 11 February, Lynch reported that

> Catholic teachers were in favour of non-recognition and would not cash salary forms. He would accordingly require about £33,000 immediately to cover payments in respect of January. It was decided that Payments should be guaranteed.[13]

This was a major financial undertaking for the Provisional Government. It must have been considered as a positive investment in the future of a united island, and a way to prevent the M.O.E. from providing an efficient education system. Lynch did not offer any credible statistics for how many teachers were prepared to participate in, and accept, the policy. It is difficult to

[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Meeting of the Provisional Government, 11 Feb. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/1).

see how any statistics could have been obtained given the level of hostilities in the north, and Belfast in particular. A memo from Eoin MacNeill, who would soon become Minister for Education, revealed that 'Mr Bradley was sent to visit the six counties to make known to school teachers and managers our undertaking'.[14] This could not have provided the appropriate data for Lynch to have arrived at his conclusion on northern teachers' attitudes towards non-recognition. It is clear, however, that education had been targeted as fundamental to the policy of non-recognition and would receive the full focus of the Provisional Government and the D.O.E.

According to T.J. O'Connell's account, MacNeill's memo omitted that

> [i]nformation reached the I.N.T.O. Executive in February, 1922, to the effect that Catholic teachers in the North were being visited by emissaries [from Provisional Government] whose purpose it was to persuade them to refuse recognition to the Northern Government … that, instead, they should signify their allegiance to the Provisional Government in Dublin which would then become responsible for their salaries.[15]

This perhaps might have added some flesh to the bones of the figures of participating recalcitrant teachers but still leaves question marks as to their accuracy. It also indicates that Bradley's trip was more about persuasion than fact finding. O'Connell's account, as told to him by two northern members who had called to him late one night at 9 Gardiner Place, stated that

> Mr Bradley from Dublin (who later became Chief Executive Officer of the Free State Primary Branch of the Department) had visited Belfast and had called on the Bishop of Down and Connor, Most Revd Dr MacRory, on St Mary's Training College, and on a number of Catholic Managers and Catholic schools in the city.[16]

This information would suggest that Bradley's remit was more specific than MacNeill's memo suggested. It appeared that his task was to engage more with middle to upper management

[14] Memo from Eoin MacNeill on payment of teachers, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).
[15] T. J. O'Connell, 100 *years of progress: The story of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation 1868-1968* (Dublin, 1968), p. 462.
[16] Ibid., p. 462.

levels within the northern Catholic schools. This information will become important in clarifying how involved the R.C. Church and the I.N.T.O. were in the proceedings.

MacNeill's memo provides a further insight into how central education was to the Provisional government's policy of non-recognition. MacNeill had earlier disclosed, at what appeared to be a private meeting of government in February 1922, that 'the argument was advanced that the refusal of the teachers to accept the salaries from the Northern Government would be a strong evidence of the mistrust and dislike with which it was regarded by those in education'.[17] The memo revealed, which the minutes of the government meeting of 17 February had not, that the 'Most Reverend Dr MacRory was in attendance and said that if a large number of teachers participated it would have an important effect'.[18] The memo will be revisited when examining MacNeill's reasons/excuses for ending the payments.

MacNeill's early 1922 essay, referred to earlier, encapsulates the Provisional Government's rationale for placing education at the centre of its policy of non-recognition and is worth quoting at length:

> *It is my belief that the kernel of the situation will be education* [author's emphasis]. Beyond doubt, there will be a determined resistance to yielding authority to the Belfast Government over the Catholic schools and colleges. If this resistance stands alone the dispute will take on a purely sectarian character. But it ought not to take that form. It is far more likely that the Belfast Government will try to denationalise education, that it will refuse to come to an agreement about its religious aspect, and the danger is that, as has happened before, the national aspect of it will be sacrificed. At present, however, the Catholic clergy cannot be induced to believe that religion will have any sort of fair play under the Belfast Government. Hence, *however difficult it may be to adopt an attitude of non-compliance towards partition generally, there will be no difficulty at all in the case of schools* [author's emphasis]. This means that there will be a standard of non-compliance raised in every parish. My view is that the laity should assert this non-compliance on national grounds and not leave it to the clergy to assert it purely on religious grounds. If this position is once taken

[17] Memo from Eoin MacNeill on payment of teachers, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).
[18] Ibid.

> up, it can become the nucleus of a wider programme of non-compliance. The point should be considered: Can the National Government undertake to support education of a kind approved by it, in every part of Ireland? Of course local contribution is not excluded. If the National Government can do this, the partition policy will fail in a most important particular.[19]

This extract demonstrates the zeal with which education was pursued as the most viable and effective method of implementing the policy of non-recognition that could not fail.

3.2 Disclosures and Exposures: Mar. 1922

As documented in Chapter 2, the M.O.E. experienced difficulties caused by the orchestrated heel-dragging of its southern counterpart. As problematic as this was, it was not a direct incursion into the internal affairs of N.I. This would change throughout the month of March as there was an increasing awareness within the M.O.E. that the Provisional Government was paying teachers and setting exams in their jurisdiction. Londonderry's memo from 16 March registered the M.O.E.'s first official acknowledgement that there was 'reason to suppose that the Money Orders issued in payment of the salaries are in many cases not being cashed in Catholic schools'.[20] The memo stated that there were 2,500 national schools in N.I. and that by 13 March, all of the one hundred and seventy with outstanding salary claims were 'under Catholic management'.[21] The memo voiced the ministry's deep suspicions and concerns over the Provisional Government's involvement when it stated that

> [i]t does not yet appear whether, and if so to what extent, the Provisional Government are prepared to from their own funds to finance Catholic Schools in Northern Ireland, but the present position in regard to the payment of salaries is obviously due to concerted action on the part of teachers with or without the concurrence of the Provisional Government'.[22]

[19] Eoin MacNeill essay on policy of non-recognition of the northern government, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163).
[20] Ministry of Education memo on difficulties with transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 10 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19).
[21] Ibid., p. 9.
[22] Ibid., p. 10.

The language was delicate in its accusatory overtures towards the Provisional Government. It created the impression that the ministry knew but was lacking the concrete evidence before recording it officially. Eoin MacNeill's 1922 essay suggested that the Dáil must be careful and guarded in their use of language, officially, when dealing with the issue.[23] He added that he believed that the Provisional Government would 'not let such injustices that are causing such suffering in the six-county area go unchallenged, both officially and more stringently, unofficially'.[24] He was advocating that the Provisional Government practice, as governments often still do, the art of distancing themselves from actions which they employ to cause disruption in another country's affairs.

On 18 April 1922, James Craig received an anonymous letter with the rather cryptic title '"The North began, The North held on" "No nibbling"'.[25] It was signed, "A Loyalist" – an extremely well informed and fervent loyalist. It informed Craig that he should be on his guard against 'the undermining influence that is being carried out against the Northern Government'.[26] The writer stated that the head teachers of 'Catholic Sunday Schools' had met in Dublin and decided that 'they would not recognise the Northern Government at the Intermediate Examinations in June'.[27] (The writer obviously did not understand Catholicism, as they did not run Sunday schools.) He declared the teachers had received a guarantee from the Provisional Government that if they complied 'all results would be paid by the Free State'.[28] Quite strikingly, he informed Craig that Mr Bradley, the same as referenced above in MacNeill's memo, had been

> […] sent out by Lynch from the Education Office, Dublin, called on almost all the Catholic Teachers of the Six Counties asking them not to recognise the Northern Parliament, but ignore it, and that they would receive their salaries from the Free State without fail and of course some of them have adopted this attitude and have been paid by the Free State.[29]

[23] Eoin MacNeill essay on policy of non-recognition of the northern government, *c*Dec.1921 – Jan. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163).
[24] Ibid.
[25] The phrases 'The 'North began' and 'The North held on' were in reference Eoin MacNeill's essay from Nov. 1913. The reference to nibbling is unclear but could be referring to the south nibbling into Ulster's territory.
[26] Anonymous letter to Prime Minister Sir James Craig, 18 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid. Fionán Lynch, mentioned in the letter, was Minister for Education from 1 Apr. to 30 Aug. 1922.

It is also interesting that Protestants, at this stage, were referring to N.I. as the six counties. This – as the evidence contained in MacNeill's memo demonstrates, though the M.O.E. was unaware of its contents – should have been treated by the northern administration as very specific and reliable intelligence.

The letter progressed to state that 'the salaries of the teachers are being paid by the Free State with the sanction of the Bishop'.[30] The content of the letter had all the hallmarks of insider information. He warned Craig to 'stand firm even to the extent of civil war if we mean to hold on to our civil and religious liberty'.[31] This allows an insight into how avidly the northern Protestants felt about the religious, cultural, and political differences between the two new states (in that order). He dismissed the ill feeling between Collins and de Valera as 'only a storm in a teacup' and 'a sham' as they were 'all joined in the common end of undermining us in the North[,] Bishops and Republicans and Free Staters'.[32] He concluded by stating that there should be no republican marches allowed or volleys fired at funerals 'unless you recognise two armies in Belfast'.[33] It was an exaggeration to suggest that Mr Bradley had spoken to that many Catholic teachers, but the purpose of his mission and what he was espousing was accurate. The same can be said of the meeting with the teachers as the language is consistent with that used by MacNeill and, as shall be seen, ministry officials. There is a very strong possibility that Craig treated the information with the appropriate respect and concern that it merited.

3.3 Teachers' Choice? Coercion and Deception

John Harbison, President of the 'non-political and non-sectarian' I.N.T.O., wrote a very revealing letter to Lewis McQuibban, permanent secretary of the M.O.E., on 20 March concerning the payments.[34] Harbison openly stated that, '[a]s you are aware, a considerable number of Catholic Teachers and some Catholic Managers have sent their Salary Claims to Dublin for payment'.[35] He requested a meeting with McQuibban and Bonaparte Wyse 'who had come up from Tyrone House [Dublin] to join the education ministry in Belfast as assistant secretary'.[36] Harbison wished to discuss 'A rather awkward situation [that] has arisen for some

[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Puirséil, *Kindling the flame*, p. 203.
[35] John Harbison, President I.N.T.O. to Secretary McQuibban, 20 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[36] Puirséil, *Kindling the flame*, p. 207; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 43; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 42

of these Teachers, where the Manager in some instances, without consulting the Teachers concerned, forwarded the claims to Dublin'.[37] The evidence suggests that Harbison was aware of the Provisional Government's clandestine payments, but in the interest of his members he was prepared to proceed regardless. He was also prepared to expose those managers who appeared to be riding roughshod over, and disregarding the wishes of teachers under their management. The meeting was arranged for 23 March.

A document dated 23 March, and 'seen by Lord Londonderry 27/3/22', stated that McQuibban and Wyse were accompanied by 'Mr Frizzell, Accountant'.[38] Harbison opened with the accusation that 'it had been represented to him … that hardship and potential loss of position were likely to be suffered by certain teachers' as a consequence of the illegal payments.[39] He put two cases before the ministry's representatives. The first was that of a principal teacher who reported that

> the School return and Salary Claims were filled by the staff for the month of February, 1922, and sent to the Manager for his signature, and where the Manager without any reference to the Principal, and contrary to the wishes of the latter, sent these papers to Dublin, with the result that the authorities of the Provisional Government remitted Bank of Ireland cheques to them for their salaries that month.[40]

Harbison asked on behalf of the teachers, given the extenuating circumstances, whether:

> 1) This Ministry would attach any blame to the teachers for cashing the cheques, and
> 2) Whether the Ministry could direct one of their Inspectors to sign the School Returns and Salary Claims in future, to prevent the recurrence of a like irregularity.[41]

The flagrant breach of trust by those managers was compounded by their contempt for the teachers and, in this case, the principal's wishes. As the managers were aware that the teachers

[37] Ibid.
[38] Minutes of Meeting between M.O.E. and Harbison, 23 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

would have known, on receipt of their cheques for the salaries, that they had been issued by the Provisional Government, this action was coercive. The manager would not have taken a decision of such enormity without the approval, however tacit, of the bishop or parish priest. Harbison was 'assured that, in the circumstance, the ministry would not attach any blame to the teacher' but that the manager could not be 'superseded by an Inspector of the Ministry for the purpose of the signing of the School returns and Salary Claims'.[42]

In the second case Harbison recounted how a principal, who had applied to the M.O.E. for his salary, became aware that his 'assistant teachers applied for payment to the Provisional Government, and had obtained Salary cheques from the latter'.[43] This made the principal fear that if he persisted 'in his loyalty to the Northern Government, whilst the rest of the staff, and possibly the School Manager, give adherence to the Provisional Government he may be deprived of his position'.[44] These very genuine fears were grounded in reality. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, and will be further examined in Chapter 4, the local manager and clergy had unprecedented power to appoint and dismiss teachers with impunity. This power imbalance was reflected in the ministry's response to Harbison:

> [s]ympathy was expressed with the teacher concerned, and it was represented that should he be deprived of his appointment the Ministry would do what it could to help him; at the same time it was pointed out that it might be very difficult for the ministry to secure him employment in another school, as the power of appointment lay in the hands of the School Managers.[45]

Control over the appointment and dismissal of teachers featured prominently in the R.C. Church's decision to reject the MacPherson Bill. It would become central to the Protestant churches objections to the Londonderry Act. For now, the power resided with the managers and the local clergy. They were abetted by the Provisional Government whose goal was to undermine the M.O.E.'s authority and make the north ungovernable.

A report sent from school inspector Mr Welply (the same Mr Welply referred to in Chapter 2) to McQuibban on 18 March illustrates that the ministry must have known about the

[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.

illicit cross-border payments; and that not all those who availed of it did so willingly, or without regret. Welply reported that he visited 'St. Eugene's B.N.S., Co. Derry.' on 16 March and had met the principal who informed him 'quite courteously that, acting on a resolution passed by the RC teachers of Derry, he was not accepting salary from the Government of Northern Ireland and that he does not recognise that Government'.[46] Welply's report added that he 'inquired where his salary now comes from and he replied that he is, or will be, paid by the Free State'.[47] When asked what the manager's views were on the subject, the principal replied that 'the Manager is sitting on the fence awaiting developments'.[48] It is very telling that the principal 'added too that perhaps he and his fellow teachers are fools to have taken this action'.[49] Bearing in mind the concerns of those who Harbison represented, this principal's general demeanour implied that he had not participated willingly in the process. It appeared that the managers and the clergy could have played their part in influencing the outcome of the resolution by the R.C. teachers of Derry not to recognise the northern government. That is not negating that there were those who supported the resolution but suggesting that forceful persuasion could have been used. The tactic achieved its aim of impeding the M.O.E. from functioning efficiently. Ideologically some teachers supported the tactic, but it also caused discomfort as they feared that supporting the Provisional Government would affect or cost them their livelihoods. This meant that, in some cases, the pragmatism of everyday economics had to usurp ideals. As the available documentation on the resolution to the teachers' payment issue does not resume until August 1922, the chapter will, in keeping with its chronological structure, readdress the theme further on.

3.4 Repudiations and Consequences: Apr. 1922

The evidence received during March meant that, by April, the M.O.E. was better placed to approach with the Provisional Government over its illegal payments to Catholic teachers. On 5 April, Lord Londonderry wrote to Michael Collins telling him that he had, despite what Collins had apparently told him during a conversation that they had in London the previous week, 'definitive evidence … that the salaries of certain teachers in National Schools under R.C. management in Northern Ireland are being paid from Dublin'.[50] Londonderry's letter exposed an undercurrent of contempt for Collins because he suspected him of deceit. This was

[46] Welply to McQuibban, 18 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Londonderry to Michael Collins, 5 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).

because Londonderry had put it to Collins earlier that week that his government had been paying teachers in the north, which Collins had forthrightly denied. Londonderry continued that he was unable to say 'at the moment' under whose authority it was being done but reminded Collins that he had told him that 'as far as you were aware, the Provisional Government was not responsible for these payments'.[51] Londonderry informed Collins that some four hundred and sixty money orders, 'all in respect of Catholic Schools, have not been presented for payment, and our information is that they were sent to Dublin'.[52] He did not spurn the opportunity to let Collins know he was aware that '[i]n some cases they were sent with the concurrence of the teachers, but we are told that in certain cases they were sent by the Managers without the consent of the teachers'.[53] Londonderry persisted in leaving the door ajar for cooperation by suggesting that '[i]f there is to be reasonable co-operation between the North and the South in educational matters I think you will agree that the dual system of payment of teachers in the Northern area, wherever the funds come from, should cease as soon as possible'.[54] It is difficult to understand how, or why, Londonderry thought, given all the information to hand, that the Provisional Government had any intention other than debilitating and destabilising his ministry and government.

Londonderry concluded by telling Collins that he had enclosed a letter for the D.O.E. He requested that Collins send it on to the 'proper quarter with such directions as will secure that the matter will be cleared at a very early date'.[55] The enclosed letter was from McQuibban to Dilworth, Secretary of the D.O.E., saying that 'recalcitrant teachers' had been paid by Dublin for the months of January and February'.[56] He wanted to know if the teachers had been paid through his ministry or 'through any other ministry under the control of the Provisional Government, and if so, in what circumstances such payments has [sic] been made'.[57] On 7 April, Dilworth responded by telling McQuibban that he had 'no knowledge of the payment from Dublin of teachers in Northern Ireland'.[58] Dilworth stated that as far as he was aware no payments had been made through his office but caveated this by adding that 'I have no knowledge of the activities of the other departments of the Provisional Government'.[59] This

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] L. McQuibban to W. J. Dilworth, 5 Apr.1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[57] Ibid.
[58] W. J. Dilworth to L. McQuibban, 7 Apr.1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[59] Ibid.

unnecessary qualification suggested that Dilworth was distancing himself from something dishonourable that he was quite possibly aware of, but disapproved of. There is room to suggest that within that caveat Dilworth had provided McQuibban with a clue that something was amiss. It is also worth remembering that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Londonderry had written to Collins on 7 April 1922 telling him that he had conclusive evidence that the D.O.E. were proposing to conduct Easter Exams in Armagh, Belfast, and Derry.[60] The consistency of the Provisional Government's/D.O.E.'s antagonism towards the M.O.E. exacerbated the antipathy between the two. It also had the designed effect of impeding the development of a proficiently administrated ministry.

When Collins replied to Londonderry on 10 April, he ignored the question of payment to teachers and denied that exams were to be held in schools within N.I. Collins' perfidy must have deeply insulted and infuriated Londonderry.[61] Londonderry replied to Collins on 12 April without mention of the payments.[62] This, it must be assumed, was done because Londonderry had realised at this juncture that Collins was not going to accept responsibility. He therefore decided that he would cut his losses and attempt to get whatever settlement he could on the one topic that Collins seemed prepared to discuss, which was Easter exams. Meanwhile, in April, a ministry memo was being generated to assess the numbers of schools who were not cashing their salary orders for the months of February, March, and April.[63] The memo reported, as seen in Table 1 below, that the increase in schools who had not cashed their salary orders over the months under review had accelerated from 164 in March to 268 in June.

County	February Returns Outstanding on 12/3/22.	March Returns Outstanding on 19/4/22.
Co. Antrim	44	62
Co. Down	10	40
Co. Armagh	11	8
Co. L'Derry	9	10
Co. Fermanagh	42	50
Co. Tyrone	25	71
Convent National Schools	23	27
Total	164	268

Table 1: Figures for outstanding School salary returns for February and March 1922[64]

[60] Londonderry to Michael Collins, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[61] Michael Collins to Londonderry, 10 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[62] Londonderry to Michael Collins, 12 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[63] Ministry of Education memo on payments of teachers, Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/32/B/1/2/123).
[64] Ibid.

The memo referenced how the above-mentioned correspondence between McQuibban and Dilworth, and Londonderry and Collins, meant that 'the source from which the teachers in RC National Schools in Northern Ireland are being paid remains to be cleared up'.[65] The number of Catholic schools not recognising the M.O.E. was swelling at a worryingly swift pace. They had no inkling of how or when it might, if ever, slow down or stop.

The memo concluded by recording that two generic letters, '(E)' and '(F)', had been attached concerning the issue.[66] Both letters, signed by McQuibban, carried serious implications for the recalcitrant teachers. They both carried the exact same threat, with letter (F) explaining that McQuibban was

> directed by the Minister to point out *that no guarantee can be given that services rendered by National School Teachers in Northern Ireland after 1st January, 1922, for which payment has not been made by this Ministry will be recognised for pensions or other purposes, such as claims for increment of salary etc.,* and I am to request that you will be good enough to inform all the members of the teaching staff.[67]

This could have had long term consequences for the teachers receiving the illegal payments. It is questionable, as Harbison pointed out, if the details of the letter would have been read to the teachers who were most in need of it, given that some principals had not informed teachers that their salary forms were being sent to Dublin. The ministry had taken the decision to apply pressure on the managers and principals engaged in this practice, by burdening them with the responsibility of the potential financial loss to the teachers. Ultimately the responsibility rested with the managers, and they would, eventually, have to explain to the teachers why they had lost out on their pensions and increments of salary. The ministry was no longer prepared to play the waiting game or depend on the Provisional Government being honest brokers in the process.

Another memo generated on 10 May showed that figures had remained constant for schools and teachers receiving payments. In the House of Commons, on 17 May 1922, Thompson Donald, MP for East Belfast, asked the ministry's parliamentary secretary, Robert

[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid. Author's emphasis to indicate that this wording was identical in both letters.

McKeown if he would 'state the total number of public elementary school places in Northern Ireland; whether all these…are carrying out the instructions of the Government; and whether R.C. teachers have refused to accept their salaries from the Northern government'.[68] McKeown replied that

> [t]here are about 2,100 public elementary schools (National Schools) in Northern Ireland, and the average daily attendance … was 144,160. There are about 740 of the National Schools in Northern Ireland under the charge of Roman Catholic managers and teachers. In some 270 of these schools the teachers are not receiving payment from the Northern Government. In such the monthly returns and salary claims have not been furnished to the ministry but from information available it is not practicable to state in how many cases respectively responsibility for this action rests with school managers and teachers.[69]

There was a veiled inference that it was the parish priest who, being the manager's superior, was in some instances, instigating the actions.[70] McKeown concluded by adding that 'in the case of a small number of these National Schools it has come under notice that the instructions of the Ministry have not been acted upon in some other aspects'.[71] He was most probably referring to other acts of civil disobedience such as teachers avoiding signing Promissory Oaths, and non-adherence to the rules forbidding the exhibition of religious emblems in schools. The effects of these two issues will be explored in detail in Chapter 4. Donald then asked McKeown if he knew 'where these teachers were receiving their salaries from, seeing that they have not recognised the Northern Government'.[72] McKeown replied that it was 'very difficult to find out exactly where the money was coming from, but we do know that it is coming from some source in Dublin'.[73] There was a reluctance to put it on public record that they knew the Provisional Government was responsible. Donald then asked 'what steps the Government propose to take to have that matter put right', to which there was no recorded

[68] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series,* vol. 1: *Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1922*, col. 555 (*Hansard N.I. (Commons),* i).
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., col. 556.
[73] Ibid.

reply.[74] The table below, from a memo addressed to McQuibban on 20 June, shows that the number of schools not claiming their salaries from the M.O.E. appeared to have plateaued.[75]

County	Total number of schools under Roman Catholic Managers and Teachers.	Number of schools under Roman Catholic Managers and Teachers which did not claim payment from the Ministry.
Co. Antrim	165	63
Co. Down	126	54
Co. Armagh	101	13
Co. Derry	107	21
Co. Tyrone	155	71
Co. Fermanagh	88	52
Total	742	274

Table 2: Figures for outstanding School salary returns for May 1922[76]

Although the figures appeared to have stabilised, they still presented difficulties for the M.O.E. Throughout the protracted correspondence over the payments, Londonderry was eager to keep communication channels with the D.O.E. open for the possibility of reaching a resolution. On April 10 he agreed, even after making Collins aware that he had conclusive evidence that the Provisional Government was behind the payments, that the two bodies should meet up with a view to resolving the outstanding issues.[77] As the payments continued, the affected teachers were coming under increasing pressure. This episode highlighted how, when it came to something as important as a job and a salary, that ideology or politics did not necessarily define attitudes and behaviour. Teachers had, in some cases, to be pragmatic, whilst also fearing that being seen to support the Provisional Government could possibly impact on their livelihoods. By May 1922, it was not only the recalcitrant teachers and the M.O.E. who were feeling the pressure; it was starting to build within the Provisional Government also.

3.5 A Financial, Legal and Political Yoke: May – June 1922

The minutes of a meeting of the Dublin government on 10 May recorded that 'A vote of £18,000 in connection with the special expenditure in North East Ulster was made'.[78] The enormity of the fiscal ramifications of prolonging this policy was beginning to dawn on the

[74] Ibid.
[75] Memo for McQuibban, 20 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[76] Ibid.
[77] Londonderry to Collins, 12 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[78] Meeting of Provisional Government, 10 May 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/2/1).

Provisional Government. Financial difficulties ultimately caused the Provisional Government to rethink its policy on the payment of recalcitrant teachers, which coincided with a shift in its attitude to the north. At the next meeting of the government on 9 June 'The Minister of Education read out a memorandum which he had received from the Treasury regarding the question of payment of salaries etc. of Northern Teachers, and pointed out that these salaries were due for payment on the 13th instant [June]'.[79] He estimated that the funds required for this purpose would amount to £18,000 each month.[80] This was the first recorded recognition of the actual cost on an ongoing basis which might have prompted Michael Collins to respond that he 'undertook to see the treasury on the matter'.[81] There was a hint of alarm during this exchange. Collins came across again as being less than honest in disclosing the full extent of his knowledge. On 12 April 1922, a handwritten note from Lynch to, what was presumably, the chairman of the Ministry of Finance, had informed him that 'The salaries to Northern Catholic teachers should issue today. Will you please see that a cheque for £18,000 is made available'.[82] This meant that Collins was aware that the amounts involved meant that the money was haemorrhaging from the state coffers.

By June, the signs of wear and tear on the Provisional Government, caused by the pressures of financing the northern teachers, were becoming obvious. On 7 June, William O'Brien, secretary to the Irish Treasury, wrote to Lynch informing him that Collins 'has had under consideration your minutes of the 26th ultimo [the previous month, May] and enclosures regarding the question of payment to the salaries of certain Catholic Teachers in Northern Ireland'.[83] Further exposing Collins, he continued

> [i]n reply, Mr. Collins desires me to point out that education in the Northern Area is not a service within the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government, and that there is no authority to make payments in respect of such education from the Irish Exchequer.[84]

O'Brien informed Lynch that 'Collins wished to discuss the matter with you at an early date'.[85] Collins appeared intent on distancing himself and his government from any paper trail that

[79] Meeting of Provisional Government, 9 June 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/2/1).
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Note from Lynch to Chairman of Ministry of Finance, 12 Apr. 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).
[83] O'Brien to Lynch, 7 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.

would lead back to him or it. O'Brien, it will be seen, might not have been comfortable with being tasked with hanging Lynch out to dry. Lynch was more concerned, and aggrieved, at the implication that he was acting alone, against the wishes of Collins and the government. There was more than a suggestion that Lynch had been targeted as a scapegoat should this explode in the government's face. There is a possibility that it was part of Collins' exit strategy from his commitment to the northern teachers.

On 8 June, the very next day, Lynch responded to Collins personally about the 'Payment of Catholic Teachers in the Six Counties'.[86] Lynch said that '[f]eling that these payments were a very heavy drain on the resources of the 26 Counties, I gave the question of finding a way of ceasing the payments very deep consideration'.[87] He continued that he had initially

> thought that it might be possible to do this by my shouldering the responsibility personally for having started the policy, and advocating the matter before the Provisional Government in a way which more or less mislead them – in other words I was prepared, if necessary and practicable, to make myself a scapegoat.[88]

Lynch was developing a strong narrative, in response to Collins' attempt to burden him with the responsibility for the policy.

Lynch then asked Collins to 'remember that early in February [1922] in the presence of Dr MacRory, the whole Provisional Government committed itself to this policy – we sent for him especially to discuss the policy'.[89] There was an appreciable increase in Lynch's discomfort at being asked to bear the responsibility for the policy. An even worse scenario was the possibility that Collins was sacrificing Lynch to distance himself from the commitment that he made in the Dáil to the illegal payments. Lynch added that if he discontinued the payments, the action would have been interpreted by Bishop MacRory, and the 'Northern Catholic teachers', as 'merely a political dodge on the part of the Provisional Govt. to get out of an awkward and expensive situation'.[90] This contained an implicit accusation that Collins, having

[86] Lynch to Collins, 8 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Lynch to Collins, 8 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).
[90] Ibid.

committed to the policy with haste and absence of foresight, had painted himself into a political corner from which he now wished to escape by abandoning the Catholic teachers in the north at Lynch's expense.

Lynch told Collins that the teachers' salaries were due in a matter of days and that it was 'urgent that some definite action should be taken' before adding the caveat that 'for this month at least, with the elections coming off on Friday week, it would be very dangerous to cease these payments'.[91] It was clear that Lynch was not politically, and perhaps morally, opposed to the cessation of the payments as long as he was not portrayed publicly as the villain of the piece. He was assuming, most probably due to the prevalent nationalist fervour imbued by recent independence, that there would have been appetite amongst the electorate to support their compatriots in the north. The general election was of profound significance as it 'was the first to be held in the independent Irish state…and the first to be contested by the parties, which, in modified forms, were to dominate subsequent Irish politics'.[92] This was a shrewd manoeuvre, and prudent advice.

The most startling and damning revelation was in O'Brien's handwritten letter to Collins on 13 June, marked confidential

> [p]ayment of £18,000 has been arranged by resort [this was barely legible, this is best interpretation] to a Secret Service Vote, but this method of disguising illegal payments out of the Exchequer cannot be continued without loss of prestige to the Government, and it is sure to lead to difficulties with the public in matters of taxation.[93]

This created several difficulties for Collins, while also exposing his connivance with the letter that he instructed O'Brien to write to Lynch on 7 June. This also shows that O'Brien, while in possession of these facts, must have been conflicted when writing the letter to Lynch. Collins was dancing on a politically precarious tight wire, the fall from which would have landed in ignominy. Not only was he flouting the law by paying teachers in another jurisdiction, but he was also breaking the law in his own by disguising illegal payments from his own exchequer. In concluding, O'Brien 'submitted that steps should be taken to terminate these obligations at

[91] Ibid.
[92] M. Gallagher, 'The Pact General Election of 1922.' in *Irish Historical Studies,* vol. 21 no. 84 (Sept. 1979), pp 404 – 421.
[93] O'Brien to Collins, 13 Mar. 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).

the earliest possible date'.[94] There was more than a shade of irony in his summation, considering the letter that he had penned to Lynch only six days previously. This fallout would have been, had they known, music to the ears of the Belfast government who were still living with the administrative mayhem that this had, and was still causing.

O'Brien wrote to Collins the next day again informing him that the 'only sum charged to the Secret Service is £18,000 in respect of teachers' salaries in the six counties for the month of May'.[95] He continued that he had also submitted with the papers 'that the obligation to pay these salaries should be discontinued, and if this course was adopted only a comparatively small amount will be required for a Secret Service Vote'. He was telling Collins that if he persisted with the illegal payments to the recalcitrant teachers the deliberately misleading, and falsely inflated vote would mean that it would 'not be possible to frame any estimate'.[96] He was pointing out to Collins that the numbers, should he persevere with the payments, meant that the figures for the estimate would be too fanciful to merit credulity. This was a situation not of O'Brien's making and over which he had no control. His concern was that this train was gathering momentum and that he was expected to accept responsibility for it when it derailed. It seemed that Collins was ignoring what appeared to be sound political and financial advice. It appeared that he was again distancing himself from any potential political fallout from this, should it become public.

On 12 June O'Brien received a memo from Joseph Brennan, Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, asking him to furnish the ministry with the total cost going to the secret service vote.[97] O'Brien replied that the chief item was 'education in the north which amounts to almost £18,000 per month'.[98] He added that it was 'hoped to discontinue this sum, but I think we must make provision for it in case of accident'.[99] It is difficult to know what exactly he meant by 'accident' but he seemed certain at this point that he would succeed in getting the payments stopped. An interesting end to O'Brien's reply was that '[t]here is also an item of £11,000 (odd) in connection with litigation in America'.[100] The Secret Service Vote was becoming a convenient place to secrete any monies for events that the government adjudged would be best

[94] Ibid.
[95] O'Brien to Collins 14 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/280).
[96] Ibid.
[97] Brennan to O'Brien, 12 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287).
[98] O'Brien to Brennan, 25 June 1922 (N.A.I.: FIN1/287); R. Fanning, *The Irish Ministry of Finance 1922-58* (Dublin, 1978), p. 130.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.

kept out of the public arena. There appeared to be an ever-increasing appetite within the Provisional Government for extricating itself from what was fast becoming the financial, legal and political yoke of payments to a number of Catholic teachers in the neighbouring jurisdiction.

3.6 Deliberations: Aug. 1922

On 26 August Harbison met McQuibban again and explained that he was acting in a personal capacity 'in which he had been consulted by a number of the teachers concerned' rather than his official role as a member of the Executive Committee of the I.N.T.O.[101] This was four days after the death of Michael Collins, the significance of which will be examined further on. He adopted this approach to prevent the I.N.T.O. from becoming embroiled in such a politically delicate affair. Puirséil recounts that T.J. O'Connell, the I.N.T.O. General Secretary, 'was approached privately to see to see if the I.N.T.O. would give its support to the action, but O'Connell suggested that this would be very unlikely, since it was an explicitly political act, and he was not approached on the matter again'.[102] This, in fitting with the political climate of the day, did not appear to fully reveal the union's position. Puirséil clarifies O'Connell's position by suggesting, correctly so, that 'it would have been impossible for the I.N.T.O. to involve itself in such an action without losing most of its remaining Protestant members in the North, but as it was, its support proved unnecessary'.[103]

It was John Duffin, a member of the I.N.T.O. who had strong family links to the northern I.R.A., who 'managed for ten months to run a clandestine administration which saw him collect the salary forms from over 800 hundred teachers in 283 schools across the six counties…and send them across the border with the help of a restaurant attendant on the Dublin train'.[104] Duffin recounted to O'Connell that he had called a meeting of R.C. teachers in Belfast and 'at its conclusion phoned Mr Fionán [Fintan] Lynch to say that the movement was launched'.[105] Inevitably there were delays and inaccuracies in payments but Duffin never mentioned anything about the cases that Harbison was representing – the unwilling participants. Although the I.N.T.O. were not participating in the process, they were fully aware of its members' activities, and there was no evidence to suggest that they had objected, even

[101] Meeting between Harbison and McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[102] Puirséil, *Kindling the flame*, p. 204.
[103] Ibid., p. 204.
[104] Ibid., pp 204-5.
[105] O'Connell, *100 years of progress*, p. 463.

conscientiously, to the process. Harbison should therefore be afforded a degree of sympathy when he approached his talks with McQuibban, as he was protecting the interests of both parties. He was as honest as discretion permitted without fully exposing those engaged in the act of recalcitrance.

Clarifying that he did not approve of the teachers' actions, Harbison declared that he 'was desirous to do anything in his power which would be likely to have the effect of inducing these teachers to reconsider the situation by agreeing to recognise the authority of the ministry, accept payment there from, and conform to the requirements of its regulations'.[106] These lofty claims were sure to placate McQuibban, and possibly gain his trust. This presented an opportunity for McQuibban to exit from the debacle. Harbison claimed again, as he had done with McQuibban on 20 March, that while

> some teachers in question were responsible personally for the attitude which had been taken up, he stated that it was within his knowledge that many of the teachers concerned did not wish personally to oppose the authority of the Ministry in any way, but were forced into seeming to do so in consequence of action taken by their Managers, or of other circumstances'.[107]

This presented an opportunity that could be mutually beneficial with the possibility of a resolution. In distancing some of the teachers from responsibility, Harbison was creating a conciliatory environment between the M.O.E. and the teachers. Harbison forwarded three enquiries explaining that if 'affirmative answer could be given there [could be] an early and satisfactory solution of the difficulty would therefore be greatly promoted'.[108] The inspiration for the teachers' change of heart, depicted in Harbison's first enquiry, could possibly have emanated from letters ('E') and ('F') from the April memo referenced above, that informed teachers that their pensions and future claims for increments of salary could be affected.[109] His first pitch to McQuibban was to ask 'if the recalcitrant teachers now recognised the authority of the Ministry, and agreed to accept pay from it, and to conform to all the regulations in future, credit would then be allowed to them for the purposes of increment, pensions etc. for the service

[106] Meeting between John Harbison and L. McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ministry of Education memo on payments of teachers, Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/32/B/1/2/123).

for which they have obtained payment from some source in Southern Ireland'.[110] Harbison was also skilled enough in diplomacy to avoid mentioning that it was, as he surely knew, the Provisional Government who was responsible for the payments.

The next two enquiries centred on the question and status of the Irish language. This was, as noted previously, integral to the northern Catholic population's sense of national identity. They felt the state did not recognise this and that they had been abandoned by the I.F.S. Considering that they now distrusted the Provisional, British and N.I. Governments there is, within this context, an argument to be made that this was, similar to the unionists, the commencement of a 'nationalist' siege mentality. Harbison asked McQuibban

> [w]hether it would be possible for the Ministry to recognise an alternative programme for National Schools in Northern Ireland which would permit Irish being taught during the ordinary school hours, and as part of the ordinary school programme, where it could be shown that this was desired by the Manager and the majority of the parents and pupils.[111]

His final enquiry ambitiously asked 'Whether it would be possible for the Ministry to establish centres in Northern Ireland area where National School teachers desiring to do so could obtain instruction in Irish during the period of School Vacation'.[112] Harbison explained, in regard to (2) and (3), that some future trainee teachers might wish to gain employment in the south where it was compulsory to have Irish. McQuibban was non-committal when replying that 'it was not possible for him to give any pledge regarding the action which would be taken by the Ministry, should an official application be made for the grant of the concession indicated'.[113]

3.7 'Whataboutery'

The diplomatic haggling towards a resolution had begun and McQuibban was being cautious, at this point, to rule nothing in or out. Having said that, McQuibban became more forceful when addressing Harbison's second question, on the Irish language, by pointing out that

> Irish had been made compulsory for all the Schools and Training Colleges in Southern Ireland, although this course of action was not likely to be

[110] Meeting between Harbison and McQuibban, 26 Aug. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400).
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.

> agreeable to the Protestant minority of the population in that area, and stated that a claim for an alternative programme in the National Schools in Northern Ireland would be greatly strengthened if it could be shown that a corresponding concession had been provided for the minority in Southern Ireland, and in such a manner that it would be free for them to avail of it.[114]

It sounded like McQuibban was suggesting that Harbison use his influence as a member of the Executive Committee of the all-Ireland I.N.T.O. to sway the Provisional Government, or at least, make it aware of the M.O.E.'s position. Whatever his motivations were, it is doubtful that his priority was the minority of Protestants in the I.F.S. who had felt as abandoned as the Catholics in N.I. Concluding with Harbison's final question, McQuibban stated that there were 'three Colleges in Northern Ireland where National School teachers desiring to do so can attend for courses of instruction in Irish during the School Vacation periods'.[115] The minutes concluded that

> Mr. McQuibban dwelt on the fact that hitherto the Ministry had shown great leniency in the matter of the action taken by it in the case of the schools that had refused to accept payment: as indicated already, he refused to pledge the Ministry to any definite course of action on the points specified by Mr. Harbison, should the matters be put before it officially, but he stated that there would be every disposition to extend sympathetic treatment to the teachers concerned so far as this could be done without sacrifice of principle, or the adoption of the line of action which would not be likely to meet with the approval of the Parliament for Northern Ireland.[116]

McQuibban had again, without committing to or guaranteeing anything, left the door ajar. His semantical replies meant that Harbison had gotten enough from the meeting to negotiate with the teachers at their next meeting; the corridors of communication were open, and the traffic was starting to flow.

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[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.

3.8 Collins' Death: Cessation of Payments: Sept. 1922

The McQuibban/Harbison meeting occurred four days after the death of Michael Collins at Beal na Bláth, County Cork on 22 August. It is doubtful if it would have occurred otherwise. As seen through the above interdepartmental memos, Collins was the main driving force behind the payment of the recalcitrant teachers, which was an integral part of his policy of making the governance of N.I. as difficult as possible for the northern parliament. The swiftness of the resolution after Collins' demise would suggest that not all in the Provisional Government agreed with his strategy on the payment of teachers.

An eleven page memo from McQuibban to Lord Londonderry, between 11 and 20 September, mentioned his meeting with Harbison, and that '[b]efore that date and on several occasions afterwards I had interviews with Father Macaulay, Manager of St. Columban's National School, Belfast, and Dr Hendley of St, Malachy's Colleges'.[117] The flurry of activity around this time, especially from a clerical Manager, would suggest that they were aware that a change in the Provisional Government's strategy was imminent. Fr Macaulay and Dr Hendley wrote to McQuibban on 11 September regarding their meeting with him Thursday, 7 September.[118] T.J. O'Connell recounted a meeting with the Minister for Education, Michael Hayes, 'a day or two before the end of August'.[119] Hayes informed O'Connell that 'it had been decided to discontinue payments to the northern teachers from the following November, that the teachers would be notified of this and advised to apply to the Ministry of Education for their salaries'. So, in all probability, Father Macaulay and Dr Hendley had been armed with this information prior to the meeting. They reported back to McQuibban that, in the interest of reconciliation, they had 'tried, as we promised to find the feeling of all parties interested in the schools which for the past few months have not acknowledged the Ministry of Education'.[120] They informed McQuibban that 'The teachers during the time of the break [partition] dreaded the interference of your Government with their ideals as Catholics and Irishmen'.[121] Asserting pressure, or gentle persuasion, they went on to say that they had 'endeavoured to assure them that these interests will be duly safeguarded as the Ministry of Education is anxious to deal generously with all creeds and classes in the six counties, and we place the following principles

[117] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/123), p. 1. The date was not recorded on the document, but it is estimated to be between 11 and 12 September in fitting with the sequence of other documents.
[118] Fr Macaulay and Dr Hendley to McQuibban, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[119] O'Connell, *100 years of progress*, p. 265.
[120] Fr Macaulay and Dr Hendley to L. McQuibban, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[121] Ibid.

before your Ministry confident that settlement will be arrived at satisfactory to all concerned'.[122] It was becoming more evident that they were attempting to get the best deal possible before the M.O.E. became aware that the Provisional Government were about to terminate payments to recalcitrant teachers.

3.9 Headway

Dr Hendly and Father Mulcahy commenced their extensive recommendations for reconciliation by suggesting that

> the best policy would be to let bygones be bygones, that no teacher be penalised for having taken the stand he believed himself justified in undertaking under the circumstances. By this we mean that no teacher be penalised or victimised in any way in regard to appointments, salaries, increments, pensions, diplomas or other emoluments which would have been paid to him had there been no break, and that services rendered since the beginning of the trouble be regarded as services for all purposes…We consider that a smooth working of things in future would be assured by a generous recognition of these claims.[123]

This was a robust opener and perhaps, in the best practice of negotiation, it was starting high to see how much was realistically obtainable. They were also inferring, and not from a position of strength, that a quid pro quo arrangement could be reached. They next addressed the case where 'some nine or ten teachers have been arrested without any charge being referred against them and are at present being interned by the Northern Government'.[124] The teachers were most likely interned after William Twaddell, unionist MP for West Belfast, was killed by gunmen on 22 May 1922.[125] That evening, using the Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act, passed on 7 April, the government introduced internment 'in a series of remarkable rounds'up in Belfast and Six Counties, and hundreds of Sinn Féin suspects were arrested'.[126]

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[122] Ibid.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] *Belfast Newsletter*, 23 May 1922; *New York Times*, 23 May 1922. See also Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State*, pp 57-61.
[126] *Belfast Newsletter*, 24 May 1922.

They progressed to the omnipresent question of the Irish language, proclaiming they had found 'that there was a general feeling among the teachers that the Ministry should allow Irish to be taught for half an hour a day under competent teachers if the parents of the children so desire, and that books of an Irish Ireland outlook be placed on the Ministry's list'.[127] As it stood, the findings of the Lynn Committee's interim report in June 1922 had 'recommended that Irish, hitherto, available as an optional subject from standard three, be available in the future only from standard five. The reason given was that 'this was more in keeping with current practice on the introduction of second languages such as French'.[128] The impact of the Lynn Committee will be examined in more detail in future chapters, but from this recommendation it was clear that they were not going to be sympathetic to the nationalist leanings of the Catholic minority. Farren points out that the same attitude prevailed with the teaching of history with McQuibban agreeing that 'the kind of history that would be taught in [Catholic] schools where it desired to foster the study of Irish would be likely to a bias of a very undesirable kind'.[129] There was a determination coursing through the U.U.P. to disallow, and discourage aspirational nationalism take root in the new state; with the Irish language, and Irish history considered the most dangerous instigators of all.

They suggested a possible resolution to the D.O.E.'s rescheduling of the Easter exams. They said that they would 'write to the Provisional Government immediately, pointing out the necessity for some kind of agreement, feeling certain as we do that a satisfactory understanding between the two Governments would be for the benefit of both'.[130] This was excessively ambitious as they must have been cognisant of the levels of animosity that existed between the two educational bodies concerning the Easter exams. The offer should therefore be viewed as a ploy to endear them to the M.O.E. They referred to McQuibban's concerns from the previous relating 'to the literature course for next year's Kings Scholars in Southern Ireland'.[131] They attempted to alleviate his misgivings with the glib and non-descript consolation that they 'could not put their finger on anything that would be likely to hurt the feelings of any Northern teacher'.[132] They persisted with the churlish observation that a number of the writers on the course were Protestant and that 'Ferguson was a Belfast Protestant' before mentioning that 'it

[127] Fr Macaulay and Dr Hendley to McQuibban, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[128] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 48.
[129] Ibid., p. 49. Quoted source 'A memorandum to Londonderry on the teaching of Irish, Nov. 1921. Ministry of Education papers'.
[130] Fr Macaulay and Dr Hendley to McQuibban, 11 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.

would not be difficult to find some kind of a common programme suitable for teachers preparing for training'.[133] They concluded, with one sentence addressing the core issue of the Irish language, saying that it 'could be solved satisfactorily if some kind of option were allowed'.[134] This was either naive in the extreme, or it displayed a lack of knowledge that this had been the main stumbling block for the M.O.E.

3.10 McQuibban's View

McQuibban's eleven-page memo, as mentioned above, reported favourably, if not cautiously, to Londonderry on his findings from his meeting with Father Mulcahy and Dr Hendley.[135] He said that

> the first thing that brought Father Macaulay into the field was the Ministry's letter of 5th August, 1922 (Paper B). His school was a vested school and the Managers are under obligation to repay the building grant if the school ceases to be conducted in accordance with the Regulations [sic].[136]

This inferred that Fr Macaulay was there to allay the fear of repayment rather than on a strictly voluntary basis. This made it even more surprising that, even though Fr Macaulay's teachers were recalcitrant, McQuibban believed his claim that he was 'anxious to work in complete harmony with the ministry'.[137] This diplomatic language was letting Fr Macaulay know that he was aware of the circumstances which had persuaded him into the discussions, whilst also making him aware that negotiations were still workable. McQuibban then pointed to Fr Macaulay's claim that '[o]ur inspector was refused admission by the Head Master of the school and without the approval of Father Macaulay' which resulted in relations between them being 'strained to breaking point'. This seems out of keeping with the rigid hierarchical structure that Catholic schools tightly adhered to, such was the absolute authority of the parish priest. This is supported by O'Connell when he recounted how, when he 'inquired as to the attitude of the clerical authorities I was informed that a number of managers favoured this move and that no manager had objected to his teachers taking the step, that the bishop likewise favoured the

[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230), p. 1.
[136] Ibid., p. 1
[137] Ibid., p. 1.

move, otherwise the managers would not have agreed to it'.[138] McQuibban said that he believed that Fr Macaulay would have dismissed the teachers but feared that doing so would have the 'effect of postponing indefinitely any settlement of the question, not only regards the teachers themselves but as regards his own grants'.[139] This again displayed the priest's vested interest in the process. McQuibban recalled Father Macaulay's claim that the dismissal of teachers would only have created 'political martyrs and, as such, would only continue to get their salaries from the South'.[140]

It is difficult to discern exactly which grouping was the key instigator of the illegal payments. The Provisional Government was, initially, enthusiastic about implementing the principle. The Catholic Church tended to be more discreet in their public expressions on the matter, but was nonetheless influential given their tight control over local primary schools; not forgetting Bishop MacRory's presence at the government meeting where the policy was sanctioned.[141] In some places, especially in border areas, Catholics 'were a majority of the population and were therefore most reluctant to yield control of education to the unionist regime in Belfast'.[142] Akenson cites the example of a

> well-publicised and widely reported meeting of Catholic teachers in Strabane in late February [1922] [which] called upon the provisional government of the Free State to continue to administer the schools throughout Ireland and pledged themselves not to accept salaries from the northern government. They also called upon the southern government to reimburse them for the financial losses incurred through their non-cooperation with the Ministry of Education.[143]

These groupings of teachers in border areas must have contributed to the principle of non-recognition. It must also be noted that had Father Macaulay wanted to dismiss, and silence, the teachers, then he was most definitely in a position to do so. Despite this he was placing all the responsibility and blame on the managers and, as shall be seen, especially the teachers. This contrasts with Harbison's account where the teachers were not always willing participants in

[138] O'Connell, *100 years of progress*, p. 462.
[139] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230).
[140] Ibid., p. 2.
[141] Provisional Government meeting, 30 Jan. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/1).
[142] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 44.
[143] Ibid., p. 44; *Belfast Newsletter*, 21 Feb. 1922.

receiving the illicit payments. This can only have caused confusion and concern for the M.O.E. in its attempts to resolve the issue.

McQuibban recounted how Father Macaulay said that he had been 'in consultation with the Managers of other schools in Belfast' who informed him that their meetings with teachers 'have been somewhat acrimonious'.[144] This created the picture for McQuibban that the managers were more amenable to a settlement than the teachers. McQuibban recorded that while the ministry was eager to arrive at a settlement 'the Managers and Teachers having got themselves into difficulties it was up to them to take some steps to get out of their trouble'.[145] McQuibban told Londonderry that '[a]fter several visits I got them to promise to submit their case in writing for your consideration' which resulted 'in their letter of 11th September (Paper C)'.[146] McQuibban then informed Londonderry that he was hopeful that Fr Macaulay could 'handle the situation in Belfast and that, if that can be managed, the whole business would soon settle itself'.[147] The Belfast ministry viewed this as a very positive development with the possibility of creating a pathway for resolution. Apart from the differences in who was blamed for the debacle, McQuibban must have had some thoughts on what had inspired Harbison and Macaulay's newfound eagerness to end the illegal payments. By this point the M.O.E. was eager to resolve the dispute to limit any further disruption to the apparatus of the ministry. Their urgency could have caused them to misread the situation and impaired their decision-making process.

3.11 Concessions and Reprimands

McQuibban proceeded to offer seven examples of 'the extraordinary collection of circumstances that had rendered it so difficult to see daylight through this matter'.[148] It is worth recording all seven examples as they exemplify the complexity of the almost farcical situation that the M.O.E. found itself in:

1. The case where the manager is recalcitrant and the teachers, or some of them, well disposed to the Ministry. In such cases all salary claims go to Dublin.

[144] McQuibban to Londonderry September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230).
[145] Ibid., p. 2.
[146] Ibid., p. 2.
[147] Ibid., p. 3.
[148] Ibid., p. 3.

2. The case where the manager is friendly but where there are "hot heads" amongst the teachers. In this case the salary claims go to Dublin, as a rule, but some of them come here.

3. The case where the inspector is refused by the Manager whether the teachers like it or not.

4. The case where the inspector is refused by the teachers in defiance of the manager.

5. The case where there is no objection to inspection but where salaries are paid from Dublin.

6. The case of vested schools in which under the Trust Deed the manager is in certain circumstances bound to repay building grants.

7. The case of the non vested [sic] schools over which we have practically no hold.[149]

He declared that 'the money for the teachers had come from Dail [sic] funds' which meant that 'the period from 1st April to 31 August (5 months) we have a sum of £90,000 on hand which would otherwise have been spent'.[150] These figures tally, more or less, with the Provisional Government's estimates, as cited above, of £18,000 per month.

McQuibban returned to address the issues raised in Fr Macaulay's letter of 11 September 1922. He said that there was a deliberate attempt by 'extremists' who wanted to politicise the internment of the teachers and were 'averse … from any settlement'.[151] On the subject of the Irish language McQuibban declared that those teachers who 'threw in their lot with the South feel bound to give effect to the Southern programme so far as Irish is concerned. If they did not their connection with the South would probably come to an end at once'.[152] McQuibban's wayward and misguided understanding of the Catholic/nationalist relationship with the Irish language is extremely revealing as it represents the views of the U.U.P., ergo the Belfast parliament, on the topic. McQuibban's take on the teachers' stance lacked an

[149] Ibid., p. 3.
[150] Ibid., p. 4.
[151] Ibid., p. 4.
[152] Ibid., p. 4.

understanding of the sense of cultural and national identity that the Catholic population associated with the language. The Unionist government's fear of what the language represented might have precluded them from developing an understanding, and/or helped it to justify refusing to accommodate it on the curriculum in Catholic schools. Whatever the reason, it provided an insight into how deeply both sides felt about the language, from a political, national, and cultural perspective. It also reveals how, by permeating multiple facets of the M.O.E., it restricted its capacity to function effectively.

Staying with the letter of 11 September, McQuibban suggested to Londonderry that 'whether any settlement will emerge from the present movement remains to be seen' but that it was 'important, however that the movement has come not from the Ministry but from the other side'.[153] McQuibban then, rather fancifully, told Londonderry that 'there were no grounds' for the Catholic teachers' fears, and that there would be no 'interference' from the government with their 'ideals as Catholics and Irishmen' post-partition. Had this been the case, it could be argued that the Belfast riots between 1920 and 1922 might not have occurred.[154] Of the Catholic Church he said that they 'did not give any decided lead to Managers and Teachers, and this is confirmed by Father Macaulay'.[155] In keeping with his use of semantics to deliver balance, McQuibban continued that 'One can understand, even if one does not agree with, the attitude of the Church in this matter'.[156] He speculated that 'whatever its sympathies have been, or may be, could, in the circumstances hardly be expected to make a public pronouncement which, for political reasons, its own adherents might consider themselves justified in disregarding'.[157] While he appeared to be absolving the R.C. Church of responsibility, he simultaneously implicated them, correctly so, by questioning their sympathies truly lay.

He repeated this intonation when he concluded that '[i]n all fairness it may certainly be assumed that the Church left a complete measure of freedom to the responsible managers'.[158] This was McQuibban's way of not letting the clerics exonerate themselves totally, as he knew that decisions of this nature would not normally have been taken without the approval of the priest in charge. There are possibly examples of rogue managers and teachers who had not adhered to the clerics' leads, but given the authoritarian nature of the Catholic clergy in the

[153] Ibid., p. 5.
[154] For more detailed reading on this see, A. F. Parkinson *Belfast's unholy war: The troubles of the 1920s* (Dublin, 2004).
[155] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230).
[156] Ibid., p. 4.
[157] Ibid., p. 4.
[158] Ibid., p. 5.

administration of their schools, this would have been a rare exception rather than the rule. This style of management has been widely recognised and documented in scholarly works such as Akenson, Ó hÓgartaigh, T. Walsh and Farren.[159] But, as previously mentioned, and which should not be lost sight of, the M.O.E. was eager to reach a settlement to alleviate some of the pressure. This could help to explain why the M.O.E. might have been blindsided by the underlying motivations behind some of the conciliatory advances. McQuibban communicated to Londonderry that, more important than all the troubles caused by the recalcitrant teachers was the fact that two thirds of managers and teachers were 'conducting their schools in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry'.[160]

He characterised the suggestions 'contained in the letter of 11th September' as 'the main considerations put forward on behalf of the recalcitrant minority' as follows:[161]

1) Let bygones be bygones.

2) No penalties to be inflicted in respect of the past action of teachers.

3) That service since the break [partition] should be recognised for the purposes of increments, pensions, diplomas or other emoluments.

4) The same conditions to apply to Intermediate Schools.

5) Consideration for the case of interned teachers.

6) Irish to be taught for half an hour a day under competent teachers if the parents so desire and that books of an Irish Ireland outlook be placed on the Ministry of Education's list.[162]

Before recommending a letter of response he stated that he regarded '(5) and (6) as something in the nature of an attempt at political justification for past action but as I have already stated these are the considerations that give the teachers any sort of claim for a continuance of support

[159] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p.13; M., Ó hÓgartaigh, ''The servants of the Nation': Quiet revolutions in education' in *Seanchas Ardmhacha: Journal of the Armagh Diocesan Historical Society*, 2013, vol. 24, no. 2 (2013), p. 206; T. Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in B., Walsh (ed.), *Essays in the history of Irish education* (London, 2016); Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 17.
[160] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230).
[161] Ibid., p. 6.
[162] Ibid., p. 6.

for the South'.[163] Targeting the demand for recognition of the Irish language as a political motivation, demonstrates how significant the language had become in the strife between the cross-border bodies, and between the Catholic schools and the ministry. McQuibban had, however, what he considered to be the finishing line in sight.

McQuibban disclosed the intended targets for his letter of reply to Father Macaulay and Dr Hendley, when he advised Londonderry that it would 'certainly find its way into the right hands'.[164] He dealt with the issues raised in Father Macaulay's letter in five clearly defined sections. Predictably, section one refuted allegations that the government had any intentions of interfering with the teachers' ideals as Catholics and Irishmen' as evidenced by 'the fact that nearly 70% of Catholic schools' had fully cooperated with the ministry.[165] This claim, especially on the question of the Irish language, does not stand up to scrutiny. In section two he commenced by agreeing that a friendly settlement to the present difficulties was desirable with the caveat that 'after very careful consideration of all the circumstances he [Lord Londonderry] is prepared, provided the concessions outlined below are accepted as a settlement…by the Managers and Teachers concerned as a body, to let "bygones be bygones" on the following conditions'.[166] The first condition stipulated that the managers and teachers of the schools concerned give an undertaking that they would be 'open to inspection to officers of the Ministry, that the programme for instruction of the pupils as in operation in the schools shall have been approved by the Ministry, that the Rules and Regulations of the Ministry in other respects, as applicable to all National Schools, be strictly adhered to'.[167] There was no ambiguity or room for creative interpretation. The ministry, which had been undermined, wounded, and disrespected, was taking back full control.

The second 'concession' dealt with salaries in three subsections. The first subsection specified that 'all information required by the Ministry as to the absences from duty of Teachers during the period in question, and the causes of such absences, is forthcoming, and that salary would have been allowable had it been claimed from the Ministry'.[168] Given that all parties were aware of where the teachers had been, and why, this approach appeared to be unnecessarily excessive, bordering on admonishment. Rather than reflecting a process

[163] Ibid., p. 6.
[164] Ibid., p.7.
[165] Ibid., p. 7.
[166] Ibid., p. 8.
[167] Ibid., p. 8.
[168] Ibid., pp 8-9.

reconciliation, it smacked of an exercise in humiliation and bringing to heel. Subsection two stipulated that 'the recognition of service as aforesaid confers on the teachers no right or claim for payment by this ministry of the salary or other grants for the periods in respect of which they claimed and obtained payment from any source in Southern Ireland'.[169] The final subsection stated that 'the concession in regard of services aforementioned may be withdrawn in the case of any teacher who at any time and for any reason refuses in future to recognise the ministry'.[170] This was, again, unambiguous and a statement of intent that the ministry would not accept any further disruption to its administration.

The third subsection dealt severely with breaches of conduct regarding secondary schools. Although this thesis' focus is on national schools, the secondary school issue also spans the contentious issue of exams and inspection. McQuibban declared that the 'Minister regrets that the failure of the school authorities to accept inspection, to take the examinations of the Ministry, and to furnish returns represent a distinct breach of conditions under which he is authorised to make grants'.[171] He continued that 'the matter is therefore out of his hands' but could be reviewed if they allowed inspections and complied with the ministry's regulations.[172] This wound was particularly deep as the exams that they refused to take had been replaced by the exams, as referenced in Chapter 1, set by the D.O.E.. This was an affront to the integrity and authority of the ministry that McQuibban had not forgotten nor, apparently, was prepared to forgive easily. Concession approached the question of the interned teachers in a more abstruse fashion. Intoning that the teachers were culpable, he declared that the 'Minister regrets that he is unable to interfere in the case of the Teachers who have made themselves amenable to the law and who are now interned'.[173] This was followed by a caveat which stated that 'if any such teacher was engaged in a school recognised by the Ministry at the time of his internment, and if he is discharged without being convicted of any offence, his period of enforced absence from school due to internment will be accepted as equivalent to service in the school'.[174] There were too many variables in the caveat for it to be considered a concrete proposal. The caveat does ignore the potential for unfair or unsafe convictions, which were not uncommon against Catholics.

[169] Ibid., p. 9.
[170] Ibid., p. 9.
[171] Ibid., p. 9.
[172] Ibid., p. 10.
[173] Ibid., p. 10.
[174] Ibid., p. 10.

Given the political and religious composition of the authorities in the new state, it was a stretch to expect that a Catholic, from any walk of life, could have expected a fair trial. Farrell provides a sobering example of how the judiciary dispatched justice in favour of those who were loyalist/Protestant, over their nationalist/Catholic neighbours.[175] As the trouble began to escalate in Belfast in 1935, that September

> [a] Catholic publican called J.J. McKiernan was shot dead in his bar in York Street and a Catholic woman was shot and wounded in Little Ship Street. At the trial of the men accused of killing McKiernan the Attorney-General, C.A.B. Babington MP, made the remarkable comment that 'The man was a republican and a Roman Catholic and was therefore liable to assassination'. When the two accused, both Orangemen, were acquitted a crowd of thousands outside the courthouse cheered and sang 'God Save the Queen' and bonfires were lit in York Street to celebrate'. [176]

This incident, although a decade after the period under review, still reflects the state's attitude to Catholics living in it and how justice was dispensed to them. It sent a clear message to the nationalist community that one could be murdered, with impunity, simply for their religion or having (or being accused of having) nationalistic aspirations.

The final concession considered the teaching of the Irish language. This was an ever-present symbolic theatre of war for the two ministries and governments. McQuibban recommended that Londonderry should reply that he was not 'prepared to discuss the question with a small minority of Teachers as a condition of their readmission to a relationship with the Ministry'.[177] It is interesting that the ministry characterised those interested in the Irish language as a malignant minority. The fissure that the language forged between the two sides still runs as deep today. As referenced in Chapter 2, the Irish language remains a contentious topic today with Acht na Gaelige (Irish Language Act). It is difficult to determine if the unionist ministry was devoid of any understanding of what the language meant to the Catholic population. McQuibban pointed out that the 'Ministry was at all times prepared to consider proposed modifications to the Time Tables'.[178] This would not be the last time that the language

[175] Farrell, *Northern Ireland: The Orange State*, p. 139; 'Ultach', 'The real case against partition' in *Capuchin Annual* 1943, (Dublin 1943), p. 298,
[176] Ibid., p. 139.
[177] Ibid., p. 10.
[178] Ibid., p. 10.

would become the focus of attrition for the M.O.E. during their dealings with the Catholic authorities.

McQuibban's concluding paragraph specified that it should be understood that the concessions which the minister proposed to

> allow in regard to recognition for the purposes of increment, pension, etc. of service for which payment has not been made by this Ministry to the National School Teachers concerned will not be accepted as conferring on the Government of the Irish Free State, or any other body, or persons, a right to or claim for reimbursement of the sums expended by them in payment of salaries and other grants to these teachers, during the period in question.[179]

This would later prove to be a declaration that rung hollow. In summation, he clarified that the minister had only agreed to the so-called concessions because of his 'desire to facilitate a friendly solution of the present difficulties'.[180] He signed off with the cautionary warning that Londonderry could 'hold out no hope that any further concessions will be granted or that his offer will be continued beyond the end of the current month'.[181] The self-assuredness of the content and tone of this proposed letter would confirm that the M.O.E. had no idea that the Provisional Government, in the wake of Collins' death, was in the process of reversing his policy on the payment of the recalcitrant teachers.

3.12 A Bitter Pill

On 20 September, Winston Churchill, then British secretary of state for the colonies, wrote a confidential letter to his cousin Lord Londonderry regarding the recent turn of events regarding the recalcitrant teachers. He addressed him with a familiar 'My dear Charlie' before continuing that

> I am given to understand that the Provisional Government are now anxious to reverse the policy by which they have hitherto paid the salaries of teachers in Catholic schools in the North, and to abstain in future from this

[179] Ibid., p. 11.
[180] Ibid., p. 11.
[181] Ibid., p. 11.

> form of interference in your affairs. I am told that the money for these salaries has been voted as part of your Education Vote, but that they have not been paid; and Cosgrave is anxious to know whether your Government would now reimburse to his Government the salaries which have been paid, in return for the vouchers.[182]

This must have come as an enormous shock to the M.O.E., especially since McQuibban had, the previous week, stated most resolutely in his 'concessions' that the Provisional government would not, under any circumstances, be reimbursed. This meant that the Provisional Government had bypassed the northern government and had gone straight to Churchill. This also indicated how seriously the British Government viewed the situation when they had been receptive to such channels of communication opened by the Provisional Government. By bypassing the M.O.E and its government, the Provisional Government had yet again undermined their authority, even in what was, essentially, defeat. The ministry must have felt a collective sense of despondency, defeat, and abandonment by the British Government. The optics of this exercise, a perceived siding with the Provisional Government, must have been profoundly unsettling for the northern government. The danger was that it intensified the Belfast government's mistrust of Westminster and expedited their developing siege mentality.

Churchill continued to inform 'dear Charlie' that

> [t]his is all part of his wish to get on a proper footing with the North, and I dare say you will think it would be a good thing to meet him. If so, it is important that the matter should be settled before questions are asked in the Dáil, as Cosgrave wants to adjust his policy on the right lines without publicly climbing down. I understand that the sum involved is £152,000. P.S. I am sending a similar letter to Craig.[183]

This must have jarred considerably with Londonderry and his ministry considering the hardship they'd endured because of the southern government's/D.O.E.'s policy of non-recognition and non-cooperation. Churchill suggested to Londonderry that it would be a 'good thing' for him meet W.T. Cosgrave, chairman of the Provisional Government and president of the executive council of the I.F.S. from December 1922. This was overstretching the limits of Londonderry's

[182] Winston Churchill to Londonderry, 20 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123).
[183] Ibid.

diplomacy and patience considering that Cosgrave had failed to afford him the courtesy of contacting him before going directly to Churchill. Churchill was asking Londonderry to facilitate the Provisional Government's face-saving exercise after tormenting the M.O.E. On the other hand, it could be viewed as shrewd politicking by the I.F.S. government to seize the initiative and take advantage of the opportunity that the situation presented. They had not only undermined the authority of the northern government by bypassing it, but they were on their way to securing repayment for implementing an illegal policy. The evidence presents a strong case to argue that the southern government was opportunistic enough to have capitalised on the fact that the British Government's decision making could have been influenced because they were in a heightened state of awareness that the early stages of the brittle peace on the island had the potential to easily fracture.

The records show that the topic of the recalcitrant teachers had not been mentioned at Provisional Government's meetings from 9 June, when Collins went 'to see the treasury on the matter' until the 4 November.[184] The November meeting recorded that due to the absence of the Minister for Education, now Eoin MacNeill, the matter was to be deferred until 6 November.[185] This date was again deferred until 8 November where the record confirmed that '[i]t was decided that no payment shall be made by the Provisional Government to teachers in the Six County area in respect of salary for any period subsequent to the 31st of October 1922'.[186] A document, with a Secret Service heading, estimated that the '[a]mount required in the Year ending 31st March 1923, to defray the Charge of Secret Service' would be £220,000. This undoubtedly contributed significantly to the government's decision to discontinue the payments. As seen earlier, this had already been decided 'a day or two before the end of August 1922'.[187]

3.13 The Exit Strategy: Revisionism and Excuses

On 18 August, twelve days prior to becoming Minister for Education, Eoin MacNeill wrote what can only be described as a revisionist account of the events.[188] It is worth examination again as it provides an insight into how the government proposed to orchestrate its spin on 'not climbing down' while justifying and exonerating itself. This was a softening of the exuberance

[184] Meetings of Provisional Government, 9 June and 4 Nov. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH/1/1/2/1; TSCH//1/1/3/1).
[185] Meeting of Provisional Government, 4 Nov. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH//1/1/3/1).
[186] Meeting of Provisional Government, 8 Nov. 1922 (N.A.I.: TSCH//1/1/3/1).
[187] O'Connell, *100 years of progress*, p. 464.
[188] Eoin MacNeill memo on stopping payments, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).

displayed for the policy in his early 1922 essay.[189] It is difficult to lend credence to his assertion that '[w]hen the payment of these teachers was undertaken it was not anticipated that it would continue for such a protracted time'.[190] It is difficult, without further clarification from MacNeill, to understand how he could have foreseen that it would have been protracted. Perhaps they were still intoxicated with the adrenalin rush of nationalist fervour in the recently achieved independence. He listed eight unforeseen difficulties 'which were not originally provided for'.[191] He commenced by claiming that 'the supervision and inspection of the schools; we have no inspectors available to be sent into the North'.[192] This seems superficial as that they could, had the political will been there, have appointed staff to deal with the schools in the north. There were, as referenced in Chapter 2, inspectors already in situ in the north who they could have used. MacNeill appeared to be retrofitting excuses to justify why the government reneged on its commitment to the northern teachers. He went on to mention the potential difficulties surrounding pensions and salaries, which were documented earlier in this chapter. Again, it is difficult to accept that this had not been considered at cabinet while committing to the undertaking. It is therefore illogical to surmise that teachers in the north who had been approaching retirement, would have voluntarily participated in being recalcitrant, thus jeopardising their pension.

MacNeill moved next to the 'ownership of schools' and how the M.O.E. had 'threatened to take proceedings against the Managers of the vested National Schools in which their authority is not recognised and to which inspectors are not admitted'.[193] This was the reason, as McQuibban suggested, that encouraged Father Macaulay into negotiations with the ministry.[194] He stated that it was 'probable that the northern government has been able to trace the source from which the teachers are being paid; our obligation under the treaty in this matter must not be lost sight of'.[195] This had the ring of another vacuous sentiment and a sudden bout of moral consciousness as he had explicitly understood that he had been flagrantly flouting the terms of the treaty up to this point. Surprisingly he stated that there was the 'Difficulty of finding the money: the amount of money being spent (See Appendix B.) is about £18,000 per month. The money is paid from the Secret Service Vote, which is thus increased to an

[189] Eoin MacNeill essay on policy of non-recognition of the northern government, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163). See pages 4 and 5 above.
[190] Eoin MacNeill memo on stopping payments, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] McQuibban to Londonderry, September 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/400; ED/32/B/1/2/1230).
[195] Eoin MacNeill memo on stopping payments, 18 Aug. 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/F/275).

exaggerated figure'.[196] His faux surprise at the scale of the financial output in the illegal payments of northern teachers is somewhat unbelievable. He was aware of, and a strong advocate of this action, if not one of the most ardent instigators, influencers, and architects.

His fifth point proposed reasons why '[i]t was thought that early action should be taken to try to come to terms with the Northern Ireland Government on this question'.[197] He suggested that there was the likelihood that 'some managers will act on the circular letter from the Ministry of Education (Appendix 1.) and force those teachers to recognise that authority or dismiss them. If teachers or managers give way in small bodies or individually, there will be less chance of successful negotiations'.[198] It is striking that there was a conspicuous absence of concern for the teachers who they purported to represent. It was also apparent that they were quite clearly already on their way out of the agreement with the northern teachers who had now become expendable. The rationale behind MacNeill's next reason for abandoning the northern teachers was that he 'believed that the Northern Government are at present in conciliatory mood and better terms may be secured from them now than later on as regards guarantees against victimisation of teachers, possible refunds of money etc.'.[199] MacNeill was creating an exit from their commitments to, as they had suggested at the outset, their struggling fellow countrymen and women. He wanted the government to lose as little integrity, credibility, and face as possible. It was, at best, disingenuous. In concluding, he noted that

> [n]egotiations with the Northern Government on this question should be undertaken soon. As the Government are *mainly* [author's emphasis, as this was a complete change of direction from the full responsibility accepted earlier in this memo] responsible for the action which was taken, the Teachers and Managers look to us for guidance. The question could be discussed as part of a general scheme of arrangement with the Northern Government, or could be utilised to lead up to such a discussion.[200]

The moral crusade that had been fuelled by nationalist ideals had been perverted into a potential bargaining tool to instigate negotiations with the northern government. There is no doubting that, initially, there had been an appetite and sincerity, especially through Michael Collins, to

[196] Ibid.
[197] Ibid.
[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Ibid.

undermine the northern government. Subsequently, this appetite, due to finances, legalities, Collins' death, and political expediency, had diminished. Finally, he 'urged that the Government review its present position with reference to the whole question, and give immediate directions as to policy and direction'.[201] This was a fait accompli. It appeared that the recalcitrant teachers and managers representatives, and the R.C Church, as their haste in engaging with the M.O.E. suggested, had become aware of the planned cessation of payments. The evidence suggests that the M.O.E. had not been consulted or engaged with in any attempts at resolving the debacle. Their authority and capacity to maintain an efficiently administrated ministry had been undermined, chronically disrupted and disrespected by the actions of the Provisional Government and the D.O.E.

3.14 Conclusion

The northern teachers' woes did not end with the cessation of the illegal payments. Policy records from the M.O.E. show that they actively pursued the recalcitrant teachers, and the Provisional Government, for moneys owed to the pension fund for the period when they were in receipt of the illegal payments.[202] By June 1923, the Ministry of Finance informed McQuibban 'that the proposed arrangements for the refund of premiums due to the Teachers' Pension Fund (Northern Ireland) from recalcitrant teachers during the period 1st February to 30th October, 1922, particularly as to the rate prescribed by Teachers' Pension Rules, namely 2½ per cent'.[203] This letter demonstrated how long the process was dragging out and how the northern government was not prepared to let the matter drop. It also revealed the policy was still causing residual upset to the northern government.

Those teachers who participated, willingly or not, were the ultimate losers and victims. They had been used as the battering rams and pawns for political blackmail during the Provisional Government's brief enthusiasm to undermine the northern government and to make N.I., especially the M.O.E., unmanageable. Education had been targeted as the defining structure of society that would cause the most, and deepest, disruption. The Irish language, through the medium of education, was weaponised as an enforcer of identity and principles to further antagonise the M.O.E. and government. It acted as a catalyst to raise the emotive temperature that triggered a further polarising between the teachers and the ministry. This had

[201] Ibid.
[202] Documents relating to payments to teacher's pension fund in N.I., Oct. 1922 to Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/13/1/176; ED/13/1/399; ED/13/1/149).
[203] Ministry of Finance letter on pensions, 21 June 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/199).

the domino effect of adding considerably to the overall discomfort and unmanageability of the ministry in their dealings with the recalcitrant protagonists. What appeared to be a rash decision to pay the northern teachers, was soon to be regretted as the financial ramifications set in. The relationship between the northern and southern governments and the two educational bodies had a deeply debilitating impact on the M.O.E.'s ability to function anywhere near its full potential. It was an inauspicious start, that would characterise its first decade of existence. The M.O.E. would bear the scars of this for generations to come.

Chapter 4: The Roman Catholic Church, Outside Looking In

Post-partition, the R.C. Church's previous position of power and influence in the sphere of education was drastically diminished within the newly established N.I. This was a new state, with a new Minister for Education, Lord Londonderry, who intended to radicalise the old system; a radicalisation that the R.C. Church could not and would not countenance. Claims, such as Akenson's, that '[i]n all probability the refusal of the Roman Catholic authorities to join the Lynn committee was the single most important determinant of the educational history of Northern Ireland from 1920 to the present day' will be addressed.[1] The rationale behind, and the consequences of, the R.C. Church's refusal to cooperate with the new M.O.E, and the Lynn Committee in particular, will be examined throughout this chapter. As Lord Londonderry was pivotal to the narrative, his character, and his vision for a non-denominational education system, will be assessed. Analysis of the Unionist government's introduction of Promissory Oaths for teachers, and rules forbidding the exhibition of religious emblems in schools, will provide an understanding of the tensions that existed between the R.C. Church and the state. How the implementation of these policies exacerbated the extant belligerence of R.C. managed schools, will be examined. This will contribute to enhancing the discussion on the Catholic authorities' claims that they would not be treated fairly.[2]

The chapter will also consider the R.C. Church's approach to teacher training within the new state. This was a contentious cross-border issue, the intensity of which did not dissipate when it became an internal matter for the northern state. The plight of teachers, who were perennial casualties throughout this period, will be examined. The chapter will provide a better understanding of how the relationship, or absence of it, between the R.C. Church and the M.O.E. impacted negatively on the system, the teachers, trainee teachers and the children. Importantly, appropriate attention will be given to evaluating the long-term impact of the Church's insistence on segregation: the lost potential.

4.1 First Parliament, First Minister for Education

The first election held in N.I., in May 1921, saw the U.U.P. win forty of the fifty-two seats in the new devolved parliament.[3] The majority of U.U.P. MPs were members of the Orange

[1] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973), p. 52.
[2] Cardinal Logue to Londonderry, 2 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB4/18/12; D3099/2/7/61).
[3] C. Reid, 'Protestant challenges to the 'Protestant State': Ulster Unionism and Independent Unionism in Northern Ireland, 1921-1939' in *20th century British history,* Vol. 19, Issue 4 (Aug. 2008), p. 420.

Order; a trend that would continue with successive governments, as 'between 1921 and 1968, 138 out of 149 Unionist were members of the Orange Order, as were all the Prime Ministers'.[4] To compound this statistic, only three Cabinet Ministers between 1921 and 1969 were not members of the Orange Order.[5] As a result, the U.U.P. was able to exert hegemonic control which Brendan O'Leary identifies as being a coercive force that

> unifies the loyal people, disorganises the disloyal, and renders revolution, rebellion, or protest futile, or at least exceptionally costly. In Northern Ireland, Ulster Protestants were the loyal people, and the U.U.P. successfully presented itself as the people's party. It unified the loyal, both across social classes and across diverse Protestant sects. In office, it manifestly and privately sought to disorganise disloyal Irish nationalists, not just republicans.[6]

The Catholic/nationalist population had a good understanding of the new government, instilling a well-informed fear in them that the U.U.P. would govern as O'Leary described. Consequently, the Catholic population experienced a sense of helplessness at the prospect of being forcefully locked into a hegemonic state where they expected not to be treated as equals. It is reasonable therefore to conclude that the significance of the opening of the parliament, for Catholics/nationalists, was reflected in the following day's *Freeman's Journal's* caustic headline: 'Lugubrious Scenes at Inauguration of the Parliament of Carsonia'.[7]

The overarching effect of the 1920 to 1922 riots must also be addressed to better appreciate how the Catholic/nationalist community, and their clergy, felt within the new state. This will contribute to understanding their distrust of the new administration, and how they viewed the possibility of working with it. The violence that occurred in Belfast 'comprised rioting, sniping, bombing, burning, reprisal killing, and forced expulsion' which, Brian Hughes

[4] C. Kinealy, 'The Orange Order and representations of Britishness' in S. Caunce, E. Mazierska, S. Sydney and J. Walton (eds), *Relocating Britishness* (Manchester, 2004), p. 227.
[5] H. Patterson and E. Kaufmann, *Unionism and Orangeism since 1942: The decline of the Loyal Family* (Manchester, 2007), p. 5; B. O'Leary and J. McGarry, *The politics of antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland* (London, 1993), p. 114.
[6] B. O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2: control, the second Protestant Ascendancy and the Irish State* (Oxford, 2019), p. 12. For a broader understanding of the concept of segregation by loyalty see C. J. V. Loughlin, *Labour and the politics of disloyalty in Belfast, 1921-39 - the moral economy of loyalty*. (Basingstoke, 2018); S. Mitchell, *Struggle or starve: working class unity in Belfast's 1932 outdoor relief riots* (Chicago, 2017).
[7] *Freeman's Journal*, 8 June 1921.

argues, meant that 'Belfast between 1920 and 1922 was unique in revolutionary Ireland'.[8] Alan Parkinson's seminal work on the conflict supports this while suggesting that 'the conflict also illustrated the underlying vulnerability of both sections of the community, as well as the inter-relationship between imminent political change and communal disturbances'.[9] Most historians are in agreement that

> … whatever conclusions are drawn, it is undeniable that, however the conflict is defined—as a pogrom, revolution, or civil war—it was the Catholic population of Belfast who emerged emphatically as its losers and principal victims, suffering horrendous levels of violence, intimidation, and severe economic hardship at the hands of the majority Protestant population.[10]

The table below illustrates that although violence occurred throughout N.I., it was concentrated mostly in Belfast.[11]

Year	Catholiccivilians	Protestantcivilians	Crown forces	Loyalists	Republicans
1920	31	34		5 not assigned	
1921	65	55	14		5
1922	170	90	18		3
Total	266	179	32		8

Table 3: Numbers killed by political violence, Belfast, 1920-22[12]

It was during these intensely violent hostilities that the sitting of the first parliament occurred on 7 June 1921.

The Prime Minister, James Craig, appointed Londonderry as Minister for Education. Londonderry had resigned from the Air Ministry, much to the chagrin of his cousin Winston

[8] B. Hughes, *Defying the IRA? intimidation, coercion, and communities during the Irish revolution* (Liverpool, 2016), p. 151.
[9] A. Parkinson, *Belfast's unholy war: the Troubles of the 1920s* (Dublin, 2004), p. 314.
[10] R. Lynch, 'The People's Protectors? The Irish Republican Army and the "Belfast Pogrom," 1920–1922' in *Journal of British Studies,* Vol. 47 (2008), pp 378-9. See also Parkinson, *Belfast's unholy war*; O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2;* Mitchell, *Struggle or starve*; M. Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange state* (London, 1980); D. Ferriter, *The transformation of Ireland, 1900-2000 (London, 2004).*
[11] O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2*, p. 20, source adapted from R. C. Murray, 'Belfast: the killing fields' in F. Wilgar Boal, S. A. Royle and M. E. Pringle (eds), *Enduring City: Belfast in the Twentieth Century* (Belfast, 2006).
[12] Ibid., p. 20.

Churchill, after Craig formally asked him, on 7 June 1921, to accept a nomination to the Senate of N.I.[13] Even though he 'had not been grounded in Edwardian Ulster unionism' he had the commonality of being, as Neil Fleming puts it, 'the wealthiest minister in a cabinet almost entirely made up of wealthy men, and although not the only landowner, he was the only titled nobleman'.[14] His father had 'sat in the British cabinet from 1902 to 1905 as President of the Board of Education' which oversaw the reform of education in England. [15] These credentials had him revered by unionists, and respected in Westminster. F. E. Smith, Secretary of State for India in 1924 and one of the signatories of the 1921 Treaty suggested that it would be better for Ireland if it were economically joined to Britain.[16] When he disagreed with Smith's assessment, Lord Londonderry drew his ire. Smith's barbed reply provides an insight into how Londonderry appeared committed to the Unionist Government

> [t]he real truth is that you in Ulster are far too sensitive. Even you, who are so largely in touch with Imperial affairs and with English political society, the moment you go back to Belfast you become parochialised.[17]

When considering that the Minister for Education would be the only minister to fully engage with the Catholic/nationalist community and their representatives, his adaptability made Londonderry, in Craig's eyes, the most appropriate candidate for the position.

This could be misleading, as Londonderry revealed to Robert McKeown, his Parliamentary Secretary, that '[t]he narrow and selfish Belfast spirit which appears in various ways is in my judgement fundamentally destructive, and I find myself always up against it, so much so that I feel that I have a mission, and the moment that mission is in my judgement fulfilled, I shall return to where I came from and leave Belfast to run the Six Counties'.[18] He then propounded that the Protestant papers, the *Whig* and the *Belfast Newsletter*, were 'endeavouring to put words and suggestions into my mouth, as I know Mr Lynn has endeavoured, and is endeavouring, to do, I may feel that my place in Ulster may be better filled by someone else, who will not be assailed in this fashion'.[19] Londonderry's relationship with

[13] N. Fleming, *The Marquees of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland* (London, 2005), p. 91.
[14] Ibid., p. 88.
[15] Ibid., p. 90.
[16] Ferriter, *The transformation of Ireland*, pp 295-6.
[17] Ibid., pp 295-6.
[18] Londonderry to McKeown 9 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/7/76).
[19] Ibid.

Lynn is an important one, and will examined in more detail in Chapter 5. Two days later he wrote again to McKeown revealing that 'I have always been criticised in Ulster and I always will be, because I am sometimes just half a length in front of local ideas and this makes me suspect'.[20] Although Londonderry displayed a level of commitment to Ulster, conversely, he also appeared impatient to leave it. These conflicting traits became more pronounced during his tenure as minister.

Akenson was more direct and scathing in his appraisal of Lord Londonderry, depicting him as a

> gifted amateur himself, [who] tried too many things and was fully master of none. He had to oversee the family coalmines in Durham, plus lands in England and in Ireland, in addition to serving as leader of the NI Senate and minister for education, and a spokesman for Ulster in the House of Lords. This meant that he was often absent from Belfast for long periods of time and that many educational decisions were left to senior officials.[21]

Akenson continued by suggesting that whatever success he might have had was due to his good fortune in assembling a good team that contained

> Andrew N. Bonaparte Wyse [who] was transferred from the Dublin government, a coup for Lord Londonderry because Wyse in all probability was the most able and widely experienced Irish civil servant in educational affairs.[22]

Lord Londonderry was a complex character who divided opinion but there was no doubting his sincerity of purpose in attempting to create a new, inclusive and non-denominational education system for the new state. His recurring absences and anti-populist unionism would ultimately be his undoing. He would eventually be judged on how he navigated between the two polarised guardians of education.

4.2 Opting Out: Aug. – Sept. 1921

[20] Londonderry to McKeown 11 Sept 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/7/77).
[21] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 41.
[22] Ibid., p. 43.

Londonderry first contacted the R.C. Church on 29 August 1921, when he wrote to Cardinal Logue explaining that 'he had decided to set up a Committee to enquire into the educational matters in the North of Ireland'.[23] After a brief explanation of the committee's remit he then asked 'if your Eminence would be good enough to give me the names of four Catholic representatives whom I should ask to serve on the Committee'.[24] Cardinal Logue responded:

> I regret I do not see my way to nominate members of the Commission on education which your Lordship proposes to appoint. I should be glad to cooperate in any effort for the improvement of education, but judging from some of the public utterances of some members of the Belfast Parliament and their sympathizers, *I have little doubt that an attack is being organised against our Catholic Schools* [author's emphasis]. I fear that the Commission proposed by Your Lordship, I am sure with the best of intentions, will be used as a foundation and pretext for that attack.[25]

This was a defining moment for the R.C. Church as their self-incurred alienation from the political process ultimately left them without voice or influence. As will be seen under the sub-heading 'Teacher Training', the argument here is not that the R.C. Church should not have aired their grievances, but rather they employed the wrong strategy in doing so. Their influence over their congregation, at the time, was absolute, meaning that the overwhelming majority would have unquestioningly followed their lead. To counterbalance this, it must be said that the behaviour of the state, and the appointment of Lynn as chairman of the education committee, contributed heavily to the Cardinal's decision. As the chapter progresses, it will become apparent, without justifying it, why the Cardinal took the decision.

The level of influence the R.C. Church might have been able to exert is debatable; but had they engaged, they would have been better placed to familiarise themselves with the new system, how it was worked and, more importantly, an understanding of those who worked it. Working within the system they could have monitored what was happening. This knowledge would have allowed them to prepare for any necessary pro-active defensive actions. Pre-partition, the R.C. Church had exercised unprecedented power and authority, but now, in the

[23] Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 29 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/6).
[24] Ibid.
[25] Cardinal Logue to Londonderry, 2 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/12; D3099/2/7/61).

ultra-Protestant state, it was finding it difficult to adjust to its new position; one which required more restraint and humility in its approach.

Sean Farren's argument that Akenson and others have been harsh in their criticism of the R.C. Church's stand as they lack the appropriate contextualisation, is unconvincing.[26] Farren suggests that the British Government's negotiations with Sinn Féin several weeks before the setting up of the Lynn Committee 'must have placed at least a question mark over Northern Ireland's future' which deterred the R.C. Church as they did not want to prematurely legitimise the state.[27] Given the political climate, it was evident that the Unionist government was not for relinquishing that position. The R.C. Church was indignant at the prospect of having its status and authority within the sphere of education eroded. Again, this is not to say that Cardinal Logue's fears were unfounded.

4.3 A Stacked Deck

On 20 August 1921, Lord Londonderry wrote to James Craig, nine days before he had written to the cardinal, to inform him of a conversation he had with his parliamentary secretary.[28] Its content, albeit unknown to the cardinal, was alarming and disturbing. In it, Londonderry expressed the earnest concern that he believed Lynn, who he would appoint to chair the committee tasked with advising him on the structure of the Education Act, was 'almost a bigoted Presbyterian, and if that is so, there would be strong opposition to whatever he said or did from the Church of Ireland and the Roman Catholics'.[29] This was a shocking statement and an indictment of the built-in religious bias of the state, and perhaps Londonderry's naivety. Just as shocking, was that it did not deter Londonderry from appointing Lynn. He employed the contorted and perplexing logic that because he was 'sufficiently well-known, respected and popular, these sectarian difficulties would doubtless be overcome'.[30] Lynn was outspoken in his defence of the Belfast Education Bill and the McPherson Bill which identified him, in the eyes of the R.C. clergy, as an advocate for local authority involvement and the payment of rates. Unquestionably, the deck was stacked against the Catholic Church which justified the

[26] S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-1965 (Belfast, 1995),* p.45.
[27] Ibid., p. 45.
[28] Londonderry to PM James Craig, 20 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/19).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.

Cardinal's fears when considering Londonderry's offer; but those fears could not be addressed from outside the system or without representation within it.

Two days later Lord Londonderry wrote to Lord Lieutenant, Edmund Fitz-Allen-Howard, who was a Catholic, to express his upset at Cardinal Logue's accusations. He explained, somewhat contradictory to the facts, that he 'would do anything to raise this committee above all political and sectarian prejudices … I cannot feel that there is any justice in Cardinal Logue's accusation'.[31] Given the context of his appraisal of Lynn, and the potential consequences of appointing him to the chair of such a significant committee, it would appear that his upset with the Cardinal's rejection was, at best, disingenuous and at worst contrived to solicit the sympathies of the Lord Lieutenant for any potential political fallout. The marginalisation of the church, its self-imposed exile, and state sponsored sectarianism ensured that the gap was widened. The Catholic Church had played its cards while the M.O.E. was still holding all the aces.

The aging Cardinal's reaction caused Londonderry to call a Cabinet conference on 9 September 1921. He told them that 'he looked upon the reply as a direct challenge and he considered, therefore, that it was a matter that should be dealt with by the Cabinet'.[32] They agreed that a letter should be sent to the Cardinal 'acknowledging his letter and stating that his decision was deeply regretted and disagreeing with the suggestion that the Committee to be appointed would be used as a pretext for an attack on Catholic Schools'.[33] There was a strong sense that positions had already become entrenched, while Londonderry's resolve to proceed with his vision of non-denominational education had hardened. It must also be acknowledged that these decisions were being taken by a singularly Protestant Cabinet, the majority of whom were also members of the Orange Order. Londonderry must have been aware, or that his cabinet had made him so, of the R.C. Church's well-established objections to local authority involvement in their educational affairs. In this context, it is challenging to understand his political naivety in not anticipating the R.C. Church's objections to its possible introduction. Londonderry then 'stated that he considered strong representation should be made to the British Cabinet to fix a definite date for the transfer of services'.[34] This would prove to be, as seen in Chapter 2, a process suffused in intrigue, non-compliance, obstructionism, covert arrangements

[31] Londonderry to Lord Lieutenant, 4 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/17).
[32] Cabinet Conference, 9 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB4/18/23).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.

and obduracy. This was the disjointed and acrimonious situation before the Lynn Committee had even convened.

4.4 Lynn Committee

It was during this political turbulence that, in September 1921, Lord Londonderry appointed Robert J. Lynn as chairman of a committee whose terms of reference were

> [t]o enquire and report on the existing organisation and administration of the educational services in Northern Ireland and to make such recommendations as may be considered necessary for the co-ordination and effective carrying out of these services.[35]

It became known as the Lynn Committee. Lynn was a member of the U.U.P., M.P. for West Belfast, Orangeman and editor of the fervently unionist *Northern Whig* newspaper. As noted, his outspoken defence of the MacPherson Bill showed that his preference was for local authority involvement and the payment of rates towards education. This would have brought him to the attention of the R.C. authorities, reawakening their concerns over local authority involvement. While this does not fully account for, or justify, the R.C. Church's refusal to participate on the committee, it could, nevertheless, be considered as significant in its decision-making. Minutes from the first ever meeting of the committee, show that it was held at Parliament Buildings in Belfast, on Friday 14 October 1921.[36]

At the second meeting held on 27 October 1921, a sub-committee was appointed to deal with religious instruction in primary schools. It is noteworthy that some of the names on this committee, such as Cannon Brown (Church of Ireland), Rev. J. Bingham (Presbyterian), and Rev. W. H. Smyth (Methodist) would later form part of a United Education Committee of Protestant Churches (U.E.C.) deputation that would confront Londonderry on not implementing their recommendations on religious instruction and the appointment of teachers.[37] The sub-committee agreed that 'it appeared possible for the three principal Protestant denominations to arrive at a common programme of religious instruction in primary schools'.[38] This scenario captures an instance of how the R.C. authorities had become

[35] Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 29 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/6).
[36] Minutes book of the first meeting of Lynn Committee (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/198B).
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.

disadvantaged through absence of representation on the committee. If they had representation on the committee, their case for religious instruction within their schools could have been forwarded, even though, due to its overwhelming Protestant makeup, it was highly probable it would have been rejected. Had they attended, they could have gotten a valuable understanding of how the system proposed to work. It would have provided them with an early warning system, allowing them the opportunity to implement, at the very least, a damage limitation exercise. As it happened, the committee, as shall be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, also signified the Protestant clerics intent to instigate their own denominational agenda, which they knew would lead to a confrontation with Londonderry.

4.5 Widening the Gap: June – July 1922

Already stressed relations between the Unionist government and the R.C. Church reached crisis point when Cardinal Logue's car was stopped by B Specials in Armagh on 16 June 1922. The *Catholic Herald* later reported it as the first in a series of incidents where the Cardinal's car was 'searched by Craig's "Specials" for the fourth time'.[39] The *Northern Whig* reported that, when questioned by Nationalist MP Devlin on the matter, Churchill stated that no one should 'object to a little inconvenience' when trying to stamp out murder. [40] The *Belfast Newsletter* reported that when the matter was raised with Craig in the House of Lords he said that 'effective steps were being taken to prevent any further act discourtesy to his Eminence'.[41] The next week however, the *Independent* reported that Craig said that Cardinal Logue's accusations were silly and stupid.[42] He inferred that the cardinal had not cooperated as he 'did not give his name until it was all over'.[43] The incident captured the tensions that existed between church and state. The directive to not stop the cardinal's car was not adhered to which further aggravated poor relations. This could also have strengthened the cardinal's belief that he was right not to cooperate with the M.O.E.

Lionel Curtis, of the Colonial Office, wrote to W.B. Spender, Secretary of the Cabinet, concerning the first recorded incident of the Cardinal's car being stopped.[44] It revealed the fractured nature of relations between the R.C. Church and the Unionist and Westminster

[39] *Catholic Herald*, 29 July 1922.
[40] *Northern Whig*, 21 June 1922.
[41] *Belfast Newsletter*, 29 June 1922.
[42] *Independent*, 26 June 1922.
[43] Ibid.
[44] L. Curtis to W.B. Spender, 22 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: HA/5/982; CAB/6/48).

parliaments. It also disclosed a contempt and scepticism, with latent racist and sectarian undercurrents, towards the Irish journalists. He warned Spender that he should 'keep in mind, however, that you are dealing with people whose genius for propaganda is almost incredible'.[45] Curtis claimed that Irish journalists, who favour 'the lower grades of journalism', were saturating the English speaking world's press.[46] He alleged that this led to 'a recent case in which the owner of a Conservative paper suddenly became aware that it read like a Sinn Féin organ'.[47] He insisted they should be starved of all opportunities for propaganda making it 'important not to antagonise Catholics'.[48] The racial undertones are inescapable. Its primary purpose was to protect 'Mr. Churchill [who] has to bear the brunt of these attacks in the House'.[49] Significantly, it also reveals how sections of the British establishment viewed the R.C. population. This would have signalled to the U.U.P. that their devolved government was marching in time to the same anti-Catholic tune as the 'mainland' government. The ramifications of this can be viewed in two ways. That the R.C. authorities were correct in deciding not to engage with the committee as it was aware of the prevailing bigotry. The other is, as this thesis argues, they would have been better equipped had they fought from within. Working from the inside, they could have presented their own proposals thus improving their prospects of gaining some concessions. This is not to say that they would have won many, or any, but they would have had a dog in the fight, which could also have acted as a guard dog, alerting them to any changes that would negatively impact them. Had they done so, they would have been better situated to represent the interests of their people.

At Cabinet on 28 February 1923, Craig asked Londonderry 'whether any particular denomination could, in his opinion, with justice assert that it had been penalised'.[50] In response Lewis McQuibban, permanent secretary to the M.O.E., replied that 'the omission of Clause 15 of the draft bill which had just been agreed upon meant that Roman Catholics would be no longer able to secure building grants or State assistance in any form towards the building of their schools'.[51] In a rather caustic tone, the Minister for Finance, Hugh Pollock, pointed out that

[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Cabinet Meeting Northern Government, 28 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/72).
[51] Ibid.

> the Roman Catholics had in the past taken fullest advantage of the State aid and made far greater use than any other denomination of these State grants. While this was not at all to their discredit, they could not urge that they had not their fair share of such State assistance during the past.[52]

Not only was there a clear sense of unionist resentment towards the R.C. authorities' previous position of power, but there was also a more palpable sense that they were determined to redress the balance, by means foul or fair. This episode demonstrates how the sectarian nature of the government created difficulties for the R.C. authorities.

Examining these incidents helps to illustrate how they informed the R.C. Church's relationship with the Unionist government. Conversely, it could be viewed that it was their position of non-recognition and non-compliance that influenced how the Unionist government dealt with them. Both interpretations are interchangeable and symbiotically interdependent. The R.C. Church's disinclination to relinquish the total authority that it had enjoyed pre-partition is also a probability. Certain circles in Westminster displayed a lack of understanding of the complex nature of Ireland. This co-existed with an inability to separate, and distinguish the differences between, Catholic and Irish. This lead, as it had throughout Anglo/Irish relations, to those circles displaying a racist, sectarian distrust of all things Catholic/Irish.

4.6 Interim Report

On 29 June 1922, the Lynn committee delivered its interim report to Lord Londonderry. It was decided that 'if possible all schools should be under the local committee, and that inducements should be offered to bring this about'.[53] They divided schools into three classes. They categorised 'new schools built and equipped by these [local] authorities' and those 'managed by Local Committees for Primary Education' as 'Class I. schools'.[54] These became known as transferred or provided schools.[55] The financial incentive for transferring was that 'the Local Committee for Education should as managers provide for maintenance, repair, furnishing and equipment, and all the cost of heating and cleansing'.[56] The 'Class II. Schools' were known as four and two schools. [57] This option proved the most unpopular of the three choices, seeing

[52] Ibid.
[53] Interim report of the Lynn Committee, Section 125, p. 32, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).
[54] Ibid., Section 105, p. 29.
[55] They will be referred to as transferred schools going forward.
[56]Interim report of the Lynn Committee, Section 126, p. 32, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).
[57] Ibid., Section 105, p. 29.

only a handful of schools consider it. The report viewed this as a compromise choice and 'recommended that in such cases School Management Committees be formed, composed of two representatives of the Local Committee, and four representatives of the patron or patrons of the school or group of schools'[58]. It was recommended that 'in the case of these schools that the Local Committee should be responsible for half the cost of maintenance, repair, furnishing and equipment, and all the cost of heating and cleansing'.[59] The recommended grant for the heating and cleaning of both was half the cost. This left the 'Class III' schools, known as voluntary schools.[60] This was relevant for the R.C. controlled schools as it was those 'whose managers may desire to remain entirely independent of local authority. These would be referred to as Class III. Schools'.[61] In this instance the financial recommendation was 'a grant in aid of heating and cleansing at the same rate as Classes I. and II., but such schools should receive no aid from local rate'.[62] Teachers' salaries, for all three classes of schools, would be paid by the government.

With the R.C. Church having no representation on the committee, the recommendations were, understandably, if not justifiably, heavily in favour of Protestant schools. They now received significant financial assistance for everyday running costs. The committee addressed the absence of Catholics as being regrettable and were at pains to point out that 'invitations to serve on the committee were issued to representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and were in every case refused'.[63] It claimed to hope 'that notwithstanding the disadvantage at which we were placed by this action it will be found that Roman Catholic interests have not suffered'.[64] Analysis of how the Promissory Oaths and Religious Emblems Acts were adapted, pursued and enforced will assist in assessing the accuracy of this claim. This is another episode Cardinal Logue could have highlighted to justify his decision.

4.7 Promissory Oaths: Apr. 1923

The document below, from the Department of Community Relations, 5 May 1972, marked 'secret', provides a perspective on the origin of the Promissory Oath Act 1923:

[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid., Section 126, p. 32.
[60] Ibid., Section 126, p. 32
[61] Ibid., Section 105, p. 29.
[62] Ibid., Section 126, p. 32.
[63] Ibid., p. 9.
[64] Ibid., p. 9.

> In 1922 the Local Government (NI) of that year introduced a declaration of allegiance for members of local authorities to prevent local authorities from purporting to 'opt out' of Northern Ireland altogether; at the same time a declaration was applied to salaried officers in local government. The oath of allegiance for civil servants and teachers was introduced the following year by the Promissory Oaths Act (NI) 1923 when it was argued that it was illogical to impose a higher standard of loyalty in local government than in central government.[65]

McQuibban wrote to the Minister for Finance, *c*. 19 April 1923, to inform him that Londonderry had directed him to

> request that an amendment be introduced in the Committee Stage to the above [Promissory Oath Act] measure whereby its provisions shall extend to all persons engaged in teaching in the schools of Northern Ireland, whether they themselves or the managers within the schools in which they teach are in receipt of grants from public funds.[66]

He explained that teachers employed in Provided or Transferred Schools would be obliged to take 'the Oath of Allegiance under the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1922'.[67] Teachers employed in Voluntary Schools did not have to take the oath which the minister decided was 'an anomaly' that he wished to avoid.[68] He concluded that all teachers within the new education system should 'be compelled to' swear an Oath of Allegiance.[69]

George C. Duggan, assistant secretary at the Ministry of Finance, who had transferred from Dublin, replied by voicing his minister's concern that Londonderry had not properly considered that 'the imposition of the oath will be likely to re-open in a more acute form the difficulties which occurred with *certain* [author's emphasis] National and Intermediate School Teachers in the course of last year'.[70] Employing the euphemism 'certain' was Duggan's attempt at circumventing the word Catholic. Duggan's correspondence conveys a tone of

[65] Document from the N.I. Government's Department of Community Relations titled 'Oath or Declaration of Allegiance', May 1972 (P.R.O.N.I.: DCR/1/128).
[66] McQuibban to Duggan, *c* 19 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/183). The letter was not dated; the date was determined by its place in a sequence of other dated correspondences.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Duggan to McQuibban, 20 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).

disbelief at the M.O.E.'s lack of awareness that this amendment would have been viewed as coercive by the R.C. Church and its teachers and therefore met with hostility. McQuibban responded to Duggan that 'the Minister is of the opinion that an imposition of the oath is unlikely to cause a reopening of the difficulties which occurred between the Ministry and certain National and Intermediate school teachers last year, particularly if the operation of the bill is delayed'.[71] A document signed by McQuibban in September 1927 showed that the government intended vigorously to pursue the policy.[72] It revealed that McQuibban was actively pursuing a Catholic substitute teacher who had yet to sign the oath and demanded that she do so and 'return the form to this office within six weeks from the date of entering on duty'.[73] The files disclose that R.C. teachers were hesitant to sign the oath and were inventive in avoiding doing so. McQuibban received a memo listing three of the tactics used: not receiving the forms on time, illness, and being out of N.I., for various reasons, until after the required time for signing them.[74] This is not to say that all cases were not genuine.

The sequence of correspondence emphasised that the M.O.E., unlike the Ministry of Finance, had failed to recognise that this was anathema to Catholic/nationalist teachers. Considering the M.O.E.'s recent problematic relationship with the R.C. authorities, its failure to anticipate any form of resistance or backlash reflected poorly on them. The M.O.E. did not stop at compelling the teachers to take the oath. In further correspondence, McQuibban told Duggan that 'steps are being taken to ensure that the whole-time wages staff, i.e., cleaners etc. shall comply with the provisions of the act'.[75] This could only have inflamed the situation. Considering that the Londonderry Act would be enacted in June of that year, this conveyed a sense of desperation and urgency that all eventualities should be covered. This meant ensuring that not only R.C. teachers, but also anyone working in the school, would be fully compliant with, and subservient to, the new government. The principle of taking an oath was predicated on employing the law to control a belligerent minority, hence limiting their ability to disrupt the system. Depending on which community you came from, this was viewed as either a strong measure or, in the case of Catholics, one of oppressive coercion.

McQuibban's memo from 17 October 1923, suggested that thus far it had not been mandatory for substitute teachers to take the oath. It stated that 'Notice is hereby given that

[71] McQuibban to Duggan, 20 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/386).
[72] Document signed by McQuibban, 22 Sept. 1927 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/386).
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ministry of Finance to McQuibban, 22 Nov. 1923. (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/386).
[75] McQuibban to Duggan, 27 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).

under the operation of the Promissory Oath Act (Northern Ireland) it is obligatory for persons acting as substitute teachers to take the Oath of Allegiance'.[76] These actions ran contrary to the Lynn Committee's claim that the interests of Catholics would be looked after. The overtly sectarian nature of this coercive act was exposed in a memo from McQuibban, on behalf of Lord Londonderry, to the Secretary of Finance, in which he suggested that the consequence of all teachers in a school not taking the oath would be a non-issue of grants.[77] The bill's punitive intent was revealed in the Minister of Finance's reply which stated that he was of the 'opinion that subsection 2 (3) should perhaps not be introduced in its present form, as the Bill does not purport to impose penalties in the case of any other classes of government employees who refuse to take the oath'.[78] On a micro level, the inclusion of the ancillary workers, and latterly the substitute teachers, would appear to be born out of petty vindictiveness. On a macro level, the threat of non-issuing of grants as a punishment for non-compliance threatened the very existence of R.C. education in the nascent state. The civil servants were all, bar a few, Protestant, but they were not threatened with penalties. That would, given that the state could be sure that a number of R.C. teachers would not take the oath, appear to be targeting them. The state would expect them to sign, but this was not an equitable and balanced application of the law. The finance minister's response to McQuibban substantiates this work's argument that the education was central to the north's identity and a method of reigning in Catholic/nationalist dissenters.

This development again raises the quandary of the correctness of the cardinal's decision not to recognise the authority of the M.O.E. The M.O.E.'s insistence on Catholic/nationalist employees taking the oath could be viewed as a justification for his decision. There are grounds to argue that he foresaw this form of governance and decided not to legitimise it by not recognising it. There is also room for the counter argument that, had he participated, the Catholic citizens would have had some representation in the sphere of education. It is a matter of conjecture to estimate how much influence they could have exerted, but some is always better than none. The cardinal must have thought that this was too high a price to pay. The M.O.E. could have been more sympathetic to Catholic concerns regarding the act. As it stood, and with no representation anywhere within the system, it was exclusively Protestant dominated. Lynn's outburst during the second reading of the education bill would suggest that

[76] A memo signed by McQuibban, 17 Oct. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).
[77] McQuibban to Secretary of Finance, 20 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).
[78] Secretary of Finance to McQuibban, 20 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/183).

the aging cardinal's misgivings, concerning Lynn at least, were not without substance. While backing the minister on the topic of religious instruction, Lynn rounded on the Catholic Bishops saying they had, in recent times 'bred … a race of murderers'.[79]

4.8 Religious Emblems: Aug. 1925 – Apr. 1926

The following case reveals that Londonderry was not going to accept any non-cooperation regarding the non-displaying of religious emblems in schools. The incident also illustrates, with some sardonic mirth, some of the tactics employed to impede the policy's implementation in R.C. schools. In refusing government assistance because they had not transferred their schools, the R.C. authorities assumed a degree of autonomy. They therefore viewed the enthusiastic implementation of this rule as petty vindictiveness. School inspector S. Kirkpatrick's (who was one of the outdoor staff caught up in the transfer of staff debacle mentioned in Chapter 2) report from his visit to St. Colman's Convent P.S.E. Co. Down on 21 August 1925 stated:

> I observed the following:- A crucifix with an effigy of Christ suspended thereon is hanging on the wall of the main room. In the same room a little font is suspended into which I observed the children dip their fingers, and make the sign of the cross … There are also two placards in large print suspended on the wall of this room. One of these is headed "Apostleship of Prayer" and gives a list of objects for prayer, and a list of indulgences, the other is headed "Daily Mass Crusade" and contains some reasons why daily mass should be attended.[80]

Londonderry's assistant secretary wrote to Kirkpatrick informing him of the minister's decision that the religious objects referenced in his report were 'at variance with the rules of The Commissioner of National Education and the Ministry'.[81] He instructed him to 'see the manager of the school and endeavour to arrange for the removal of these objects and placards and report the result of your conference with the Manager'.[82]

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[79] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series*, vol. 3: *Third session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1923*, col. 355 (*Hansard N.I. (House of Commons)*, i).
[80] Minister's Assistant Secretary to Kirkpatrick, Oct. 1925; Extract from Kirkpatrick's report, 21 Aug. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.

McQuibban, sensing Londonderry's urgency, wrote to Kirkpatrick in December again enquiring if he had since visited the school.[83] The minister's reason for such an interest in what the evidence suggests was a trivial case is not obvious. It was the principle, perhaps, that was at stake, as much as a clash of wills. On closer inspection, Kirkpatrick's numerous attempts to contact the manager of the school would support the interpretation that the fundamental source of the clash centred on obduracy. The minister's obduracy regarding the implementation of the rules, opposing the R.C. Church's, in not complying with them. It is difficult to evaluate how exaggerated, or not, the R.C. Church's fear that this was part of a unionist conspiracy to erode its faith at source. Whatever the reality might have been, its influence cannot be underestimated.

When Kirkpatrick submitted his report on 17 February 1926, its farcical nature depicted the spirit of the prevailing antagonism in R.C. schools. He reported that

> owing to the illness of the Manager, and his repeated absences from his home I failed in my efforts to secure an interview. He is now gone on a long sea voyage.[84]

The dates show that the inspector had been pursuing the school manager for up to five months, which might have contributed to Londonderry's ire. That the manager was ill for all this time is stretching the boundaries of credulity. It is amusing to picture the inspector being told that the manager had eventually gone on not any old sea voyage but, indeed, an exceptionally long one, which was an exclusive luxury for the wealthy of the time. Kirkpatrick concluded his report by informing his superiors that he 'mentioned the matter to the conductors, and they have removed all but the crucifix with the figure upon it'.[85]

A ministerial meeting on 16 March 1926, in Lord Londonderry's absence as he had left the government in January 1926, recorded that Mr Wyse had previously suggested on 2 October 1925 that the crucifix could not be regarded as denominational, and that the inspector should inform the school to remove the other two offending objects during school hours.[86] It noted that Londonderry had disagreed and ordered the inspector on 22 October to remove all objects. McQuibban, not a noted ecumenist, agreed with Wyse's interpretation, clearly illustrating that

[83] McQuibban to Kirkpatrick, 4 Dec. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).
[84]. Inspector Kirkpatrick's report submitted, 17 Feb. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).
[85] Ibid.
[86] Minutes from M.O.E. meeting, 16 Mar. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).

the impetus must have originated from Lord Londonderry. On 15 April 1926 Charlemont's secretary again wrote to Kirkpatrick informing him that he was 'directed by the Minister of Education [now Viscount Charlemont] to inform you that the removal of the Crucifix … need not be pressed'.[87]

Tensions between the school and the M.O.E. were symptomatic of the disconnect between the R.C. authorities and the State. The compromise reached by Charlemont with his ministerial team suggests that there was a disconnect between Londonderry and the members of the same team. Their unity suggested that they considered Londonderry was out of touch with the reality of the situation and that his persistence regarding the crucifix would have aggravated pre-existing volatile relations with the R.C. authorities. For their part, the R.C. authorities, with Cardinal Logue's prophecy ringing in their ears, regarded the minister's doggedness concerning the crucifix as an attack on, and subjugation of, their religious and civil liberties. The R.C. authorities/management were the parish priests who had local authority, and the bishops, who had diocesan authority. The evidence would support this work's contention that Lord Londonderry was not motivated by a sectarian agenda. It was, in fact, the opposite; he was so heavily influenced by, and invested in, the 'mainland Britain' non-denominational model, that he did not wish to see any emblems in any of the schools. There remains the question of how well advised this approach was, given the history of schooling on the island, and particularly where it was more pronounced in the new state. There was no doubting his sincerity, but it was at best misplaced or simply put, he was sincerely wrong.

Another anomaly of the Unionist government was that Lord Londonderry, apart from perhaps the only Catholic, Bonaparte Wyse, was the exception when it came to having a sectarian agenda. In his eagerness to pursue a non-denominational school system he was perhaps politically naive to the sectarian dispositions of the members of his team. His discussion regarding Lynn's bigoted leanings might infuse doubt into this possibility. The mitigating factor in understanding Londonderry's attitude to Lynn was his abject naivety when it came to the historical sectarian nature of N.I. As mentioned previously, he was not steeped in the traditional unionist values that were particular to N.I. When he said that Lynn's leanings could be overcome, it was in keeping with his character. When considering such cases, the Lynn Committee's boast that Catholics would be looked after was not lived up to. Incidents such as these served only to isolate the Catholic community further and did not contribute to

[87] Lord Londonderry's Assistant Secretary to Kirkpatrick, 15 Apr. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/819).

constructing any form of mutual trust that could have been employed to create a state that was not such 'a cold house for Catholics'.[88] The R.C. Church's absence from the Lynn Committee cannot be underestimated or dismissed when considering the behaviour of the M.O.E. in such cases. In the vacuum created by the absence of any dissenting voice, a Protestant ethos for education was, considering its historical context, an inevitable outcome. The Catholic authorities could have, with some justification, argued that this would have been the outcome regardless. Teacher training was the only other aspect of education where the R.C. authorities had yet to confront the M.O.E.

4.9 Teacher Training, Setting the Tone: Mar. – Apr. 1923

Much scholarly detail has rightly been devoted to the Protestant churches' notorious battle to exert more influence and control over Stranmillis, the north's new Teacher Training College.[89] The lasting consequences of the R.C. Church's confrontation with the M.O.E. however, has not received the same scholarly focus. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, teacher training had become a contentious issue between the two newly formed governments and ministries on the island. As a result of the animosities, the northern government had to consider opening their own teacher training college. The M.O.E./government would eventually not employ teachers who trained in the I.F.S. This meant that to qualify to teach in N.I., male Catholic trainees would have to attend Stranmillis. Catholic female trainees could train in St. Mary's in Belfast. The Catholic authorities would strenuously oppose this proposition. The M.O.E. was hurtling headlong into an internal dispute with the Catholic authorities.

While authors such as Akenson, Farren, McNeilly, McElligott, and Buckland have provided some of the more detailed accounts surrounding this theme, they have not fully considered some of the finer details.[90] Farren devotes only two pages to the topic while Akenson provides four.[91] Neither delve into the intrigue that characterised the internal quarrelling between the M.O.E. and the R.C. authorities. Examining of correspondence and minutes of meetings between the two, this section will provide a more detailed account of how

[88] David Trimble's Nobel laureate acceptance speech where he acknowledged that Northern had been a "cold house" for its minority (www.davidtrimble.org/speeches.htm) (30 Mar. 2020).
[89] Akenson, *Education and enmity*; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; Buckland, *The factory of grievances*; W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988).
[90] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, Farren, *The politics of Irish education;* McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years*; T. J. McElligott, *Secondary education in Ireland: 1870-19219* (Dublin, 1981); Buckland, *The factory of grievances.* See also C. Moore, *Birth of the border: the impact of partition in Ireland* (Kildare, 2019).
[91] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, pp 51-2; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 120-4.

such an extreme outcome was arrived at. An in-depth analysis of the negotiation process is crucial to broadening the narrative to include the agendas of both the R.C. Church and the M.O.E. This analysis will contribute to a fuller understanding of how the R.C. Church, in overestimating its powers, hindered those negotiations. Crucially, this allows for a more informed appraisal of the R.C. Church's allegations that M.O.E. decisions against them were motivated by religious discrimination.

In March 1923, the Catholic Bishops issued a statement that Catholic students who enrolled in Stranmillis 'would not be employed in Catholic schools on the completion of their training'.[92] In response to this, and 'not to be outdone, the government regulated that teachers trained in the Free State … who completed their training after 1925 would not be eligible for employment in the north'.[93] On 17 April 1923 in the House of Commons, Londonderry pointed out that Protestants and Catholics on the island had contributed to the teacher training colleges and that they should therefore be used for the 'benefit of the whole country'.[94] He also noted that schools under Catholic management would not accept those young teachers who had trained in Marlborough Street College and condemned the Catholic managed training colleges for their refusal to train teachers 'for schools in Northern Ireland on a program approved by the Ministry and on the usual terms as to grants'.[95] He informed the house that 'out of a total of 420 – 91 men and 329 women – applicants' to Stranmillis 'no fewer than 159 – 46 men and 113 women – are Catholics'.[96] In view of the R.C. Church's declaration on not employing trainees if they trained in Stranmillis, Londonderry inferred that his M.O.E. would have to reconsider the whole matter.[97] When they did reconsider, the result was that Catholic teachers trained in the I.F.S. would not be eligible for employment in N.I. This was the genesis of the fallout that peaked on 25 April 1925, when first year R.C. students at Stranmillis were informed of the episcopal edict that they must leave and enrol in Strawberry Hill Teacher Training College, Middlesex. The edict carried the explicit threat that failure to comply meant that it 'would be very unlikely that they would secure an appointment in a Catholic elementary school anywhere in Northern Ireland'.[98] By August 1925, there were no more R.C. students attending Stranmillis.

[92] Londonderry to O'Donnell, 13 Jan. 1925 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18); (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/62).
[93] O. Rafferty, *Catholicism in Ulster 1603-1983, an interpretative history* (London, 1994), p. 224.
[94] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i,* col. 360.
[95] Ibid., col. 356.
[96] Ibid., col. 356.
[97] Ibid., col. 356.
[98] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* pp 122-3; Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 52.

It is important to situate the issue of teacher training within the correct context. Historically, teachers were trained only for primary education, a trend that the M.O.E. continued.[99] Despite the R.C. Church's policy of non-co-operation with the M.O.E., Catholic female teachers who were trained in St. Mary's College in Belfast were not restricted in taking up teaching posts. The bigger issue for the M.O.E., as Farren points out, 'concerned the supply of Protestant teachers, male and female, and the supply of Catholic male teachers, all of whom had, until then, to seek teacher training places outside Northern Ireland' (usually in the I.F.S.).[100] After the Provisional Government assumed power they decided, somewhat short-sightedly, to close Marlborough Street College, where Presbyterian students usually chose to attend 'because most of its students, being from the north, would return there and so its closure would have least impact within the south'.[101] As mentioned in Chapter 2, the M.O.E. had seen merit in the continuation of cross-border training as being mutually beneficial. Their attempts at entering into a joint arrangement were thwarted by the D.O.E.'s 'obstructive tendencies'.[102] The rescheduling of the Easter exams and the Gaelicisation of the southern curriculum compounded the pre-existing animosities between the governments. It was in this climate that negotiations between the R.C. authorities and the M.O.E. over teacher training in N.I. took place. There was the added obstacle Catholic authority's lack of co-operation with the M.O.E.

4.10 The Contract: May 1925 – Dec. 1926

By March 1922 the M.O.E. had commenced plans to set up its own teacher training college. This created concerns for prospective trainees from the I.F.S. Their letters to the M.O.E in early 1923 expressed the confusion that abounded. Mary Smyth, Claremorris, County Mayo, wanted to 'know can students trained in Belfast teach in national schools of Southern Ireland'.[103] The M.O.E. replied that 'students accepted for the training college under this Committee must sign an agreement to teach in National Schools in Northern Ireland for a period of at least five years'.[104] Miss B Duffy, Ballaghadereen, County Roscommon, enquired about her eligibility to sit the King's Scholarship Exam. She was informed that she could, with the proviso that she sign the agreement to teach in northern schools 'for a period of not less than five years'.[105] Answering another query, the M.O.E. told Mary O'Brien that Stranmillis was

[99] Ibid., p. 119.
[100] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 50.
[101] Ibid., p. 51.
[102] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 50. See also M.O.E. N.I., 16 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/1/2).
[103] Mary Smyth to M.O.E., 3 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[104] M.O.E. to Mary Smyth, 5 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[105] M.O.E. to B. Duffy, 12 Jan.1923. (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).

'undenominational and the King's Scholarship Examination is only intended for Entrants to that college'.[106] Another female student informed the ministry that she was a 'Roman Catholic and as such fully bound to enter only a Roman Catholic Training College for girls'.[107] The M.O.E. responded that the college was open to all denominations and that 'No Roman Catholic Training College is at present recognised by the Ministry'.[108] It was more the case that St. Mary's Catholic training college didn't recognise the M.O.E., in line with their non-co-operative outlook, than the other way around.

Protestant students who wanted to train south of the border also experienced difficulties. Mary Thornberry, from Dungannon, wrote to the M.O.E. explaining that as she had 'applied for training to Kildare Place, Dublin, I wish to notify you that Omagh is the most convenient centre for my examination'.[109] Kildare Place was a Church of Ireland training college that was also open to other Protestant faiths. The M.O.E. responded by telling her that 'the ministry does not propose to send any further students to Kildare Place Training College to be trained for service in Northern Ireland'.[110] This was obviously not public knowledge at this point and must have come as a surprise to the student. Like their northern counterparts, the following letter will show that teachers who trained in the I.F.S. would also be required to sign a contract stipulating that they would work there for five years after graduation.

The I.F.S. Government actively sought repayment of fees from teachers who, on completion of training with them, returned to N.I. to work. A letter sent to the M.O.E. in May 1925, representing some twenty teachers, alleged that the arrangement was not as transparent as first thought.[111] It stated that the teachers had 'trained in Free State Colleges during the years 1922-24. Before entering the Colleges we signed the usual agreement to teach in any part of the British Empire, thereby understanding that we could return to teach in Northern Ireland'.[112] The issue arose when, during their course of training, the M.O.E. 'took control of St. Mary's Training College in which the girls had been studying the same programme as us (i.e. the Free State programme)'.[113] The M.O.E. had not technically taken control of St. Mary's, as the R.C. authorities were not prepared to recognise the ministry. A compromise of sorts was reached

[106] M.O.E. to Mary O'Brien, 11 Jan. 1922. (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[107] Elizabeth Trainor to M.O.E, 11 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[108] M.O.E. to C.E. Trainor, 12 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[109] Mary Thornberry to M.O.E., 29 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[110] M.O.E. to M. Thornberry, 3 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/31/1/4).
[111] Teachers to M.O.E., 1 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.

whereby, and without affecting denominational control, the 'college received financial support for training Roman Catholic women in a course of studies subject to the control of the government's teacher training committee'.[114] This development caused the teachers to question the security of their own position which prompted them to contact, and seek clarity from, the M.O.E. The teachers claimed that they were given to understand that the M.O.E. was 'prepared to recognise us if our final examinations in the I.F.S., (excluding Irish) satisfied them, provided that we succeeded in passing a supplementary examination'.[115]

They next alleged that 'immediately prior to our sitting for the final examination we were compelled to sign an agreement to teach in the Free State for a period of five years…which agreement, (according to its wording), should have been presented to us before we entered training'.[116] This was a serious allegation of using coercion and blackmail, given its timing, to sign what was effectively a pre-dated contract. In spite of this, they returned to Northern Ireland whereupon they took up teaching positions and 'were duly recognised by the Northern Ministry'.[117] This recognition was subsequently withdrawn because of their contract with the D.O.E. meaning that 'for the past nine months we have been teaching here waiting for the above permission, and have received no salary whatever'.[118] This was an invidious position, not of their making, for the young teachers to find themselves in. They had, at all times, done their utmost to follow the protocols that were in place. The problem for them was that these were fluid and again, it was the teachers who were the victims of inter-governmental squabbling.

4.11 The Casualties

Prior to this, there had been correspondence from the D.O.E. to the M.O.E., seeking repayment for teachers who had taken up positions in N.I. A document dated 14 May attempted to clarify the M.O.E.'s position on the matter. It disclosed that proceedings had stalled due to, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the D.O.E.'s hesitancy in forwarding teachers' qualifications.[119] The D.O.E. had agreed that qualified teachers who had passed the Irish exam 'would be allowed to serve temporarily in Northern Ireland'.[120] An M.O.E. document showed that the arrangement

[114] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 121-2
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Document 'Recognition of teachers trained in Free State', 14 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[120] Ibid.

was for 'a provisional period of two years terminating on June 30, 1926'.[121] The M.O.E. would implement this upon receipt of a list of qualified teachers. On the topic of teachers who had failed Irish, the M.O.E. 'was of the opinion that that the Free State Ministry could not hold them to the terms of their agreement and presumed that they would be at liberty to serve indefinitely in Northern Ireland if recognised by the ministry'.[122] The D.O.E. responded agreeing with the proviso that 'such teachers, or this Ministry, shall refund to the Free State Ministry the full cost of the training of these teachers'.[123] While the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. haggled, the teachers were suspended in uncertainty. Nationalist Party Leader Joseph Devlin, now MP for Belfast West, contacted Londonderry concerning the matter. He was furnished with the findings of the above document and responded by telling Londonderry that those who had failed the Irish exam were 'in a worse position because Irish is an indispensable subject in the South'.[124] These teachers in particular were again left with no way of winning or even seeing a way to do so. The uncertainty surrounding their livelihood had been visited upon them without invitation or welcome.

Londonderry responded, telling Devlin that the circumstances for accepting teachers trained in the I.F.S. had not altered from those referenced above. He did say that they had only just received the relevant qualifications on 18 May which would expedite the process of payment and status.[125] Londonderry expressed his regret over the delay but, in keeping with the culture of blame, suggested that 'the responsibility for it does not lie with the Ministry of Education for Northern Ireland'.[126] It was not until October 1926 that there were signs that a compromise might be reached. The D.O.E. contacted the M.O.E. explaining that it wanted payment of £176 per teacher for their training, whether they had failed Irish or not.[127] On 11 December the M.O.E. responded saying that it was prepared to assist ten named teachers to refund the cost of their training.[128] A ledger containing the names and details of the teachers shows that all ten had passed Irish in their final exams.[129] The M.O.E. proposed to the teachers

[121] M.O.E. memo, date unknown (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/464).
[122] Document 'Recognition of teachers trained in Free State', 14 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[123] Ibid.
[124] J. Devlin to Londonderry, 14 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[125] Londonderry to Devlin, 19 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/116).
[126] Ibid.
[127] D.O.E. to M.O.E., 20 Oct. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/464).
[128] M.O.E. to D.O.E., 11 Dec. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/464).
[129] Ledger of teachers' qualifications 'Trained in the Frees State Colleges – 1922/24'. The ledger was undated; Londonderry's letter to J. Devlin said the names were delivered, 18 May 1925. (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed//13/1/464); Londonderry letter, 18 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED//32/B/1/2/116).

that the money be repaid in five instalments of £17, with the ministry paying £88.[130] The memo concluded that the case of the four teachers who had failed Irish was still under consideration.[131]

The agreement stipulated that the teachers had to serve for five years, or repay the £88 that the M.O.E. had contributed to their repayments.[132] There was an interesting and restrictive caveat that stated 'that the Ministry of Education for Northern Ireland shall be the sole and absolute judges of the reasonableness of the period allowed for the completion of the said five years' service'.[133] It appeared that the M.O.E. were intent on getting full value, ethical or not, for their meagre investment of £88. The M.O.E. knew that they would have to pay the D.O.E. if they wanted to work in the north. As teaching was the only way to meet the repayments, the M.O.E. had the teachers over a barrel, and did not hesitate in taking advantage of it. These were all Catholic teachers who, by their accounts, had signed contracts in good faith that allowed them to teach in N.I. upon successful completion of their training. They had to, under duress, sign retrofitted contracts that kept them confined to teaching in the I.F.S. for five years after graduation. They had lost earnings and job security because of it. The distress of this must have heavily impacted the lives of those young aspiring teachers while the Catholic authorities, whose schools they were teaching in, decided not to engage with the M.O.E. on their behalf. While others were indulging in politicking and point scoring, it was the trainee and qualified teachers who were paying the price.

4.12 Dividing Walls, Symbolic and Concrete: June 1924 – Mar. 1925

Londonderry displayed an earnest desire to accommodate the Catholic authorities' wishes when building Stranmillis. Surviving minutes from the M.O.E. and the Cardinal O'Donnell papers in C.O.F.L.A. confirm that a deputation of five members of the Catholic clergy was 'received by Mr. Wyse, Assistant Secretary and Mr. Yates in the absence of Mr. McQuibban on Thursday, 12 June 1924'.[134] The tone of the minutes show that it was a very frank and pithy exchange of both parties' positions. Cannon O'Donnell (as he was at the time) put it to Wyse 'that the Bishops desired to have teachers trained (a) either in a separate Training College in Belfast or (b) as an alternative in Saint Patrick's Training College, Drumcondra, which he

[130] M.O.E. to D.O.E., 11 Dec. 1926 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/464).
[131] Ibid.
[132] Contract, c Jan. 1927 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/464).
[133] Ibid.
[134] Meeting between R.C. deputation, and M.O.E., 12 June. 1924. (The date of the year is not documented but content and tone of meeting place it in 1924) (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).

believed would be quite satisfactory and more economical'.[135] Wyse informed the deputation that these were not feasible options. He explained that (a) it was not economically viable as there would have been be only '40 to 50 [trainees] at any time' meaning that it was 'considered too small for the efficient and economical running of a separate college'.[136] Option (a) was also dismissed on the grounds that it was 'held that the Government of Ireland Act 1920 prevents the setting up of a new denominational Training College'.[137] Wyse concluded by clarifying that Drumcondra, option (b), was not acceptable to the minister as it was outside the boundaries of N.I. and that the curriculum was unacceptable.[138] The curriculum was unacceptable because it had been Gaelicised. Robert McKeown informed the house that when it came to studying the Irish language and culture that 'Hon. Members will readily realise that we could not fall in with a proceeding such as that'.[139] The tone was set.

Canon O'Donnell responded, somewhat naively, by suggesting that the M.O.E. allow Drumcondra to teach the M.O.E.'s programme and it would also '*allow* [author's emphasis] the Ministry's [D.O.E.'s] officials to examine the students and inspect the work if necessary'.[140] The use of the word allow by Canon O'Donnell suggests that the R.C. Church had yet to grasp that it was no longer the dominant party in the new six county state. In March 1922, the M.O.E. had contacted the principals of the seven southern training colleges, to consider letting them set the exams for their own northern candidates. The M.O.E. suggested that this should be 'on the understanding that the successful candidates are admitted to the Colleges under the hitherto accepted regulations'.[141] It must have still smarted that their offer was refused. The stinging irony that the authorities of those colleges were now approaching the M.O.E with the same proposal was surely not lost on the ministry. Investing so much energy into achieving their demands left the Catholic authorities vulnerable to the accusation that they had not fully considered the difficulties that the students would encounter because of it. They would have had to travel, which, for a lot of families, meant a further financial burden. While Wyse rejected

[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.
[139] See R. McKeown, Parliamentary Secretary, M.O.E., *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i)*, col. 525.
[140] Ibid.
[141] McQuibban to principals of all seven teacher training colleges in Ireland, 24 March 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).

their naive offer, he said that the minister would meet the bishops' other request and, by way of compromise, offered to house the R.C. trainees 'in a special hostel outside that institution'.[142]

The detail of this offer was in the semantical minutiae. Primarily, the offer was to house the trainees in one of the hostels to be built on the Stranmillis estate with the condition that 'If the Hostel were not built on Stranmillis Estate no grant would be available towards capital expenditure'.[143] The deputation's response exemplified how their obduracy, on issues such as accommodation and trainees socialising, stymied any progress towards narrowing the gap in negotiations. O'Donnell responded insisting that they would not accept a hostel on the Stranmillis Estate 'unless it were completely separated from the other Hostels by a wall'.[144]

This was perhaps not the best strategy to adopt when they were locked into a state that was hostile to their religious ethos on education. This is not to suggest that the R.C. authorities should not have fought for certain concessions. The intention is to highlight how a church, which had been so dominant before partition, and remained an all-island institution, had failed to readjust to the new environment. They could have revised their strategy to better adapt to a different political climate where their religion was not particularly welcome or respected, especially in education. Instead, they insisted, in relation to the wall in Stranmillis, that 'they would not object to the association of the Catholic students with others in organised games, but they would require separate ground for recreation where the student could spend their ordinary leisure hours [solely with other Catholic trainees]'.[145]

Once again, the R.C. Church was setting preconditions when it should have been more accommodating to attain the best deal possible. It is difficult to understand why, after three years' experience of unionist hegemony, and their resoluteness in not bowing to R.C. pressure, they had not considered recalibrating their approach. In fact, they went on to make further demands. Abrasive confrontation of this nature was the antithesis of what was required. When offered the option of a paid chaplain, on the same terms as the Protestant chaplains, they declined. On the issue of training, the bishops' generally accepted the course with the exception of 'History, Psychology and Ethics and possibly English Literature'.[146] In response to their

[142] Minutes of meeting between R.C. deputation, and M.O.E., 12 June. 1924. (The date of the year is not documented but content and tone of meeting place it in 1924) (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).
[143] Ibid.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.

request for a separate lecturer in History, Wyse, somewhat amusingly, given Ireland's contentious history, suggested that it 'Might be avoided if the controversial periods were not selected for study'.[147] On the other subjects, Wyse offered workable alternatives which he said would have to be approved by the Minister. The deputation concluded by requesting that Wyse get back to them by the end of the next week.

A meeting on 20 June showed that Wyse was true to his word in prioritising the matter.[148] Employing cautious and non-committal language, he commenced by explaining that, although the restrictive timeframe imposed upon them rendered 'it impossible to give specific replies to each [point] he would be able to give definite information as to the attitude of the Ministry on most of the important points'.[149] However, the minister's sentiment that he was 'willing to meet the Bishops as far possible in order to find a friendly and harmonious settlement to the question' was 'more promising when considering his suggested compromises regarding the building of a hostel outside the grounds of Stranmillis'.[150] He informed the bishops that Londonderry was 'willing to consider favourably the question of making a substantial grant from State sources towards the cost of erecting and furnishing a Hostel'.[151] Page two of the three page memo is not available. The third page however contains enough information to conclude that the deputation was not displeased with the concessions offered by the minister on the four subjects of History, Psychology, Ethics and English Literature. Here, all that they asked was 'if it would be allowable to charge the students a small additional fee to defray the expenses of such lectures'.[152] This would have created an additional financial burden on the Catholic families whose children attended the college. This was a power struggle on two fronts. The first was between the Unionist officials and the Catholic authorities who were engaged in arm-wrestling for religious superiority. The second involved Lord Londonderry's attempts to implement a non-denominational system that was anathema to both Catholic and Protestant clerics.

In this regard Londonderry was determined to offer the R.C. authorities every opportunity to re-engage with the system. While this was sincere it again displayed an unbelievable lack of understanding. Londonderry wrote to Cardinal Logue in November 1924

[147] Ibid.
[148] Memo detailing meeting between R.C. deputation and Wyse, 20 June 1924 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.

informing him that 'provision was made under the Education Act (Northern Ireland), 1923, for the establishment of an Advisory Council on education matters'.[153] The Council, whose main function was 'to tender advice to the minister at any time, or to make any representation which it may deem desirable' was to meet 'at least twice a year'.[154] The Council was a watchdog/come regulatory body that had a direct line to the M.O.E. Within this structure the R.C. authorities would have had an opportunity to have their grievances heard, albeit with the possibility of them not being properly addressed, by the M.O.E. This was another poor choice of strategy by the R.C. authorities, closing another possible avenue for improving their position and having a voice within the system. The letter asked the Cardinal if 'he was willing to accept nomination to a seat on this Council'.[155] At this stage the aging Cardinal was in extremely bad health and Bishop O'Donnell was acting on his behalf and had been for some time. The O'Donnell papers contain very sparse records of Bishop O'Donnell's correspondence on the matter. Hence, the next correspondence was Londonderry's which stated that he was 'sorry to have your letter of 11th November, informing me that you are unable to accept nomination to the Advisory Council'.[156] Diplomatically, yet persistently, he acknowledged the Cardinal's advanced years precluded him from taking up the offer and asked if they would 'recommend a substitute'.[157] These correspondences demonstrated that Londonderry's resoluteness to include the R.C. Church in a body that 'would secure the respect and confidence of the whole population of Northern Ireland' was matched by the R.C. Church's own determination to remain apart from it.[158] This was, it should be pointed out, the same system that had introduced the Promissory Oath and Religious Emblems Acts. These acts further alienated the Catholic authorities, strengthening their resolve to continue their policy of non-recognition of the M.O.E. and government.

4.13 The 'Compromise', Strawberry Hill

O'Donnell's next correspondence to Lord Londonderry on 27 December 1924, after the Cardinal Logue's death, was direct and demanding.[159] He told Londonderry that 'Apart from the question of how the Council may be composed I could not propose anyone to you for the

[153] Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 7 Nov. 1924 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/19).
[154] Interim report of the Lynn Committee, Section 138, pp 24-5. 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).
[155] Ibid.
[156] Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 15 Nov. 1924 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/19).
[157] Ibid.
[158] Ibid.
[159] Bishop O'Donnell to Londonderry, 27 Dec. 1924 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/19).

Advisory Council before the training of Catholic male teachers is put upon a tolerable basis'.[160] The tone was uncompromising, communicating his dissatisfaction that the question of teacher training had yet to be resolved. Londonderry's responded clearly expressing what the M.O.E. was willing to accept regarding teachers who were trained in the I.F.S.[161] He informed O'Donnell that there were eighteen R.C. students due to complete their training in 1925 and a further sixteen first year students due to complete their course in 1926. He continued that he saw 'no reasons whatsoever on religious and moral grounds why they should not become efficient teachers'.[162] In a thinly veiled accusation of blackmail directed at the bishops, he pointed out that, in spite of their threat not to employ them, Catholic candidates were 'presenting themselves for training in sufficient numbers to supply the vacancies for men teachers in the Catholic schools in Northern Ireland'.[163] Stressing that the M.O.E. would never countenance giving 'denominational preference' to any candidates, he emphasised that if the R.C. authorities did not employ R.C. graduates, their training would therefore have been a waste of ministerial finances and resources.

Londonderry wrote to O'Donnell again in January 1925, in which he described the practice of denominational preference as 'invidious discrimination'.[164] This suggested that Lord Londonderry was genuine in his endeavours with the church. O'Donnell might have also considered Londonderry's suggestion in the context of Londonderry appointing Lynn with the knowledge that he was 'almost a bigoted Presbyterian'.[165] Londonderry informed O'Donnell that teachers trained in the I.F.S. in 1925, and after, would not be employed by the state, effectively cutting off the church's supply of teachers from that source.[166] Londonderry acknowledged that staffing R.C. schools was a 'source of anxiety to the managers' and pointed to the breakdown of negotiations the previous June (1924) as a reason for this.[167] He concluded that the new system had 'won the approval and acceptance of the Catholic community' and offered to meet O'Donnell later that month. There is a degree of genuine naivety to

[160] Ibid.
[161] Londonderry to O'Donnell, 13 Jan. 1925 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18), (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B1/2/62).
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Londonderry to O'Donnell, Jan. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: Ed/32/B/1/2/62).
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid

Londonderry's understanding of the historical position of the R.C. Church within education on the island. This lends itself to Akenson's description of him being a 'gifted amateur'.[168]

After a series of correspondences in January 1925, a meeting between the two parties saw matters come to a head. Cabinet Conclusions from 27 January record that Bishop O'Donnell was not of a reconciliatory disposition when, at a meeting with the minister, he had informed him that 'he would not see his way to come to any very satisfactory settlement of the question of Roman Catholic teachers'.[169] He further expressed his dissatisfaction and by informing the minister that he 'was not prepared to recognise the male teachers trained in our Stranmillis training college, and pressed for the recognition by Northern Ireland of teachers trained in the Free State training establishment'.[170] By way of compromise Lord Londonderry offered to assist the training of R.C. teachers in 'Hammersmith Training College' with the caveat that if it was refused 'there would be great friction in the future and probably considerable political bitterness would be engendered'.[171] As the memo was written by a member of his staff, it could explain Londonderry being portrayed in the more favourable light as the one who was more willing to compromise. The bishop was characterised as abrupt and intransigent. The Minister for Finance suggested that Londonderry's compromise should be accepted, citing the precedent that 'in America no contribution was made by the State to Roman Catholic Teachers who were not trained at the State recognised colleges, and that therefore we were doing considerably more so to meet then[m] than was the case in the States'.[172] Tensions, and the tone of language, were escalating to the point where a compromise was needed, or Londonderry's predicted scenario of 'political bitterness' would materialise.[173] Not for the first time, Londonderry's apparent lack of awareness of pre-existing political bitterness proved to be detrimental to the negotiation process.

The Principal of Strawberry Hill wrote to Bishop O'Donnell on 5 March 1925 informing him that 'Lord Londonderry and Mr. McQuibban … had discussions with the Board of Education with a view to the training of the Catholic students of Northern Ireland in this

[168] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 41.
[169] Single document, 'cabinet conclusions', 27 Jan. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/52/1). See also (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH 10/3/18).
[170] Ibid.
[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid.
[173] Single document, 'cabinet conclusions', 27 Jan. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/52/1). See also (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH 10/3/18).

college'.[174] He explained that 'Mr. McQuibban called here some weeks ago' to see if he was willing to accept the Catholic students and had led him 'to believe that Your Grace was in favour of this proposal, and I shall be glad to know definitely from yourself whether this is so'.[175] These initial correspondence indicated the M.O.E.'s eagerness to accelerate the process. They also reveal that there was a level of distrust of the M.O.E within Catholic educational circles in England. Even though it was proposed as a temporary arrangement, the principal still voiced his dissatisfaction at the arrangement saying that he could 'not welcome it very heartily, considering it entails much expense in providing for the accommodation and tuition of about 40 students'.[176] Student welfare was not considered by any of the parties concerned, least of all the R.C. authorities.

On 25 March, Lord Londonderry wrote to Bishop O'Donnell stipulating four conditions for the temporary arrangement with Strawberry Hill.[177] The first was lifting the R.C. Church's ban on students who were currently training, or had been trained in Stranmillis.[178] The second was that students who were due to complete their second year that summer 'could not be allowed to proceed to Hammersmith' and the third was that 'students now in their first year get the option of completing at Stranmillis if they desire'.[179] Lastly, and most probably most significant, specified that

> [a]n arrangement with the Hammersmith College would not in the first instance be extend beyond five years and, if for any reason it does not prove to be a solution of the present difficulties, it might have to be terminated at an earlier date'.[180]

The debacle was settled, but the division widened. For all the R.C. Church's protestations regarding the government's sectarian discrimination, which were not without foundation, their intransigent sectarian ethos more than matched it. The R.C. church attempted to thwart every offer of compromise and was unwilling to move beyond its own rooted position. As the M.O.E. was deeply influenced by a unionist agenda it meant that the Catholic authorities would not be adequately represented, nor their interests looked after. The reality was that, had they

[174] Principal Strawberry Hill to Bishop O'Donnell, 5 Mar. 1925 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).
[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Londonderry to Bishop O'Donnell, 25 Mar. 1925 (C.O.F.L.A.: ARCH/10/3/18).
[178] Ibid
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.

participated on the Lynn Committee and the Advisory Committee, they would have had better opportunities of representing and forwarding the R.C. case. Had they endeavoured to build better, not necessarily genuine, working relations with the M.O.E., there was a stronger likelihood that more gains/concessions could have been secured. The concept of building better relations in the interest of compromise, while not being completely genuine, would not be uncommon in such/many political relationships – it being the art of the possible, not necessarily the genuine. This may have been, given the more pronounced divisions in the north, more commonplace. It could also be argued that their previous dealings the state supported their belief that they would not, no matter how they might engage in the diplomacy of compromise, have been treated fairly.

The evidence, as presented here, supports this work's contention that the R.C. authority's failure to engage with a more proactive approach caused the Catholic schooling system to suffer unnecessarily in terms of finance. As mentioned at the outset, the Cardinal had his reasons, but the means did not justify the end. This work must also acknowledge that it is easier to make such judgment calls with the knowledge of the consequences to hand. Judgements made within the pressures of recent partition, the Belfast riots and a perceived threat to his schools and religion, must have weighed heavily on the aging cardinal. It also impacted negatively on those who had to travel to Hammersmith for training, thus enduring more financial hardship and the imposition of being unnecessarily distanced from their families. This situation had developed out of the episcopal decree that they would not employ any teachers who had trained in Stranmillis.

Education, in theory, was to be funded by rates and taxes, but 'due largely to the historical development of the education and police services in Northern Ireland … it was borne almost entirely by the state in Northern Ireland'.[181] As the majority of Catholics were ineligible for paying rates, the transferred system would have seen them with better school infrastructure and facilities, more so than their meagre finances could have provided. If the R.C. authorities had transferred schools, or even engaged with the process of transference, then the financial burden on Catholic families would have become less as they would not have had to pay for the upkeep of the R.C. controlled schools. Akenson encapsulates the essence, and balance, of the argument being presented here when observing that

[181] Buckland, *The factory of grievances,* p. 37.

> [i]n practice, religious discrimination in Northern Ireland in the years 1920-1950 was chiefly a matter of Protestant discrimination against Roman Catholics because Protestants controlled most of the instruments of power. Emphatically, this does not mean that the Protestants were any more intolerant or self-seeking than the Catholics, only that they were more effective.[182]

The reality of the R.C. authority's decision was that the future of R.C. children's understanding of segregation was sealed in these early years of the state. It was made compulsory, and it was normalised. Generations were to be nurtured in this negative, church-sponsored sectarian vacuum. The families of the generations to follow would have to live with the consequences of non-compliance.

[182] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 32-3.

Chapter 5: The Education Bill, a Difficult Labour

> I suppose that the question of education does, in many of its aspects, excite more controversy than perhaps any other question that could be brought forward.[1] (Lord Londonderry)

The beleaguered Protestant schools entered the new state under financial and structural distress. The Protestant churches therefore welcomed the financial rewards to be accrued from the M.O.E.'s decision to introduce local authority involvement in education. Due to the Lynn committee's Protestant orientation, its recommendations on administration, religious education, and appointment of teachers were customised to meet its own particular Protestant needs. This study will explore these three recommendations as they became central to the Protestant clergy's objections to the Londonderry Act. The investigation will reveal that the Lynn committee had attempted to provide the Protestant clergy with the same level of authority as it had pre-partition. Revealing the disparity between Lynn's recommendations and the act will provide the context for understanding the Protestant churches' later attacks on the ministry and minister, to have the 1923 bill amended. A detailed examination of the first two readings of Londonderry's bill, and his refusal to accept the committee's three recommendations, will provide the platform to understanding why 'the religious provisions of his bill engendered a great deal of bitterness in Northern Ireland as the Protestant authorities spent the years 1923–1929 fighting for the inclusion of the Lynn committee's partisan stipulations into the North's educational code'.[2]

A comprehensive examination of Cabinet Conclusion files, Ministry of Education D files, the Londonderry Papers, and Parliamentary Papers on Education will corroborate this work's contention that because the Lynn Committee were aware of Londonderry's strong objection to denominationalism, there was a real possibility that their recommendations were designed to be rejected. This was part of the clerics' long-term strategy whereby they would present the omission of the three recommendations from the bill as pre-existing rights that were being revoked. The files show why the Protestant churches objected so robustly to Londonderry's wish for the bill to make 'the long step from the centralised system to a system

[1] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series*, vol. 3: *Third session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, Senate, session 1923*, col. 13 (*Hansard N.I. (Senate)*, i).
[2] *P.* Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39* (Dublin, 1973), p. 251.

of democratic control'.[3] Akenson, and to a lesser extent Buckland, Farren, Walsh and McNeilly, provide an informed overview of the Protestant churches' main grievances, and the results of the pressure they put on the government to redress them.[4] The majority of scholarly work has, however, concentrated on the aftermath of the introduction of the 1923 act. This work will differ in its approach by examining official communications between McQuibban, Londonderry and the churches before the bill was engrossed on the statute books. As well as detailing the events, the correspondence examined here provides a clearer understanding of how personalities and groups influenced events, their evolution and escalation.

5.1 Ulsterisation of Education: Oct. 1922 – June 1922

The 1923 Education bill was drafted within the parameters set out in Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, meaning that it was *ultra vires* to 'make a law so as directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion … or affect prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instructions at that school'.[5] Consequently, the government was legally prohibited from implementing a denominational system of education. Sections 26 (religious instruction) and 66 (appointment of teachers) of the Londonderry Act were drafted in accordance with the non-denominational directive contained in Section 5. Londonderry was consistent in his attempts, frequently to his detriment, to adhere to the letter of the law. This resulted in Lord Londonderry clashing with, and being vilified by, the Protestant clergy.

As it was Protestants who had endorsed the principal of transferring control of their schools, this chapter will focus on transferred/provided schools. Examining recommendations in the Lynn committee's report will provide the background to examine the origins of the Protestant clergy's discontent. Analysis of Section 5 of the report, dealing with local organisation, will establish that it was structured to enable the Protestant clergy to maintain control of their schools in the crucial areas of religious instruction and recruitment of teachers. The first issue they addressed, before the core issue of who would actually assume control, was

[3] *Hansard N.I. (Senate), i),* cols. 148-60.
[4] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973); Buckland, *The factory of grievances;* S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-65* (Belfast, 1995); T. Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in Brendan Walsh (ed.), *Essays in the history of Irish education* (London, 2016*)*; N. McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work (1923-73)* (Belfast, 1974).
[5] Section 5 Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/19), Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 37; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 65; Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 250.

that ‘local administration then would delegate only those matters on which local knowledge and interest would be peculiarly valuable, such as … where schools come under local control, the appointment and removal of teachers’.[6]

The first sitting of the Lynn committee on 14 October 1921 was uneventful.[7] Minutes from the second meeting on 27 October revealed that a sub-committee was set up to deal with the subject of ‘Religious Instruction’.[8] This was a significant early development as it flagged the importance attached to the subject. Three of its ten members, Rev. Cannon Browne, Rev. James Bingham and Rev. W. H. Smyth, would form part of a church delegation who would meet Londonderry on 9 April 1923, to voice opposition to the bill.[9] A change to the minutes showed the word religious was struck through, and replaced with scriptural: ‘~~religious~~ Scriptural’ instruction.[10] The wording, which related only to primary schools, was carefully chosen, scriptural being central to the teachings of the Protestant religion. This made it denominational, which they knew ran contrary to Londonderry’s non-denominationalism. At its third session on 24 November very little was discussed, but the meeting concluded with the clarification that scriptures might be taught freely by teachers of any denomination ‘but that denominational teaching should be confined to teachers of the particular denomination concerned’.[11] These events will support this work’s contention that the committee was setting itself up for a future confrontation with the M.O.E. The issue of administration was not covered in these initial meetings. The committee’s full interim report would not be produced until 29 June 1922.

The first line of the report’s introduction expressed the ‘reluctance’ of the unionist population to accept the Government of Ireland Act ‘which established two autonomous areas, Northern and Southern Ireland’.[12] The distinctly unionist orientation of this statement diminished the committee’s declaration of impartiality. It explained how ‘the highly industrialised North-East had naturally developed an educational administration peculiar to its own necessities’ which could not be expressed as long as schools were ‘under the control of the central boards in Dublin’.[13] The opening remarks intimated that the ‘Ulster’ unionists viewed themselves, pre-partition, as a separate entity within the island. The unionist led Belfast

[6] Interim report of the Lynn Committee, Section 89, p. 26, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).
[7] First meeting of Lynn Committee, 14 Oct. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/198B).
[8] Second meeting of Lynn Committee, 27 Oct. 1921 (P.R.O.I.N.: ED/13/1/198B).
[9] Church deputation meeting with Londonderry, 9 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[10] Second meeting of Lynn Committee, 27 Oct. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/198B).
[11] Third meeting of Lynn Committee, 24 Nov. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/13/1/198B).
[12] Interim report of Lynn Committee, p. 8, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).
[13] Ibid., p. 8.

bill, 1919, was referenced to signify their uniqueness as it 'introduced a principle new to this country, that of local control and local rating in relation to primary education'.[14]

The report also stated that 'every other shade of opinion in the six counties' was represented, except for R.C.s'.[15] The report placed the responsibility for the R.C. omission on its clergy.[16] Without reverting to simplistic and binary identities which can dominate discourse on N.I., it must be pointed out that, in this instance, there were only two shades concerning education; green and orange. They hoped that their proposals would provide the basis for 'all creeds, classes and varieties of opinion in the six counties to co-operate with mutual forbearance and respect in the construction of a sound system of public education'.[17] But as witnessed in Chapter 4, in practice this did not match the expressed experience of the R.C. authorities. Page eleven declared that the values of Stanley's recommendations on non-denominationalism in primary schools were still being maintained. It further stated that 'the principle of combined secular instruction for children of different religious persuasions has … always been maintained'.[18] This was, and deliberately so, historically inaccurate, as schools had been de facto denominationally segregated since the second half of the previous century. The rationale for this historical inaccuracy will be further examined in the section dealing with religious education.

5.2 Administration: Distancing by Stealth

The main body of the interim report suggested that it would not be feasible for N.I. 'at a single stride to change from a highly centralised control … to complete local control'.[19] Local administration, proposed on a county basis, would be limited, but crucially would have control of 'the appointments and removal of teachers' in transferred schools'.[20] They requested that the County Council form a joint delegation to submit their views on the establishment of local administration on a county basis.[21] The County Council delegation said that they would 'co-operate as far as possible in the re-organising of public education' and accept responsibility if it was imposed upon them'.[22] They placed emphasis 'on the fact that if such responsibility

[14] Ibid., p. 8.
[15] Ibid., p. 8.
[16] Ibid., p. 9.
[17] Ibid., p. 9
[18] Ibid., p. 11.
[19] Ibid., p. 26.
[20] Ibid., p. 26.
[21] Ibid., p. 26.
[22] Ibid., p. 26.

involved an additional burden on the ratepayers, the proposal would be unpopular' and therefore they 'must have control of the expenditure'.[23] This was reflected in their conclusion, declaring that they 'were unanimously of the opinion that the entire scheme should be administered by the central body'.[24] The Urban Districts' delegation was more accepting of the proposed new system. They 'were willing to strike such rates as might be necessary, subject to the condition that expenditure should be under their control' and they appeared 'to be ready to co-operate with adjourning rural areas'.[25] This, along with their 'breadth of outlook, and appreciation of the value of education' the committee said, had impressed them.[26] On closer examination there would not appear to be a great deal of difference between the two sets of delegations. Both wanted financial control, and apart from the County Council's' apparent lack of enthusiasm, it is difficult to discern any further differences. Ostensibly, this was the ambiguous criteria that informed the committee's conclusion 'that the County Boroughs, Urban Districts and Rural Districts should be the units for local administration of public education'.[27] The glaring anomaly was that the County Boroughs were not small entities.

Throughout the report, the committee constantly acknowledged that the County system operated well in England and Scotland, while simultaneously offering inadequate explanations for not implementing it in N.I. Reasons offered for not doing so varied from a suggestion that the County Councils had 'too much to do' to another that 'communications in Ireland are slow and underdeveloped'.[28] The rationale for this, and how they chose the two smaller units, Urban Districts and Rural Districts, and the two County Boroughs of Belfast and Derry, can be best understood within the context of the Protestant clergy's pursuit of control. Even though their remit was to decentralise education, examining the next phase of the process will better illustrate how the Protestant clergy engineered a further distancing from the authority of the M.O.E. towards an autonomous style of micromanagement. They envisaged that this would provide them with the control that they sought, particularly in the areas of religious instruction and teacher recruitment. Their suggested system diluted the ministry's involvement with the recommendation that it was 'not intended that Council should have direct relations with the schools in the area'.[29] Their more elevated function was 'to finance the schemes of *local*

[23] Ibid., pp 26-7.
[24] Ibid., p. 27.
[25] Ibid., p. 27.
[26] Ibid., pp 26-7.
[27] Ibid., pp 27-8.
[28] Ibid., p. 27.
[29] Ibid., p. 28.

education committees [author's emphasis] who will administer the funds obtained from local rates, and grants in aid thereof made by the Ministry'.[30]

This is the first mention of such committees, and it is surprising that they should be given such fiscal authority in the same breath as their introduction. The report elaborated on the powers invested in the local committees. It clarified that 'Class I. schools will be entirely under the control of the Local Committee'.[31] The local committees would also have authority over the 'appointment and removal of teachers' thus providing them with total control.[32] This became a contentious matter which the Protestant clergy would confront the M.O.E. over. The electoral practice of gerrymandering employed in N.I. meant that there was a strong probability that the committee would be Protestant. This meant that they would have hired Protestant teachers for Protestant schools. The transfer of authority of transferred schools was, as seen by the actual control that they were set to retain, a cosmetic exercise, as was the criteria for the three classes of schools. It exposed the Lynn committee to accusations of being partisan and reneging on their earlier promise of impartiality. In the case of technical education, there was a hitherto 'established constitution whereby committees are chosen entirely by the rating authorities'.[33]

While the report stated that this was a satisfactory arrangement for technical education, it was deemed 'wholly unsatisfactory' for primary education as 'specialisation [not defined] has not been considered, and religious interests form an element which cannot be overlooked'.[34] The Protestant clergy were driving this agenda as they had most to gain from it. They had again carefully selected the most favourable aspects from extant structures to facilitate their future powerbase within primary education. They suggested that 'it should be possible for a Rural District to be divided into two or more smaller units for the purpose of primary education, subject to the consent of the ministry'.[35] It was from these committees that that the local committees would be formed. The breakdown of the committees also favoured the local clergy with the recommendation that 'each Council or combination of Councils should create a committee of fifteen for primary education, made up of eight members appointed by the council … and seven appointed by the Ministry'.[36] Simply put, this gave the Protestant

[30] Ibid., p. 28.
[31] Ibid., p.31.
[32] Ibid., p. 31
[33] Ibid., p. 28.
[34] Ibid., p.28.
[35] Ibid., p. 28.
[36] Ibid., p. 28.

schools, in localities of Protestant dominance, the majority vote. Strengthening their position even further, they specified that it was 'essential' that representatives of the Council should not be members of the committees. Instead, they advocated that they should 'be elected on the principal of proportional representation (P.R.), and members appointed by the M.O.E. should be chosen from persons in the locality interested in education'.[37] This was another shift, by stealth, away from their previous recommendation on Council representation on the education committee.

The bill for the abolition of P.R. in local government elections was introduced on 31 May 1922.[38] They were therefore aware that soon, thanks to gerrymandering, they could be confident in securing majority Protestant councils. Of more significance, in relation to the future governance of N.I., was Westminster lifting its veto in the face of Craig's threat to resign had the P.R. bill not been ratified. O'Leary is correct in his claim, which is worth recounting in full, that:

> The precedent of not exercising the veto proved more dangerous. The UUP was allowed to gerrymander local-government councils on the new border; the new minority was convinced at the outset that London was an ineffective court of appeal; and fortified by its success, the UUP went on to extend the abolition of PR to Belfast parliamentary elections. The precedent established that London did not wish to oversee let alone manage Northern Ireland's internal politics. It was not prepared to act either as a policeman for the constitution or as a guardian of minority rights. [39]

The Protestant clergy were now assured of having a majority within the two groups (eight by P.R. and seven by the M.O.E.) that were required to make up the local education committees. The recommendations were constructed to syphon authority incrementally from the M.O.E. to fuel the ambitions of local Protestant clergy. Lynn would later state that 'we had the unique advantage of having on the committee the Bishop of Down and Connor, the moderator of the

[37] Ibid., p. 29.
[38] P. Buckland, 'Who governed Northern Ireland? The royal assent and the local government bill 1922' in *Irish Jurist*, new series, vol.18 no. 2 (Winter, 1980), pp 326-40.
[39] B. O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2: control, the second Protestant Ascendancy and the Irish State* (Oxford, 2019), p. 35.

general assembly and the vice-president of the Methodist conference'.[40] Translated, this meant that the three traditional powerhouses of Ulster Protestantism had been in accordance when authoring the recommendations on religious instruction. The administrative system was carefully constructed to provide the Protestant clergy with the same authority they enjoyed before the proposed decentralisation. They knew it was placing them in opposition to Londonderry's ideals and positioning them for confrontation with the M.O.E.

5.3 Securing Control: Religious Instruction and Appointment of Teachers

The recommendations on religious instruction and the appointment of teachers were designed, by the specially selected sub-committee solely for provided and transferred schools, ergo, Protestant schools. They were purposefully constructed for the Protestant clergies' retention of complete control of religious instruction and appointment of teachers. These were some of the Protestant clergy who would later attack the M.O.E., particularly Lord Londonderry, for not implementing the recommendations. The following chronological analysis of their recommendations will define more clearly how they proposed to achieve clerical dominance. Recommendation 123 on the appointment of teachers stated that '[t]he following are amongst the duties that are indispensable to management:- The appointment and removal of teachers'.[41] This gave the clergy control over the appointment of teacher's, thus providing them with total authority over the content, and delivery, of religious instruction. As the schools were provided/transferred, it meant that the government was paying the teachers' salaries which made them government employees. Responsibility for the hiring and firing of teachers was the government's responsibility. Going forward, teachers would become employees of the state, meaning that the interview process should, as set out in the Government of Ireland Act, be free from any form of endowment of one religion over the other.

The recommendations on religious education were based on a bogus history. It stated that Stanley's original ecumenical system of national education should be maintained. This, as explained previously, had not been the case since the middle of the nineteenth century when the system was de facto segregated. The report further recommended that:

> ***138***. In schools of Class I. such religious instructions as is approved by the parents or guardians of the children should be given for a period of, as

[40] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 234; *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i)*, col. 131.
[41] Interim report of the Lynn Committee, p. 31, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).

> a rule, at least half an hour in each school day, or its equivalent within each week.[42]

This clause established the right of the parents, in what they knew would be exclusively Protestant schools, to consent to religious instruction. It also ensured that religion would be part of the curriculum, which they also knew would not be acceptable to Londonderry. This was the beginning of the process that built the base for later attacks on the Londonderry act.

The next clause recommended that:

> ***139***. The churches should prescribe the programme of religious instruction for their own children either separately or in agreement amongst themselves. It is hoped that a common Scripture programme will be agreed upon for the religious instruction of children belonging to all Protestant denominations.[43]

Teaching the scriptures was central to all the Protestant denominations' doctrines on religious education which differentiated it fundamentally from R.C. teachings. This facilitated a pan-Protestant approach to delivering their own programme of religious instruction within the schools. As the committee was aware, Londonderry would not approve of teaching of scriptures during school hours, and it would not be included in Section 26 of the bill. This issue became central to the Protestant clerics' objection this section of the bill. It was becoming clear that these arrangements were edging Protestant schools towards the religious autonomy that the R.C. schools had opted for but had sacrificed central funding for.

The wording of the section below would cause the Protestant clergy and the M.O.E. to clash over the hiring of teachers. It delivers clarity on two additional points that contribute to understanding the Protestant clergy's zeal to secure religious instruction, on their terms:

> ***140***. While it is expected that teachers will give religious instruction in schools of Class I., it should not be obligatory upon them to teach any part of the prescribed programme which requires catechetical or other instruction in the tenets of any denomination, but a teacher may

[42] Ibid., p. 34.
[43] Ibid., p. 34.

> voluntarily give such instruction, if he has the approval of the authorities of the Church, and of the parents to whose children instruction is given.[44]

The contradictory ambiguity of the recommendation was misleading in its stipulation that a teacher should not be compelled to provide religious instruction while he/she is clearly *expected* to.

Had the guidelines for religious instruction and appointment of teachers not been adhered to, Lord Londonderry, and therefore the state, would have been associated with endowing Protestantism. This contributes to sustaining the argument that, given their knowledge of Londonderry's opposition to denominationalism, the recommendations were devised to be rejected. Their purpose was twofold. Firstly, it would create the illusion within the broader Protestant population that the teaching of Scriptures was being taken away from and denied to them, as opposed to the reality that it was merely a recommendation rejected on legal grounds. This was a contrived strategy given that the government was in its infancy and, as Buckland observed, 'its supposed supporters, were far from united behind or contented with their Unionist government'.[45] Secondly, once this version of the situation had permeated the Protestant community, the recommendations could be portrayed as reasonable and rational that the government had no good reason to reject. The representatives of the Protestant denominations could now characterise themselves as the victims of Londonderry and the M.O.E. This was the more circuitous route to confrontation.

This final section centres on the church exercising full control of all matters pertaining to the teaching of religion to children in primary schools:

> ***141.*** The right of entry of the clergy or others, to whom the parents or guardians of the children do not object, to give Scriptural and denominational instruction at fixed and stated hours, with facilities for examination and inspection at other times, should be given in all schools of Class I and II. The persons entitled to right of entry to a school or group of schools should be those appointed thereto by authorities of the church.[46]

[44] Ibid., p. 34.
[45] Buckland, The f*actory of grievances,* p. 2.
[46] Interim report of the Lynn Committee, Section 138, p. 34, 29 June 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/10/24/5).

They reiterated their desire for the incorporation of religious instruction into the curriculum with parents having the veto on who was permitted to do so. The section reveals that it was the church authorities who had the right to say who could, and who could not, enter the schools. A closer reading of this section discloses an attempt by the clerics, and the Lynn Committee as a whole, to secure self-regulation. The Protestant churches had played their hand very carefully and had, before the bill had even been drafted, primed the situation for confrontation. They had, in what Akenson described as a 'partisan blight', devised two separate classes of schools, with only the Protestant schools to receive full financial aid.[47] While 'this partisan blight … [was] cauterised' by Lord Londonderry's reworking of the Lynn committee's self-serving recommendations, it inevitably provoked the Protestant religious authorities into fighting for their inclusion for the remainder of the 1920s.[48]

5.4 Dissention and Confusion: Nov. 1922 – Dec. 1922

Londonderry received the first draft of the bill on 30 September 1922. On 10 October in the House of Commons, Craig informed the members that Londonderry had informed him that 'administration of the department of Primary Education has proceeded smoothly upon the accepted lines, and the control of the Ministry has been *loyally* [author's emphasis] accepted by all Protestant managers and teachers and by the great majority of Roman Catholic managers and teachers'.[49] This statement was, given the evidence from previous chapters, inaccurate and must be considered as political spin. The word 'loyally' exposed a Protestant/unionist bias, irrespective of it being conscious or otherwise. Craig continued that 'the report was not only welcomed by the Government … but I feel from the criticisms which have appeared that it has been received very well indeed by the community as a whole'.[50] A rather liberal and loose use of the word 'whole', it would appear. Regardless, it would prove to be a short lived welcome.

On 28 November, Dawson Bates, Minister for Home Affairs, replied to Londonderry's request for his thoughts on the draft bill.[51] Bates first suggested that it might be 'better to proceed gradually' with reforms and to 'be careful not to frighten rate payers'.[52] His objection

[47] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 58.
[48] Ibid., p. 58.
[49] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series, vol. 3: Third session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, Senate, session 1923, col. 131 (Hansard N.I. (House of Commons), i). col. 948.*
[50] Ibid., col. 949.
[51] Bates to Londonderry, 28 Nov. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/5).
[52] Ibid.

focused on the administrative changes contained in the draft. While Londonderry accepted Lynn's recommendations on establishing local education committees as sub-committees of the existing rural, urban and county and borough councils, his bill 'introduced a complicated set of arrangements involving the establishment of entirely new government units'.[53] Bates' worry was that the administrative expenses for these small education authorities 'would run up to a very considerable figure'.[54] McQuibban explained at a cabinet meeting that the plan was to 'make the County and County Borough Councils the Local Authorities for education, with full financial control … [and] so far as County Councils were concerned to set up certain regional Educational Committees'.[55] This meant that the Londonderry Act 'created the county councils and county borough councils … and local education authorities in their areas, and imposed on them certain duties for the establishment of machinery for the local administration of education'.[56] This was the reason for Bates' concern about the fiscal output needed to set up and maintain these small education authorities.[57]

Buckland illustrates how complicated this administrative system could become when observing that 'in 1938 there were six county councils, two county borough councils, three borough councils, thirty urban district councils, thirty two rural district councils, three town commissions and twenty seven Boards of Guardians'.[58] George Beale's study of county Down reveals that it alone 'was divided into 18 county districts: 8 rural districts and 10 urban districts'.[59] Londonderry, in his second reading of the bill, stated that he could envisage the creation of 'some twenty regional areas under regional committees'.[60] Beale explains that 'it was possible … to establish a single regional committee for the entire county district, or several smaller committees within the county'.[61] Finally, it was decided that 'if a suitable educational area could be agreed within the county, Section 2(5) of the Act provided for a combination of county districts situated in more than one county'.[62] This option was suggested by the M.O.E. in the case of County Down, but the County Council objected 'on financial and representational

[53] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 59.
[54] Bates to Londonderry, 28 Nov. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/5).
[55] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, proposals for education bill, Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/66/21).
[56] G. Beale, 'Local education authority administration in Northern Ireland after partition: the early years of the County Down education committee' in *The Irish Journal of Education*, xxxi (2000), pp 5-24.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 37.
[59] Ibid., p. 6.
[60] *Hansard N.I. (House of Commons)*, i), col. 347.
[61] Beale, 'Local education authority administration in Northern Ireland after partition', p. 7.
[62] Ibid., p. 7.

grounds'.[63] Londonderry's notes for a cabinet meeting on 12 December, 1922, revealed that he considered the Lynn recommendations for separate committees for technical, secondary and primary education could result in 'a possibility of between 60 and 70 committees dealing with primary education alone'.[64]

Eventually, eighteen regional educational committees were established under the 1923 Education Act.[65] Educational power rested with the local educational authority as they had the authority 'to appoint School Committees for the local management of [transferred/provided] schools'.[66] They had the power to accept the transfer of schools and to 'provide new schools'.[67] Londonderry's notes stipulated that the local authority 'may contribute to the support of the voluntary schools' with the caveat that 'it may have to be repaid'.[68] The final point was that they 'may make a contribution to the establishment of a new voluntary school … but with like provisions as to repayment'.[69] This option has not been encountered during the research for this thesis. There were no details as to the rates of repayment for any such loan, but it does show that the government were willing to assist in the building of new R.C. schools.

Bates was in favour of a county system and thought it unwise to give local authorities the authority to make by-laws concerning children. The problematic nature of Lynn's and Londonderry's diverging proposals is reflected in Bates not fully agreeing with either. There was no mention of religious instruction or the appointment of teachers in his concerns. The Minister for Finance Hugh Pollock returned his concerns to Londonderry on 5 December voicing the same concerns as Bates about 'creating in a small area such as ours such a large number of new local authorities'.[70] He also favoured a 'Committee of the County Council … [to] concentrate in one body the administration of educational revenue and expenditure'.[71] Pollock also advocated special representation of urban districts on the committee. He voiced his concerns about the considerable added expense associated with the establishment of the multiple new authorities. Pollock also did not express any objections concerning religious education or the appointment of teachers. Londonderry's proposed system for administration

[63] Ibid., p. 8.
[64] Londonderry's notes for cabinet meeting to be held 12 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/5).
[65] Buckland, The f*actory of grievances,* p. 37.
[66] Proposals for education bill, Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/66/10).
[67] Londonderry's notes for cabinet meeting to be held, 12 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/5).
[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid.

provided the managers of transferred schools with less authority than Lynn had sought. The local authority system would, however, provide the disputatious Protestant clergy with further grounds for protest in the future.

At the cabinet meeting on 15 December, Londonderry said that 'he knew that there would be an attempt when the Bill came before the Parliament to force the County Council as the local authorities instead of the special authorities created in the draft bill'.[72] He said that his proposed 'special authorities' scheme 'stood midway between the Lynn Committee's proposals and the County Council scheme'.[73] Pollock and Bates voiced their preference for a county system, expressing their concerns that the 'ad hoc bodies' would be expensive and 'there would be no uniformity of administration'.[74] While there was general agreement that 'the province generally demanded education' John Gordon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Labour, noted 'a wide feeling against clerical control'.[75] When asked by Bates for a 'definition' of religious education, Londonderry would not be drawn and 'pointed out that while the Ministry gave facilities it would not be responsible for denominational instruction'.[76] It seemed that Londonderry was aware that Bates was asking on behalf of others, and answered him accordingly. It was agreed that the parliamentary draughtsman should be instructed to proceed with the bill. This section vividly depicts the difficulties that Londonderry's bill faced from the inside out.

5.5 The Bill: Jan. 1923

By January, Londonderry had agreed that the 'Councils of the Six Counties and the two County Boroughs shall be the Local Education Authorities'.[77] He went on to explain that while these bodies had financial control, they were obliged to set up regional educational committees and delegate to them the same powers as previously mentioned except:

> c) The appointment, transfer, remuneration and dismissal of teachers in schools under management (direct or devolved) of the Local Education Authority.[78]

[72] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 15 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/61).
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 11 Jan. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/66/21).
[78] Ibid.

This became Section 66 of the bill. The regional committees would be given the power to 'appoint School Committees for the local management of schools or groups of schools provided by, or transferred to, the Local Education authorities'.[79] This was a change in the dynamic, and now 'the real educational powers resided in the regional committees'.[80] In acquiescing to employ the county system, Londonderry placated the draft's detractors within the cabinet, without changing the fundamentals of his original structure, apart from allocating more power to the regional committees. At a Cabinet meeting held on 28 February 1923, Londonderry's proposal for part five of the draft on religious instruction to be totally recast was carried. It was suggested that 'The education authorities should be prohibited from providing religious instruction'.[81] The clause meant that religious instruction, in particular scriptural teaching, in keeping with Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act, could not be provided during school hours and therefore not part of the curriculum. This was the most substantive of the seven amendments. These would make up Section 26 of the bill making it the second, and more contentious, of the two issues for the Protestant clerics.

5.6 Lynn Erupts: Feb. 1923

On 8 February, McQuibban wrote to Craig and 'various Ministers' with a first draft of the bill 'as drawn up by Mr. Quekett'.[82] It requested that any suggested amendments they might have should be returned by the following week as Londonderry was anxious to present a final draft 'for Cabinet approval before the close of the first week in March'.[83] The draft enraged Lynn who wrote to Londonderry to say that he found 'it difficult to give expression to my deep disappointment'.[84] He accused Londonderry of insulting him and his committee, and that his 'letter might be summed up thus: "You and your Committee have produced a report; I have not adopted a single important recommendation in that Report, but you may still make any suggestion you please"'.[85] He declared that Londonderry's 'scheme is so bad, both educationally and financially, that I wish to protest at the earliest possible moment, and at the same time give you notice that I intend to carry that protest to every corner of Northern Ireland'.[86] He further accused Londonderry of riveting denominationalism 'more firmly to the

[79] Ibid.
[80] Akenson, Education and enmity, p. 59.
[81] Conclusions of ccabinet meeting, 28 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/72/8).
[82] McQuibban to various ministers, 8 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[83] Ibid.
[84] Lynn to Londonderry, 19 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.

necks of the people of Ulster'.[87] His suggestion that his committee sought to remove it by easy stages was farcical. Lynn warned Londonderry that he was not 'prepared for the inevitable outburst of indignation from the people you will have so cruelly deceived'.[88] Lynn's ego was wounded, and he believed that his committee's work had largely been undervalued, or worse still, ignored. His threat of a backlash was well founded.

The following day, a letter (unsigned) to Londonderry declared that Lynn's letter was 'a declaration of war against the government'.[89] It informed Londonderry that John Andrews, Minister for Labour, had 'heard from Lynn saying that he proposes to start a whirlwind campaign against the Education Bill this weekend'.[90] Andrews wrote to Lynn advising him that what he received was a draft bill, which had yet to be considered by cabinet, therefore making it premature to 'bless it or damn it'.[91] He admonished Lynn for using the knowledge obtained from a confidential draft, before it was made public, for an attack on the government.[92] Lynn wrote to Londonderry again on 20 February reiterating his resolve to fight the bill because 'if it became law, it would put back education in Ulster by half a century'.[93] He concluded with the seditious threat that he saw 'a grave danger that the resulting fight will mean the destruction of the Government'.[94] Londonderry replied to Lynn on 21 February, telling him that he had received an advance copy of the bill to afford him the opportunity to air his views and 'discuss any alterations and modifications which you might think it advisable to suggest'.[95] Londonderry gave full vent to his exasperation telling Lynn that instead of availing of the opportunity of contributing to the bill 'you send me two threatening letters which give me the impression, rightly or wrongly, that your one desire is to wreck the Government'.[96] He concluded that he would be returning to Belfast in a few days and would discuss the matter with the prime minister.[97]

The danger now for Londonderry was that his vision for education was jeopardised by Lynn making the details of the confidential draft public. The genie was out of the bottle and

[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] The letter was not signed by the author. Londonderry had sent a copy of Lynn's letter, 19 Feb., to the author. (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[90] Ibid.
[91] Andrews to Lynn, 20 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[92] Ibid.
[93] Lynn to Londonderry, 20 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[94] Ibid.
[95] Londonderry to Lynn, 21 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/1).
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.

the clerics were congregating to devise their strategies for protest. Rev. Corkey, who would become agitator in chief of the U.E.C., summarised the Protestant clerics' reaction to the 'confidential' draft thus:

> since it was found on examination that little or no connection had been given to the findings of the Lynn committee on many important matters such as, for example, the recommendations of the Lynn committee on the management of schools; the method of appointing teachers; the continuance of religious instruction as heretofore; the representation of those hitherto interested in education on Borough and Regional committees' implemented changes to the recommendations had fuelled the ire of the Protestant religious authorities.[98]

Londonderry used a Senate debate on 27 February 1923, to implement a damage limitation exercise to stem the growing tide of resentment towards the bill before its introduction 'in the middle of March'.[99] He acknowledged that 'the question of education does, in many of its aspects, excite more controversy than perhaps any other question that could be brought forward' adding that the bill was 'not in its final form'.[100] He declared his deep indebtedness to Lynn and his committee before adding that the committee were 'guided by what ought to be and we [the ministry] have to be guided by what can be'.[101] Whether it was abject naivety, or wishful thinking, Londonderry added that he did not envisage 'any wide difference of opinion between us' (the ministry and the Lynn committee) and that owing to the financial restraints he could not go as far he 'should like to go in various directions'.[102] Given the strength of opposition demonstrated in Lynn's letters, and the testimony of Rev. Corkey, the damage limitation would have been extremely limited.

5.7 Amendments

The cabinet met on 28 February, as mentioned above, to discuss 'amendments to the draft bill brought forward by the Minister for Education'.[103] The conclusions show that Londonderry opened by asking 'for a Cabinet decision upon the charges for education between the Ministry

[98] W. Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster, 1923-1947* (Belfast, n.d.), p. 19.
[99] *Hansard N.I. (Senate), i),* col. 13.
[100] Ibid., col. 13.
[101] Ibid., col. 13.
[102] Ibid., col. 114.
[103] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 28 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/72/8).

(taxation) and the Local Authorities (rates)'.[104] The Minister for Finance, Pollock, informed Londonderry that the treasury in London had already asked him if 'we had reduced the salaries of our Primary School Teachers by five per cent, as had been done in Great Britain'.[105] This, he said, showed that their expenditure would be under scrutiny from London and he 'was afraid that unless there was some substantial contribution from the rates, much of our educational expenditure will be looked upon as abnormal'.[106] They agreed on Lynn's recommendation of 4d. Buckland's observations on how the state would ultimately be burdened with the cost of education highlights the inherent failures of the system. He concluded that:

> By maintaining a close supervision of the system, by paying teachers' salaries, and by making grants to the local education authorities, the state continued to be the main source of educational finance. In 1930-31 the net cost of education to public funds was £2,174,000. The local authority contribution was theoretically £250,000 (or 7 per cent), but, owing to derating, the actual contribution was £92,000 (or 4.23 per cent)'.[107]

While this would become more of an issue for the Department of Finance in the years ahead, it nevertheless demonstrates how the transition to the new system would be problematic to the unionist politicians, clergy, and public.

The other, more contentious, amendments regarding religious instruction were addressed at the meeting. It was proposed that 'the whole of this part (Clause 32 to 36 inclusive) should be recast'.[108] This became Section 26 of the act which triggered the agitation fomented by the Protestant clergy to have it modified. The first stipulation was that 'the education authorities should be prohibited from providing religious instruction'.[109] The other two main pillars of the section expressed that denominational teaching and scripture lessons were to be given outside of school hours, and that no teachers would be obliged to give religious instruction as a condition of their appointment.[110] This linked with Section 66 of the act which

[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 38-9.
[108] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 28 Feb. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/72/8).
[109] Ibid.
[110] Ibid.

stated that a teacher's religion could not be taken into consideration when making appointments.

In the House Commons, on 14 March 1923, Parliamentary Secretary to the M.O.E., Robert McKeown, by way of introducing Londonderry, requested 'That leave be given to bring a Bill to establish Local Authorities for Education in Northern Ireland'.[111] Londonderry commenced by thanking the House for permitting him, as a non-member, to introduce the bill. He boasted that the difficulties experienced with the transfer of services and the on-going aggravated social disturbances' had not detracted from the ministry 'successfully carrying on the administration and control of Education in the Six Counties'.[112] Before progressing to the bill, he lauded the contribution of Lynn and his committee, which, given the recent correspondence between the two, seemed incongruent.

In an attempt to defuse the rising tensions, Londonderry said that he was going to take the unusual step of explaining what he hoped would 'be brought about by the operation of the Bill'.[113] He stated that he wished the bill to deliver 'for every child between the ages of 6 and 14, and in some cases up to 19, an education which will furnish him or her with the intellectual equipment to cope successfully with the difficulties which no one on his or journey through life can hope to avoid'.[114] While considering the disputatious nature of Ulster Protestantism, Londonderry offered the following cautionary text:

> With struggles between interests and prejudices, there is always a danger of the children being forgotten and of those precious and all too brief years, when the mind is receptive, being lost forever to their lasting detriment.[115]

On the subject of Local Education Authorities, he stated that he felt bound to adopt the county Council model 'because it is the recognised rating authority' and that 'the Bill, therefore, makes provision for the striking of a local rate for general educational purposes'.[116] To strike a balance, he added that he accepted the principle laid down by the Lynn Committee that 'the

[111] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i), col. 114.
[112] Ibid., col. 115.
[113] Ibid., cols. 116-17.
[114] Ibid., col., 117.
[115] Ibid., col. 118.
[116] Ibid., col. 119.

amount of assistance given out of the funds at the disposal of the Local Committees should vary in proportion to which the school comes under the authority'.[117]

On the contentious question of religious education, he declared that the 'State is non-sectarian, but not secular'.[118] Given his earlier allusion to the riots of 1922, and that religion was the most obvious ethnic marker in the state, his claim that the state was non-sectarian is unconvincing. This may have been an image that the northern government wished to present to the world, and, perhaps, even believed themselves. With a cautionary shot across the boughs of the Protestant clergy, Londonderry exclaimed that he had:

> often thought the curse of the poor man's lot has not been so much his poverty, his lack of means, as his ignorance, his lack of knowledge. His need of education through the want of opportunity has often rendered him the easy dupe of demagogues and schemers of every kind.[119]

The inference in this thinly veiled swipe at the clerics was that, if the working-class were educated, the clerics' control over them would be considerably lessened. This did not necessarily mean that he had the working classes' best interests at heart. It was more that it clashed with his patrician attitude where 'he knew what was best for the people'.[120] Fleming makes the point that it was unfortunate for him that he 'met his match in that other section of Irish society that knew what was best for the people, the clergy'.[121] Londonderry displayed a colonial style of governance in which 'the opinions of the ruled mattered little but he always aimed to improve society'.[122] As he had previously, he struck a balance by praising the Protestant churches' proud history in education and appealing to their better nature not to 'segregate their flocks'.[123] He delivered his defining clause on religious education by declaring that, given a chance, the new system would provide a 'new spirit of the new era now dawning before our eyes, tolerance and mutual respect will replace prejudice and jealous mistrust. *But beyond giving opportunities for denominational instruction the state cannot go* [author's

[117] Ibid., col. 122.
[118] Ibid., col. 125
[119] Ibid., col. 123.
[120] N. Fleming, *The seventh Marquees of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 174
[121] Ibid., p. 174.
[122] Ibid., p. 174.
[123] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i), col. 125.

emphasis]'.[124] This, as mentioned previously, would become the most contentious issue for the Protestant clerics.

5.8 Lynn's Epiphany

In a startling and most unexpected turn of events, Lynn spoke in support of Londonderry when declaring that he was glad 'to congratulate him wholeheartedly on the broad principles of the Bill as laid down'.[125] He then descended into a frenzy of sycophancy, showering Londonderry and his ministry in a deluge of superlatives. He continued that, regarding his committee's report that 'practically the Bill we are to have in a few days has been modelled on it'.[126] The reason for Lynn's Damascene conversion to one of the bill's leading advocates is not certain. Neil Fleming, however, points out that 'what is certain is that in 1924 Londonderry reluctantly contributed to Lynn's election expenses'.[127]

Lynn continued by stating that

> [n]obody is foolish enough to expect that in all the details they were bound to follow the Report of our Committee as if they were dealing with the Ten Commandments. We do not say it is the last word in educational wisdom. We do not say that it has not a large margin to play with, but I think on the whole we have laid down broad principles on which any successful scheme of education can work in this province of ours.[128]

Lynn did however offer his counsel regarding the Protestant clerics. He said that when drawing up the chapter on religious instruction, the Lynn committee had

> the unique advantage of having on the Committee the Bishop of Down and Connor, the Moderator of the General Assembly, and the Vice-President of the Methodist Conference. We had, therefore, the heads of

[124] Ibid., col. 125
[125] Ibid., col. 127
[126] Ibid., col. 128
[127] N. Fleming, *Marquees of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland* (London, 2005), p. 108. See also N. Fleming, *The seventh Marquees of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 160; N. Fleming, 'The first Government of Northern Ireland, education reform and the failure of anti-populist Unionism' in *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 18, Issue 2, (2007), pp 146–169, p. 161; Lynn to Londonderry, 6 Oct. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/11/3); Lynn to Londonderry, 9 Oct. 1924 (D3099/2/11/4); Lynn to Senator Sam Cunningham, 16 Mar. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/2/4/19B); Londonderry to Lynn, 10 June 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3480/59/46).
[128] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i), col. 128.

> the three Protestant churches with us in drawing up that chapter, and if the minister sticks to as closely as he can to that he will find there will not be very much trouble.[129]

This reveals, as stated earlier, that their recommendations on religious education were drawn up denominationally, in contravention of their remit. This advice could also, without taxing one's imagination, be interpreted as a threat not to cross the clergy whose anger he had fuelled. Most questions from the members of the House, which were broadly good-natured, centred on religious instruction and the maze of complications concerning local authorities. Lynn's counsel would prove to be accurate.

5.9 The Backlash: Oct. 1922 – Apr. 1923

The Protestant clergy's objections, as documented by Rev. Corkey, were predicated on the non-implementation of the Lynn Committee's recommendations on religious instruction and appointing teachers. Section VI of the first draft stipulated that 'each school shall be open to children of all communions for combined literary and *moral instruction* [author's emphasis]'.[130] Moral instruction, the same phrase used by Stanley, would become pivotal to Londonderry convincing the Protestant clerics to agree to the second reading of the bill. Section 26 of the bill provided opportunities for denominational religious teaching by clergymen and other persons to whom the parents did not object. The important caveat that caused the disquiet amongst the Protestant clergy was that any religious education would have to take place outside of compulsory hours of attendance and not provided by the educational authority, i.e., public money was not to be used. Rev. Corkey would become one of the most prominent and forceful personalities in the Protestant clergy's ongoing battles with the M.O.E. throughout the decade. Akenson's description of him as being capable of 'immense bitterness and of vicious invective' and 'at a minimum, a zealot in matters of religious education' was neither inaccurate nor exaggerated.[131]

Corkey was also part of a group calling itself the Northern Ireland School Managers Association, which was set up in late 1922.[132] They were set up in response to, and suspicion

[129] Ibid., col. 131.
[130] First draft education bill (copy no. 11) Section VI (41) p. 28 Oct. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A1/17)
[131] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 75.
[132] W. J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 1, p. 2. McAllister does not provide a date for its formation.

of, the amount of proposed governmental control in the management of their schools. The group, led by the clerics from the Protestant churches, appear to have been a loose alliance as they are not mentioned by name in any of the literature, apart from Rev. Corkey who refers to them as 'Protestant managers of schools'.[133] McAllister does not mention them after this but, as in other literature on the topic, refers to delegations. They would, McAllister says, have private meetings with the government throughout 1924 to see if 'a solution could be found to heal what was becoming a serious division between the Government and the Protestant churches'.[134]The clergy also insisted that not taking a teacher's religion into consideration could lead to Catholics teaching in their schools. The Protestant clergy were, as part of their longer-term strategy, ignoring the reality that these were merely *recommendations* that were presented to the M.O.E. for consideration. It is necessary to stress this point at this stage, as there is the possibility of it being lost in the war of semantics that would ensue between the two parties. In his memoir, Corkey concluded that Londonderry, much to the 'bitter disappointment' of those interested in educational reform, wanted to operate 'a clearly secular system of education, which was totally alien to the wishes of the Ulster people, Protestant and Catholic alike'.[135] This accusation will be shown to be without foundation. It was disingenuous of Corkey to suggest that he was in any way concerned about Catholic schools as they were not part of this scenario. That aside, the observation conveyed the mood and the objections of the Protestant clerics.

In the wake of the 'Education Bill recently introduced to the Parliament of Northern Ireland', the Board of Education of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland gathered and drafted its concerns for the attention of the ministry.[136] On the question of administration there was, surprisingly, only one objection. On the principal of religious instruction and appointment of teachers, they suggested that amendments should be introduced 'based in general on the recommendations of Section VI of the Lynn Report'.[137] They suggested that local authorities provide denominational instruction, prepared by the Protestant churches, and taught by Protestant teachers.[138] The strategy of continually referring to Lynn's

[133] W. Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 26.
[134] Ibid., p. 11. See p. 17 Chapter 5 for further developments.
[135] Ibid., p. 19.
[136] Conclusions from Board of Education Board of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, n/d but it is early 1923 as it was first response to the introduction of the bill (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9). See this file also for individual cases outlining the same grievances, as put forward by the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church of Ireland.
[137] Ibid.
[138] Ibid.

recommendations was fully functional at this point. In contravention of the bill, it demanded that religion be taught denominationally, with clerical input. It also shoehorned in the proviso that the teacher would have had to be Protestant. The second demand centred on the right of clergy, of each denomination, to set the programme for 'catechetical or other religious instruction' with the stipulation that 'teachers may voluntarily give such instruction if they have the approval of the authorities of the denomination of the parents to whose children are being instructed'.[139] This was designed to increase the clerics' authority by securing their right to set the programme for denominational religious instruction. The approval of teachers by denomination was edging towards securing the right to appoint Protestant teachers for Protestant schools. The clerics were intensifying the pressure on the M.O.E. to concede on these issues.

The third demand concentrated on the right to impart 'Scriptural and denominational instruction' by persons 'appointed thereto by the authorities of the Churches'.[140] In some respects this overlapped with the previous demands, but it was the first time that the issue of Scriptural instruction was openly addressed. Teaching the Scriptures was central to the Protestant faith and the clerics believed that this could only be done by clerics, or Protestant teachers. This section also demanded that this instruction should take place during school hours by those appointed by the authorities of the churches; another attempt to secure the appointing of teachers. The fifth demand stated that the Board could not 'approve of the proposal in the Bill to place the appointment of Teachers and the ordinary duties of managers in the hands of Education Committees of Boroughs or of Regional Committees of Counties'.[141] The demands directly challenged Lord Londonderry's prerequisite that religion would not be taught during school hours and that the authority to appoint, and dismiss, teachers rested with the local management, i.e., the clerics. Overlapping these demands was calculated to ensure that there was no margin for ambiguity or misunderstanding.

It is worth noting that, generally, teachers of all denominations were candidly critical of the previous regime and welcoming of Londonderry's bill. As seen already, the I.N.T.O., albeit with a few reservations, were in favour of it. Minutes from a meeting of the inter-denominational Belfast Teachers' Association, 15 February 1922, show that they found the old system of local school management repressive and incompetent. They wanted a strong

[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.

centralised M.O.E. that would compel the local authorities, who they distrusted, to address their shortcomings. They called for representation on all school management committees and the instigation of new appeal procedures for dismissed teachers.[142] This suggests that teachers were at the mercy of the local clerical managers when it came to their appointment and dismissal. On 10 September 1923, the *Belfast Telegraph* reported that J. Smith, of the predominantly Protestant Ulster National Teachers' Union, when speaking in favour of the proposals, said that denominationalism had cursed our country and that 'Teachers in these schools owed their appointment not to their scholastic attainments nor to their efficiency as school keepers but to the favour of interested parties or their willingness to perform duties altogether outside the province of a secular teacher'.[143] On 25 June the *Northern Whig* reported that the organisation of Irish Protestant National Teachers was more robust in its condemnation of those who wanted to 'secure compulsion on, and clerical control of, the teachers' by 'heartless and despotic managers'.[144] The Protestant churches, in their quest for dominance, were oblivious to the input of the teachers who would, after all, be the ones educating the children who would fill the new provided and transferred schools.

On Monday, 9 April 1923 'the Minister, accompanied by the Parliamentary Secretary Mr McKeown, and the Permanent Secretary Mr. McQuibban' received a sizable deputation of the three main Protestant churches, eleven clergy in total.[145] The Bishop of Down, the Right Rev. Grierson, informed Londonderry that religious education and the appointment of teachers 'which the three churches were bringing forward had been previously determined upon by a unanimous vote of each church taken separately'.[146] It is significant that the Rev. Cannon Brown (Church of Ireland), Rev. Dr Bingham (Presbyterian) and Rev. W.H. Smyth (Methodist), who were in attendance, were on the sub-committee appointed by the Lynn Committee to oversee religious education. Rev. Grierson then said that '[t]heir fundamental position was that they could not hand over schools unless in the Bill it were enacted that daily scriptural lessons should be given by teachers'.[147] He told Londonderry that he also wanted permission for the teachers to deliver denominational instruction adding that they would not transfer schools until the power was returned to school committees.[148] These points were

[142] Minutes of Belfast teachers' association, 15 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: D1285/1).
[143] *Belfast Telegraph*, Sept. 1923.
[144] *Northern Whig*, 25 June 1922.
[145] Minutes of meeting between M.O.E. and deputation from three main Protestant churches, 9 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D30995/9).
[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.
[148] Ibid.

developed by other members of the deputation. Rev. Pratt expressed concern that 'the appointment of teachers by the Regional Committee in County Fermanagh would mean the appointment of Roman Catholic teachers in Protestant schools'.[149] The principles guiding this concern would be argued in more detail in the House of Commons in May, by Dr Hugh Morrison, MP for Queen's University.[150] As shall be seen, the prospect of this faux concern becoming a reality was unlikely, in the extreme. The meeting concluded with Londonderry assuring the delegation that he would 'endeavour to make some amendments to the Bill which would reassure the Churches', and that he was confident that the regional committees would 'use their authority in a no [sic] partisan manner'.[151] It was becoming more apparent that Londonderry's bill would have a difficult passage from within the party and from the clerics.

At a cabinet meeting on 16 April, the day before the second reading of the bill, Londonderry expressed his concern that he was 'being very hard pressed by the clergy to allow denominational teaching within the hours of compulsory attendance'.[152] He stated that '*moral instruction* should be of an entirely undenominational character given by teachers during compulsory hours as part of a curriculum and obligatory upon all children'.[153] Londonderry said that Craig had suggested that, in the event of denominational instruction being allowed, the regional committees would have the say on which days it would be permitted. After objections from the John Andrews and Robert McKeown, Craig expressed the opinion that it would force local authorities to 'face their own difficulties instead of fixing them on the shoulders of the Government'.[154] The tensions between local authorities and central government are clearly detectable in this exchange. This was another difficulty that Londonderry would have to contend with. After further discussion it was agreed that Londonderry should 'proceed on the Bill without foreshadowing any further amendment than the insertion of some words making the introduction of moral instruction into their curriculum obligatory upon all Education Authorities'.[155] Finally it was agreed that, failing this, Craig's scheme should be adopted. As it was, Londonderry had no intention of following Craig's lead on denominational teaching.

[149] Ibid.
[150] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i), col. 917.
[151] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 16 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/77).
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

Lord Londonderry opened his second reading of the bill on 17 April by reassuring the House that he had spent the time from the reading of the first bill 'studying and appraising at their correct value the different criticisms which those proposals have evoked'.[156] He said that he did not 'substantially differ' from the Lynn committee on the question of administration.[157] He added that he was 'contemplating the establishment of some 20 Regional areas under Regional Committees, each serving the requirements of an average population of some 40,000'.[158] He was clear that in framing the bill, he

> was particularly anxious to give full opportunity to the churches for denominational instruction, and I think I may fairly claim to have been successful. The question arose as to how this instruction could be given in accordance with the tenets of all the various denominations, and yet inflict no hardship upon those children whose parents belong to a particular denomination. I therefore decided to grant the use of school buildings to the representatives of all denominations, outside those hours during which children are required attend compulsorily.[159]

He was transparent and unambiguous that denominational religious instruction was to occur outside of school hours.

In referring to the curriculum he stated that he 'never had any doubt in my mind that each regional committee would prescribe in the curriculum a certain length of time every day, or its equivalent in the week, during which *teachers could impart to the children the lessons of Christian teaching and those moral principles to which we all subscribe* [author's emphasis]'.[160] This was establishing the principle of 'moral instruction'. He did not suggest that he was going to allow denominational education during school hours. He added that he had not considered it

> necessary, at first, to include a provision for this in the Bill. However, from the various representations which have been made to me, since the introduction of the Bill, and from the deputations which I have met, I have

[156] *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i), col. 341.
[157] Ibid., col. 346.
[158] Ibid., col. 347.
[159] Ibid., col. 351.
[160] Ibid., col. 351.

> changed my opinion on this point, and I now agree that we should include in the Bill such provisions as will ensure that instruction of this description will be imparted to the children. I intend, therefore, on the committee stage, to introduce words calculated to give effect to this proposal'.[161]

His intimation of his intention to change the wording had most probably sold the clerics on the idea.

Londonderry was keen to disparage the notion that the government 'attaches too much weight to the secular training of the young' as a 'complete fallacy'.[162] He held that he had 'come to the conclusion that, unless we lay down, as a government, our adherence to Christian principles and the belief that we hold in the necessity for associating Christian ethics with secular teaching, we shall not be discharging the duty which we owe to the rising generation'.[163] The use of the words, principles and ethics, do not suggest denominational or Scriptural teaching. They did, however, provide Londonderry with room to manoeuvre. Here again he found an ally in Lynn who contributed, as if on cue, that there had

> been a considerable amount of misunderstanding in the country regarding the clause dealing with religious instruction. I should say however that those misunderstandings will be removed by the speech made today…therefore there will be no trouble, at any rate so far as the Protestant churches are concerned, regarding religious teaching.[164]

Lynn's contribution would carry considerable sway in convincing the clerics of Londonderry's sincerity of purpose. He was not to go unchallenged however, with his perceived treachery being called out later in the year. The groundwork to bring the clerics back into alignment with the bill had been laid. The second reading of the bill, designed to ease the fears of the Protestant clergy would now be put to the test. This would also provide the ministry with an opportunity to gauge if it was in a favourable position with the clergy and its supporters. The future of Protestant education, and Londonderry's political career in N.I., hung in the balance.

[161] Ibid., col. 351.
[162] Ibid., col. 352
[163] Ibid., col. 352.
[164] Ibid., col. 360.

Chapter 6: Condemnation, Confrontation, and Capitulation

The second reading of the Londonderry Bill on 17 April was designed to allay the concerns of the deputation of clerics who met with the M.O.E. the previous week. While the initial reaction to the second reading appeared favourable, it would prove short lived. This chapter will examine the causes of the Protestant churches' paradigm shift from their congratulatory disposition to the second reading, to forcefully seeking to have it amended. Their rationale for a more regular and forceful use of the Orange Order's considerable power to pressurise the government on their behalf will also be considered. The intricate workings of the triumvirate, consisting of the Protestant churches, the Orange Order, and the U.U.P., will be carefully examined to demonstrate how they were interdependent on each other, while also being central to all negotiations and their outcomes. Providing a coherent understanding of these contributory factors will add to a more nuanced and broader appreciation of why the bill's passage to the statute books was so problematic and troubled.

6.1 Compliments and Admonishments: Apr. 1923

The day after the second reading of the bill, Lord Londonderry received a letter from Dr Charles Grierson, C. of I. Bishop of Down, Connor and Dromore, congratulating him on his 'great speech'.[1] While the bishop acknowledged that there 'would be differences and strong arguments in regard to various points' he also thanked Londonderry for 'generously meeting the wishes of the Deputation of the Protestant Churches'.[2] A mistaken understanding that Londonderry had included 'daily religious instruction' in the bill would become central to the Protestant clerics' later disputes with the M.O.E.[3] The Synod of Belfast, at a meeting on 24 April, also welcomed Londonderry's 'promise' to include recommendations on 'Christian teaching, and those moral principles to which we all subscribe'.[4] They added that 'the provisions to be introduced should be in accordance with the recommendation of the Lynn Committee. Part IV'.[5] The policy of adhering to the Lynn report remained a constant. Their eagerness to accept this measure is difficult to understand. On the appointing of teachers, they argued that the ministry should choose from a list of candidates supplied by the committees as recommended by Lynn.[6] They also protested that they were unhappy at the prospect of R.C.

[1] Bishop Grierson to Londonderry 18 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Synod of Belfast Resolutions 24 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

majority councils having control over Protestant schools. The synod suggested that the M.O.E. bear the full cost of heating and cleaning in voluntary schools. This is somewhat surprising as the bill recommended that voluntary schools bear the full cost. The predominant mood emanating from the Synod's resolutions towards the bill was one of optimism.

Londonderry replied to Bishop Grierson on 26 April in order to 'avoid any possible misunderstanding'.[7] This letter is crucial in the timeline of events that led to the Protestant clerics' future backlash where some would personally attack Londonderry. More importantly, on a personal level for Londonderry, it shielded his integrity as an honest broker and from future accusations of perfidy. Londonderry stressed that 'religious instruction, in the sense in which the term is used in the bill, will only be given outside the hours of compulsory attendance'.[8] He unequivocally laid out his intentions for the 'type of instruction which I shall call for the sake of clearness, not religious but moral instruction'.[9] He clarified that this was the instruction that he had mentioned in his speech and which he 'promised to make obligatory by amendment'.[10] He further clarified that

> such teaching must necessarily be absolutely undenominational [sic]… It thus cannot include reading from pages of the Bible itself, which will, I hope, form part of that religious instruction specifically alluded to in in Clause 26 of the Bill. But it can and will contain lessons in Christian morality and Christian principles, which are the basis of good citizenship, and, in my opinion, cannot better be illustrated than by examples taken from Our Lord's teaching and Biblical history, and, of course, the Bible will form the best Textbook from which to draw these lessons'. [11]

Londonderry was at pains to appease the bishop by suggesting that the moral instruction would be, in all but name, Bible instruction. The salient point is that Londonderry had been totally transparent with Bishop Grierson. The bishop had been part of the deputation that met with the M.O.E. the previous week, and was, therefore, in regular contact with the clergy who were representing the main Protestant churches. This again will prove crucial to the timeline of events

[7] Londonderry to Bishop Grierson 26 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.

when it comes to understanding the clergies' later accusations that have left Londonderry with a reputation for perfidy.

6.2 Haggling and Posturing: May 1923

Delegates selected to represent the three main churches met on 1 May to formulate a document with suggested amendments to the bill. They wrote to Londonderry on 3 May requesting the ministry to consider implementing amendments on religious instruction, the appointment of teachers and, to a lesser extent, grants for heating and cleaning of schools. They said that religious instruction was presently

> given during the half hour of the school day immediately before the marking of the roll, and included in the subjects marked on the time-table. It was thus within the school hours, but not within the compulsory curriculum. Religious Instruction is given, as a rule, Scriptural, except on one day of the week when denominational instruction is given.[12]

The delegates argued that the plan had worked well in the past and that they could not be 'satisfied with anything less'.[13] They further suggested that 'instead of making denominational instruction an extra, it should take the place of Scriptural Instruction on one day of the week'.[14] They continued that they thought 'that those who have built and equipped the schools should have a recognised part in the appointment of teachers and in the management of schools if they are transferred to the Education Authority'.[15] There was an inferred threat that if these concessions were not granted, they would not co-operate with the M.O.E. to the point of non-transferral of schools.

The delegation commenced their list of requests with the central caveat that they 'should be based in general on the recommendations in Section VI of the Lynn Report'.[16] As this section has been documented previously there is no need to detail their requests, but the caveat does support this work's contention that the Lynn report was drafted with a confrontation in mind. The representatives did, however, manage to bring the Catholic bishops' refusal to transfer their schools into the discourse. The Protestant clerics argued that because

[12] Delegates of the Protestant churches to Londonderry, 3 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

Catholic schools would not come under the authority of the regional committees, 'it would be manifestly unjust to give the power of appointing teachers and of management in provided and transferred schools to Regional Committees where the membership will be predominantly Roman Catholic, and where only schools with a majority of Protestant children would be under these committees'.[17] This was possible, but the probability of a R.C. regional committee interfering in the running of a Protestant school was negligible, and they certainly would not have appointed R.C. teachers in their schools. This served as a false pretext for arguing that Lynn's recommendation for school committees should be implemented. They suggested that 'the principal of each school should be of the same religious denomination as the majority of the children'.[18] In conclusion, they declared that if these concessions were not granted, they would 'find it impossible to recommend the transference of schools to the Education Authority'.[19] It would appear that the clergy were seeking to establish a quasi-transactional relationship with the government. This form of relationship, based on conditional loyalty, would become more pronounced as the decade, and the century, progressed.[20]

Londonderry drafted a memo, dated 7 May, in response to the delegates' proposed amendments.[21] The memo provides an insight into Londonderry's rationale on religious instruction, and how he would proceed to defend it when he met the clerics. The memo began dismantling the Protestant churches' argument by comparing the rules of the Commissioners to those of the bill, to demonstrate that 'the fundamental principles of the system of public education remain unchanged'.[22] The comparisons are too numerous to document here but the first one is representative of what followed and will suffice for demonstrating the tone of the memo. Rule of the Commissioner's code stated that 'the object of the system of national education is to afford combined literary and moral, and separate religious instruction, to children of all persuasions'.[23] The bill stated that 'the school shall be open to children of all religious denominations for combined literary and moral instruction'.[24] This theme continued throughout the memo and it demonstrated very clearly that there were no discernible

[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See C.J.V. Loughlin, Labour *and the politics of disloyalty in Belfast, 1921-39 - the moral economy of loyalty* (Basingstoke, 2018), pp 1-29.
[21] MOE memo, 7 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2; D3099/5/9; D3099/5/8).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.

differences between the two sets of codes on religious instruction. The question of the appointment of teachers received similar scrutiny with the same outcome.

The memo's conclusion stated that the denominational and the scriptural went 'hand in hand' under the commissioners, and would do so under the bill.[25] It continued that the bill had been 'carefully crafted' to preserve the existing custom in regard to religious instruction, as established under the rules of the commissioners.[26] Finally, it pointed out that the parliamentary draughtsman had advised that any departure from the amendments already tabled by the government would involve an infringement of Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act, and of Article 16 of the Irish Free State Agreement Act. The memo appeared to make a watertight argument that the bill had not strayed from the core values of the commissioners while adhering to the legal restraints imposed by the aforementioned acts. An observation midway through the memo revealed how the government viewed the clerics' *modus operandi*, stating that 'the remedy against a tyrannical Minister, acting against the will of the people … is easy and at hand, where he is … the servant of a popularly elected Parliament'.[27] The top civil servants in the M.O.E. were convinced that the clerics had employed the tactic of portraying Londonderry as the enemy. It was also intriguing that they chose the phrase 'elected Parliament', as Londonderry had not been elected but 'like all patrician politicians in the early twentieth century he relied on the good will of an elected politician [James Craig] for his position'.[28]

Another memo from the M.O.E., dated 7 May, set out to deal with the question of the appointment of teachers in transferred schools.[29] As with the previous memo on religious instruction, this was also prepared to answer the questions of the Protestant clerics. The first point addressed the clerics' demand that the appointment of teachers in transferred schools should lie with the school committee and not the regional committee as the bill directed. Their rationale was that, as R.C.'s had declared their intention not to transfer, they should not have a say in the appointment of teachers in transferred Protestant schools. They argued that they would be able to do so in 'a predominantly Roman Catholic area, or on which there are any Roman Catholic members at all'.[30] The memo advised that the answer to this should be that 'the Roman Catholics will have to pay for the privilege of keeping their schools to themselves,

[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] N. Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 174.
[29] M.O.E. memo, 7 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2).
[30] Ibid.

and the Protestants, if they are willing to pay the additional expense, may enjoy the same privilege'.[31] The clerics also argued that these committees could appoint R.C. teachers to Protestant schools. This was a highly unlikely occurrence; such was the Catholic Bishops' control over their teachers. It is plausible that the politicians understood that the clerics would have known a teachers' religious affiliation by his or her school background and that it was customary for the parish priest to provide a reference, meaning that they could have considered an applicant's religion without technically violating the law.[32]

The clerics suggested that the issue could result in the Protestant schools not transferring. The ministry's response was that it neither contemplated nor desired 'to set up a camouflaged system where under transferred schools are nothing more than schools under private denominational management at the public expense'.[33] This was a swipe at the Lynn model of not funding R.C. schools that did not transfer, but funding Protestant schools that transferred, yet granting them the same religious and administrative autonomy as the R.C. schools. The clerics' final grievance was that Catholic regional committees would 'act tyrannically in their appointments to schools attended by a large majority of Protestant children'.[34] The M.O.E. quoted an amendment, clause 96, which would safeguard against the unfair exercise of powers by a religious majority on any regional committee against a religious minority. The memo concluded by providing three definitive reasons why the appointment of teachers was given to the regional committee. The first was that it was 'de facto owner of the schools' and the second was that it would 'enable a regular system of promotion for teachers to be established under the authority'.[35] The latter alludes to the restrictive nature of the old managerial system. This also indicates why all teachers' unions supported the act. The third explained that it would 'enormously ease the difficulties which always occur under the present system whenever it is proposed to amalgamate existing schools under private managership'.[36] This episode highlights the complex issues encountered by the ministry in trying to gain acceptance for these basic changes. These changes would have provided teachers with more

[31] Ibid.
[32] S. Farren, *The politics of Irish education, 1920-1965 (*Belfast, 1995*)*, p. 71; Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973*)*, pp 76-7; W. Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster* (Belfast, n.d.), p 31.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.

job security with improved prospects of promotion and incremental wage increases. This mattered little to the clerics who wanted to maintain control of the schools and the teachers.

6.3 Betrayal or Misguided Hope?

On 8 May, Hugh Pollock, the Minister for Finance, represented the government in the final negotiations when 'section 26 was redrafted to meet the Churches objection'.[37] He submitted the draft to the heads of the Protestant churches at the meeting in Stormont.[38] Rev. Bingham's (Presbyterian) letter of thanks to Lord Londonderry suggests that he had already provided him with a copy of the amendment the day before. Rev. Bingham thanked Londonderry for the wording of the amendment which he would present to the Education Board of his Assembly.[39] Bishop Grierson (C. of I.) also wrote to Londonderry to say that 'the change seems to me to meet all our wishes' and that 'we owe you a debt of gratitude for meeting so fully our wishes'.[40] Charles Frederick D'Arcy, the Archbishop of Armagh, wrote to Londonderry on 9 May to thank him warmly for 'the proposed amendment to Clause 26 [which] is, in my opinion, a perfect solution to all our difficulties'. [41] He concluded that, having been shown a copy of the proposed amendment by Pollock, 'I can assure [you] that we were very grateful for the complete way in which our points have been dealt with'.[42]

On 9 May, Parliamentary Secretary Robert McKeown delivered what Akenson termed 'the colourless explanation' of the redrafted clause 26.[43] McKeown communicated how the M.O.E. understood that 'fears have been expressed that the wording of the bill would preclude in provided or transferred schools, religious instruction which, while non-catechetical, might include the reading of the scriptures. The amendment now proposed will, it is believed, remove all doubt on this point'.[44] This was followed on 10 May by Rev. Smyth (Methodist) who wished to thank Londonderry 'for the Clause dealing with religious instruction as passed yesterday in the House of Commons. You have met the Churches in an admirable manner'.[45] Minutes from the General Methodist Education Fund's annual meeting in May also acknowledged that the

[37] D. Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 67. Akenson could not provide the exact date for this as the archival records were unavailable at the time.
[38] Ibid., p. 67.
[39] Rev. Bingham to Londonderry, 8 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[40] Bishop Grierson to Londonderry, 8 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[41] Archbishop D'Arcy to Londonderry, 9 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[42] Ibid.
[43] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 67.
[44] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series,* vol. 1: *Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of, session 1922*, col. 791 (*Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i).
[45] Rev. W.H. Smyth to Londonderry 10 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

bill had been amended to their satisfaction.[46] The issue of the bill, or indeed the act, was not addressed at any of the quarterly meetings of the C. of I. Board of Education throughout 1923.[47] As an all-Ireland body, this absence is somewhat mysterious, even more so as there was mention of their dissatisfaction at teachers having to go to Belfast instead of Kildare Street for training which they suggested could 'risk non-employment' for them.[48]

There is a crucial timeline to follow when assessing these events. It is critical to deconstructing the clerics' claims that Londonderry had deceived them into agreeing to the amended section. Farren goes some way to supporting the clerics' interpretation when suggesting that Londonderry 'maintained a degree of deliberate vagueness around the definition of moral instruction'.[49] A first reading of the evidence suggests that Akenson, and to a lesser extent Farren, might have been correct in their accusation that Londonderry was being strategically ambiguous.[50] Farren quotes from Akenson's use of Londonderry's letter to Bishop Grierson on 26 April explaining what he meant by 'moral instruction'.[51] The fundamental point that is missed here is that the letter categorically forewarned and forearmed the clergy to the meaning of moral instruction contained in the amendment. Akenson also subscribes to this theory, describing Londonderry as 'studiously vague' in public and 'only in private did Lord Londonderry fully define his views'.[52] Akenson, as mentioned, quotes the correspondence between Londonderry and the bishop, but also fails to grasp its significance in the context of the Protestant churches' reaction to the May amendment. The letter makes it clear that Bishop Grierson had this crucial information before the collective bishops had agreed to the amendment. This means one of three things. The first, for reasons best known to him, Bishop Grierson decided to keep this information to himself. The second is that he simply did not grasp the essence of what Londonderry was saying and therefore did not properly interpret his intentions. Thirdly, he relayed it as it was written, and in their eagerness for a resolution or victory, they heard what they wanted to hear. Also, at a cabinet meeting held on 15 December 1922, Lord Londonderry stated that 'while the ministry provided facilities it would not be responsible for denominational instruction'; the principle was constant, denominational instruction could occur outside of compulsory school hours.[53] Considering the triumvirate

[46] *General Methodist Education Fund*, May 1923 (Edgehill Theological College Library).
[47] Board of education minutes book, C. of I. 1923 (C. of I. Diocesan Records, GS/1/5).
[48] Ibid., 22/3/1923 (C. of I. Diocesan Records, GS/1/5).
[49] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 65.
[50] Ibid.; Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 68.
[51] Ibid., Londonderry to Bishop Grierson 26 Apr. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[52] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 68.
[53] Conclusions of cabinet meeting, 15 Dec. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/61).

relationship between certain ministers, the Orange Order, and the churches, it is highly probable that this information had reached the clergy. The bill passed into law 2 June 1923 and now the battle was set to rage with an intensity that would endure for the remainder of the decade. The characterisation of Londonderry as a deceitful and dishonest broker has, in this instance, been disproved. He had not prevaricated in his dealings with the Protestant clergy.

The exchange instead demonstrates that Londonderry had been clear and unequivocal in spelling out to the heads of the churches what was meant by moral instruction. He met with them collectively and individually, responding to their correspondences on the subject with all the clarity and transparency that the situation allowed him. The strong accord across the main Protestant churches that the amendments to Section 26 had met their expectations, bears testimony to this. This proved to be a false dawn for the clerical controversialists which could be attributed, in part, to an apparent pique of eagerness that saw them blinded in the headlights of hope and expectation. They had not properly interpreted the amendment as it again concluded with the caveat that the M.O.E. would not provide such instruction, meaning that it had to occur outside the hours of compulsory attendance. The misinterpretation of the amendment as a victory would embitter the more confrontational elements within the clerics who would become even more adversarial in pursuing their cause. Apart from the fact that Londonderry was a strong advocate of non-denominational education, the Government of Ireland Act precluded him from allocating public funding for religious education, which the clerics were aware of. This further supports the argument that the clerics knew this from the Lynn committee stage and were now prepared to engage in a protracted struggle with the M.O.E.

6.4 Passing the Bill, Striking a Balance: June 1923

The bill was passed on 2 June but would not be engrossed onto the statute books until 1 October the same year.[54] On introducing the bill to the Senate on 4 June, Londonderry remarked:

> I have endeavoured, as I have said, to keep the interests of the children before my own mind and before the minds of everyone else, and to endeavour to urge them to realise that this is the paramount necessity, and all sectional interests and all sectional duties must give way to our one

[54] N. Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 160.

> object, that is to give the children of the Six Counties the best possible education.[55]

This foregrounded the educational needs of the children as a counter to the clergy's objections and desire for control. Covering another area of controversy, he added that the bill was making 'the long step from the centralised system to a system of democratic control'.[56] The word democratic connoted that the old system of clerical control had been autocratic and no longer tolerable. Londonderry was anxious to abolish the old managerial system as he considered it the root cause of 'so many of Ulster's educational ills'.[57]

Londonderry struck a balance by next thanking the churches for having 'done more, perhaps than any other section of the community in imparting education to the youth of the country'.[58] He continued that 'the administration of education has already been unified by the coming into existence of the Ministry of Education' before referring again to the 'paramount object' which was the 'welfare of the child'. He spoke at length of the need for the government to feed children. He acknowledged that this policy had been criticised on the grounds that it was 'atrophying the efforts of those who ought to be responsible for feeding school children'.[59] He defended implementing the policy by arguing that it was 'folly … to endeavour to impart education to the young when they are incapable of assimilating the education imparted to them' because of hunger.[60] This more humanitarian and politically progressive side to Londonderry jarred uncomfortably with Ulster Unionism, and even more so with the clerics. This contrasted with the parsimoniousness that characterised Ulster Unionists 'who were shaped by early Edwardian loyalism and obsessed with the need for unionist unity'.[61] While acknowledging that poverty was commonplace throughout Britain at the time, Londonderry nevertheless exposed the levels of poverty that existed in the new state.

Addressing Lynn's recommendations, Londonderry said that he was following them by 'making the great step from the centralised system to the system of control by the local people

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[55] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series,* vol. 3: *Third session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, Senate, session 1923,* col. 150 (*Hansard N.I. (Senate),* i).
[56] Ibid.
[57] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 71.
[58] *Hansard N.I. (Senate), i)* col. 152.
[59] Ibid., col. 152.
[60] Ibid., col. 152.
[61] N. Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 129.

themselves'.[62] In this case, there was a verbal sleight of hand as he deliberately misinterpreted what Lynn meant by local control. He then stated, in direct contrast to Lynn's recommendations, that because the county councils were the actual rating authorities it would be better if they were established at once as education authorities. He spuriously, or naively, stated that these councils served their communities without favour.[63] He stated that 'the best way in which the county councils can operate as the education authority would be through what we call regional committees'.[64] Londonderry suggested that the counties being divided into local committees would 'have the advantage of being large enough to escape what I may call parochial influences, and yet not be so large as not to be sensible of and susceptible to local necessities'.[65] This was another critique of the old system where the teachers loathed and feared the influence of a vindictive clerical manager who could dismiss them on a whim.[66] Fleming argues that Craig selected Londonderry for the position because Craig had recognised 'his ability to fall into line'.[67] This is not an inaccurate depiction of this side of Londonderry's character; but there was also a strand to his complex character where he would stand firm on a point of principle as seen in his opposition to a bill that proposed the elimination of women jurors.[68] The speech captured this complexity as he sought to placate the bill's detractors, while simultaneously antagonising them. He experienced similar difficulties when balancing his principles on education against those who sought to undermine it.

6.5 Clarity and Acceptance

Londonderry stated that the M.O.E. had accepted the Lynn committee's proposal that the amount of local assistance that comes from the rates should vary with the amount of local control which is exercised by the people themselves. He then listed the three categories of schools, as dealt with in Chapter 4. Addressing the topic of religious instruction, Londonderry stated that 'we have established what has always been the practice in the past – that religious

[62] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 154.
[63] For further reading see M, Elliot, *Hearthlands: a memoir of the White City housing estate Belfast* (Belfast, 2017); M, Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange state* (London, 1980); Loughlin, *Labour and the politics of disloyalty in Belfast*; J. O'Brien, *Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 1920-1939: myth or reality?* (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2010).
[64] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 154.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 67; T, Walsh, 'The national system of education, 1831-2000' in Walsh, B., (ed), *Essays in the history of Irish education* (London, 2016).
[67] N. Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry: a political life* (PhD, Queen's University, Belfast, 2002), p. 129.
[68] Cabinet conclusions 25 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/1/35/18).

education should be given in school hours, but not in compulsory school hours'.[69] Londonderry was unambiguous that the Government of Ireland Act prevented the M.O.E. from providing religious instruction in transferred schools. He added that religious education was given before roll call in the old system, which technically meant that it was outside of school hours. He elaborated that his proposed education system would 'allow the denominations to give their denominational instruction, and that we should give an opportunity for that instruction, but that it should be instruction in which the Education Authority as representing the people cannot take any part and on which it cannot expend any money'.[70]

This definition explicitly specified the M.O.E.'s position that it could not consent to denominational religious instruction during compulsory hours of attendance, as stipulated in Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act. When looked at another way, it offered a compromise of sorts that the clergy were not willing to accept. He sought to remove any doubt by pointing out that the M.O.E. was determined that moral instruction should be associated with secular instruction as part of what he called 'civics'.[71] Rev. Corkey would later accuse Londonderry of treachery as he had promised the Protestant churches that 'provision would be made in the bill for religious instruction'.[72] Corkey added that a few days later Bishop Grierson received a letter from Londonderry which stated that he had not meant 'Bible instruction' but 'instruction in Civics and Ethics and good citizenship'.[73] He declared this to be treachery and vowed to 'denounce it in every town in Northern Ireland'.[74] This was a partisan misrepresentation of the facts. It does, however, serve to illustrate the depth of ill-feeling that the bill was engendering among significant numbers of the Protestant clergy.

Londonderry added that the inauguration of the new system would enable them 'to produce as loyal citizens as have ever existed in these Six Counties in the past'.[75] Further into the speech he spoke of how 'we made up our minds that we would do whatever lay in our power to benefit that portion of the community which expressly came under our jurisdiction, and also to prove ourselves to be loyal citizens of the Empire which we have always claimed to be in the past'.[76] This statement was blatantly sectarian in its nature as he knew that the

[69] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 158.
[70] Ibid., col. 158.
[71] Ibid., col. 158.
[72] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 23.
[73] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 23.
[74] Ibid., p. 23.
[75] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 158.
[76] Ibid., col. 160.

community he was referring to was Protestant. He knew most Catholics would not have identified as being loyal, or part of the Empire, and had therefore excluded them from being represented. He was long enough in the political environment of N.I. to have matured beyond any naivety that might have excused such an oversight. It was possible, as the Catholic authorities had unconditionally opted out, that he could concentrate his efforts on the one audience that needed persuasion. The more probable motive was that he was courting favour for the bill from those doubters and dissenters in the Senate.

The speech was patently structured to appeal to, and appease, the loyalist leanings of those who opposed the bill inside and outside the senate. His speech did not, and neither was it intended to, alleviate any of the alienation felt by the Catholic population. Even if the Catholic alienation was imposed by their cardinal, Londonderry's language did nothing to improve relations or facilitate the Catholic authorities to reconsider their position. Rhetoric of this sort would have, in the eyes of the cardinal and most Catholics, vindicated the decision to remain apart from the process. The nuances of the speech also accentuate the complexities of Londonderry's character and how he attempted to navigate between the dissenters and the restraints of the Government of Ireland Act. In one breath, he sought to subdue the objectors by appealing to that which underpinned Ulster Unionism – their loyalism.[77] In the next breath he would slight them when alluding to the clerics autocratic control of education.[78]

Despite some lingering misgivings which surrounded the bill, it was generally well received. Joseph Cunningham, senator, Grand Master of the Orange Order in Belfast and trades unionist, congratulated him on explaining the bill very clearly.[79] He stated that Londonderry had 'certainly cut a great deal of the ground from below our feet in matters we may have objected to'.[80] He stated it to be 'working men's legislation' that was 'intended specially … for working class children'.[81] He declared that the recommendations made by the 'Labour associations' of which he was a member 'have almost all been embodied in the bill'.[82] He pointed out that he was more in favour of Lynn's recommendations on the authority of the local committees but accepted Londonderry's proposal on an experimental basis. Cunningham

[77] For further reading see Loughlin, *Labour and the politics of disloyalty in Belfast;* Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange State;* G, Walker, *A history of the Ulster Unionist Party: protest, pragmatism and* pessimism (Manchester, 2004); P, Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921-39* (Dublin, 1973).
[78] *Hansard N.I. (Senate), i),* col.150.
[79] R. L. Jordan, *Paisleyism and civil rights: an ambassador unchained* (Cambridge, 3018), p. 9.
[80] *Hansard N.I. (Senate) i),* col.160.
[81] Ibid., col. 160.
[82] Ibid., col. 160.

continued that he was pleased that every opportunity had been given to teachers to impart religious instruction which, he claimed, 'the majority of the working classes in the Six Counties' were in favour of.[83] That other senators spoke in a similar positive vein on religious instruction, and that it was to be delivered by teachers, conveys how they had interpreted Londonderry's words. Londonderry concluded the session stating that 'controversy has raged round' the appointment of teachers.[84] He stated that managers wanted to retain the power to appoint teachers after schools were transferred, in contravention of the bill. This, he said, was a principle on which he was 'unable to concede'.[85] He was again very direct in his handling of the issue. The divergence of understanding surrounding religious instruction and the appointment of teachers would prove to be the accelerant to fan the flames of discontent for the rest of the decade.

6.6 Retribution of the Beguiled, the Clerics and the Orange Order: July – Oct. 1923

Later that month the Grand Orange Lodge of County Armagh contacted James Craig and Londonderry to register their 'emphatic protest against the passing of the bill' which they said should be 'amended so as to secure the appointment' of Protestant teachers for Protestant schools.[86] They declared that the bill 'in its present form presents a serious menace to the rights and liberties of Protestants in the Six Counties and to the vital interests of the Protestant Religion'.[87] The lodge had met on 21 May in readiness for the passing of the bill. The mood music had significantly altered since the churches' acceptance of Londonderry's explanation to the bill passing into law on 2 June. At the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland on 26 June 1923, fear was expressed that 'the safeguards provided in the act were entirely inadequate' to protect against 'Protestant schools coming under Roman Catholic management' where R.C.'s were in the majority.[88] Corkey denuded how the government was viewed in the new state when he declared that 'there was a deep and well-grounded feeling that the Protestant religion which the Northern Government was expected to safeguard had suffered hurt'.[89] These perceptions of instability within N.I. must have fuelled a growing cultural insecurity. On the evidence of Londonderry's second reading in the Senate, it is difficult to see any outstanding differences to his clarifications to the churches. This however would not deter

[83] Ibid., col. 161.
[84] Ibid., col. 182.
[85] Ibid., col. 182.
[86] Orange Order to Craig and Londonderry June 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/1).
[87] Ibid.
[88] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 24.
[89] Ibid., p. 26.

the churches, aided by the considerable influence of the Orange Order, from openly expressing their anger, predominantly in Londonderry's direction. It is ironic that it was the clerics who were less than direct with their intentions regarding religious instruction. They had very rarely stipulated that by religious instruction, they really meant that they wanted the scripture reading from the Bible taught by teachers during compulsory hours of attendance.[90]

Rev. Corkey presented four detailed arguments as to why 'scripture should be recognised in the curriculum of higher education as a subject to be taught by teachers'.[91] One of his arguments put the religious, cultural and nationality divide that existed in the state into perspective. He argued that it 'was the study of Scripture that made Cromwell a statesman and created democratic constitutional government in England'.[92] Even though it was not for the eyes or ears of the Catholic population, and leaving aside the historical inaccuracy of this statement, it would have been anathema to them. Corkey provides historical context to the Protestant heritage of educating the children of the working classes founded on Bible reading. He referenced from John Knox, the leader of the Scottish Reformation in the sixteenth century, to the Planters of the seventeenth century and up to 1831 when the Board of Commissioners was established. They had always paid for the building of their own schools from church funds and maintained autonomy in religious matters in accordance with Knox's teachings. Corkey made the historically inaccurate argument that the schools had, since 1831, taught religion with the 'official sanction of the British Government'.[93] He offered a distorted nostalgic portrait of the pre-Londonderry Act schools saying that they 'educated men and women who … made Ulster what it is today'.[94] What is clear is the deeply felt sense of a right to a traditional Protestant model of education, as he recalled it. As referenced earlier, there was a price to pay for the new buildings and fiscal benefits, which were stipulated in Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act. This created a dissonance within Ulster Protestantism which manifested itself in conditional loyalism.

On 31 July 1923 delegates from the Presbyterian Church and C. of I. sent Craig their resolutions regarding the transfer of schools. The Methodist representatives were unable to

[90] See Conclusions from Board of Education Board of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, n/d but it is early 1923 as it was first response to the introduction of the bill (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9). See this file also for individual cases, outlining the same grievances, as put forward by the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church of Ireland, in Chapter 4.
[91] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, pp 10-11.
[92] Ibid., p. 11.
[93] Ibid., p. 15.
[94] Ibid., p. 16.

attend but were content to attach their signatures. These were some of the most influential clerics in N.I., including the Archbishop of Armagh, the bishops of Derry and of Down and Connor, the moderator of the Presbyterian Church and the president of the Methodist Church in Ireland.[95] The delegation resolved that power in transferred schools should be given to committees 'composed of two representatives selected by the parents … two representatives of the managers or trustees and two other persons by the local authority to appoint and manage the schools when they are transferred'.[96] They next demanded that 'the principal shall be of the same denomination as those who transferred the school'.[97] They also demanded that 'the teachers in each school shall be denominationally, as far as possible, in proportion to the children attending the school'.[98] Finally, a resolution was passed advising owners and managers not to transfer their schools.[99]

The following episode illustrates the two different approaches within the clerical agitators. Some clergy, mostly C. of I., sought to deal with the matter in what they perceived as a more moderate/less confrontational approach. The two groups did not differ on any of the fundamental principles and ideologies of the collective. The preference for the less confrontational approach underlines the dilemma some traditional supporters of the government, such as the C. of I. Bishop of Down, Dr Grierson, now faced. They were anxious that the confrontationists' approach had the potential to cause a split with the government which ran contrary to their mainstream conventionality.[100] Managers had, by this point, been advised not to engage in any negotiations with the M.O.E. regarding the transfer of schools. Despite having signed the document on 31 July, C. of I. Bishop Grierson encouraged Rev. Brown, who was a member of Lynn committee, to 'transfer his school to the Belfast Corporation 999-year lease'.[101] C. of I. minister Quinn later publicly voiced his dissatisfaction at Grierson's behaviour and bemoaned the lack of leadership in Protestant churches. He urged his congregation 'to refuse to support any candidate in the upcoming general election who failed to give beforehand a written pledge that, if elected, he would work and vote for an amending act'.[102] Quinn was invited to join the Protestant managers of schools' group

[95] Delegation of main Protestant Churches to Londonderry 31 July 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/1).
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 25.
[100] W. J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 1, p. 9.
[101] Ibid., pp 9-10.
[102] Ibid., pp 10-11.

mentioned in Chapter 4. This meant that he was now in the company of Corkey and Smyth, the three of them would become the dominant voices of the U.E.C.

As previously mentioned, a candidate's religion was easily identifiable from their school background. This created the de facto arrangement where a teacher's religion could usually be considered discretely without overtly breaking the law. This was not enough for the clerics; they wanted their demands concretised in legislation. This resolution was based on the Lynn model where the power resided with the school management. This was hardly surprising, as four of the delegates, Archbishop D'Arcy, Rev. W.H. Smyth, Rev. W. G. Strahan and Rev. J. Bingham, were on Lynn's sub-committee for religious instruction. That committee, as had this delegation, framed their demands to place Protestant teachers in Protestant schools, to teach Protestant children, controlled by Protestant clerics. This thread ran through the clerics' approach to primary education in the new state. They had manipulated this position as part of their long-term strategy to scuttle Londonderry's attempts to introduce non-denominational primary education. They strongly recommended that trustees of primary schools should not transfer their schools unless the three matters were 'dealt with satisfactorily in an amending bill at an early date'.[103] The threat of non-transferral of schools was a new departure and, if successful, had the potential to render the act impotent. This became an important weapon in the clerics' armoury. Corkey concluded that it was the Cabinet's inactivity on their 'reasonable demands … [that] led to a prolonged controversy in which the representatives of the Protestant Churches had the whole-hearted support of a Committee of the Grand Lodge Ireland representing 150,000 Protestant laymen'.[104] Going forward, the clerics decided on a more regular and forceful use of the Orange Order to exert their considerable power to pressurise the government on their behalf.

On 10 August, Londonderry wrote to Craig informing him of his considerations on the 'question as to how far, and in what localities, we should enforce the Education Act, which will be enforceable on and after October 1st next'.[105] The ministry decided it best to commence only with the two county boroughs of Belfast and 'Derry'.[106] This was because the boroughs had been recently elected, 'whereas the County Councils are all moribund bodies nearly ready

[103] Ibid.
[104] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 22.
[105] Londonderry to Craig, 10 Aug. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2).
[106] Ibid. The abbreviated form of Derry used by a unionist appears incongruent as the term is contentious and is almost exclusively used by Catholics and nationalists.

for re-election'.[107] This could also go some way towards explaining the delay with the act reaching the statute books. The other reason for starting with the boroughs was that there was 'considerably greater urgency in the educational problem … than in our more scattered urban and rural districts'.[108]

A large gathering of managers took place on 17 October to discuss 'the new situation created by the Education Act'.[109] They wanted to bring their resolutions to the attention of the Cabinet. Their resolutions did not greatly differ from the resolutions of 31 July. They complained that the churches could no longer bear the financial burden of running their schools (neither could Catholic run schools which had also refused the attractive financial rewards for transferring their schools, so they could preserve their autonomy). The Protestant churches wanted both. They wanted local authority control over the appointment of teachers and religious instruction 'as recommended by the Lynn Committee'.[110] The delegates called for the amendment of Section 66 to ensure that 'Protestant teachers shall be appointed to teach Protestant children'.[111] It is not coincidental that this document drew heavily on Lynn, reinforcing this work's contention that Lynn's recommendations were designed to fail, so that they could support these later protestations. The three signatories were Revs. Smyth, Corkey and Browne, who would form the vanguard of the U.E.C. after it was founded in December 1924. Corkey recalled that Rev. Bingham wrote to him about a heated exchange he had with Pollock at a meeting of the managers on 24 October.[112] Bingham recounted how Pollock came at him 'like a little terrier' but he countered by mentioning 'the corruption in the Belfast Corporation under which they propose to put education'.[113] Bingham urged that the managers' stand together in the face of the M.O.E.'s aim to break them down. This encounter depicts how incendiary and divisive the act had become within unionism.

The M.O.E. prepared an eight page response outlining that while they were not against the formation of local committees, they 'would have no financial responsibility whatsoever for

[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Belfast Protestant clerical managers of National Schools for the attention of the cabinet 17 Oct. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2). Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 26.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid.
[112] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 27.
[113] Ibid., p. 27. Corkey references the Megaw report, 1926, which was a damning indictment of the corporation's housing committee. See O'Brien, *Discrimination in Northern Ireland*; Elliot, *Hearthlands*; Loughlin, *Labour and the politics of disloyalty in Belfast*.

the school'.[114] They agreed in principle to appointing school committees but stated the Government of Ireland Act 'extremely prohibited (Section 66 (3)) from placing the appointment of teachers in the hands of the committee'.[115] They pointed out, as this thesis has, that the M.O.E. would be exposed to 'every denomination (consider the position of the Catholic Church) to press its claim, on conscientious grounds, for separate denominational schools fully equipped and maintained at the public expense and staffed by teacher selected on denominational grounds'.[116] Addressing their resolution on religious instruction, the M.O.E. said that amending act 'would raise more difficulties than it would settle'.[117] It reiterated that it would 'afford opportunities for catechetical instruction' but that the 'education authority shall not itself provide religious instruction in any provided or transferred school'.[118] As for the managers' fears of R.C. teachers teaching in Protestant schools, the M.O.E. stated that the demand for 'Protestant teachers for Protestant children' was a logical step towards 'a demand to be made for Presbyterian teachers for Presbyterian children; Methodist teachers for Methodist children; … and so on'.[119]

6.7 Controversy in the Commons: Oct. – Dec. 1923

There were angry exchanges during a House of Commons debate on 25 October.[120] William Coote, M.P. for Fermanagh and Tyrone, objected strongly to the act denouncing it as having 'commenced in the middle ages'.[121] With an eloquent rage, and sectarian logic, he proclaimed that Class 3 schools were included 'to allow the Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church to maintain the same grip upon education that they have held, that they propose to hold'.[122] He was correct in his assertion about aspirations of the R.C. Church, however he conveniently omitted that the Protestant churches were similarly motivated. The R.C. Church had no part in the creation of the classes of schools, and Class 3 schools were designed to financially bully the R.C. schools into transferring. On Section 66 of the act that dealt with appointment of teachers, he preferred to call it 'by a short name, the Infidelity Clause or Socialist Clause'.[123] Corkey employed similar inflammatory language claiming that the clause meant that

[114] Ministry response to resolutions of Belfast clerical managers Oct. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2).
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid.
[120] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 1604.
[121] Ibid., col. 1604.
[122] Ibid., col. 1604.
[123] Ibid., col. 1614.

'Communists or other persons opposed to the Christian faith could become teachers in our schools'.[124] Whether real or imagined, this appeared to be a genuine fear amongst unionists. It was Lynn who again defended the act. He told Coote, who had continued at some length, that his was the most illogical speech that he had experienced in the House. Completing his political U-turn, described in Chapter 5, Lynn informed Coote that the 'only real difference between the act as it stands, and the interim report of the committee which was signed by the three heads of the Protestant churches in Northern Ireland is that our regional committees are smaller than yours'.[125]

Lynn was sending a message to the clergy that it was they who had changed, and not the act or his committee's recommendations. He mentioned Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act, which his committee had completely ignored as the legitimate reason, for not permitting religious instruction during compulsory school hours. The Government of Ireland Act is a crucial part of understanding Londonderry's actions, as without repealing it, there was nothing he could do, whether he wanted to or not. During another heated exchange, Dr Hugh Morrison, M.P. for Queen's University, stated that 'this House and the public thought that they were getting the Lynn report, and I regret to say that … [Mr Lynn] turned right about face and supported a Bill that was in direct conflict with his own report on the most important and most vital question'.[126] Further undermining Lynn's political integrity, Morrison alleged that the act made religious teaching optional and that 'they have helped to introduce a foundling into Ulster, a foundling that might have born in the Soviet Government of Moscow or in the Independent Labour Party of England'.[127] Amid the heckling across the House, Dehra Chichester, M.P. for Londonderry, County and Borough, added a salutary tone to the proceedings when pointing out 'that it would have been better for the Churches and the hon. Member who has last spoken (Dr Morrison) to have brought forward their opposition at the proper time and in the proper way instead of waiting until this act was on the Statute Book'.[128] These exchanges demonstrate how divisions within the government created further difficulties and uncertainty for the M.O.E. The new act was finding it difficult to find a secure footing within the parliament. Londonderry must have felt a form of claustrophobia, given that all sides were closing in on him.

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[124] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 31.
[125] *(House of Commons), i),* col. 1620.
[126] Ibid., col. 1628.
[127] Ibid., col. 1630.
[128] Ibid., col. 1636.

The argument spilled over into the *Belfast Telegraph* with Rev. Bingham's letter taking Lynn to task over his remarks on religious instruction. Bingham charged Lynn with 'inconsistency', while taking exception to his claim that 'the heads of the Protestant Churches were satisfied with the provisions made for religious instruction in the schools'.[129] He inferred that Lynn was primed by Londonderry to speak on his behalf, which was a probability. Bingham claimed that Lynn's comment on the differences between the interim report and the act was a vital one which took away the school committee's right to 'appoint teachers and manage schools'.[130] Bingham disputed Lynn's claim that this would lead to parochialism. The teachers' unions agreed that it would have caused parochialism and was one of the main factors why they were in favour of the act. Bingham suggested that the interests of locals would be lost in the bigger machinery of regional committees. He also alleged that the clerics had not agreed to the provisions in the bill, which was not true as shown previously in this chapter. These were weak arguments without foundation or substance. He was correct in his assertion that Lynn was inconsistent, which is the diplomatic alternative for double-dealing. Lynn, who was now self-detonating with regularity, hit back by suggesting that Coote was doing Bingham's bidding and that there was no 'shadow of justification' for Bingham's 'insinuation that I [Lynn] was acting in concert with the ministry'.[131] Lynn quoted Archbishop D'Arcy's positive reaction to the bill's provision on religious instruction, as mentioned previously, accusing Bingham of being inconsistent. This was true, but his reply that 'the broad outlines of the Education Act and the Interim Report which Dr Bingham signed are the same' was not true.[132] The act was causing grave uncertainty amongst the major influencers within unionism. Londonderry's act, and his ministry, was becoming the focus of growing unrest and anger.

On 9 November 1923, Londonderry addressed the prestigious Ulster Reform Club for elite businessmen on the importance of the education act.[133] This was an important audience who, if persuaded to support the act, could prove to be very influential and powerful allies. He said he was directing his words more to the younger men present as they had the 'heaviest responsibility for the ultimate success of the act'.[134] He commenced by emphasising that local control was the cornerstone of the act. He stressed that the act could survive by the removal of

[129] *Belfast Telegraph*, 30 Oct. 1923.
[130] Ibid.
[131] *Belfast Telegraph*, 31 Oct. 1923.
[132] Ibid.
[133] The Ulster Reform Club was opened on 1 Jan. 1885, and it still claims to be the 'most prestigious business, social and dining club in Northern Ireland' (www.ulsterreformclub.com) (8 Mar. 2022).
[134] Booklet containing Londonderry's speech to the Reform Club, p. 2, 9 Nov. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/ 9/D/1/4).

any one of the contentious provisions, but collapse was unavoidable if the principle of local control was removed. The next ten pages were given to explaining the mechanics of local administration. It was evident that Londonderry considered this to be the plug that kept the dam from breaking. Londonderry simply said that he was legally bound by the Government of Ireland Act to place the authority for appointing teachers with the regional committees.[135] He thanked the Churches for their 'great services in the past' but he could not grant their wishes, even under the threat of not transferring schools, and he had gone as far as he could 'under the constitution to meet them'.[136] He concluded somewhat optimistically, by stating his belief 'that difficulties, which at the moment seem to be insurmountable, will disappear, and that many perplexing problems will solve themselves under honest and straightforward administration'.[137] The speech was tinged with pathos, characterising Londonderry as an isolated man pleading into a political void for allies. The subtext exposed Londonderry's fear that the act was in danger of being swept away on the swelling tide of volatility in opposition to it.

The County Down Grand Orange Lodge wrote to Craig on 15 November to voice their 'grave apprehension' that the act did not ensure that Protestant children would be taught by Protestant teachers.[138] The letter addressed Craig as 'Dear Sir and Brother', automatically flagging a conflict of interest. The motion was proposed and seconded by two clerics, demonstrating the complexities of the trifecta consisting of the U.U.P., the Protestant clerics, and the Orange Order. The state could not have been governed with any degree of impartiality with these sets of relationships. Cardinal Logue's decision of non-cooperation can also be considered in this regard, and it helps to clarify the Catholic community's accusations of not being treated with any degree of impartiality. The protests were harbingers of the forthcoming barrage of protest that would become a feature for the minister's tenure over the following years. Bishop Grierson contacted Londonderry again on 16 December to complain about the act not being 'explicit and clear' when it came to religious instruction.[139] There was an air of frustration and fatigue in Londonderry's response that 'Sections 26 to 29 of the act are so free from ambiguity that I find it difficult to understand how anyone can misapprehend their

[135] Ibid., pp 12-13.
[136] Ibid., p. 12.
[137] Ibid., pp 14-15.
[138] County Down Grand Orange Lodge to PM Craig, 15 Nov. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/3).
[139] Bishop Grierson to Londonderry 16 Dec. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

intention'.[140] He went on to dismiss the bishop's fears that a R.C. teacher would be appointed to a Protestant school.

At this point, personal relationships between Londonderry and the clerics were becoming increasingly problematic because of what W.J. McAllister describes as the 'general attitude he [Londonderry] adopted when negotiating with them'.[141] McAllister's thesis is Methodist and U.E.C. centric and concentrates more on Revs. Corkey, Smyth and Quinn. It therefore provides an insight to their interactions with the M.O.E. and Londonderry. Rev. Quinn recalled that at one particular meeting, Londonderry 'antagonised the deputation with his high and mighty attitude and his complete lack of motivation to consider any alternative suggestions'.[142] So vexed had Quinn become 'with the attitude of Londonderry that he would have walked out of the meeting in protest had it not been for the intervention of a colleague who persuaded him to stay'.[143] It was ominous for Londonderry that Rev. Quinn would become one of the leaders of the U.E.C., who would set their sights firmly on Londonderry as the point of attack to have the act amended.

6.8 Intensifying the Pressure: Jan. – Dec. 1924

Pressure to amend the act continued into the New Year, setting the tone for the rest of that year. The 'representatives of the Protestant Churches' wrote to Craig to voice their 'great anxiety … amongst the Protestants of Northern Ireland with regard to the Education Act'.[144] The usual demands of religious education during compulsory school hours and 'that Protestant teachers will be appointed to teach Protestant children' were tabled for their requested meeting with Craig.[145] The strategy of circumventing Londonderry was becoming more pronounced with time. Londonderry was contacted the same day by leading representatives of the Presbyterian Church who proclaimed that they could not 'see their way to enter into any detailed consideration of the act until it was suitably amended'.[146]

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[140] Londonderry to Bishop Grierson, Dec. 1923 The letter dated only by the month, but it was in response to Bishop Grierson's letter from 16 Dec. 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[141] W. J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 47.
[142] Ibid.
[143] Ibid.
[144] Protestant clerics to PM Craig, 19 Jan. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/3).
[145] Ibid.
[146] Presbyterian representatives to Londonderry 9 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

Rev. Browne wrote to Craig on behalf of the heads of the Protestant churches. He informed Craig that they had unanimously decided to send him an 'enclosed letter which we believe expresses the wishes of the Protestant community with regard to religious education and the teachers in primary schools'.[147] The letter explained that they had refused Craig's invitation to discuss their concerns because Londonderry had followed it up with a letter restricting the meeting to discussing draft regulations.[148] Claiming to have the overwhelming support of the public, they demanded that the act be amended. They quoted Colonel Traill's letter to the *Belfast Newsletter* which said that, 'at a largely attended public meeting in Bushmills … That Bible teaching should be made part of the ordinary school programme … and should be given by teachers, with right of entry to clergy'.[149] Traill continued that 'when we voted for our representatives in the Parliament of Northern Ireland we believed that if one thing was safe in their hands it was our religion'.[150] According to Traill, there was a general expectation amongst Protestants that the act would be based on Lynn's recommendations with regard to religious instruction and the appointment of teachers.[151] He concluded that the act made it possible to have no religious instruction at all, which he believed would result in 'a worthless education'.[152] Apart from the gross inaccuracy of the piece, it embodied the deepening resentment towards the act, and Londonderry. It also demonstrated that they were voting on religion and not policies. Cardinal Logue would have known the likelihood of this being the case in the new state, and would have influenced his decision not to cooperate with the M.O.E.

The letter continued that the 'reasoned report of the Lynn committee, the resolutions passed by representative church bodies, by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland and the Black Chapter of Ireland, all bear witness in support of the claims we make for religious education'.[153] It also displayed how the unionist/Protestant population viewed the state, its values and reason d'etre. It similarly exposed why the nationalist population had felt trapped into a state that was designed to cater for the rights, religion, culture and national identity of those who were loyal, British and Protestant. They concluded by saying that they would reluctantly appeal to public opinion as they had no alternative.[154] The menacing undertone of this intimidatory posturing

[147] Rev Browne to PM Craig, 11 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/3).
[148] Heads of Protestant churches to PM Craig, 11 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/3).
[149] *Belfast Newsletter*, Jan. 10 1924.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Heads of Protestant churches to PM Craig, 11 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/3).
[154] Ibid.

was designed to increase the pressure on Londonderry. This approach became a feature within sections of Ulster Unionism when it was confronted with anything that it disagreed with or saw as a threat to its power and existence. Londonderry was defiant when he wrote to Wilfred Spender, Secretary to the Cabinet. He told Spender that, having received the heads of the churches' letter regarding an amending bill, his position was that he could 'only say that my opinion, which is the considered opinion of the Education Ministry, has undergone no modification whatsoever, and I do not propose to suggest to the Prime Minister the introduction of an amending Bill'.[155] The relentless pressure continued when Londonderry was contacted on 13 February by the Methodist Church and Church of Ireland who requested to be 'excuse[d] from offering any suggestions on said regulations until such times … there is placed on the Statute Book an amending bill to the Education Act'.[156] This correspondence also claimed that 'the large majority' of parents agreed with the church.[157]

Protests and meetings with the M.O.E., too many to document here, dominated throughout 1924. A meeting between the ministry and seven representatives of the Protestant churches on 2 April set the tone for the rest of that year. Rev. Strahan opened proceedings stating that 'the churches maintained their opinion that the act required amendment' and if granted, they would 'endeavour to work the act and try to make it a success'.[158] Londonderry replied 'that their desire for immediate amendment could not be met with if he [Londonderry] were to continue in office'.[159] These words proved to be prophetic eleven months later. Londonderry explained that because self-government in Ulster had demanded radical change in education, the churches must embrace decentralisation and 'be prepared to surrender their privileged position in education'.[160] Londonderry was unequivocal and specified that 'under no circumstances can local authorities bargain away their responsibility for the appointment of teachers in provided and transferred schools'.[161] He did offer as a condition of transfer, that the school committee 'should be consulted and empowered to make recommendations to the local authority whenever a vacancy occurs in the school staff'.[162] This was clearly addressing the threat of non-transferral of schools. The clerics could then, de facto, take an applicant's religion into account when making appointments. This was, again, not considered robust enough in its

[155] Londonderry to Spender, 15 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/3).
[156] Methodist Church to Londonderry 13 Feb. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[157] Ibid.
[158] Meeting between the ministry and church representatives, 2 Apr. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Ibid

phraseology; the Churches wanted it enshrined in law. The delegation then demanded that it should be made compulsory for teachers to teach religious instruction. This was denied by Londonderry saying that he did not 'anticipate any such difficulties'.[163] This scenario would be repeated throughout the year. Ultimately, only five out of approximately 1,362 schools were transferred between 1923 and 1925.[164] This established the reluctance to transfer. Withholding transfers was becoming a more prominent threat, as the controversialists knew that without them, Londonderry's policies were unworkable. The exercise was also a demonstration of the power that the clerics wielded over their schools.

6.9 The U-Turn and Londonderry's Demise: Dec. 1924 – Feb. 1925

Londonderry's letter to Craig on 8 December 1924 affirmed his festering exasperation with the clerics.[165] He said how he had heard from a third party that Rev. Corkey and Rev. R.W. Hamilton had contacted Craig and that he had 'little sympathy with either of them'.[166] Bypassing Londonderry was becoming more common, intensifying extant tensions. Londonderry accused the Moderator of 'wanting to gain a certain amount of prominence in his year in office and is doing his very best to misrepresent the act'.[167] He charged the clerics with 'persist[ing] in circulating deliberate falsehoods' for their own ends.[168] Londonderry's continued absences from the province further exasperated the clerics and Orange Order. A memo from Blackmore, Craig's private secretary and assistant secretary to the cabinet, dated 16 December, indicated that Londonderry was absent and would not be back in Belfast until 'some time in January' when an 'interview should be arranged between himself [Craig], Lord Londonderry, the Moderator and Rev Corkey'.[169]

The segregation agenda was now being pursued more vigorously. The ultra-aggressive U.E.C. was formed on 15 December 1924, with Rev. Corkey, Rev. James Quinn, a Belfast Anglican, and Methodist Rev. W. Smyth as its joint secretaries and chief agitators.[170] They

[163] Ibid.
[164] N., McNeilly, *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work (1923-73)* (Belfast, 1974), p. 11; *Hansard N.I. (Commons)*, i, col. 555.
[165] Londonderry to Craig, 8 Dec. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Ibid.
[169] Memo from Blackmore, 16 Dec. 1924 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[170] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 36. See also Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, pp 252-4; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 80-3; W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2.

became inextricably linked with the Orange Order, with all communications to the M.O.E. headed with both organisations' names. The U.E.C. decided on a more regular and forceful use of the Order to exert its considerable power to rally popular support and pressurise the government on their behalf. Together they decided on a policy of taking 'every opportunity to make the convictions of the people and their opposition to the act known'.[171] McAllister attributes the dramatic change of events in spring of 1925 to the Orange Order's involvement. The U.E.C. also sought the support of Unionist politicians to launch 'a virulent campaign against Londonderry and his act'.[172] On 29 January 1925, the trinity of Corkey, Smyth and Quinn wrote what Akenson described as 'a long vile letter' about Londonderry to the *Belfast Newsletter*.[173] Having rebuked Rev. Quinn (C of I) privately, Archbishop D'Arcy distanced his church publicly from what his own letter to the *Belfast Newsletter* described as an unjust attack.[174] The archbishop's opinion, and that of the other moderates, that they had secured 'practically all that we desired', would be lost in the imminent cacophony of invective, orchestrated by the U.E.C.. As happens with internal struggles such as these, once a victory was in sight, the moderates' indignation dissipated. In early 1925, the M.O.E. was inundated with letters of complaint and resolutions from various unionist groupings seeking meetings with Craig and/or Londonderry to amend the 1923 act. This agenda, instigated by the U.E.C., was increasing the pressure daily, with Londonderry being circumvented with more regularity.

The County Grand Lodge of Belfast (C.G.L.B.) contacted Craig on 31 January with their resolutions on Sections 26 and 66 which they believed would 'seriously imperil the Protestant religion'.[175] They then requested a meeting to discuss their resolutions.[176] Following on from its letter of 9 February, the C.G.L.B. wrote to Londonderry confirming they would meet him on 29 February.[177] Later that day, Londonderry received an unsigned correspondence from a member of his staff telling him that the C.G.L.B. had telephoned to say that 23 February suited them better. Astonishingly, the author informed Londonderry that he had phoned Blackmore to tell him that if there was a 'Cabinet to be held in the immediate future' to rearrange for the Monday morning.[178] This demonstrated the power of the Orange Order. That one of its brothers was such a willing accomplice in rearranging a Cabinet meeting for their

[171] Ibid., p. 37.
[172] Buckland, The *factory of grievances*, p. 252.
[173] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 81.
[174] *Belfast Newsletter*, 31 Jan. 1925.
[175] C.G.L.B. to PM Craig, 31 Jan. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[176] C.G.L.B. of Belfast to Londonderry, 9 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[177] C.G.L.B. to Londonderry 17 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[178] Ministry of Education staff to Londonderry 17 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

convenience exposes the difficulties faced by Londonderry. It also helps to appreciate Cardinal Logue's decision to withhold representation from the Lynn Committee. At the meeting, Londonderry explained that there was a difference between school hours and 'hours of compulsory attendance'.[179] He explained that compulsory attendance was incorporated into school hours, and it was after this, which was still during school hours, that religious instruction could be given. There is a subtle distinction, but so subtle that the frustration felt by the representatives of the C.G.L.B. is almost understandable. Conversely, the subtly of the proposal provided the C.G.L.B with adequate room to accept it. Londonderry then read to them letters from the heads of the churches who had thanked him for the amendments made to Section 26, the same section about which they were protesting.[180] The meeting concluded unproductively with Londonderry stating unequivocally that he 'regretted that he could not comply with the wishes of the deputation'.[181]

6.10 Beware the Ides of March: Feb. – Mar. 1925

The U.E.C. set its second meeting for 27 February where the C.G.L.B. 'and prominent unionist politicians met'.[182] They decided to hold a 'Six Counties Conference' on 5 March to pressurise the government to amend the 1923 act.[183] The letter of invitation to the conference stated that there was good 'reason to fear Parliament may be dissolved and a General election held almost immediately'.[184] This information must have come from, as Akenson described, 'dissident' Unionist M.P.s, as Craig was becoming increasingly anxious over the pending report of the boundary commission.[185] It was no coincidence therefore that the campaign was intensified to coincide with this 'nodal moment' for the M.O.E. and Belfast government.[186] It was the same month a year earlier that 'Northern Ireland voted itself out of the treaty settlement, thereby triggering the boundary commission'. McAllister said that this policy would 'become their [U.E.C.] hallmark for the next twenty years. They struck hard at election time'.[187]

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[179] Meeting between C.G.L.B. and Londonderry 23 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid.
[182] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 82. Akenson named it the Belfast County Grand Orange Lodge, the headed paper in the correspondences was, C.G.L.B.
[183] Letter to attendees of the conference 28 Feb. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[184] Ibid.
[185] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 82.
[186] Ibid., p. 81.
[187] W. J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 56; *Irish Christian Advocate,* 19 Jan. 1925.
[187] Ibid.

The government was awaiting the report of the boundary commission which had wider constitutional connotations. While waiting on the report, Craig called a snap election for 3 April 1925 as a show of strength to the Imperial and Free State Governments that 'not an inch of Northern Ireland territory would be surrendered'.[188] Craig could not afford any suggestion of disunity in the face of such a defining moment for the new state, which the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. were very much aware of. It was a source of grave concern to the government that support for the U.E.C.'s campaign was strengthening with 'an increasing number of Craig's own backbenchers' joining its ranks.[189] Rev Quinn's piece in the Methodist newspaper the *Irish Christian Advocate*, in January 1925, warned Craig that

> [w]e cannot believe Sir James Craig is wishful to defy the religious sentiment of the Ulster people. TO GO BACK TO THE ELECTORATE [original capitalisation] on a charge of bad faith would destroy the government and delay progress for an infant state for a generation at least.[190]

Early March witnessed an intense flurry of activity between the government and the controversialist clerics and their associates. Up to this point Londonderry remained steadfast in 'assuring the Prime Minister that he could ride out the storm'.[191] On 3 March 1925, believing he had Craig's full backing, Londonderry informed a press conference of 'what was then official government position, that there would be no change to his 1923 act'.[192] That he then departed for London the same day raises some questions about his commitment. Within the increasingly hostile political microclimate of N.I., the timing of Londonderry's decision to overtly antagonise the government's enemies is, at best, questionable. The U.E.C. conference on 5 March was a resounding success for its organisers which Buckland described as 'an impressive demonstration of Protestant unity'.[193] The meeting, held in the assembly hall of the Presbyterian Church, was full to capacity with

[188] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 253.
[189] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 75.
[190] W. J. McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 56; *Irish Christian Advocate*, 19 Jan. 1925.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 83.
[193] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 253.

> the platform thronged with leading clergymen; and, most importantly, Sir Joseph Davison, the Grand Master of the County Grand Lodge of Belfast, who claimed to represent 20,000 Belfast Orangemen and had considerable influence among Orangemen throughout the province, was at the forefront.[194]

There was no mistaking the show of strength with the implicit threat that they could inflict political humiliation on Craig in the upcoming election. It had the required effect on the government, and in particular Craig who, the following day, 'requested the secretaries of the United Committee and The Orange Order to meet him for consultation'.[195] The swiftness of Craig's reaction, irrespective of 'whatever Londonderry might think', was indicative of his exponentially increasing panic. McAllister points out that Craig 'was accompanied at the meeting by the Chief Whip, Capt. The Rt. Hon. Herbert Dixon, M.P., signifying the pressure being placed on him by his backbenchers'.[196] The clerics' tactic of going over Londonderry's head had reached its zenith, which Craig recognised. Government minutes from the meeting were brief, showing that a 'frank discussion took place', where the government hoped to reach an amicable agreement 'of the questions at issue'.[197] Craig promised to 'consult his colleagues at the earliest possible moment and will make a statement on the subject at an early date'.[198] By 1pm the following day, the government released the following statement:

> A special Cabinet was held at Stormont this morning to consider the amendments proposed by the members of Friday's deputation… The Prime Minister announced that after telegraphic communication with Lord Londonderry an agreement had been reached and that the Government would proceed immediately with amending the bill embodying the proposals agreed upon.[199]

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[194] Ibid., p. 253. See also Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 83.
[195] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 44. See also Buckland, *The factory of grievances,* p. 253; Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 83; W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, pp 58-7; Farren, *The politics of Irish education,* p. 75; (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[196] W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 59.
[197] Government meeting with U.E.C. and Orange Order, 6 March 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9D/1/4).
[198] Ibid.
[199] Government statement, 7 Mar. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4); Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster,* p. 45.

Londonderry missed the meeting because he was still in London 'confined to bed with flu'.[200] Buckland's contention that 'Craig kept him informed' connotes that Craig was acting independently and not as part of a consultative process with Londonderry. He was merely keeping Londonderry abreast of the decisions that he was making and not part of a consultative process.[201] Londonderry's resoluteness at the press conference on 3 March that no change would occur, and that he 'remained sceptical that any genuine compromise was possible' supports this work's argument that Craig was acting independently.[202] Neil Fleming suggested that because Craig felt Londonderry was out of touch, he was 'determined to overstep him, a deliberate slight that Londonderry deeply resented'.[203] By this stage, Craig seemed to believe that Londonderry had become unfit for office. After the cabinet meeting, the representatives of the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. called to Stormont where they were informed of the government's decision, which was unanimous; hardly surprising, as to do otherwise was tantamount to political suicide. The representatives thanked the government 'for their sympathy and kindness in allowing matters in the dispute to be reopened and expressed their complete satisfaction at the amicable agreement arrived at'.[204] The reality should not be overlooked that when a gun is held to a person's head, there is always the tendency to be conciliatory and react sympathetically to their requests.

The conclusions of the cabinet meeting on 7 March revealed how Craig had capitulated with 'almost dazzling swiftness'.[205] As a result of his consultations with the representatives, 'the cabinet approved of the Prime Minister's suggestions, which have now been embodied in an Amending Bill'.[206] Both parties were in agreement and the bill's passage through all its stages was expedited and became an 'Amending Act on the very day that Parliament was prorogued for the General Election, the 13 March 1925'.[207] It was a very short, if not ambiguous, act with only three provisions. The terms of the settlement were accepted by the U.E.C. and Orange Order 'on the clear understanding that when the prohibitory clauses had

[200] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 253.
[201] Ibid.
[202] Ibid.
[203] Neil Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry: a political life* (London, 2005), p. 112.
[204] Ibid.; Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 45.
[205] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 83.
[206] Government statement, 7 Mar. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4); Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 45.
[207] W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 59; Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 84; Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 46; Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 254; Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry*, p. 111.

been deleted … no objection would now be taken by the M.O.E., or the Borough or Regional Committees to insertion in the deeds of transfer of Protestant schools of two vital conditions'.[208] The first was that Bible instruction would be given each day by the teaching staff of the school. The second condition stipulated that in the case of a vacancy in the teaching staff, the teacher appointed by the Education Authority would be from a list of three nominated by the local education committee of the school.[209] Corkey claimed that their legal advice was that 'there were no legal grounds for any objections to these conditions'.[210] Londonderry would interpret the changes differently. He held firm to the principle that Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act trumped the amendments to the 1923 act.

Craig was victorious in the 1925 elections, held on 21 April, enabling him to present a united unionist front to the British and Free State Governments. The wounds of the education conflict, however, were soon to be reopened. Buckland makes a compelling argument in suggesting that responsibility for the ambiguity lay with Craig's handling of the meeting with the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. in Londonderry's absence.[211] Craig had deliberately granted the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. amendments to the 1923 act, knowing that he was 'hamstrung by the constituent act of 1920, over which he had no control'.[212] Craig had averted the threatened electoral humiliation but had lost the confidence and support of Londonderry. Akenson incorrectly suggests that Craig had been successful in appeasing both parties.[213] This was not the case as Londonderry had, justifiably, felt slighted. Buckland points out that Craig had 'later told a complaining Londonderry, that the Stormont conference gave "us breathing space"'.[214] This is common political practice, especially with a situation as perilous as Craig found himself in. It transpired that Craig's economy of truth had bought him the minimal amount of time required for political survival. This was one of the many anomalies of loyalism, and indeed Northern political life in general. The Protestant campaigners would not have wanted to jeopardise the constitutional status of Ulster, but it had to be an Ulster founded on Protestantism, such was the nature of their conditional loyalism.

The Governor of N.I., the Duke of Abercorn, was obliged to inspect the constitutionality of all legislation. Farren suggests that if his handling of the amending act had become public,

[208] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 46.
[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 254.
[212] Ibid., p. 254. See also reports in (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).
[213] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 83.
[214] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, pp 254-5. See also reports in (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/4).

it could have had 'very serious consequences for the government and the constitution of Northern Ireland'.[215] The danger lay in the negative view that Abercorn, as guardian of the constitution, took of the amendments. Abercorn contacted Craig on the day the act was passed telling him that the only reason that the 'Secretary of State' [Home Secretary] had decided against reserving the bill was 'the desire of not causing your government embarrassment'.[216] The letter pointed out that Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act should have been consulted before the bill was put before the House. This had been established, as referenced earlier, on 7 May 1923 in a government memo where the parliamentary draughtsman stated that any departure from the amendments already tabled by the government would involve an infringement of Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act, and of Article 16 of the Irish Free State Agreement Act.[217]

Farren argues that Abercorn allowed his concern for the wider political context to influence him, which was extraordinary given his role as guardian of the constitution.[218] This interpretation let Craig wriggle off the hook as he had left Abercorn with little option. The concentration of power in this one-party state might have influenced Abercorn's thinking. Craig exercised this power when he threatened to resign his Cabinet in July 1922 unless the bill to abolish proportional representation in N.I. was ratified. [219] This placed Churchill in the unenviably embarrassing position of having to explain to Cosgrave, then Chairman of the Provisional Government, that he had unwillingly concluded that the N.I. Government could not be vetoed, and to do so would set a dangerous precedent.[220] This could have been a mitigating factor which informed Abercorn's decision to avoid any provocation with Craig. Being mindful that Westminster might not want or need the inconvenience or aggravation of another skirmish with Ulster, could also have influence his decision to deal with the issue inhouse. Apart from these possibilities, it is a struggle to understand why Abercorn would have allowed this to develop to maturation. It showed however that Craig, and his attorney general, had understood the ramifications of repealing the prohibitions in Sections 26 and 66 of the act, but had done so anyway.

[215] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 76.
[216] Abercorn to Craig, 13 Mar. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/8).
[217] MOE memo 7 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2; D3099/5/9; D3099/5/8).
[218] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 76.
[219] O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2: control, the Second Protestant Ascendancy and the Irish State* (Oxford, 2019), *p.* 35.
[220] Ibid.

6.11 Defiance and Victory: Apr. – June 1925

Akenson rightly points out that the chronicling of the 'amending act of 1925 is a tawdry and often tediously complicated tale'.[221] For that reason, and because this thesis is more concerned with how matters had reached this sorry state, this section will provide an overview of how events proceeded and concluded by June 1925. This is also partly because the same substantive matters which the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. were bickering with the ministry over remained unchanged. This section will therefore assess how an amicable agreement was reached to avoid any further disharmony and pressure on the government as the 12 July approached. Crucially, this work will assess the important developments in May 1925, which Akenson, Farren, Buckland, McAllister and even Rev. Corkey have not included in their works. The events in this month are critical to creating a more detailed background within which Londonderry's political humiliation can be understood.

Corkey recorded that the U.E.C. and the C.G.L.B. wrote to the M.O.E. on 24 April, asking if they were 'prepared to approve of the following conditions being incorporated into the Deeds of Transfer of Schools'. [222] The two conditions were taken from Lynn's recommendations:

> 1) That religious instruction shall be given by the teaching staff as heretofore on a programme to be approved by the person or bodies transferring the schools.
>
> 2) That in the event of a teacher being appointed who on religious grounds is objectionable to the persons or Body transferring the school (or the persons transferring and the school committee), it shall be competent … to terminate the lease of transfer.[223]

On 6 May, McQuibban replied that Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act made it illegal for the ministry to agree to 'the incorporation in an agreement for the transfer of a school to

[221] Akenson, *Education and enmity,* p. 87.
[222] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster,* p. 47; Buckland, *The factory of grievances,* pp 254-5; W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 62; U.E.C. and Orange Order to McQuibban 24 Apr. 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[223] Ibid.

any education authority of either two conditions submitted in your letter'.[224] It is questionable how much of a surprise, if any, this was to the groupings.

Speaking to the House on 12 May, Londonderry declared that the new bill had not changed the fundamental fact that the Government of Ireland Act still took precedence, thus rendering the new bill extraneous.[225] The U.E.C. contacted the M.O.E. to ask why the government had removed the prohibitions if they had no intention of making 'any change whatever to their policy'.[226] Why had the delegation left their meeting with Craig with such false hopes? The reason for this was that they had engaged the services of two eminent lawyers, Leech and Pringle, who advised them that the removal of the prohibitions contained in Sections 26 and 66 would not conflict with the constitutional position.[227] They based their argument on the principle that most of N.I.'s citizens were Christian 'so the Bible was not denominational but common to the realm'.[228] This removed the issue of endowment, ergo legitimising deleting the prohibitions on appointment of teachers and religious instruction. This, the clerics believed, would 'leave the door open … to negotiate terms suitable to its [U.E.C.] interests when the Deeds of Transfer were discussed'.[229] Given the presence of the attorney general at the meeting, it is reasonable to speculate that Craig had been deliberately deceitful by omission in not explaining that the Government of Ireland Act rendered the amendments irrelevant; 'hardly surprising since the attorney-general was dependent upon the government's good will for his office'.[230] The evidence would support this work's contention that the U.E.C.'s fervour to win had impeded its judgement. They had not seen the smoke screen created by Craig to achieve his own political aims.

The U.E.C. malcontents wrote to Londonderry expressing their dissatisfaction at the turn of events.[231] On 14 May, Londonderry and Craig received a deputation from the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. Davison explained that 'the schools should be transferred under conditions which would secure that religious instruction should be given by the teaching staff … on a programme approved by the transferors and which would enable the transferors to terminate the lease of

[224] McQuibban to Rev Quinn U.E.C., 6 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8); Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, pp 47-8.
[225] *(House of Commons), i)*, col, 87.
[226] Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster*, p. 48.
[227] Ibid., pp 48-49.
[228] W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 55.
[229] Ibid., p. 56.
[230] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 87.
[231] U.E.C. to Londonderry, 11 May1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).

transfer in the event of a teacher being appointed who, on religious grounds, was objectionable to the transferors'.[232] Davison of the C.G.L.B. spoke first indicating where the most dangerous threat for the ministry lay. That Craig was also in attendance was further proof of the dilution of Londonderry's stature as minister. The demands, if met, would effectively have seen the implementation of Lynn's recommendations. This strengthens this work's contention that the recommendations had been purposefully structured to facilitate this prolonged dispute. Davison also quoted the legal advice of Leech and Pringle that the education authorities could function under the repealed prohibitions in the act.[233] It was agreed that the ministry's and the U.E.C.'s legal advisors should meet to discuss the matter.[234]

McQuibban's letter to Londonderry on 22 May 1925 outlined the pressure being applied to the Belfast Corporation by the educationalist agitators. He pointed out that they were 'afraid of the Corporation going ahead with the supply of schools so fast that when they wish to transfer their schools the corporation will have no need for them'.[235] Put in simple economic terms, they were frightened that supply would outstrip the demand. McQuibban informed Londonderry that he did not believe that 'the corporation mean to allow themselves to be bullied by the clerics or the Orangemen'.[236] He added a cautionary note that the people generally would, especially in rural areas, rally to the clerics as 'after all, they can't read an Act of Parliament and they are disposed to accept what the clergymen tell them as truth'.[237] He acknowledged that the 'authorities are very young' but 'the longer the local authorities are in the saddle the stronger they become and the more knowledgeable, and so less willing to be bullied by the clergy'.[238] It is a clear indication of the degree of bullying and haranguing employed by the clerics and the Orange Order. McQuibban was also informed that Davison had met with the groupings' legal advisors.

This passing of information, from what was obviously an Orange Order insider, further exposes the intricacies of the unionist triumvirate. His information was that the solicitors had advised that 'as a condition of the Act of 1920 that the transferors may at any time on three months' notice withdraw from the authority'.[239] McQuibban deemed it 'not an illegal

[232] Meeting between ministry, U.E.C. and C.G.L.B., 14 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid.
[235] McQuibban to Londonderry, 22 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.

condition', rather one that was unfair to the ratepayer and taxpayer. And there was room for compromise if they stipulated that the transferors pay compensation 'if they resume occupation'. [240] As for teachers and religious instruction, he suggested that the further condition '(for window-dressing purposes only) that the teachers should be recommended (i.e. nothing put in their way to prevent it) by the local authority to give religious (Bible and other) instruction voluntarily as heretofore'.[241] McQuibban, always the diplomatic pragmatist, speculated that these two conditions meant that the 'Churches would feel that their faces had been saved and would be content to let the act run without further hindrance'.[242] Ever wary, he also urged vigilance, warning that the churches were not beyond moral reproach. He said that he 'could trust the local authorities not to be victimised into the transfer of impossible schools, i.e., mere parochial halls, which they are unable to convert into suitable shape, masquerading as schools'.[243] This was a well-considered and balanced letter offering Londonderry and the churches a mutually agreeable settlement, enabling all parties involved to walk away with the façade of not having lost face.

On 25 May, McQuibban received a letter from the lord mayor complaining of the pressure the U.E.C. and the C.G.L.B. were asserting to 'force a settlement or a capitulation on the transfer question'.[244] Unsurprisingly, Corkey did not record any of this pressure and bullying in his book. The letter recorded that Londonderry was absent again, this time for a week. This must have added to the enormous strain that his ministry was already experiencing. McQuibban penned a suggested reply that Craig might send to the lord mayor of Belfast. He suggested that Craig inform the mayor of the outcome of their meeting with the deputation on 14 May and that their advice was that in order to 'secure what is desired by the other side it would be necessary to have the Government of Ireland Act amended'.[245] The irony of suggesting this to Craig is palpable given his discourse with Abercorn on the topic. On 29 May, Craig wrote to Londonderry, who was meeting the mayor the next day, telling him to 'continue along the conciliatory lines of the letter prepared by McQuibban'.[246] The undertones of Craig's lack of confidence in Londonderry's abilities were becoming more pronounced. He informed Londonderry that he was meeting Leech and Pringle the next day and was optimistic as he

[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid.
[244] McQuibban to Blackmore, 25 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8). The Lord Mayor's letter was within the letter to Blackmore.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Craig to Londonderry, 29 May 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).

understood from 'the Attorney General that he has successfully switched them on to discussing the question of transferring schools on short Leases, which appears to me to be a safe line to adopt as it is within the ambit of our act and obviates bumping up against Clause 5 of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920'.[247] Craig believed that the worst was 'over and that by continuing to play for time in a conciliatory manner we will prevent a recrudescence of the unfair agitation'.[248] Correspondence show that from mid-May, instances of the harassing and bulling by the clerics and Orange Order were increasing. With the 12 July approaching, the government were acutely aware of the potential impact that the Orange Order and the clerics' inflammatory demagoguery could have on the province. John Andrews, Minister of Finance, wrote to Craig on 17 June voicing his concerns that a number of backbenchers would not support the government when Parliament next met.[249] He shared his distress at having had to listen to 'two lengthy harangues' from the pulpit, which were now being used to defend 'Protestant rights'.[250] He concluded that the Orange Order were working with the churches and was afraid that, unless something was done before the 12 July, their position would become more problematic. The overriding objective for the government now was to channel all its energies into finding a resolution to the education dispute. Craig was aware that members of the government were attending meetings at orange lodges, where 'hostile resolutions' were being prepared on the education question.[251] On 8 June Londonderry wrote to the Moderator telling him that he was 'at a loss to discover a basis on which we can arrive at a mutually satisfactory understanding' on the matter of teachers delivering religious instruction.[252] Unfortunately for Londonderry, his steadfastness had blinded him to the political realities that were unfolding. He had again grossly misunderstood and underestimated the dynamic of the trifecta around which political power in the new state orbited. This was an understandable predicament for an 'outsider' to find themselves in; a predicament that 'insiders' must also have experienced to varying degrees.

The conclusions of a meeting between the M.O.E., the U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. on 9 June 1925 show that Londonderry was not changing his position regarding compelling teachers to provide religious education in primary schools. There was, however, an important caveat: if a

[247] Ibid.
[248] Ibid.
[249] Andrews to Craig, 17 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[250] Ibid.
[251] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 255; R. Wallace Grand Master Irish Orangemen to Blackmore, 2 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[252] Londonderry to the Moderator 8 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).

court decided otherwise, then 'the whole matter would have to be reviewed by government'.[253] On 11 June, Londonderry released a statement to the press summarising the situation after the meeting of 9 June, reiterating his view that compelling teachers to teach religion 'can receive no support from the government'.[254] He identified that the clerics had conveniently omitted from the debate that they could, if they waived the grants, continue with their present arrangements. Londonderry said that he 'deeply deplore[d] the assiduously circulated assertion that the Bible had been banished from education'.[255] He argued that, regarding religious instruction, the act provided 'another aspect of the question which, for controversial purposes, is conveniently ignored'.[256] He again stated that the Bible had not been removed from education as Protestant schools had the choice to remain outside the system and teach it as they had heretofore. Londonderry was obviously not on a diplomatic mission. In stating that the teachers were willing to teach religion, he argued that the school managers would succumb to the new system if they gave a chance to bed in. The crux of the debacle was being exposed, that the Protestant clergy wanted public funding and to remain autonomous, and wanted it enshrined in law. The R.C. schools had forfeited access to public funding to maintain their autonomy. The system was now veering towards endowing the Protestant faith while leaving the R.C. schools out in the cold.

Londonderry had misread, or had chosen to ignore, the signs of impending victory for the clergy. This was due, in part, to Craig telling Londonderry to be strong and 'to confidently rely upon me to shoulder with you every responsibility'.[257] Buckland reveals the balance of power in the state when pointing out that 'Craig and the cabinet secretariat, which was in close contact with the Orange leadership', shared the same concerns Andrews had expressed.[258] Craig's supportive shoulder was removed by 18 June when he pressed Londonderry to invite the leaders of the main churches and the U.E.C. to meet him 'if possible … prior to the 12 July, so that if a final settlement is reached an announcement can be made that will satisfy the Orange Body and therefore prevent any adverse speeches at various gatherings'.[259] After a meeting between representatives of the clerics and the M.O.E., that took only two hours, terms were agreed subject to legal approval by law officers of the crown and acceptance by the churches

[253] Conclusions of meeting between ministry, U.E.C. and C.G.L.B. 9 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[254] Press release from ministry of education, 11 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[255] Ibid.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 255; Craig to Londonderry 13 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[258] Ibid., p. 255; Andrews to Craig, 17 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[259] Ibid., p. 255; Craig to Londonderry 18 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).

and the teachers.[260] In what was a profound paradigm shift from Londonderry, they agreed that 'the local education authority may, if they desire, adopt a programme of religious instruction … in the half hour set apart for that purpose'.[261] This had two conditions which stipulated that:

> a) such programme shall not include instruction according to the tenets of distinctive of any religious denomination, and
>
> b) the giving of such programme, other than simple Bible reading, shall not be obligatory upon the teachers.[262]

There was a mutual agreement not to inform the press which, given the fragile nature of the negotiations, made sense. If these suggestions were authorised, the clerics would have achieved exactly what they wanted through the Christian principles of haranguing, bullying and public shaming. It was a fait accompli at which Londonderry was required for the optics of the process.

The M.O.E. met with 'Mr Haslett, for the Principal Teachers' Union, Mr Harbison for the INTO, Mr McLoughlin for the Ulster National Teachers' Union, and Mr McCauley for the Irish Protestant National Teachers' Association' on 24 June to discuss what appeared to be an already sealed deal with the representatives of the churches.[263] The diverse array of unions, and their names, provides an insight into how complex opposing political, cultural, and religious entities co-existed (and generally still do) in such a confined shared area, on a small island. It is noteworthy that the U.E.C. and the C.G.L.B. were now in the passenger seat, leaving the impression that this was an ecclesiastical gentlemanly agreement between the clerics and the ministry. Londonderry explained the terms with the church representatives. He asked the representatives 'whether they would consent to the application of this formula, which meant that Bible reading should be a condition of the teacher's appointment in provided and transferred schools'.[264] Londonderry must have been deeply conflicted throughout this onerous task as it ran contrary to his non-denominationalist principles. The teachers 'only serious objection' was that teachers of the future might be exposed to dismissal 'as the result of a bad report on inspection by the Diocesan or other inspector of religious instruction'.[265]

[260] Minutes of conference between representatives of the churches and the ministry, 22 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[261] Ibid.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Meeting between ministry and teachers' representative, 24 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.

Londonderry allayed their apprehensions by when telling them that 'the ministry's inspector could not inspect religious instruction'.[266] Londonderry said that any dismissal could be appealed to the M.O.E. and if the teacher could prove that they had carried out their duties under the terms of the formula, then the ministry would refuse the dismissal.[267] These were lofty aspirations indeed given the strength of the clergy and the shift in real power back to school managers. The representatives, it must be said, surprisingly, agreed.

On 24 June, the U.E.C. contacted the M.O.E. on behalf of the General Assembly with further demands on religious instruction. They insisted that

> if after the words "simple Bible reading" there was inserted the words "and such instruction therefore in the in the principles of Christian religion and of morality as are suited to the capacities of children", it would make the memorandum the basis for a definite settlement… Provided always that the opportunities afforded for catechetical instruction as set forth in Section 26 of the Education Act 1923 will still be available where desired.[268]

They were squeezing hard and cherry-picking what they wanted, which was to create what they had always desired, a bespoke act founded on the Lynn recommendations. They stated that if the ministry agreed to their proposals, albeit with a gun to its head, they were 'prepared forthwith to call a Six County conference of our members and submit the proposal to them for ratification'.[269] Londonderry thanked the U.E.C.'s representatives for their attendance 'and said that he thought they might now regard the whole dispute settled'.[270] The government's move to appease the clerics was, to borrow from Akenson again, delivered with 'dazzling swiftness'.[271] Although Londonderry was a colleague of some of the triumvirate, he was not a member, and now found himself isolated and politically decimated by it. This was a humiliating public climb-down for an aristocrat with such high self-regard.[272]

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[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] U.E.C. to Londonderry, 24 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[269] Ibid.
[270] Ibid.
[271] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 83
[272] Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry*, p. 2; W. J, McAllister, 'The Protestant Churches, the Orange Order and public education in Northern Ireland, 1923 until 1947' (PhD thesis, Queens University, Belfast,1988), Chapter 2, p. 47

A statement was prepared for the press saying that Londonderry, after consultation with all the concerned groupings, believed that he had secured a mutually satisfactory settlement of the religious difficulties that had arisen with the administration of the education acts.[273] It outlined the details of the agreement which chronicled the public humiliation of the Minister. It said that

> [t]he formula arrived at permits local education authorities to adopt a programme of simple Bible instruction to be given by teachers in any provided or transferred school under their management during the period set apart for religious instruction provided that the instruction shall be of a totally undenominational character. The teachers in these schools will be required to give this instruction as a condition of their appointment or of their continuance in appointment; but provide they give the instruction bona fide, the Ministry of Education will uphold the appeal of a teacher against dismissal by the education authority on grounds connected with the efficiency of his teaching of the undenominational programme'.[274]

The clerics now had won it all; their teachers paid by the ministry and the expenses for their transferred and provided schools funded by local and central government bodies. This action unashamedly contravened the Government of Ireland Act. Sarah Campbell points out that the unionists were so comfortable in overtly flouting the 1920 act because 'by 1923 a convention had been established at Westminster whereby M.P.s were barred from asking questions about subjects and areas which were the competence of the Northern Ireland government'.[275] This was another victory gained by bullying when Westminster was forced to lift its veto in the face of Craig's threat to resign had the 1922 P.R. bill not been ratified.[276] The press release also revealed that the teachers, who were the perennial casualties in these hostilities, had been sold back into the dark ages of the old managerial system.

The debacle all but quenched Londonderry's enthusiasm for educational reform and he finally resigned, signalling his 'departure from the government of Northern Ireland in January

[273] Ministry of Education press release, 25 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/8).
[274] Ibid.
[275] Campbell, S., ''A cold house for Catholics'? The consolidation of the Northern Ireland State in the 1920s' in Farrell, M., Knirck, J. and Meehan C., (eds), *A formative decade: Ireland in the 1920s* (Kildare, 2015), p. 201.
[276] B. O'Leary, *A treatise on Northern Ireland, volume 2*, p. 35.

1926'.[277] The quasi truce that followed would not last as the clerics resumed their battle with the ministry again in 1928 which saw the implementation of the 1930 act. The non-denominational aspiration of the 1923 act was doomed in a deeply divided society. Without lapsing into the often-limited binary characterisation of identities within the northern state, it was, in this case, the Protestant and R.C. Churches who were the antagonists who thwarted Londonderry's attempts to implement his ecumenist vision for education. Awash with contradictions, the Protestant clergy, who swore allegiance to the new Protestant state, would also threaten to bring its government down if its demands for segregated schooling were not met. Akenson observed another contradiction in Ulster Protestantism when pointing out '[t]hat before partition, the Protestant Ulsterman had often denounced the Catholic "priest in politics", but no band of Catholic priests in the former united Ireland had engaged in politics with the energy and efficacy of the Protestant clerics who led the United Education Committee of the Protestant Churches'.[278] The clerics could not have achieved their goal without the considerable clout of the Orange Order which completed the trifecta within which power in the state rested.

The clerics, the Orange Order and many within the government were fighting for an ultra-Protestant state, predicated on the fundamentalist, evangelical Calvinism of their forbearers from the early seventeenth century plantation of Ulster. This creed ran deep in the identity of the Ulster Protestant. It appeared to the clerics that Londonderry was attempting to erode these core principles of Ulster unionism. Fleming argues that 'with the creation of Northern Ireland, Ulster unionists had developed from an "ethnic association" – in which members developed common interests and political organisations – into an "ethnic community", possessing a permanent physically bounded territory over and above its political organisations'.[279] The Unionist government's introduction of Promissory Oaths for teachers, and rules forbidding the exhibition of religious emblems in schools, reveals how they proceeded to assert their identity as a state that was loyal to the crown, with a distinctive brand of Ulster Protestantism and Orangeism. Londonderry should have acquainted himself, as much as an 'outsider' can, with the complexities of the Protestant Ulster loyalist. His failure to do so saw him, and his 1923 act, defeated. The profoundly negative consequences cannot be overstated and would reverberate through future generations of children in the province. The lost potential facilitated the estrangement of children from one faith to those of differing faiths.

[277] Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry*, p. 117.
[278] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, p. 88; Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 245.
[279] Fleming, *The seventh marquess of Londonderry*, p. 117.

In defeating the act, the clerics had won the battle to achieve segregation; but they had contributed to the causes of the war that followed in the second half of the century.

Conclusion: Lost Potential

> The way in which people school their children is culturally diagnostic and one can learn a great deal about Northern Ireland's social and political configurations by studying the history of the region's educational system. Furthermore, the way in which children are schooled not only reveals a great deal about the attitudes and values of the parental generation, but helps to explain the later actions of the children's generation.[1]

The quote from D. Akenson's seminal book, *Education and enmity* points to the value of this thesis, and it is to this work that this study is most indebted. While only its first four chapters address the first four years of the M.O.E., it nevertheless includes some of the main issues encountered by the ministry during this period. Akenson's work supplied the impetus to carry out a detailed investigation to provide a more complete representation of the M.O.E.'s profound influence in the new state. This opened new avenues of research, such as examining the intrigue and political quarrelling that the ministry had to endure, from both sides of the border, when attempting to implement the Londonderry Act. Through challenging accepted orthodoxies, such as Londonderry's alleged treachery with the Protestant clergy during his bill's passage, the research in hand will extend understanding of the ministry. Original arguments, including that the Lynn committee deliberately formulated its recommendations for failure, are designed to break new ground and stimulate further study into the M.O.E. and how it found itself central to the process of state building in N.I.

These new developments will challenge the current historiography on the politics of education in N.I. by providing detailed analysis of the ministry's interactions with the I.F.S. and the R.C. and Protestant churches. This initiatory, 'behind the scenes' approach, provides the detail needed to illustrate how the ministry navigated its way through some of the more adversarial encounters during its relationships, north and south of the border. This work endeavoured to represent the common experience, in this case teachers/student teachers, throughout the M.O.E.'s acrimonious three sets of relationships. Through the rejection of the non-denominational Londonderry Act, this study has portrayed the lost potential for the children of N.I. to be educated together. It is hoped that the significance of these arguments

[1] D., Akenson, *Education and enmity: the control of schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-1950* (Abington, 1973), p. 9.

will encourage further research and a renewed interest in the importance of the ministry in the development of the new state.

Many of the problems that existed in Ireland before partition were, in some cases, exacerbated post-partition. In the I.F.S., some loyalists were targeted for perceived loyalty to the crown, or alleged informants, which in some cases meant that 'boycotts, visits by masked, armed men and anonymous letters were used'.[2] In the north, the Belfast riots were ongoing, adding to the precariousness of the new Unionist government as it sought to establish itself.[3] The Unionist government considered the I.F.S. and the I.R.A. as threats to the state, whilst distrusting Westminster, especially Prime Minister Lloyd George.[4] The R.C. Church, and the majority of its congregation, would not recognise the legitimacy of the state or its government, while 'the grievances of its perceived supporters, who were far from united behind and contented with their Unionist government, except on the question of partition'.[5] The M.O.E. was born into this multiplicity of contentious variables that partition had accentuated. Investigating its complex and turbulent first four years revealed that, in many ways, the M.O.E., reflected many of the issues faced by N.I. after partition. The ministry's remit positioned it central to dealing with all the negative consequences, external and internal, that partition had created. It exposed many of the ails and controversies that had affected, and would affect, the new state for the following half century.

This study focused on the strategies employed by the ministry to create a non-denominational environment, grounded in democracy, within which education could be provided. This incorporated examining education's role by focusing on the apparatus of the ministry, such as examining bills and acts, and how it negotiated through its relationships with the main churches and the I.F.S. In assessing the intricacies of the M.O.E.'s experiences and influence, this thesis endeavoured to create a richer, more complete understanding of the new

[2] P. McCarthy, 'A beleaguered community? Waterford Loyalists during the revolution, 1912-1924' in Hughes and C. Morrissey (eds.), *Southern Irish Loyalism*, 1912-1949 (Liverpool, 2020), p. 238. See B. Hughes, *Defying the IRA? intimidation, coercion, and communities during the Irish revolution* (Liverpool, 2016), pp 129-136.
[3]For further detailed reading on this see, A. F. Parkinson *Belfast's unholy war: The troubles of the 1920s* (Dublin, 2004).
[4] Winston Churchill to Londonderry, 20 Sept. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/123). See D. Ferriter, The Border: The Legacy of a Century of Anglo-Irish Politics (London, 2019), p. 14; D. Ferriter, '22 March 2019' in J. Collins (ed.,), *Laying it on the Line: The Border and Brexit* (Cork, 2019); M. Farrell, *Northern Ireland: the Orange state* (London, 1980) pp 71-5.
[5] P. Buckland, *The factory of grievances: devolved government in Northern Ireland, 1921*-39 (Dublin, 1973), p. 2; Campbell, S., ''A cold house for Catholics'? The consolidation of the Northern Ireland State in the 1920s' in Farrell, M., Knirck, J. and Meehan C., (eds), *A formative decade: Ireland in the 1920s* (Kildare, 2015).

state. Studying the M.O.E.'s relationships with the R.C. and Protestant churches and the I.F.S. provided the momentum for this study to explore how each relationship would eventually mould the political, cultural and educational landscapes of both jurisdictions, and its citizens. Studying the M.O.E.'s interactions with its southern counterpart enabled this study to demonstrate how education and the Irish language became central to both jurisdictions' state building processes. The strained relationships developed during this period would influence cross-border relations for decades thereafter.

Generally, the area of cross-border relations in the sphere of education has been underrepresented. This thesis has striven to address the deficit of scholarly focus on the M.O.E.s fractious relationship with D.O.E. and the Provisional Government. While much valuable scholarly work has been dedicated to education within both jurisdictions, it was found that none thus far have investigated, in any detail, the relationship between the two educational bodies.[6] This has created a narrow appreciation of how education, and in particular the Irish language, became a potent weapon in the process of creating a national identity within both territories. Within the N.I. it was found that the rejection of the language was as strong an identifier of nationality, as its resurgence had been in the I.F.S. Extensive analysis of internal memoranda within, and correspondence between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E., makes clear how fraught relations had become as a direct result of the latter's insistence on prioritising the language.[7] This occurred during the initial phase of the transfer of services in February 1922 when the Easter exams, which were for selection for teacher training, still functioned on an all-island basis.[8]

As covered in Chapter 2, this work challenged the conventional belief that the M.O.E. created their own training college because of difficulties associated with the I.F.S.'s promotion of Irish language. A memo from the M.O.E.'s Permanent Secretary, Lewis McQuibban, to his

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[6] J. Coolahan, J. and P. F. O'Donovan, *A history of Ireland's school inspectorate 1831-2008* (Dublin, 2009); Buckland, *The factory of grievances;* Farren, *The politics of Irish education*; N. C. Fleming, Marquess of Londonderry: Aristocracy, Power and Politics in Britain and Ireland (London, 2005); McNeilly, N. *Exactly 50 years: the Belfast Education Authority and its work* (1923-73) (Belfast, 1974); D. Murray, *Worlds apart: segregated schools in Northern Ireland* (Belfast, 1985); S. Ó Buachalla, *Education Policy in Twentieth Century Ireland* (Dublin, 1988); T.J. O'Connell, *100 years of progress: The story of the Irish National Teachers' Organisation 1868-1968* (Dublin, 1968); T. O'Doherty, and T. O'Donoghue, *Radical reform in Irish schools, 1900-1922: the 'new education' turn* (Dublin, 2021); P.F. O'Donovan, *Stanley's Letter: The National School System and Inspectors in Ireland, 1831-1922* (Dublin, 2009).

[7] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 6, (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/ 19); *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series, vol. 1: Second session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, House of Commons, session 1922, col. 525 (Hansard N.I. (Commons), i).*

[8] Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 110.

counterpart W.J. Dilworth mentioning the setting up of teacher training colleges in N.I., predates any mention of the Easter exams.[9] This clearly demonstrates that the decision to create their own training college was instigated by the frustration created with the D.O.E.'s delaying tactics during the first month of the transfer of services. It would be more accurate to say that exasperation with the D.O.E.'s belligerence certainly stiffened the M.O.E.'s resolve to expedite the process. The Irish language had become instrumental in an evolving retaliatory culture with the Parliamentary Secretary Robert McKeown announcing in the House, that 'although in the Estimates before the House there is a provision for the post of Organiser of Irish Language in Northern Ireland, that post is now vacant and it is not the intention of the Ministry at present to fill it at present'.[10] The finer details from the memos and correspondence created a new appreciation of how the M.O.E. arrived at its decision to found Stranmillis Teacher Training College.

The effect of the D.O.E.'s Gaelicisation of education in the I.F.S. cannot, and should not be underestimated, or lost. A thorough investigation of internal memoranda within, and communications between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E. revealed that the Irish language had become a prominent factor for defining nationality and culture. The I.F.S. was candid in displaying its intention to create a renaissance of Irish culture by modifying 'the Time-Tables of the National Schools so as to make the teaching of Irish compulsory to the extent of not less than one hour each day'.[11] The success of this tactic was manifest in the anger expressed in Londonderry's memo when accusing the D.O.E. of having 'extensively circulated [the modifying of time-tables] by advertisement in the Northern area with the object, no doubt, of its being applied in that area by managers and teachers willing to adopt it'.[12] In his 1922 essay, Eoin MacNeil declared that, when creating a national identity and developing a policy of non-compliance in the north, it was his 'belief that the kernel of the situation will be education'.[13] Correspondence between McQuibban and Dilworth has, for the first time, documented the incremental escalation of discord between the M.O.E. and the D.O.E.[14] Michael Collins' nonresponse to Londonderry's letter accusing him of having lied to him in person, about

[9] McQuibban to Dilworth, 6 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[10] *Hansard N.I. (Commons), i),* col. 525.
[11] M.O.E. memo regarding transfer of services from Provisional Government, 16 Mar. 1922, p. 8, (P.R.O.N.I.:CAB/6/ 19).
[12] Ibid., p. 8.
[13] MacNeill essay, early 1922 (U.C.D.A.: MacNeill Papers, LA1/J/163).
[14] McQuibban to Dilworth, 23 Feb. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/12/52; ED/31/A/1/5); McQuibban to Dilworth, 6 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52); McQuibban to Dilworth, on payment of salaries and expenses to inspectors, 9 Mar. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/A/1/5).

knowledge of payments to northern Catholic teachers, and holding Easter exams in N.I., reflects the declining disrespect between the two authorities.[15] This thesis demonstrates that, from the bottom up, the M.O.E.'s acrimonious relationship with the D.O.E. and the Provisional Government, had a significant influence on future intergovernmental relations for the next half of the century.

Education on the island was now governed by two conflicting political, national, cultural, and religious entities. In N.I., the M.O.E. had to establish and assert its authority within the state. It found itself having to do likewise with the D.O.E. and Provisional Government who were determined to undermine its authority and make the ministry as unworkable as they could. There were several variables to consider when assessing the M.O.E.'s influence in northern society. The motives behind the recommendations of the Lynn committee, which Londonderry created to advise on the structure of his act, have never been challenged. This work, after rigorous analysis of the committee's report, has argued that the recommendations on religious instruction and the appointment of teachers were formulated in the knowledge that they would be rejected. This original argument is predicated on the fact that the committee were aware that their recommendations would be rejected on the grounds that they would endorse denominationalism, which was in direct contravention of Londonderry's non-denominational vision for northern education; and Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act. This work reveals that Londonderry ignored the warning signs when, prior to appointing him as chairman, he acknowledged in a letter to James Craig that Lynn was 'almost a bigoted Presbyterian, and if that is so, there would be strong opposition to whatever he said or did from the Church of Ireland and the Roman Catholics'.[16]

Londonderry had cast the die that would impact every facet of education in N.I. Lynn's appointment served to further alienate the R.C. Church who already were distrustful of the state. The conventional narrative portraying Cardinal Logue's refusal to send representatives to the committee as a gross miscalculation that excluded R.C.'s from the process, while not totally misguided, is rather one dimensional.[17] While examining the consequences of this policy, this study had to strike a balance by examining the cardinal's reasons for the decision.

[15] Londonderry to Collins, 7 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52); Londonderry to Collins 12 Apr. 1922 (P.R.O.N.I.: ED/32/B/1/2/52).
[16] Londonderry to PM James Craig, 20 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/6/19).
[17]Londonderry to Cardinal Logue, 29 Aug. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/4/18/6); Cardinal Logue to Londonderry, 2 Sept. 1921 (P.R.O.N.I.:CAB/4/18/12; D3099/2/7/61). See Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 52-3 and Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, pp 39-42.

In doing so, he reflected the broadly felt Catholic/nationalist attitude towards the Belfast government. Examining the Promissory Oaths and Religious Emblems Acts increases the understanding of why Cardinal Logue might have snubbed the committee. Lynn's partisan recommendations for school funding further excluded the R.C. schools strengthening support for Logue's rebuff of Londonderry's invitation to join the committee. The ensuing wider consequences, and worsening relations, became evident when an episcopal edict ordered R.C. students to stop attending Stranmillis teacher training college, or it 'would be very unlikely that they would secure an appointment in a Catholic elementary school anywhere in Northern Ireland.'[18] The M.O.E. became one of the main focal points for nationalist discontent, as it reflected their perception of the oppressive unionist monolith which they were now trapped in. This thesis also encourages further debate and research into the notion of a Catholic/nationalist siege mentality. A trait associated solely with the unionist population, this study argues that it also existed within the Catholic community who felt betrayed by the I.F.S. and trusted neither the Belfast nor the London government. The ministry's problematic relationship with the uncooperative R.C. Church offers an additional opportunity to address and contextualise the widespread plight of the nationalist/Catholic population.

Through examining its relationship with the Protestant churches, and subsequently the Orange Order and members of the U.U.P., this study endeavoured to present a balanced, more nuanced, history of the challenges encountered by the M.O.E. Determining that the Protestant clergy's relationship with the M.O.E. was no better than the R.C.'s., emphasised the enormity of the task facing the ministry. During the period under review, the ministry had at one time or another, experienced hostility and disagreement from one, or all the most powerful authorities in the state. The often attritional nature of the ministry's relationships was not always of their own making as some were down to the legacy of partition. Generally, in the case of the Protestant churches, and to a lesser extent the R.C. Church, it was attributable to Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act prohibiting denominationalism.

Internal M.O.E. memoranda, and its correspondence with Protestant church representatives, reveals the latter's distrust of the ministry.[19] The Londonderry Act was, real or

[18] Akenson, *Education and enmity*, pp 122-3; Farren, *The politics of Irish education*, p. 52.
[19] W. Corkey, *Episode in the history of Protestant Ulster, 1923-1947* (Belfast, n.d.), p. 19; Conclusions from Board of Education Board of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, n/d but it is early 1923 as it was first response to the introduction of the bill (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9). See this file also for individual cases outlining the same grievances, as put forward by the Methodist Church and the Presbyterian Church of Ireland; Meeting between Londonderry and Protestant churches, 9 April 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: D3099/5/9).

otherwise, identified as a threat to upholding denominationalism in, and retaining control of, their schools. The clergy therefore denounced what they believed was the introduction of a secular system, which did not allow for teaching Scriptures during school hours.[20] This exposed Londonderry's naivety and his failure to fully grasp a meaningful understanding of traditional Ulster Protestant values. This failing culminated in political humiliation for him, effectively making his position as minister untenable. This study has identified that Londonderry's shortcomings throughout his ministership are attributable to his failure to grasp the historical control of the main churches over education on the island. The controversy also revealed the controversialist Protestant clergy as unyielding, aggressive adversaries to have the new act amended.

This thesis has examined how interactions with the triumvirate consisting of the Protestant churches, the Orange Order, and the U.U.P., impacted the development and decision making of the M.O.E. The triumvirate's centrality to all negotiations, creates a more informed understanding of how they applied intensive pressure on the M.O.E. to have the bill amended in 1925. The very effective pressure group, the U.E.C., was formed in December 1924, seeing a more regular and forceful use of the Orange Order to exert their considerable power to pressurise the government on their behalf. M.O.E. memos disclose that the disputatious clergy intensified proceedings by what appeared to be ad hominem attacks on M.P.'s attending their services.[21] John Andrews, Minister of Finance forcefully articulated his own experience to the Craig and Londonderry, further pressurising the ministry and government by concluding that the Orange Order were working with the churches and was afraid that, unless something was done before the 12 July, their position would become more problematic.[22] A correspondence from R. Wallace, Grand Master Irish Orangemen to Charles Blackmore, Secretary to the Cabinet, discloses that Craig was aware that members of the government were attending meetings at Orange lodges, where 'hostile resolutions' were being prepared on the education question.[23] This passage exemplifies how the complex interconnectivity of the triumvirate made life extremely complicated and difficult for the M.O.E. The events also synopsise how the inter-relational nature of the trifecta generated levels of disharmony and dissonance within ruling Ulster Protestantism towards the M.O.E.

[20] Delegates of the Protestant churches to Londonderry, 3 May 1923 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/2).
[21] Andrews to Craig, 17 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Wallace to Blackmore, 2 June 1925 (P.R.O.N.I.: CAB/9/D/1/5); Buckland, *The factory of grievances*, p. 255.

This study has shown the M.O.E. to be an integral component in the creation of the N.I.'s identity as a new state in post-partition Ireland. It demonstrated that through the ministry, with the Irish language and teacher training as one example, that the state sought to assert, and define, its distinct cultural identity. Its acrimonious relationship with the D.O.E. confirmed the M.O.E.'s status as one of the fundamental bodies through which the Belfast government implemented its objectives for state building. The M.O.E. also had many internal challenges to deal with. Londonderry's non-denominational approach was seen as a dilution of Ulster Protestantism's cultural, religious and political identity. As an 'outsider', Londonderry had severely underestimated, or grossly miscalculated the importance of the Scriptures to the fundamentalist, evangelical Ulster brand of Protestantism. This became a battle Londonderry was destined to lose. In one of the anomalies of Ulster political life, the triumvirate, the true powerhouse of Ulster authority, ensured that, in this case, the ministry would bend to its will in securing segregated education. This study has shown that the ministry also had to deal with the R.C. Church's antagonism towards it. The R.C.'s also wanted to maintain the status quo of segregated education. They would not recognise the ministry and by 1925 they had removed all Catholic trainee teachers from Stranmillis training college. Although not directly referred to, this thesis has endeavoured to foreground how the self-serving motives of the churches to secure segregated education, guaranteed that the sectarian landscape of N.I. was secured for the rest of the century, to the present day. It was unfortunate for the children that both sets of churches, in their own way, insisted on segregation.

This study has proposed a number of avenues for future research on the M.O.E. after 1925. The relationship between the M.O.E. and D.O.E., for example, has been largely ignored in the historiography of education. The findings presented here on its cross-border relationship with its Dublin counterpart suggests that further research is needed to better understand the long-term detrimental effects created by the transfer of services and staff. In the context of education, there is potential for further study into the consequences of the weaponising of the Irish language and its implementation in nation building by both jurisdictions. Similarly, the plight of teachers/trainee teachers, in part due to the language issue, has been underrepresented in the literature. Correspondence between the M.O.E. and D.O.E studied here revealed how the teachers had been compromised by both educational departments. This has created the possibility for further study into how the hostile cross-border relationship negatively impacted teachers and, to a lesser extent, school inspectors. Reassessing the R.C. Church's rationale for refusing to send representatives to the Lynn committee, this work has challenged the

established narrative that it was totally unjustified. This, and the impact of their handling of teacher training in N.I., can lead to more meaningful research. It is hoped that this study's contention that the Lynn committee's recommendations were formulated for rejection will regenerate an interest to add to or challenge this argument.

The original intention of this study was to investigate how the Unionist Government's implementation of policies in education, employment, housing, policing and gender impacted on the people of N.I., 1920-1939. The twin objective was to argue that the misappropriation of authority during this period was the genesis of the conflict that occurred from 1969 to 1998, causing the same lost potential experienced by the rejection of non-denominational education. The weight of research material amassed before the onset of COVID.19, meant that the thesis was destined to focus on the theme of education, and eventually concentrate solely on the M.O.E. Despite the pandemic and the many challenges it created during and for this research, the quality of scholarship was not compromised, securing the scholarly integrity of the thesis. Future scholars may assess how the lost potential caused through the implementation of the policies in employment, housing, policing and gender, impacted the people of N.I.

This study did not encounter any evidence, from within any of the churches, that the best interest of the children's welfare or educational experience was prioritised above their own need for segregation. Their all-consuming drive for religious dominance within their own schools blinded them to what was best for those who would be filling those schools. This study is not arguing that mixed education would have been a panacea for all the new state's many ailments. At best, it would have offered a better foundation for it to progress in a less hostile atmosphere, with the possibility of the sectarian divide narrowing; at worst it would have recalibrated the sectarian austereness that the previous generations were conditioned to. The lost potential from the clerical aversion to desegregation enabled extant sectarian divisions to continue into the second half of the century. The extreme othering, nurtured by denominationalism, served to facilitate justifications for certain groups, and individuals, for acts of violence and atrocities during the conflict, 1968 – 1998. For its part, the ministry, especially the mercurial Lord Londonderry (often to his detriment), fought against the churches, the Orange Order, and his own party members to break the lineage of dividing children along sectarian lines. The M.O.E. has much more to offer to historiography of education and N.I generally. This thesis is offered as an entry for further research into the underestimated influence the M.O.E. had on education and northern society generally.

It is perhaps best to close with Lord Londonderry's own words from a senate debate on the 27 of February 1923. In it, he captured not only his aspirations but also the possibilities the ministry, if unimpeded, could have fulfilled:

> The intention of the Government is to re-model the system which has been in operation for many years past, to remove many of the anomalies that exist, and to establish on a sound and lasting basis, a basis consistent with ideas of educationalists and of the great community we represent, a system which will provide an education for the rising generation and will enable them to face and to shoulder with success the great responsibilities that are bound to fall upon them on their pathway through life.[24]

The future pathway for N.I. and the lives of its children, especially in the latter half of the century, could have been a different one had Londonderry's proposed non-denominational system of education been accepted.

[24] *The parliamentary debates, official report, first series, vol. 3: Third session of the first parliament of Northern Ireland, 12 & 13 George V, Senate, session 1923, col. 13 (Hansard N.I. (Senate), i)*.
[24] Ibid.

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