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dc.contributor.authorMcGann, Marek
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-06T11:42:39Z
dc.date.available2012-11-06T11:42:39Z
dc.date.issued2007
dc.identifier.citationMcGann,M.(2007).'Enactive Theorists Do It On Purpose:On why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.'Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Vol.6,(4),463-483.en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10395/1174
dc.description.abstractThe enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to “action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, no definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not just descriptions of biological maintenance, but the range of social and cultural activities in which human beings continual engage. The present paper briefly surveys some of references to goals and goal-directedness in the cognitive scientific literature in an attempt draw out an account which might successfully fill this gap in theory. Finding no easy answer, some suggestions are made as to how such a theory might be developed in the future.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences;6/4/463-483
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097-007-9074-yen
dc.subjectGoals
dc.subjectEnaction
dc.subjectTeleology
dc.subjectMeaning
dc.subjectAdaptivity
dc.subjectAction
dc.subjectEmbodiment
dc.titleEnactive theorists do it on purpose: on why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.supercollectionall_mic_researchen
dc.type.supercollectionmic_published_revieweden
dc.type.restrictionnoneen
dc.type.restrictionnoneen
dc.description.versionYesen


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