Heidegger on truth and subjectivity: a nihilistic interpretation

Abstract

This research offers an original interpretation of Heidegger's philosophy, which can be termed 'nihilistic' with reference to Heidegger's notion of nothingness and his reception of nihilism. The interpretation contributes to Heideggerian scholarship by clearing up two controversies surrounding the interpretation of his philosophy, relating to truth and subjectivity. On the proposed reading, these two topics are related. Truth concerns the 'disclosure' of human existence, or in other words, the self-manifestation of human existence. For Heidegger, the experience of angst is insightful for this sense of truth. On his account, angst is a 'fundamental mood' that makes apparent a kind of 'nothingness', which can also be described as the 'uncanniness' of human existence. Ultimately, the interpretation proposes that these notions refer to the ineffable opacity of human existence. It makes for a conception of truth that is dialetheic, and for this reason unconventional. Countering the dogma that truth must be in opposition to falsity and re-interpreting the idea of a contradiction, uncanniness presents a sense of truth that is conflictual and self-effacing. Whereas Heidegger sees this issue as foundational to the history of philosophy, the current paradigm for Heideggerian research explicitly denounces the importance of contemplating nothingness, and in that way misrepresents Heidegger's way of thinking. The correct interpretation must be nihilistic, even if this complicates the normative character of his thinking. It may be bound by an explicit norm, but it nonetheless takes measure in reticence, being compelled to this by guilt over its own ineffability.