| dc.contributor.author | McGann, Marek | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-06T11:42:39Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-11-06T11:42:39Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | McGann,M.(2007).'Enactive Theorists Do It On Purpose:On why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.'Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Vol.6,(4),463-483. | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10395/1174 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to
“action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, no
definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not just
descriptions of biological maintenance, but the range of social and cultural
activities in which human beings continual engage. The present paper briefly
surveys some of references to goals and goal-directedness in the cognitive
scientific literature in an attempt draw out an account which might successfully
fill this gap in theory. Finding no easy answer, some suggestions are made as to
how such a theory might be developed in the future. | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.publisher | Springer Netherlands | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences;6/4/463-483 | |
| dc.rights | The original publication is available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11097-007-9074-y | en |
| dc.subject | Goals | |
| dc.subject | Enaction | |
| dc.subject | Teleology | |
| dc.subject | Meaning | |
| dc.subject | Adaptivity | |
| dc.subject | Action | |
| dc.subject | Embodiment | |
| dc.title | Enactive theorists do it on purpose: on why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness. | en |
| dc.type | Article | en |
| dc.type.supercollection | all_mic_research | en |
| dc.type.supercollection | mic_published_reviewed | en |
| dc.type.restriction | none | en |
| dc.type.restriction | none | en |
| dc.description.version | Yes | en |
