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dc.contributor.creatorEgan, Suzanne M.
dc.contributor.creatorByrne, Ruth M.J.
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-11T11:30:04Z
dc.date.available2018-12-11T11:30:04Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.citationSuzanne M. Egan and Ruth M.J. Burke. “Counterfactual Promises and Threats.” Annual Cognitive Science Conference, Vancouver, B.C., Canada. July 2006. (Refereed).en_US
dc.identifier.otherhttp://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2006/docs/p1257.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10395/2547
dc.descriptionCounterfactual promises and threats.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine counterfactual conditionals about promises, such as ‘if you had tidied your room then I would have given you ice-cream’ and threats such as ‘if you had hit your sister then I would have grounded you’. Reasoners tend to understand counterfactual conditionals of the form, ‘if A had been then B would have been’ by thinking about the conjectured possibility, ‘A and B', and also the presupposed facts ‘not-A and not-B’. We report the results of an experiment that indicates reasoners may understand counterfactual inducements somewhat differently by thinking about just the presupposed facts: not-A and not-B. We discuss the implications of the results for accounts of the mental representations of promises and threats.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCognitive Science Societyen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://csjarchive.cogsci.rpi.edu/proceedings/2006/docs/p1257.pdfen_US
dc.subjectCounterfactualen_US
dc.subjectPromisesen_US
dc.subjectThreatsen_US
dc.titleCounterfactual promises and threatsen_US
dc.typeConference reporten_US
dc.type.supercollectionall_mic_researchen_US
dc.type.supercollectionmic_published_revieweden_US
dc.description.versionYesen_US


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