dc.contributor.creator | Downes, Gerard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-26T12:32:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-26T12:32:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Downes, G.(2010), 'The TRIPs agreement: A test of the WTO's legitimacy?', Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration; No. 1. | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10395/1804 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the issue of legitimacy in international public law
and its application to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPs). Since the signing of TRIPs in Marrakesh in April 1994 at the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks, a formidable
compliance-implementation gap has curtailed the possibility of
implementing an efficacious intellectual property rights regime on a
global basis, a scenario which indicates that the deployment of
extensive relational and structural power in trade negotiations does
not axiomatically produce the desired transformative outcome within
the domestic legislative framework of Member states. This paper
argues that the principal reason why TRIPs has not been successfully
transposed onto the legislative agenda of WTO Member States is
because the agreement suffers from a legitimacy deficit which
ultimately undermines not only the efficacy of the agreement itself,
but also the authority of the WTO as a global governance institution.
The paper also aims to demonstrate how legitimacy is a deep-seated
aspect of global governance, given that states are unlikely to abide by
norms, rules and decisions taken at institutional level unless they are
perceived to provide mutual benefits that render them legitimate. In
order to assess the legitimacy of TRIPs as an internationally-binding
agreement, this paper begins by outlining the basic tenets of
legitimacy in global governance and examines the ostensible benefits
of adherence to the precepts of global governance for members,
namely reciprocal benefits and lower transaction costs. Expanding
upon the work undertaken in this area by Daya Shanker (2002), this
paper then seeks to apply Peter Drahos’ theory of democratic
bargaining among sovereign states onto the negotiating process that
led to the appearance of TRIPs within the WTO in order to determine
whether the negotiations that led to TRIPs agreement adheres to that
theory’s test of legitimacy. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | University of Limerick, Department of Politics and Public Administration | en |
dc.subject | World Trade Organisation (WTO) | en |
dc.subject | TRIPs | en |
dc.title | The TRIPs agreement: A test of the WTO's legitimacy? | en |
dc.type | Research paper | en |
dc.type.supercollection | all_mic_research | en |
dc.type.restriction | none | en |
dc.type.restriction | none | en |
dc.description.version | No | en |