Philosophy (Theses)https://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/15122024-03-29T01:29:33Z2024-03-29T01:29:33ZHeidegger on truth and subjectivity: a nihilistic interpretationhttps://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/31322023-09-30T02:00:48Z2023-09-29T00:00:00ZHeidegger on truth and subjectivity: a nihilistic interpretation
This research offers an original interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, which can be termed 'nihilistic' with reference to Heidegger's notion of nothingness and his reception of nihilism. The interpretation contributes to Heideggerian scholarship by clearing up two controversies surrounding the interpretation of his philosophy, relating to truth and subjectivity. On the proposed reading, these two topics are related. Truth concerns the 'disclosure' of human existence, or in other words, the self-manifestation of human existence. For Heidegger, the experience of angst is insightful for this sense of truth. On his account, angst is a 'fundamental mood' that makes apparent a kind of 'nothingness', which can also be described as the 'uncanniness' of human existence. Ultimately, the interpretation proposes that these notions refer to the ineffable opacity of human existence. It makes for a conception of truth that is dialetheic, and for this reason unconventional. Countering the dogma that truth must be in opposition to falsity and re-interpreting the idea of a contradiction, uncanniness presents a sense of truth that is conflictual and self-effacing. Whereas Heidegger sees this issue as foundational to the history of philosophy, the current paradigm for Heideggerian research explicitly denounces the importance of contemplating nothingness, and in that way misrepresents Heidegger's way of thinking. The correct interpretation must be nihilistic, even if this complicates the normative character of his thinking. It may be bound by an explicit norm, but it nonetheless takes measure in reticence, being compelled to this by guilt over its own ineffability.
2023-09-29T00:00:00ZA metaphilosophical defense of Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods of analysishttps://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/30472022-04-07T02:00:44Z2022-04-06T00:00:00ZA metaphilosophical defense of Wittgenstein's conception of polythetic methods of analysis
This thesis advances a metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later conception of philosophy and specifically, its emphasis on a plurality of different philosophical methods. The thesis aims to achieve three things. The first task is to clarify the meaning of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on methods. This is attained by defending a metaphilosophical interpretation of methods as polythetic. I argue that Wittgenstein’s later emphasis on methods consists of a polythetic account of numerous different methods. The diversity of the methods is a necessary consequence that results from two distinct sources of conceptual confusions. These relate to grammatical confusions and confusions resulting from captivations that Wittgenstein identifies as numerous aspects of scientism. The second is to develop the potential application that the metaphilosophical analysis and defence of polythetic methods can offer to current exegetical controversies, relating to the meaning of methods (PI 133). The metaphilosophical interpretation of methods rejects both grammatical and therapeutic interpretations as having missed the metaphilosophical context of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on methods. It is argued that the complexity of the sources of confusions determine the form of methods to be polythetic and far more complex and diverse than either grammatical or therapeutic interpretations would permit. Thirdly, in concluding, the thesis claims that the metaphilosophical interpretation of methods and its defence of the polythetic conception of methods has several potential applications. This is evident in the need for new diverse methods of analysis that require dynamic forms of conceptual analysis, as well as diverse multiple conceptions of methods.
2022-04-06T00:00:00Z‘Standing in the Gap’: A Theological Reflection on The Meaning, Value and Significance of Faith in The Life and Ministry of Healthcare Chaplainshttps://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/30332022-03-31T02:00:50Z2022-03-30T00:00:00Z‘Standing in the Gap’: A Theological Reflection on The Meaning, Value and Significance of Faith in The Life and Ministry of Healthcare Chaplains
To date, there has been a dearth of research in the area of Healthcare Chaplaincy, particularly in the Irish context. The literature recognises this and indeed, calls for a rebalance, especially by chaplains themselves. Framed around the trigger question, ‘Do chaplains need to be people of faith?’ this thesis seeks to redress the gap in research and begin a process of reflection and growth in this area.
This study is supported and framed by the action-reflection-action methodology which is at the heart of the Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) model of teaching and learning. At the centre of CPE, is what Anton Boisen has called, ‘living human documents’, or in other words, the human person. At the heart of this thesis, is the narrative of twenty-six chaplains. It is their narrative, their experience and their story which help to provide significant insight into the ministry of the contemporary chaplain.
This study is further supported by theological reflection, an integral part of the CPE process. Using the Whiteheads’ model of theological reflection, which encompasses experience, culture and tradition, it has been possible to undertake a process of theological reflection on the meaning, value and significance of faith in the life and ministry of Healthcare Chaplains. Having explored each of these dialogue partners, the thesis then moves to an exploration of the fruits of the dialogue. This is done by using a bespoke method of theological reflection – a new and fresh approach to the discipline. In other words, in crafting a new method of theological reflection, this thesis, is able to attend to the experience of the chaplains, explore what the experience has to say, before then moving to name new insights and areas for transformation and growth.
2022-03-30T00:00:00ZAn enquiry into contemporary relativism: arguing in favour of irrealist metaethicshttps://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/30082021-11-19T03:00:31Z2021-11-08T00:00:00ZAn enquiry into contemporary relativism: arguing in favour of irrealist metaethics
This project will firstly set out to argue that relativism is a viable and defensible stance which can be taken up in many contemporary philosophical debates. This will be achieved firstly by drafting an overview of the lineage of relativist theories; a pivotal task, due to the fact that there is no clear “school” of relativism – as there is in other areas of philosophy. Of course, the
history of this theory is perhaps more a history of attempts to refute it than anything else. For this reason, it will be crucial to address some of the many concerns that have been voiced about the implications of a relativist approach over the years. Once these matters have been sufficiently addressed, there will be solid ground on which this project may build a unique moral perspective. Ultimately, it will be argued that relativism is an available stance within moral irrealism and that a moral irrealist relativism would be an attractive position to take up in contemporary metaethical debate.
2021-11-08T00:00:00Z