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Self-other contingencies: enacting social perception
(Springer Netherlands, 2009)
Can we see the expressiveness of other people's gestures, hear the intentions in their
voice, see the emotions in their posture? Traditional theories of social cognition still say we cannot,
because intentions and emotions ...
Perceptual modalities: modes of presentation or modes of interaction?
(Imprint Academic, 2010)
Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered
the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for
higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological
evidence is offered which ...
Searching for moral dumbfounding: identifying measurable indicators of moral dumbfounding
(2017)
Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has not been published in ...
Enacting a social ecology: radically embodied intersubjectivity
(Frontiers, 2014)
Embodied approaches to cognitive science frequently describe the mind as “world-involving, ”indicating complementary and interdependent relationships between an agent and its environment. The precise nature of the environment ...
How mean is the mean?
(Frontiers, 2013)
In this paper we voice concerns about the uncritical manner in which the mean is often used as a summary statistic in psychological research. We identify a number of implicit assumptions underlying the use of the mean and ...
Sampling participants’ experience in laboratory experiments: complementary challenges for more complete data collection
(Frontiers, 2016)
Speelman and McGann’s (2013) examination of the uncritical way in which the mean is often used in psychological research raises questions both about the average’s reliability and its validity. In the present paper, we argue ...
Situated agency: the normative medium of human action
(Croatian Philosophical Society, 2014)
In this paper the notion of individual agency is critically examined in light of the enactive approach to understanding the mind. It is argued that following the work of Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel Di Paolo, Tom Froese and ...
Enactive theorists do it on purpose: on why the enactive approach demands an account of goals and goal-directedness.
(Springer Netherlands, 2007)
The enactive approach to cognitive science involves frequent references to
“action” without making clear what is intended by the term. In particular, no
definition or account is offered of goals which can encompass not ...
Doing it and meaning it (and the relationship between the two) (pre-published version)
(John Benjamins, 2005)
A number of related approaches to cognition and consciousness have been gaining momentum in the literature in recent years, emphasizing the active, embodied nature of the mind and grounding mental states and processes in ...