| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation will investigate the concept of Divine Freedom within the philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas by analysing in detail the arguments that St Thomas Aquinas makes in order to establish that God enjoys divine freedom – the ability for God to make choices, determinations, and decisions and so on, unconstrained by any sort of deterministic influences. To properly analyse these arguments, the thesis first establishes and then considers Aquinas’s more general account of the divine, starting with how it might first be known, and progressing to encompass what claims about God Aquinas felt able to make. After this, the thesis will consider Aquinas’s account of the will in light of his conception of God and of knowledge claims concerning God. It will then continue with a rigorous comparison of the divine and human wills, and how Aquinas considers the concept of ‘freedom’ as applying to each. Finally, the thesis will conclude with an analysis of one of the most striking and exhaustive critiques of Aquinas’s own conception of divine freedom by one Norman Kretzmann. It will be found through careful examination of Aquinas’s understanding of divine freedom in light of Norman Kretzmann’s critique that Aquinas’s arguments for that same divine freedom were ultimately lacking. Mainly, they will be found to be insufficient with respect to God’s lacking a suitable motive for choosing to will creation into being if one considers the divine will as free from the divine goodness in the sense that Aquinas does. Thus, the thesis will ultimately be forced to conclude that Aquinas’s conception of divine freedom cannot surmount a critique concerning divine motive. | en_US |
