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    Indicative and Counterfactual 'only if' conditionals'.

    Citation

    Egan, S.M., Garcia-Madruga, J.A. and Byrne, R.M.J.(2009), 'Indicative and Counterfactual 'only if' conditionals'. Acta Psychologica, Vol. 132(3). 240-249.
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    Egan, S.M., Garcia-Madruga, J.A. and Byrne, R.M.J.(2009), 'Indicative and Counterfactual 'only if' conditionals'.(Journal Article)pdf (278.3Kb)
    Date
    2009-11
    Author
    Egan, Suzanne M.
    García-Madruga, Juan A.
    Byrne, Ruth M.J.
    Peer Reviewed
    Yes
    Metadata
    Show full item record
    Egan, S.M., Garcia-Madruga, J.A. and Byrne, R.M.J.(2009), 'Indicative and Counterfactual 'only if' conditionals'. Acta Psychologica, Vol. 132(3). 240-249.
    Abstract
    We report three experiments to test the possibilities reasoners think about when they understand a con-ditional of the form ‘A only if B’ compared to ‘if A then B’. The experiments examine conditionals in the indicative mood (e.g., A occurred only if B occurred) and counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood (A would have occurred only if B had occurred). The first experiment examines the conjunctions of events that reasoners judge to be consistent with conditionals, e.g., A and B, not-A and not-B. It shows that peo-ple think about one possibility to understand ‘if’ and two possibilities to understand ‘only if’; they think about two possibilities to understand counterfactual ‘if’ and ‘only if’. The second experiment shows that the possibilities people think about when they understand ‘only if’ are in a different temporal order (e.g., B and A) to the possibilities they think about for ‘if’ (A and B). The third experiment shows that people make different inferences from ‘only if’ and ‘if’ conditionals and counterfactuals. The implications of the results for theories of counterfactual conditionals are considered.
    Keywords
    Conditional Reasoning
    Counterfactuals
    Only If
    Language (ISO 639-3)
    eng
    Publisher
    Elsevier
    Rights
    © Elsevier the original article can be accessed through the following link http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001691809000961
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/10395/1297
    Sponsor(s)
    Enterprise Ireland
    Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences
    Collections
    • Psychology (Peer-reviewed publications)

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