Psychology (Conference proceedings)

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://dspace.mic.ul.ie/handle/10395/2469

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Creating composites as evidence based research into an approach to counselling therapy (the experience of the propeller model approach)
(Irish College of Humanities and Applied Sciences, 2022-05-12) Stevenson, Kevin
As a Post-Doctoral Fellow with Sofia University in Bulgaria, who is a practicing Counselling Therapist with the British Association of Counsellors and Psychotherapists in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, it has been a challenging and interesting experience introducing and utilizing one’s own therapeutic approach in my own practice. The Propeller Approach to psychotherapy and counselling is an approach that was developed from a Philosophy Doctoral dissertation which aims to be holistic, and can be considered an Existentialist, Gestalt or even Daseinanalytic approach that essentially aims to increase a client’s awareness of themselves. In order to provide an evidence-based backing for the Propeller Approach and understand the experience that clients have had with the approach a qualitative approach to research was implemented in order to receive feedback from five participants through semi-structured interviews after having received ethical approval from the Irish College of Humanities and Applied Science which is the college of which I am Sessional Lecturer. After receiving the data from the participants, the data was transcribed in order to apply thematic analysis to the data. In order to maintain anonymity but also to present the information in a creative and interesting manner, a composite of the data was created in order to fictionalize the data and increase the flow of the presentation of the information received. The use of thematic analysis also led to thematic mapping in order to code and identify the themes derived from the data which the composite contributed to. The project shows not only the potential of a new therapeutic approach to counselling therapy with the Propeller Model, but how to render it as an evidence-based effective approach through applied research methods whilst demonstrating the value that composites can have within thematic analysis.
Therapist awareness of client reduction of self: a daseinanalytic approach
(2022-04-24) Stevenson, Kevin
Program: Heidegger and the Neuroscience
Screen-time versus screen type: The impact of screen engagement on cognitive development in Irish 5 year olds
(ESRI [Economic & Social Research Institute], 2018) Egan, Suzanne M.; Beatty, Chloé
Counterfactual promises and threats
(Cognitive Science Society, 2004) Egan, Suzanne M.; Byrne, Ruth M.J.
We examine counterfactual conditionals about promises, such as ‘if you had tidied your room then I would have given you ice-cream’ and threats such as ‘if you had hit your sister then I would have grounded you’. Reasoners tend to understand counterfactual conditionals of the form, ‘if A had been then B would have been’ by thinking about the conjectured possibility, ‘A and B', and also the presupposed facts ‘not-A and not-B’. We report the results of an experiment that indicates reasoners may understand counterfactual inducements somewhat differently by thinking about just the presupposed facts: not-A and not-B. We discuss the implications of the results for accounts of the mental representations of promises and threats.
What else could have caused it? Counterfactuals, enablers and alternatives
(Science Foundation Ireland, 2010) Egan, Suzanne M.; Frosch, Caren A.; Hancock, Emily N.
The aim of this study was to explore why people focus on enablers rather than causes in their counterfactual thinking (i.e., how people undo the past). We report the results of an experiment that compared causes and enablers in likelihood and the number of available alternatives. The results indicate that the number of alternatives may explain the focus of counterfactual thoughts. The findings are discussed in the context of previous research on counterfactual thinking and causality.
How we undo the past: counterfactual thinking about enablers
(PSI [Psychological Society of Ireland], 2010) Egan, Suzanne M.; Frosch, Caren A.; Hancock, Emily N.
Does time spent watching television in early childhood affect socio-emotional development?
(ESRI [Economic and Social Research Institute], 2014) Egan, Suzanne M.; Murray, Aisling
Counterfactual ‘only if ’ conditionals
(Cognitive Science Society, 2003) Egan, Suzanne M.; Byrne, Ruth M.J.; García-Madruga, Juan A.
People understand a conditional, 'if A then B', such as 'if Peg went swimming then she felt well' by keeping in mind only true possibilities, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B, not-A and B (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Initially they think about only a few of them, e.g., A and B, because of working memory limitations. As a result, they make some inferences readily e.g., modus ponens (MP), given A, therefore B. But they find other inferences difficult, e.g., modus tollens (MT), given not-B, therefore not-A. The information does not correspond to their initial possibility and they must think about other true ones, e.g., not-A and not-B.
Thinking counterfactually – how controllability affects the ‘undoing’ of causes and enablers.
(Cognitive Science Society, 2008) Egan, Suzanne M.; Frosch, Caren A.; Hancock, Emily N.
Abstract Previous research on counterfactual thoughts about prevention suggests that people tend to focus on enabling rather than causing agents. However, research has also demonstrated that people have a preference for mutating controllable events. We explore whether counterfactual thinking about enablers is distinct from ‘undoing’ controllable events. We presented participants with scenarios in which a cause and an enabler contribute to a negative outcome. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups in which we systematically manipulated the controllability of the cause and the enabler. Participants generated counterfactuals which focused on the cause or the enabler and completed blame ratings for the cause and the enabler. The results indicate that participants had a preference for mutating the enabling relation, apart from in one condition where the cause was controllable and the enabler was uncontrollable. Participants tended to assign more blame to the cause than the enabler, regardless of controllability. The findings are discussed in the context of previous research on causal and counterfactual thinking.

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